证券内幕交易的法律规制探究

为有效遏制证券内幕交易,完善我国的内幕交易法律规制体系,在事前预防方面,需增加信息披露的种类和方式,拓宽信息披露的渠道,规范上市公司收购时信息披露的规则;在事中监控方面,需明确证券监管机构的职权,构建联合监管体系,强化社会公众监督;在事后制裁方面,要明确民事诉讼主体的认定,确定举证责任,加大经济处罚的力度。     

内幕交易新动向及其法律规制研究

在资本市场企业并购重组活跃环境下,内幕交易这一资本市场"痼疾"不断呈现出新动向,如行为加剧化、主体多元化等.内幕交易新动向的法律成因主要在于现行法律法规对内幕交易规制的缺陷,即内幕交易法律责任的不力、内幕信息认定标准的不足、内幕交易取证的不易以及上市公司内部控制信息披露机制的不健全.因此,应立足于这些缺陷,完善内幕交易的法律规制,以维护资本市场的健康发展.     

浅谈证券市场内幕交易的法律监管——以美国法为比较对象

内幕交易乃证券欺诈表现形式之一,伴随着证券市场的发展而又屡禁不止。美国是世界上最早对内幕交易进行规制的国家,其在长期的司法实践中已经探索出了较为完备的内幕交易监管规则,比较中美内幕交易监管制度的异同可以为我国制度完善佐以镜鉴。     

英美两国对证券内幕交易的认定及法律规制

英美两国对证券内幕交易的认定美国是较早对证券内幕交易进行法律规制的国家。1934年美国的《证券交易法》首先以法律形式禁止包括内幕交易在内的各种证券欺诈行为,在1984年的《内幕交易制裁法》和1988年的《内幕交易与证券欺诈强制法》中又进一步采取了更严厉的措施。尽管成文     

防治内幕交易行为的方法与策略

防治证券内幕交易需三个步骤:首先,需对证券从业人员的个人交易进行疏导,而不是单向堵截;其次,应采取严格的监管措施,杜绝法律漏洞与监管不力;最后,施以严厉的刑事制裁,这是规制内幕交易的有力手段,也是防治内幕交易罪的最后防线.     

防治内幕交易行为的方法与策略

防治证券内幕交易需三个步骤:首先,需对证券从业人员的个人交易进行疏导,而不是单向堵截;其次,应采取严格的监管措施,杜绝法律漏洞与监管不力;最后,施以严厉的刑事制裁,这是规制内幕交易的有力手段,也是防治内幕交易罪的最后防线。     

规制内幕交易行为的行政监管与刑事制裁

防治证券内幕交易需三个步骤：首先,需对证券从业人员的个人交易进行疏导,而不是单向堵截;其次,应采取严格的监管措施,杜绝法律漏洞与监管不力;最后,施以严厉的刑事制裁,这是规制内幕交易的有力手段,也是防治内幕交易罪的最后防线。     

新形势下并购重组中证券内幕交易的实证研究

防范证券内幕交易是市场监管的主要目标之一。当前,并购重组业已成为证券市场内幕交易行为频发的一个重要环节,不仅有少数公职人员卷入其中,内幕信息知情人士的范围也呈现愈加多样化的趋势。据此,监管方应当减少审批环节,提高披露效率,完善相关立法,加大惩处力度,运用民事、行政、刑事手段的合力共同打击这一违法违规行为,遏制我国证券市场内幕交易愈演愈烈的态势。     

论内幕交易罪的若干问题及立法完善

在我国证券市场的实践中,内幕交易行为屡见不鲜.对于内幕交易行为的刑法规制,在司法实践中还存在一些问题及争议,有待立法进一步的完善.本文主要探讨了三个问题:通过合法手段获取证券内幕信息的人员是否应纳入内幕交易罪的犯罪主体;内幕交易罪的抗辩事由;罚金的处罚依据.分别针对各个问题,提出了相应的看法和解决措施.最后通过总结,做出了立法完善上的建议.     

