Adam Smith's invisible hand argument

Adam Smith is usually thought to argue that the result of everyone pursuing their own interests will be the maximization of the interests of society. The invisible hand of the free market will transform the individual's pursuit of gain into the general utility of society. This is the invisible hand argument. Many people, although Smith did not, draw a moral corollary from this argument, and use it to defend the moral acceptability of pursuing one's own self-interest. Smith does use the invisible hand argument; however, a close reading of theWealth of Nations reveals that Smith thought the interests of merchants and manufacturers were fundamentally opposed to those of society in general, and that they had an inherent tendency to deceive and oppress society while pursuing their own interests. How can these two views of what results when merchants and manufactures pursue their self-interest be made compatible? It is argued that the invisible hand argument when applied to merchants and manufacturers, (its application to labour and landlords is only mentioned briefly), is extremely restrictive, and that similar restrictions must apply to the moral corollary. In particular, the invisible hand argument applies only to investing capital in one's own country for maximum profit.     

Realizing the Spirit and Impact of Adam Smith's Capitalism through Entrepreneurship

Adam Smith argued in The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments that in order to create an effective and productive capitalist system, individuals must pursue interests of both the self and society. Despite this assertion, modern economic theory has become tightly focused on the pursuit of economic self-interests at the expense of other, higher order motives. This paper will argue that the tendency to employ such an egocentric strategy often generates externalities and inequalities that serve to detract from the greater welfare of society. However, by tempering these economic self-interests with non-economically motivated considerations, this paper will suggest that individuals may create tremendous benefits to society, precisely as Smith outlined more than two centuries ago. In defense of this assertion, this paper will review an array of theoretical arguments and empirical findings that suggest that today's entrepreneurs are not only seeking to satisfy both selfish and ethical motivations, but in so doing they are also contributing substantially to the overall welfare of society through job creation, wealth redistribution, and a lack of discrimination. As such, it appears that spirit and impact of the capitalist system that Smith envisioned is being realized through entrepreneurship.     

Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic Ethic, and Adam Smith

In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) Adam Smith draws on the Stoic idea of a Providence that uses everything for the good of the whole. The process is often painful, so the Stoic ethic insisted on conscious cooperation. Stoic ideas contributed to the rise of science and enjoyed wide popularity in Smith’s England. Smith was more influenced by the Stoicism of his professors than by the Epicureanism of Hume. In TMS, Marcus Aurelius’s “helmsman” becomes the “impartial spectator,” who judges actions in terms of the way they are seen by others. This is the key to justice, without which society collapses. Business school students should be taught that Smith’s “invisible hand” is best understood as a universal rationality that uses just actions for the benefit of the whole.     

The use of foreign currency derivatives,corporate governance,and firm value around the world

This paper examines the impact of currency derivatives on firm value using a broad sample of firms from thirty-nine countries with significant exchange-rate exposure. Derivatives can be used for managers' self-interest, for hedging or for speculative purposes. We hypothesize that investors can appeal to a firm's internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) corporate governance to draw inferences on a firm's motive behind the use of derivatives, since well-governed firms are more likely to use derivatives to hedge rather than to speculate or pursue managers' self-interest. Consistent with this explanation, we find strong evidence that the use of currency derivatives for firms that have strong internal firm-level or external country-level governance is associated with a significant value premium.     

Reflections on management style and corporate social policy

Corporate social policy can be viewed as three legs of a tripod: efficient production, stable employment, and a social and political environment that promotes high performance of both workers and managers. Social policy process consists of achieving a balance of corporate interest with other interests in the society. Each policy position taken by the firm alters its relationships with all other interests and creates a new balance. This entails the risk of creating unfriendly interests and losing the support of others, depending on the issue and shift in power. The substance of policy affects this balance according to varying degrees of risk ranging from low to high: provision of good pay and working conditions, and justice; participation in local community affairs, charitable and cultural contributions, corporate lobbying, and electing candidates. Social policy formation is, thus, the search for a balance of public policy and private interests. It is an experiment in governance; in mediating differences over values between public and private interests.     

