Risk as perceived by the German public: pervasive risks and “switching” risks

In 2001, a major project on the perception and evaluation of risks in southern Germany was conducted consisting of survey data as well as of semi‐structured interviews. With reference to the psychometric paradigm, this article analyzes public risk perception, pointing out the perceived risk semantic for nuclear energy, GM‐food, mad cow disease (BSE), crime, global climate change, mobile telephony and its radiation risks. These hazards reveal different patterns of risk perception and different levels of risk acceptability. Secondly, a comparison of qualitative and quantitative findings will be conducted: qualitative analyses indicate that the results of quantitative rating scales on the perception, evaluation and acceptance of technical and environmental hazards might be misleading since the public's focus on risks as elicited by open association stimuli relies much more on ‘everyday‐life’ and ‘pervasive’ risks than for instance on hazards emerging from new technologies. The relevance of technological risks tends to be dependent on the context: If explicitly mentioned in newscasts, in debates or listed in questionnaires memories, fears or other immediate responses become activated, yet they may be forgotten a short time later. We have called this phenomenon “switching effect” and the respective risks “switching risks”. In standardized opinion polls such ‘switching effects’ may evoke firm judgments, even if the importance in the interviewee's mental representation seems marginal.     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

The t copula with multiple parameters of degrees of freedom: bivariate characteristics and application to risk management

The t copula is often used in risk management as it allows for modeling the tail dependence between risks and it is simple to simulate and calibrate. However, the use of a standard t copula is often criticized due to its restriction of having a single parameter for the degrees of freedom (dof) that may limit its capability to model the tail dependence structure in a multivariate case. To overcome this problem, the grouped t copula was proposed recently, where risks are grouped a priori in such a way that each group has a standard t copula with its specific dof parameter. In this paper we propose the use of a generalized grouped t copula, where each group consists of one risk factor only, so that a priori grouping is not required. The copula characteristics in the bivariate case are studied. We explain simulation and calibration procedures, including a simulation study on the finite sample properties of the maximum likelihood estimators and Kendall's tau approximation. This new copula is significantly different from the standard t copula in terms of risk measures such as tail dependence, value at risk and expected shortfall.     

A Framework for Identifying (and Avoiding) Fraudulent Financial Reporting*

This commentary analyzes the relationship of fraud risk assessments to other risk assessments by auditors. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board notes that this is a problem area of current practice. Effective detection of fraudulent financial reporting requires an integrative accounting/auditing conceptual framework. As a result, this paper is as much about accounting theory as it is about auditing. To simplify the development of such an integrated framework, this paper uses an expanded risk model. This effectively results in a risk perspective on fraudulent financial reporting. There are many potential implications but the major findings are as follows. First, the study identifies the crucial role of benchmarks based on acceptable levels of risk to help differentiate between intentional and unintentional misstatements. Such differentiation is critical to successfully implementing the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 and international standards ISA Nos. 240, 540, and 700. Second, the paper shows the importance of not allowing the major categories of risks identified here from getting too high. This paper explains the need to set acceptable levels of these risks, either by standard‐setters as a matter of broad policy, or by individual practitioners as part of the terms of specific engagements. I propose that a major factor in the concept of “present fairly” be the acceptable levels of accounting risks that are defined here, especially the risks due to intentional forecast errors. Third, this paper clarifies how the fraud risk of SAS No. 99, and similar international standards, relates to the current audit risk model framework.     

Capturing hedge fund risk factor exposures: Hedge fund return replication with ETFs

We develop a new factor selection methodology of spanning the space of hedge fund risk factors with all available exchange traded funds (ETFs). We demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology with out-of-sample individual hedge fund return replication by ETF clone portfolios. This is consistent with our interpretation of ETF returns as proxies to risk factors driving hedge fund returns. We further consider portfolios of “cloneable” and “noncloneable” hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R² matches, and demonstrate that our ETF clone portfolios slightly outperform cloneable hedge funds out of sample.     

