CEO变更与盈余管理——基于PSM和DID方法的分析北大核心CSSCISSCI

文章以2011-2015年我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为样本,采用倾向得分匹配法和双重差分法,对比分析发生和未发生CEO变更公司的盈余管理差异,探讨CEO变更对盈余管理的"净效应"。结果表明,发生CEO变更的公司盈余管理程度显著高于未发生CEO变更的公司。进一步研究发现,当CEO与董事长同时变更、CEO继任者为外部继任者或公司股权性质为非国有时,CEO变更导致的盈余管理程度更高;董事会会议次数与股权制衡度对CEO变更导致的盈余管理有一定抑制作用。     

CEO权力会影响垂直薪酬差异筛选效应吗?北大核心CSSCISSCI

CEO与副总经理之间的垂直薪酬差异筛选效应是指垂直薪酬差异对副总经理主动离职倾向的影响。本文利用2005—2015年我国A股上市公司数据,考察了CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异筛选效应的影响。CEO权力的发挥会受到公司内部治理结构和外部治理环境的影响,因而本文还考察了CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异筛选效应的影响是否受制于上市公司的产权性质和上市公司所在地的市场化进程。研究发现,CEO权力越大,垂直薪酬差异对副总经理主动离职率的正向影响越大,说明CEO权力加重了垂直薪酬差异的负向筛选效应;相比非国有企业,CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异与国有企业副总经理主动离职率关系的正向影响更大,说明CEO权力对国有企业垂直薪酬差异负向筛选效应的影响大于非国有企业;市场化进程越高,CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异与副总经理主动离职率关系的正向影响越小,说明市场化进程越高,CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异负向筛选效应的影响越小。进一步研究还发现,CEO权力越大,垂直薪酬差异通过副总经理主动离职率对公司绩效的间接负向影响越大,说明CEO权力加重了垂直薪酬差异筛选效应对公司绩效的负向影响。本文为CEO权力影响高管行为及公司绩效提供了新的研究视角。     

治理环境、宗教因素与债务融资行为

以2002 - 2011年我国A股主板上市公司为研究样本,研究了宗教因素对上市公司债务融资行为的影响,包括公司的债务融资规模和公司的债务期限结构两方面。实证研究发现,上市公司所受的宗教影响程度与债务融资规模和债务期限结构是负相关的关系,在宗教影响较为浓厚的地区,上市公司总负债率和长期负债率比较低,说明这类公司更倾向于规避风险,而且更倾向于采用短期债务融资的方式。进一步研究表明,上市公司所处的地区治理环境会强化宗教因素与公司债务水平和债务期限结构的负相关关系。     

中小企业总经理薪酬激励机制研究——一项来自中小企业板的经验证据

文章主要运用实证的研究方法,以中小企业板上市公司作为研究对象,对中小企业板上市公司内CEO的薪酬和企业绩效之间的关系进行了检验,发现二者之间存在显著的正相关关系,薪酬可以给CEO提供足够的激励;但持股比例与企业绩效之间弱相关。文章还发现公司规模对CEO的报酬存在显著的影响,CEO的持股比例、CEO的来源以及上市公司内总经理和董事长两职的合一也会影响CEO的薪酬水平。     

基于多理论视角的董事会-CEO关系与公司绩效研究述评

董事会和CEO是核心公司治理机制的两个关键要素,两者之间的关系会影响公司的战略选择,进而影响公司绩效。不同理论视角下的董事会-CEO关系及其对公司绩效的影响相异,基于此,本文首先梳理和归纳了有关董事会-CEO关系及其对公司绩效影响研究的理论渊源,然后构建了董事会-CEO关系与公司绩效研究的理论模型,并分析了现有研究存在的不足,最后指出了未来研究值得关注的方向,以期为后续研究提供借鉴和启示。     

管家理论与代理理论的比较分析

本文通过对管家理论与代理理论的比较分析 ,结合现实环境 ,对上市公司董事会与首席执行官 (CEO)关系的指导思想重新进行了阐释 :当CEO在公司内部尚处于领导地位和权力的发展阶段 ,获得重大成就之前 ,董事会应该借鉴管家理论与CEO发展一种相互合作、彼此信任的工作关系 ;而当CEO在公司中的领导地位和权力得到较强发展 ,其潜能得到充分展示 ,在工作中取得重大成就以后 ,董事会则应该借鉴代理理论思想对CEO可能出现的自负心态及机会主义行为实施严格控制     

内部薪酬差距与公司绩效--基于上市公司的实证研究

本文以2007-2010年A股上市公司为研究样本,研究在不同的环境下,高管团队与普通员工的薪酬差距对公司绩效的影响。研究发现：高管团队与普通员工的薪酬差距对公司绩效起促进作用。锦标赛理论成为近年来解释我国上市公司内部薪酬差距对公司绩效影响的有效理论。随着企业员工薪酬的不同,高管团队与普通员工的薪酬差距对公司绩效的影响也会不同。具体表现在,与员工薪酬比较低的企业相比,在员工薪酬比较高的企业中,加大高管团队与普通员工的薪酬差距将更有利于公司绩效的提高。此外,企业性质也会影响到薪酬差距对公司绩效的作用。具体来说,与国有性质企业相比,非国有性质企业的薪酬差距对公司绩效提升的促进作用更大。     