Corporate Governance,Ethics, and the Backdating of Stock Options

Backdating of stock options is an example of an agency problem. It has emerged despite all the measures (i.e., new regulations and additional corporate governance mechanisms) aimed at addressing such problems? Beyond such negative controlling measures, a more positive empowering approach based on ethics may also be necessary. What ethical measures need to be taken to address the agency problem? What values and norms should guide the board of directors in protecting the shareholders’ interests? To examine these issues, we first discuss the role values and norms can play with respect to underlying corporate governance and the proper role of directors, such as transparency, accountability, integrity (which is reflected in proper mechanisms of checks and balances), and public responsibility. Second, we discuss various stakeholder approaches (e.g., government, directors, managers, and shareholders) by which conflicts of interest (i.e., the agency problem) can be addressed. Third, we assess the practice of backdating stock options, as an illustration of the agency problem, in terms of whether the practice is legally acceptable or ethically justifiable. Fourth, we proceed to an analysis of good corporate governance practice involving backdating options based on a series of ethical standards including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) utilitarianism; (3) justice; and (4) Kantianism. We conclude that while executive compensation schemes (e.g., stock options) were originally intended to help remedy the agency problem by tying together the interests of the executives and shareholders, these schemes may have actually become “part of the problem,” and that the solution ultimately depends upon whether directors and executives accept that all of their actions must be based on a set of core ethical values.     

Normative Marketing Ethics Redux, Incorporating a Reply to Smith

Author of "Does Marketing Ethics Really Have Anything to Say? – A Critical Inventory of the Literature," responds to Smith's comment. Content is mostly of a reply orientation, targeting Smith's general and specific objections sequentially and in appropriate detail. Because Smith also introduces material not directly derived from the original Gaski article, subject matter here eventually ranges into a corresponding breadth of issues.     

Islamic Corporate Governance: Risk-Sharing and Islamic Preferred Shares

The recent financial crises (including the Asian and subprime crises) indicated the need to reinforce corporate governance mechanisms in emerging and developing market economies. Corporate governance refers to all the factors that affect firm processes (including, among others, financing strategies). Firms must avoid debt financing instruments and adopt financing instruments that allow for “risk-sharing” rather than “risk-shifting” because all recent financial crises were, in essence, debt crises. The primary objective of this paper is to examine the principles of risk-sharing promoted by Islamic finance and study their implications for corporate governance. The secondary objective of this paper is to propose a pricing model for a new risk-sharing financial instrument (Islamic preferred shares, IPS) that was recently discussed by Zarka and Al-Suhaibani (Shariah-compatible preference shares: The Sharia Basis and Economic Rationale. Working paper, SABIC Chair for Islamic Financial Market Studies, 2012). We study the implications of this new instrument as a powerful tool for corporate governance in the case of Islamic markets. We explain the possible contribution of IPS to agency cost reduction, Sharia screening costs and ethical corporate governance.     

Corporate Governance, Ethics, and the Backdating of Stock Options

Backdating of stock options is an example of an agency problem. It has emerged despite all the measures (i.e., new regulations and additional corporate governance mechanisms) aimed at addressing such problems? Beyond such negative controlling measures, a more positive empowering approach based on ethics may also be necessary. What ethical measures need to be taken to address the agency problem? What values and norms should guide the board of directors in protecting the shareholders’ interests? To examine these issues, we first discuss the role values and norms can play with respect to underlying corporate governance and the proper role of directors, such as transparency, accountability, integrity (which is reflected in proper mechanisms of checks and balances), and public responsibility. Second, we discuss various stakeholder approaches (e.g., government, directors, managers, and shareholders) by which conflicts of interest (i.e., the agency problem) can be addressed. Third, we assess the practice of backdating stock options, as an illustration of the agency problem, in terms of whether the practice is legally acceptable or ethically justifiable. Fourth, we proceed to an analysis of good corporate governance practice involving backdating options based on a series of ethical standards including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) utilitarianism; (3) justice; and (4) Kantianism. We conclude that while executive compensation schemes (e.g., stock options) were originally intended to help remedy the agency problem by tying together the interests of the executives and shareholders, these schemes may have actually become “part of the problem,” and that the solution ultimately depends upon whether directors and executives accept that all of their actions must be based on a set of core ethical values.     

