技术引入和技术学习——外资企业与内资企业技术空间博弈

外商直接投资对我国造成了怎样的影响?很多研究局限在总体正负外溢效应的争论上,很少有学者关注区域因素和企业行为对外商直接投资技术外溢效应的影响。本文借鉴Wang与Blomstrom的内生理论模型建立思路,把外商直接投资技术外溢放在一个相互作用的系统中,同时引入“距离”因素,更全面地分析外资企业的技术引入行为和内资企业的技术学习行为。     

Vertical Foreign Direct Investment versus Outsourcing: A Welfare Comparison from the Perspective of a Host Country

In the offshoring literature, there is a huge disconnect between the alternative modes of organizing offshore production and their relative welfare impact on a host country. We bridge this gap by comparing the welfare of a host country from vertical foreign direct investment (VFDI) vis‐à‐vis international outsourcing. Our model finds that the ability to maximize welfare in the alternative modes of organizing offshore production is contingent on the absorptive capacity of the host country. If a host country's absorptive capacity is above a critical threshold, outsourcing is more welfare enhancing vis‐à‐vis VFDI; while even with an absorptive capacity lower than this critical threshold, outsourcing being welfare improving over VFDI cannot be ruled out.     

Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.     

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the growing interest in capital and technology issues, certain issues still remain to be explored regarding the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation and the corporation's consequent choice of investment location. This paper addresses some of these concerns by analyzing the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation, both theoretically and empirically. For this purpose, the paper integrates a number of traditional and nontraditional variables into the standard theory of investment based on the maximization of the expected value of the firm. The theoretical model implies that both traditional as well as nontraditional factors matter in determining the flows of foreign direct investment in a country. The generalized investment theory on US foreign direct investment then is tested empirically utilizing panel data for 44 countries from 1983 to 1990. The estimation results provide considerable support for the importance of both traditional and nontraditional factors in determining flows of foreign direct investment in a country. Furthermore, the country-specific dummies show high level of significance, reflecting the importance of the country-specific characteristics in explaining flows of foreign direct investment.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

外商直接投资与金融创新

改革开放20多年以为，中国与世界经济一体化迅速加快，而外商直接投资已经成为中国经济快速增长的关键因素之一。外商直接投资促进了所有制结构多元化的变迁，对中国经济制度的市场化变革提供了持续的推动力。虽然我国金融市场化改革取得了很大成就，但是金融结构和金融制度安排并没有发生实质性的变化。随着中国加入WTO，外商直接投资的深度与广度将得到很大发展，这将推动我国金融结构的金融制度安排和创新。     

Regional Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper examines the impact of the emergence of regional blocs on the patterns of interbloc and intrabloc trade when firms have the option to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). For exogenously given external tariffs, when firms have the option to engage in FDI, all interbloc trade may cease—complete trade diversion that is replaced by interbloc FDI investment creation. In such an event the volume of world trade declines but this is more than offset by the increase in world output due to direct investment. The paper also investigates the optimal tariff that a trading bloc levies on imports from nonmember countries. The tariffs are restricted by the option to engage in two‐way direct investment; hence, the regional blocs are hampered from mutually harming one another through an escalation in the tariff war. Finally, the formation of two regional blocs enhances the welfare of all countries.     

Market Structure and Foreign Direct Investment

During the last decade the extent of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US has increased dramatically. An important aspect of industries where most FDI takes place is their high level of concentration. This paper investigates how strategic interactions among domestic and foreign producers influence the structure of the industry. Especially, it focuses on the foreign firms' choice between exporting versus servicing these markets by investing in a plant located in the host country when facing competition from a domestic oligopoly. The empirical investigation reveals that the relationship between FDI and tariffs is not as simple as previously thought. In highly concentrated industries, where strategic behavior may play an important role, high tariffs rather than low tariffs may lead to less FDI and more imports.     

Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper investigates why a developing country may adopt a partial reform. A country is considered where the ruling elite (referred to as state capital) prevents the entry of foreign capital, and taxes the private sector before reform. A higher productivity of foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which state capital can control the inflow of foreign capital, but can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of foreign capital is unregulated. Hence, state capital's control over foreign capital may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period, double-moral-hazard model, non-binding contracts are shown to be preferred by all parties, implying that contract enforcement is unnecessary. Our results shed light on the puzzling phenomenon that substantial FDI has been carried out under contractual arrangements in developing countries in which contract enforcement is problematic. They can also explain some interesting stylized facts on contractual joint ventures between multinationals and local firms in the early stage of an economic transition.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 761–782. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.     