The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System*

In these excerpts from The Squam Lake Report, fifteen distinguished economists analyze where the global financial system failed, and how such failures might be prevented (or at least their damage better contained) in the future. Although there were many contributing factors to the crisis—including “agency” problems throughout the financial system and a bankruptcy code poorly suited for reorganizing financial firms—at the core of the problem is a potential conflict between the risk-taking proclivity of financial institutions and the interests of the economy at large that must be managed at least in part through more effective regulation. The Squam Lake Report provides a nonpartisan plan to transform the regulation of financial markets in ways designed to limit systemic risk while preserving—to the extent possible and prudent—the economies of scale and scope that justify the existence of today's large financial institutions. To reduce the risks that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements based on more effective assessments of the risks of bank assets and liabilities, as well as a new systemic regulator that should be part of the central bank. To reduce the costs of failure when it occurs, the authors propose that banks be required to create “living wills” laying out their plan to sell assets or shut down operations in the event of financial trouble. As part of that plan, regulators are urged to “aggressively encourage” banks to issue “contingent” debt capital securities that convert into equity.     

On the Stewardship and Valuation Implications of Accrual Accounting Systems

In this paper we explore the role of accruals in determining “earnings quality” from both a stewardship and a valuation perspective. We show that the valuation and stewardship qualities of accrual accounting are maximized by either an “aggressive” or a “conservative” accrual strategy. Furthermore, accrual strategy choices can be delegated to management as it does not benefit by implementing a strategy that is not in the best interests of the shareholders. We also investigate the implications of accrual strategies for standard empirical measures of “earnings quality”: regression coefficients and R²s from price‐earnings and market‐to‐book regressions. We show that such measures respond differently, and in some cases adversely, to the kind of strategies that make accounting constructs more correlated with the underlying economic activities of firms.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

Worst case portfolio vectors and diversification effects

We consider the problem of identifying the worst case dependence structure of a portfolio X ₁,…,X _n of d-dimensional risks, which yields the largest risk of the joint portfolio. Based on a recent characterization result of law invariant convex risk measures, the worst case portfolio structure is identified as a μ-comonotone risk vector for some worst case scenario measure μ. It turns out that typically there will be a diversification effect even in worst case situations. The only exceptions arise when risks are measured by translated max correlation risk measures. We determine the worst case portfolio structure and the worst case diversification effect in several classes of examples as, e.g. in elliptical, Euclidean spherical, and Archimedean type distribution classes.     

“一带一路”下防范主权信用评级风险的法律对策研究

“一带一路”战略的实施,凸显主权信用评级的重要价值。然而,主权评级屡次发生风险并演化为系统性风险和危机,造成重大损失。此风险一方面是由主权评级自身在金融稳定时期潜在的风险要素引起的,另一方面也是美欧当下缺乏有效的风险防范措施所导致的。因此,为推进“一带一路”建设,以尽早防范主权评级风险,我国应采取设定“本土+全球”的双评级规范、强化控制和监管国际评级机构以及减弱对主权评级的依赖等法律对策。     

Forecasting market risk of portfolios: copula-Markov switching multifractal approach

This paper proposes a new methodology for modeling and forecasting market risks of portfolios. It is based on a combination of copula functions and Markov switching multifractal (MSM) processes. We assess the performance of the copula-MSM model by computing the value at risk of a portfolio composed of the NASDAQ composite index and the S&P 500. Using the likelihood ratio (LR) test by Christoffersen [1998. “Evaluating Interval Forecasts.” International Economic Review 39: 841–862], the GMM duration-based test by Candelon et al. [2011. “Backtesting Value at Risk: A GMM Duration-based Test.” Journal of Financial Econometrics 9: 314–343] and the superior predictive ability (SPA) test by Hansen [2005. “A Test for Superior Predictive Ability.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 23, 365–380] we evaluate the predictive ability of the copula-MSM model and compare it to other common approaches such as historical simulation, variance–covariance, RiskMetrics, copula-GARCH and constant conditional correlation GARCH (CCC-GARCH) models. We find that the copula-MSM model is more robust, provides the best fit and outperforms the other models in terms of forecasting accuracy and VaR prediction.     