Mental Models, Moral Imagination and System Thinking in the Age of Globalization

After experiments with various economic systems, we appear to have conceded, to misquote Winston Churchill that “free enterprise is the worst economic system, except all the others that have been tried.” Affirming that conclusion, I shall argue that in today’s expanding global economy, we need to revisit our mind-sets about corporate governance and leadership to fit what will be new kinds of free enterprise. The aim is to develop a values-based model for corporate governance in this age of globalization that will be appropriate in a variety of challenging cultural and economic settings. I shall present an analysis of mental models from a social constructivist perspective. I shall then develop the notion of moral imagination as one way to revisit traditional mind-sets about values-based corporate governance and outline what I mean by systems thinking. I shall conclude with examples for modeling corporate governance in multi-cultural settings and draw tentative conclusions about globalization. Patricia H. Werhane is the Wicklander Chair of Business Ethics and Director of the Institute for Business and Professional Ethics at DePaul University with a joint appointment as the Peter and Adeline Ruffin Professor of Business Ethics in the Darden School at the University of Virginia. Professor Werhane has published numerous articles and is the author or editor of twenty books including Persons, Rights and Corporations, Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism, Moral Imagination and Managerial Decision-Making with Oxford University Press and Employment and Employee Rights (with Tara J. Radin and Norman Bowie) with Blackwell’s. She is the founder and former Editor-in-Chief of Business Ethics Quarterly, the journal of the Society for Business Ethics.     

Corporate governance predictors of adoption of anti-takeover amendments: An empirical analysis

This study of 481 corporations provides an assessment of the relationship between several corporate governance variables (board composition, type of board leadership, officer and director stock holdings, institutional stock holdings, number of majority owners, existence of severance agreements) and adoption of anti-takeover amendments. The results of analysis suggest that the two groups (adopters/non-adopters) differ significantly in regards to these variables.Paula L. Rechner is an Assistant Professor at the University of Houston. She received her Ph.D., her research interests include corporate governance and executive succession/compensation. Her articles have appeared inAcademy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Executive, andOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, among others.Chamu Sundaramurthy, an Assistant Professor of Management at the University of Kentucky, is interested in corporate governance. Her dissertation examines board governance within the context of antitakeover corporate charter amendments adopted between 1984–1988. Her other research interests include executive succession and corporate social responsibility.Dan R. Dalton is the Dow Professor of Management and Director of Graduate Programs, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University. Formerly with General Telephone & Electronics (GT&E) for thirteen years, he received his Ph.D. from the University of California. Widely published in business and psychology, his articles have appeared in theAcademy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Business Ethics, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Business Strategy, Behavioral Science, andHuman Relations, as well as many others.     

Multinational corporate social policy process for ethical responsibility in sub-Saharan Africa

The article identifies the challenges that multinational corporations (MNCs) from the developed world face in sub-Saharan Africa and examines the direct foreign-investment and development interests of the region. In light of these challenges and interests, it also explores answers to the question “What is to be done?” The occurrence of MNCs' operations in culturally pluralistic societies suggest that they use, as the basis for a corporation-formulated regional code of conduct, a value-based corporate social policy process. That process should embody utilitarian and situation ethics in the exercise of MNCs' prima facie operations and of their responsibilities to society. For the African normative environment, the appeal of this approach is substantiated by the notion that both utilitarian and situation ethics are at once consistent with the region's investment codes, development interests, and value systems. But more than that, utilitarian and situation ethics are consistent with corporate social policy process and can assist MNCs to meet effectively their social responsibilities by helping them reverse the economic stagnation of most of the continent. However, because deontological (that is, Kantian) ethics emphasize autonomous actions that satisfy individual goals, they are largely at odds with sub-Saharan African value systems that typically emphasize the ethnic group (heteronomy) rather than the self. MNCs would, therefore, do well to de-emphasize their use in the region.     

Does the Quality of Corporate Governance Affect Firm Valuation and Risk? Evidence from a Corporate Governance Scorecard in Hong Kong*

Using Hong Kong firm data, we construct an index of corporate governance during 2002–2005, which scores the corporate governance practices of listed companies from the public shareholders' perspective based on the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development Principles of Corporate Governance. The findings show that family firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures are associated with bad corporate governance. The evidence also shows that these firms improve their corporate governance practices slower than their peers. Overall, the quality of corporate governance is very significant in explaining future company stock returns and risk. Good corporate governance is associated with both higher stock returns and with lower risk. Improvements in corporate governance are associated with significantly higher stock returns and lower company risk.     