官员腐败、审计师选择与公司价值

本文根据近年来披露的腐败官员的案例为基础,以涉及省部级腐败官员的上市公司为样本,实证分析了官员腐败、审计师选择与公司价值三者之间的关系。研究发现,行贿的公司倾向于选择低质量的审计师,非行贿的公司倾向于选择高质量的审计师;行贿公司的公司价值在短期内显著高于非行贿公司;以审计师选择为传导机制与实现途径,官员腐败对公司价值的影响会显著提高。     

基于高管变更下的盈余管理研究——以沪市A股上市公司为例

文章以沪市A股上市公司2006²011年数据为研究样本,研究高管变更会导致怎样的盈余管理发生。研究结果显示:在CEO变更当年,企业倾向于采用应计项目负向盈余管理;在CEO变更后的一至二年内,企业倾向于运用应计项目和真实活动正向盈余管理,这源于新上任的CEO急于通过盈余管理调节来增加企业的会计盈余,从而粉饰自己上任后的经营业绩并向高层领导者展示自己的"能力"。     

CEO 权力、媒体关注与企业过度投资

通过选取 2011 年至 2015 年中国沪深两市 A 股上市公司数据为样本,研究了上市公司 CEO 权力、媒体关注对企业过度投资问题的影响,并进一步考察了上述影响关系在不同制度环境 下的差异。研究发现,公司 CEO 权力越大,上市公司过度投资的行为越严重;而媒体关注能够降 低公司 CEO 权力—过度投资的敏感性。即,媒体关注能够有效抑制公司 CEO 权力引发的过度投资; 在其他条件一定的情况下,相比于制度环境“差”的地区,制度环境“好”的地区媒体关注抑制 公司 CEO 权力引发的过度投资效果更加显著。该研究对于完善公司治理结构、扩展媒体关注治理 作用、加强制度环境建设,最终提高公司的投资效率,具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

Multinational activity and CEO compensation: Preliminary evidence from large UK firms

Multinational Activity and CEO Compensation: Preliminary Evidence from Large UK Firms. — Since the early 1980s the rate of growth in executive remuneration has consistently outpaced that of average earnings. This phenomenon has been widely assumed to be part of an internationalization of the executive labor market. This paper starts from the premise that the multinational enterprise will be a major agent in such a market and presents some preliminary tests for the impact of multinational activity in general, and specific regional effects in particular, on CEO remuneration using a sample of large UK firms. Surprisingly, we find no evidence to support our conjecture that CEO pay will be positively related to firm involvement in the United States. However, multinational activity does generate a significant premium over purely domestic activity.     

Effect of CEO power and board strength on bank performance in China

Given that a powerful CEO is more likely to overcome problems and control performance in a firm, this study first focuses on exploring whether CEO power positively affects certain measures of bank performance and which sources of CEO power have these positive impacts. Next, this study further analyzes whether the positive impact of CEO power on performance is negatively mediated by board strength. Our sample includes data on the three main types of Chinese banks for 2006 to –2016.Our results show that CEO structural power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability, risk-taking ability and lending quality, CEO ownership power significantly raises a bank’s lending quality, and CEO expert power significantly increases a bank’s overall and shareholder profitability. As considering the endogeneity, CEO prestige power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability. Next, we use the proportion of independent directors as our measure of board strength and find that a stronger board reduces the beneficial effects of CEO structural power on a bank’s lending quality, of CEO ownership power on shareholder profitability, and of CEO expert power on lending quality. There are similar harmful mediating effects when we use the proportion of foreign investors and board size as measures of board strength. Our results can help Chinese bank authorities develop policies to appropriately raise bank CEOs’ power and reduce board supervision of CEO power.     

The Relation between Strategy,CEO Selection,and Firm Performance

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence its selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value‐adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector‐type strategy) select a CEO with high social capital. We argue that uncertainty, driven by a firm's strategy, will determine the decision to select a CEO with high social capital; such CEOs can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty and thus can be valuable to the firm. However, prior research indicates that CEOs with high social capital can engage in behavior detrimental to firm value. To mitigate the potential for this to occur, we assess whether corporate governance can play a role in prospector firms who appoint CEOs with high social capital. Drawing on archival data of CEO successions over a 14‐year period, we find that prospector firms have greater incentives to appoint CEOs with high social capital. We also find that prospector firms who appoint a CEO with high social capital improve their performance. Furthermore, the value‐adding effect of this selection choice is stronger in prospector firms with good corporate governance.     