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A DECADE OF INNOVATIONS IN PROCESS AND PRODUCTS

The explosion of corporate risk management programs in the early 1990s was a hasty and ill‐conceived reaction by U.S. corporations to the great “derivatives disasters” of that period. Anxious to avoid the fate of Barings and Procter & Gamble, most top executives were more concerned about crisis management than risk management. Many companies quickly installed (often outrageously priced) value‐at‐risk (VaR) systems without paying much attention to how such systems fit their specific business requirements. Focused myopically on loss avoidance and technical risk measurement issues, the corporate risk management revolution of the '90s thus got underway in a disorganized, ad hoc fashion, producing a curious amalgam of policies and procedures with no clear link to the corporate mission of maximizing value. But as the risk management revolution unfolded over the last decade, the result has been the “convergence” of different risk management perspectives, processes, and products. The most visible sign of such convergence is a fairly recent development called “alternative risk transfer,” or ART. ART forms consist of the large and growing collection of new risk transfer and financing products now being offered by insurance and reinsurance companies. As just one example, a new class of security known as “contingent capital” gives a company the option over a specified period—say, the next five years—to issue new equity or debt at a pre‐negotiated price. And to hold down their cost, such “pre‐loss” financing options are typically designed to be “triggered” only when the firm is most likely to need an infusion of new capital to avoid underinvestment or financial distress. But underlying—and to a large extent driving—this convergence of insurance and capital markets is a more fundamental kind of convergence: the integration of risk management with corporate financing decisions. As first corporate finance theorists and now practitioners have come to realize, decisions about a company's optimal capital structure and the design of its securities cannot be made without first taking account of the firm's risks and its opportunities for managing them. Indeed, this article argues that a comprehensive, value‐maximizing approach to corporate finance must begin with a risk management strategy that incorporates the full range of available risk management products, including the new risk finance products as well as established risk transfer instruments like interest rate and currency derivatives. The challenge confronting today's CFO is to maximize firm value by choosing the mixture of securities and risk management products and solutions that gives the company access to capital at the lowest possible cost.     

Rethinking “Strength of Incentives” for Executives of Financial Institutions

The recent crisis has caused some finance theorists and practitioners to rethink the effects of managerial incentives on the total enterprise value of large financial institutions. This re-examination has identified and analyzed a number of potential problems with the use of equity-based compensation, including insufficiently long managerial time horizons as well as the temptation for excessive risk-taking provided by “asymmetric” payoff structures in which shareholders have virtually all the upside while debtholders bear most of the downside risk. In an attempt to address such problems, finance and governance scholars have increasingly explored the possible value of aligning managerial interests with those of not only shareholders, but other important corporate claimants such as debtholders and taxpayers. After reviewing the latest thinking about risk and managerial incentives at financial institutions, the authors come to the following conclusions:

• • The design of incentives for value maximization needs to reflect a healthy appreciation of downside risk as well as upside reward, and both senior and subordinated debt may be ideal instruments for establishing that balance. At the same time, most senior executives should continue to receive equity-linked compensation in addition to significant proportions of “inside debt.”
• • Since decision-makers below the highest level executives of large financial institutions collectively wield enormous power to assume and manage risks, this “upper-middle” tier of managers deserves special attention. Rather than rewarding these managers with stock or options, the authors suggest use of a combination of uncapped but “held-at-risk” bonuses denominated in subordinated inside debt as the best way of rewarding effort and competence while controlling opportunities for risk-shifting.

     

Commodity Bonds and Consumption Risks

This paper analyzes the economic role of commodity bonds by examining the nature of the demand for these securities. I show that while commodity bonds protect against relative price changes, they do so by introducing variability into the future real income stream. This variability limits the desirability of using commodity bonds to provide “price insurance” for future consumption. However, this variability may allow commodity bonds to hedge risks to consumption caused by stochastic changes in income. The analysis also suggests that it is this “income insurance” rather than “price insurance” that is important in hedging risks to future consumption.     