Dynamic Transparency,Prudential Justice,and Corporate Transformation: Becoming Socially Responsible in the Internet Age

This article brings together two concepts of ethical practice into a single construct that describes how modern corporations can responsibly meet the information needs of their stakeholder networks in a way that promotes both corporate self-interest and widespread distributive justice. Internet technology is providing corporations with transformative tools that permit and encourage the exercise of social responsibility through “dynamic transparency.” “Prudential justice” is a concept representing a set of values that can provide an ethical justification for corporate implementation of dynamic transparency. This article argues that by using dynamic transparency in accordance with the provisions of prudential justice, firms can avoid many crises and manipulative or deceptive information transfers, can fulfill their responsibilities regarding stakeholders’ informational rights, and can undergo an organizational culture transformation that allows them to move from pure corporate egoism to a beneficial mix of self-interest and corporate social responsibility.     

Intragroup Transactions,Corporate Governance,and Corporate Philanthropy in Korean Business Groups

This study examines how the corporate philanthropy decisions of group-affiliated firms in Korea (Chaebol firms) are made. Based on the attention-based view, we argue that when corporate decision makers at group-affiliated firms focus their attention more (less) on internal markets than external stakeholders because of the firm’s high (low) reliance on intragroup transactions, the firm will decrease (increase) its level of corporate philanthropy. We further argue that the relationship will be stronger when governance mechanisms focus on the instrumental value of corporate philanthropy. Using a panel sample of group-affiliated firms in Korea from 2011 to 2015, we find that as intragroup sales increase, the level of corporate philanthropy decreases, and such a negative relationship is stronger when outside director representation and foreign investor ownership are high. Our study suggests that internal dependence and corporate governance mechanisms jointly affect the level of corporate philanthropy at firms in a business group. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on corporate philanthropy, business group, and corporate governance.     

The effect of corporate governance on firm value and profitability: Time-series evidence from Turkey

We study the corporate governance practices of Turkish public firms from 2006 to 2012, relying on hand-collected data covering the vast majority of listed firms. We build a Turkey Corporate Governance Index, TCGI, composed of subindices for board structure, board procedure, disclosure, ownership, and shareholder rights. TCGI predicts higher market value (with firm fixed effects) and higher firm-level profitability with firm random effects. The principal subindex which predicts higher market value and profitability, and drives the results for TCGI as a whole, is disclosure subindex. We also study the determinants of firms' governance and find that most firm-specific factors have little effect on firms' governance choices.     

Analysis of a merger from a governance perspective: the case of Abitibi‐Consolidated and Donohue

Adopting a governance perspective, this study analyzes the merger between closely‐held Donohue Inc. and widely‐held Abitibi‐Consolidated Inc. Findings suggest that the absence of a controlling shareholder and weak board governance at Abitibi might explain both (a) its executives' interests in the transaction and (b) its CEO's compensation increase despite underperformance. Second, an intergeneration shift of control at Quebecor (Donohue's parent company) led to a strategic reorientation that (a) transformed Donohue into a target and (b) insured that Donohue's executives had incentives to pursue a deal. Finally, Donohue's noncontrolling shareholders benefited from the transaction while Abitibi shareholders experienced wealth reduction. The merger's aftermath provides some counter evidence regarding blockholders' power in widely‐held firms. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Being good or being known: corporate governance,media coverage,and earnings announcements

Based on a sample of banking firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, we examine the impact of corporate governance and media coverage on the market reaction to unexpected earnings announcements. This study finds that positive media reports prior to bad earnings announcements have a positive short-term impact on the market's response to unexpected negative earnings, but the impact is reversed in the long term. In contrast, a better corporate governance quality has a persistent positive impact on market's reaction to unexpected negative earnings, especially when the quality of corporate governance is measured by pledge ratios. The study finding provides one central implication for managements: Yes, being good would pay off.     

Participation and Property Rights

This paper puts forward an argument for stakeholder rights. It begins by exploring two major answers to the question, 'in whose interests should the commercial company function?'. One claims parity for other stakeholders alongside the shareholder on the basis of a theory of property rights, and another on a theory of citizenship. Each of these answers, it is argued, fail to convince. The way forward is to recast the initial question, not asking in whose interest the company should function, but which type of interest, potentially located in any sort of person, might the company serve. That interest is identified and distinguished from others that people affected by corporations might have. These distinctions then provide the basis for an argument in favour of enfranchising two sorts of individual: sovereign stakeholders, in charge of monitoring the formulation and revision of company objectives; and secondary stakeholders, who along with those in the first category monitor the means used to achieve those objectives. The paper concludes that these distinctions should lead us to reconsider other elements in the corporate governance debate, such as the nature of a director's fiduciary duty; and the difference between democracy in corporations and democracy in the wider society.