Effects of presidents’ characteristics on internationalization of small and medium firms in Japan

Recent heterogeneous-firm models of international trade suggest that productivity determines whether firms engage in export activity and foreign direct investment. In practice, however, many productive firms are not internationalized, whereas many unproductive firms are, which suggests that there are factors other than productivity that influence firms’ internationalization. This study uses a unique panel data set for Japanese small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to examine whether the personal characteristics of a firm’s president are factors in firm internationalization. We find that SMEs with a risk-tolerant, forward-looking president are more likely to be internationalized. These effects are large in magnitude, as is the productivity effect, which provides a partial explanation as to why many productive firms are not internationalized. In addition, we find that productivity has an insignificant effect on firms exiting export markets, whereas presidential myopia increases the probability of exit. The evidence further suggests that a firm’s initial export costs become sunk following its entry into export markets, which explains why many unproductive firms are internationalized.     

嵌入讨价还价博弈的经营者报酬对公司绩效影响研究

文章研究表明:董事会与CEO之间的权力博弈是影响CEO报酬和公司绩效关系的重要因素.中国国有上市公司董事会与CEO之间的博弈扭曲了CEO报酬机制,损害了CEO报酬对公司绩效的促进作用,应当从博弈的制度环境入手矫正上述博弈机制,理顺CEO报酬机制的作用机理.     

Female CEOs on Japanese corporate boards and firm performance

This paper examines the effects of female chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm performance. Using data on nonfinancial listed firms in Japan, we show that only 0.8% of some 42,000 firm-year observations have female CEOs. There is also little evidence that firms appoint more females as CEOs during our sample period. While the stock market reacts positively to the introduction of a firm's first female CEO, the relationship between CEO gender and firm accounting performance is generally not strong. However, when we classify the type of female CEO, the estimated coefficient for a founder female CEO and Tobin's Q is positive and significant.     

Accounting Restatements and External Financing Choices*

There is little research on how accounting information quality affects a firm’s external financing choices. In this paper, we use the occurrence of accounting restatements as a proxy for the reduced credibility of accounting information and investigate how restatements affect a firm’s external financing choices. We find that for firms that obtain external financing after restatements, they rely more on debt financing, especially private debt financing, and less on equity financing. The increase in debt financing is more pronounced for firms with more severe information problems and less pronounced for firms with prompt CEO or CFO turnover and auditor dismissal. Our evidence indicates that accounting information quality affects capital providers’ resource allocation and that debt holders help alleviate information problems after accounting restatements.     

Debt financing structure,ownership concentration and firm performance: a comparison of the listed state-owned and non-state-owned CMNEs

This paper examines the impact of debt financing and ownership concentration on internationalization performance by using a sample of 217 Chinese multinational enterprises (CMNEs) from 2009 to 2016. Through fixed-effect regression and dynamic threshold analysis, this paper finds that increasing short-term debts is positively associated with the internationalization performance of non-state-owned CMNEs, while increasing short-term debts by state-owned CMNEs will harm their performance. Ownership concentration affects CMNEs’ risk preference and thus affecting their internationalization performance in different degrees. This paper finds that the threshold for the impact of CMNEs’ largest shareholder’s ownership concentration on its internationalization performance is 0.18, the thresholds for the impact of CMNEs’ top 10 shareholders’ ownership concentration on its internationalization performance are 0.346 and 0.433. When state-owned CMNEs’ top 10 shareholders’ ownership concentration exceeds 0.337 and 0.347, their internationalization performance will have significant positive changes. Overall, this study is expected to contribute to the literature of internationalization of emerging market companies.     

中国企业对外直接投资的资源基础与或然问题

从资源基础观的角度寻找企业异质性资源对其海外直接投资的推动机制,通过运用国际比较及相关数据检验代理变量的显著程度,检验这些推动因素对中国企业的影响程度的强弱。经过分析与比较得出:学习与研发能力中的研发效率与研发支出方面以及国际化经验等因素对中国企业的异质化资源的形成起到显著作用,较强的推动了对外直接投资;而管理能力以及技术的学习吸收能力对对外直接投资的推动作用较弱。     

Do Shareholders Fight for Firm Value or Market Value in Emerging Markets? The Mediating Effect of Board Structure Dynamics on Dividend Policy Decision

The paper examines the mediating effect of board structure dynamics on the relationship between dividend payout and shareholders’ wealth at the firm level and market level. Panel regression models are used by applying data from 27 listed firms in Ghana between 2010 and 2017. We find that board structure dynamics have a direct effect on shareholders’ wealth at both levels. However, the results reveal new evidence that board structure dynamics play a mediating role on the relationship between dividend policy decision and shareholders’ wealth only at the market level. We find that independent directors and CEO duality significantly reduce market value of shareholders through dividend payout decision. However, independent directors and longer CEO tenure in office mediate a positive effect on the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth at the market level. Thus, the mediating effect of board structure dynamics, particularly independent directors and CEO tenure, are important in predicting a positive relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth at the market level than at the firm level. Therefore, regulatory bodies and investors should provide strong board structure dynamics that serve as a mediating mechanism for prudent dividend policy decisions that add value to shareholders’ wealth.