Specific knowledge and performance measurement

I examine optimal incentives and performance measurement in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Contracts can be based both on “input” measures related to the agent's actions and an “output” measure related to the principal's payoff. Whereas input‐based pay minimizes income risk, only output‐based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge efficiently. In general, it is optimal to use both kinds of performance measures. The results help to explain some empirical puzzles and lead to several new predictions.     

BEHIND THE CORPORATE HEDGE: INFORMATION AND THE LIMITS OF "SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION"

The article begins by setting out three alternative conceptions of the corporate objective function. Relying on this framework, it shows that legal analyses tend to neglect conflicts between the interests of the corporate entity and the interests of shareholders over the amount of corporate risk-taking. Financial analyses tend to ignore both constraints on managerial discretion imposed by law and a fundamental ambiguity the author identifies in the “shareholder wealth maximization” assumption that underlies such analyses. This ambiguity arises in part from market “frictions”–particularly, the investor uncertainty and heightened price volatility that stem from informational “asymmetry.” Such an information gap between management and outside investors (along with market “irrationality”) can cause material disparities between the actual trading price and the intrinsic value (or what the author calls the “blissful price”) of a company's shares. As a consequence, corporate hedging that maximizes actual share values may not maximize intrinsic values (and vice versa), thus giving rise to a managerial dilemma. Previous analyses have also failed to give adequate consideration to the expectations of shareholders. If, for example, the shareholders of a natural resource company are seeking a relatively “pure play” on that resource–in part because they believe the company's management has no comparative advantage in managing price risks–corporate hedging that increases shareholder wealth may re-duceshareholder welfare. In this sense, the usual “shareholder wealth maximization” directive is not only ambiguous, but also incomplete. These problems stem not only from informational asymmetry, but from other institutional realities (such as the “political” taint associated with reported derivative losses of any kind) that raise the information costs of using derivatives. The article concludes with some suggestions for improving disclosure of corporate risk management “philosophy.” Better disclosure may not only help reduce such information costs, but could also encourage corporations to find–and stick to–their derivatives niche.     

What Determines TSR

Researchers have long wrestled with the question of what determines a company's total shareholder return, or TSR, and their results have been decidedly mixed. Some empirical studies come down in favor of dividends or earnings per share, while others favor return on capital or other profitability measures. In this article, the author takes a “first principles” approach that begins by demonstrating that TSR should be a function of a company's economic profit, or its Economic Value Added (or EVA). He shows that, from a theoretical standpoint, the sum of dividends and share price appreciation—which is the definition of TSR—is ultimately a function of increasing EVA and, along with it, a company's “aggregate NPV.” He further shows that if stock prices are determined by discounting expected cash flows, corporate NPV will equal the discounted value of EVA, and increasing NPV will come down to increasing EVA. In developing his argument, the author demonstrates that TSR is actually a leveraged version of a measure he calls “TIR,” or total investor return, which is the blended return that an investor would earn from owning the entire capital structure of a company, bonds as well as stock. He then presents the findings of regression analysis showing that a company's TIR and TSR are both strongly positively correlated with its EVA performance plus the change in its aggregate NPV (with R²s equal to 1.0 and 0.94, respectively). In a final step, the author shows that the change in EVA provides a better statistical explanation than other financial measures for changes in aggregate NPV and, hence, actual TSR     

A new closed-form formula for pricing European options under a skew Brownian motion

In this paper, we present a new pricing formula based on a modified Black–Scholes (B-S) model with the standard Brownian motion being replaced by a particular process constructed with a special type of skew Brownian motions. Although Corns and Satchell [2007. “Skew Brownian Motion and Pricing European Options.” The European Journal of Finance 13 (6): 523–544] have worked on this model, the results they obtained are incorrect. In this paper, not only do we identify precisely where the errors in Although Corns and Satchell [2007. “Skew Brownian Motion and Pricing European Options”. The European Journal of Finance 13 (6): 523–544] are, we also present a new closed-form pricing formula based on a newly proposed equivalent martingale measure, called ‘endogenous risk neutral measure’, by which only endogenous risks should and can be fully hedged. The newly derived option pricing formula takes the B-S formula as a special case and it does not induce any significant additional burden in terms of numerically computing option values, compared with the effort involved in computing the B-S formula.