证券投资基金关联交易的法律规制——美国的经验及启示

由于证券投资基金独特的治理结构，与一般商事公司相比，投资基金领域的关联交易存在更大的滥用或不公平的风险。我国现行法律中有关关联交易的规范从总体上来说还存在立法政策下清晰、相关条款简单粗略、缺乏系统化的现范体系等缺陷。我国应借鉴美国的经验，对投资基金的关联交易采取严格禁止的立法政策，并从合理界定关联交易的主体、对关联交易实行分类监管、完善投资基金的内部约束机制、信息披露制度、赋予基金持有人诉权等方面完善我国证券投资基金关联交易的法律规范体系。     

The Role of Tick Size in Upstairs Trading and Downstairs Trading

This paper examines the impact of reducing the tick size on market-making behavior on The Toronto Stock Exchange. The results indicate a significant decrease in the percentage of trades of fewer than 10,000 shares involving the upstairs traders and a significant increase in the percentage of trades of fewer than 1,000 share involving the designated market makers. Consistent with this finding, the upstairs traders earn significantly lower returns on non-block trades and the designated market markers earn lower returns on trades smaller than 1,000 shares. We conclude the tick size reduction benefits the trading public.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers, G20, G24.     

Nasdaq Trading and Trading Costs: 1993–2002

Nasdaq spreads decline from 1993 to 2002, largely independently of tick‐size reductions. Trade size declines, consistent with greater retail investor activity. Using the method of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), we find that concurrent market returns strongly affect liquidity and trading activity. Liquidity exhibits distinct day‐of‐the‐week patterns. There is little evidence that macroeconomic announcements or changes in key interest rates affect Nasdaq stocks overall; but in the bear market, we find a relation between some of these variables and effective spreads, which we interpret as consistent with Nasdaq participants' paying greater attention to fundamentals after the market crash.     

Correlated Trading and Location

This paper analyzes the trading behavior of stock market investors. Purchases and sales are highly correlated when we divide investors geographically. Investors who live near a firm's headquarters react in a similar manner to releases of public information. We are able to make this identification by exploiting a unique feature of individual brokerage accounts in the People's Republic of China. The data allow us to pinpoint an investor's location at the time he or she places a trade. Our results are consistent with a simple, rational expectations model of heterogeneously informed investors.     

Trading and Shareholder Democracy

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.     

News Trading and Speed

We compare the optimal trading strategy of an informed speculator when he can trade ahead of incoming news (is “fast”), versus when he cannot (is “slow”). We find that speed matters: the fast speculator's trades account for a larger fraction of trading volume, and are more correlated with short‐run price changes. Nevertheless, he realizes a large fraction of his profits from trading on long‐term price changes. The fast speculator's behavior matches evidence about high‐frequency traders. We predict that stocks with more informative news are more liquid even though they attract more activity from informed high‐frequency traders.     

Merger Announcements and Trading

We test whether an increase either in informed trades or in large liquidity trades leads to greater correlation of trading volume across markets. We confirm that both trading volume and positive returns of target companies are abnormally high before merger announcements. We find a statistically significant increase in the correlation between New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq/regional trading volume before merger announcements. Furthermore, after merger announcements, we find evidence of both large liquidity trading and a statistically significant increase in the correlation of trading volume across markets.     

Tipping and Option Trading

This study examines options’ market behavior before analysts’ initiations. We find abnormal trading activity in the options market several days prior to the release of analysts’ initiations. Informed traders recognize the content and timing of the initial recommendations. We determine that informed trading is attributed to information leakage rather than savvy investors’ stock‐picking ability. We also find a significant information transmission from the options market to the underlying equity market around the event. Our results are consistent with the tipping hypothesis and confirm the informational role of equity options.     

Correlated Trading and Returns

A German broker's clients place similar speculative trades and therefore tend to be on the same side of the market in a given stock during a given day, week, month, and quarter. Aggregate liquidity effects, short sale constraints, the systematic execution of limit orders (coordinated through price movements) or the correlated trading of other investors who pick off retail limit orders do not fully explain why retail investors trade similarly. Correlated market orders lead returns, presumably due to persistent speculative price pressure. Correlated limit orders also predict subsequent returns, consistent with executed limit orders being compensated for accommodating liquidity demands.     

Predatory Trading

This paper studies predatory trading, trading that induces and/or exploits the need of other investors to reduce their positions. We show that if one trader needs to sell, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price overshooting and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence, the market is illiquid when liquidity is most needed. Further, a trader profits from triggering another trader's crisis, and the crisis can spill over across traders and across markets.