Labor Training and Foreign Direct Investment

Evidence shows that most foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developed to developed countries (North–North) in skilled labor‐intensive industries. This paper builds a model that incorporates labor training into the proximity–concentration tradeoffs to analyze the entry mode of multinationals to a foreign country. Production requires both skilled labor and unskilled labor.. A multinational pursuing FDI needs to provide training to some workers in the host country to equip them with skills that are specific to the production of the firm. Labor training and skill specificity lead to contract friction. It is shown that in skilled labor‐intensive industries, FDI increases along with the economic development level of the host country, whereas in unskilled labor‐intensive industries, the reverse is true. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical findings on the prevalence of North–North FDI in skilled labor‐industries and North–South FDI in unskilled labor‐intensive industries.     

外商直接投资与国家自主创新

本文将FDI(外商直接投资)和LICENSIING(技术许可)作为其潜在的渠道,建立了技术引进的模型.此模型的一个重要特征是模型中的主要假设,模型的结论以及模型的政策意义都与实际经验的观察相一致.对于包括中国在内的发展中国家(LDC)而言,技术许可比外商直接投资所带来的技术外溢更有效,在考虑制定何种政策以达到社会福利的最优化时,人力资本的水平起到了决定性的作用.     

Direct Foreign Investment Versus Licensing

This paper examines the choice among alternative modes of direct foreign investment, namely, the wholly owned subsidiary (the S option) and joint venture (the J option), vis-à-vis licensing (the L option). The focus is on the role of moral hazard, difference in risk attitude and the prospect of the host country's policy toward the venture. An apparently surprising result is that riskiness of the project is a factor against the J option. Moreover, in the absence of policy intervention, L is dominated by either S or J, whereas if there is an anticipation of policy intervention (i.e., there is a policy moral hazard) L may emerge as the best option.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.     

跨国公司对外直接投资理论研究

跨国公司对外直接投资理论从其适用范围上大体可分为发达国家和发展中国家两大类。本文将首先介绍发达国家跨国公司对外直接投资理论,其次阐述发展中国家跨国公司对外直接投资理论,最后是总结性评述,并指出跨国公司对外直接投资领域未来进一步研究的方向。     

Foreign Direct Investment and the Unionization Rate

Technological innovations improve the welfare of a country facing fixed terms of trade, but may lead to immiserization when the terms of terms of trade are adversely affected. This paper establishes that transport innovation can be immiserizing for a small country when the transport sector exhibits variable returns to scale. The release of resources from the transport sector triggers Rybczynski-like effects, and the resulting expansion (contraction) in the volume of trade and in the demand for transport services raises unit costs of these services, and may reduce welfare in the presence of decreasing (increasing) returns to scale. [411]     

Intra Eurozone Foreign Direct Investment and Deflation

After the recent economic turmoil, besides the severe recession that hit most European Union (EU) countries, and the resulting downward trend in inflation, foreign direct investment (FDI) levels in certain EU countries have bounced back. Hence, we evaluate the effect of deflation on intra-Eurozone FDI. Even though deflation tends to cause a negative effect on investment, low production cost opportunities may arise, thus attracting inward FDI. Using panel data that span from 2003 to 2015, we initially estimate an FDI equation that incorporates deflation as a pre-determined variable and, consequently, a two-equation model that treats both FDI and deflation as endogenous variables. Our results suggest that deflation in periphery Eurozone countries does not deter FDI flows from core to periphery Eurozone countries.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Child Labor

Empirical evidence suggests that use of child labor as domestic help has increased significantly in recent years although the overall incidence of child labor across the globe has declined satisfactorily. This should draw the attention of economists and policymakers because domestic child labor is considered as exploitative and in many cases hazardous. This paper purports to explain this apparently perplexing finding theoretically in terms of a three‐sector general equilibrium model with a nontraded sector where only child labor is used to render services to the richer section of the society. The analysis shows how FDI‐led economic growth increases the size of the services sector although it lowers the overall incidence of child labor in the economy and improves the welfare of the poor families that supply child labor. Finally, a composite policy has been recommended that can deal with all three aspects favorably.     

中小跨国企业及其对外直接投资

中小企业在各国经济发展中发挥着重要作用,但在国际对外直接投资中所占的比例较低,近年来,中小跨国公司迅速增长,我们分析了中小跨国企业对外直接投资的原因,及在对外投资中所面临的问题,最后,提出了积极吸收中小跨国企业投资的政策建设。     

对外直接投资与国内产业空心化

本文针对一些西方学者关于美国、日本对外直接投资导致国内产业“空心化”的观点,提出了不同的见解。首先, 第一、第二产业比重下降, 第三产业比重上升是一国产业结构演进的一般规律, 与对外直接投资无关; 其次, 一国的对外直接投资规模巨大与贸易逆差并无直接联系; 第三, 对外直接投资增强了投资者的国际竞争力; 第四, 对外直接投资对一国的就业机会影响甚微。总之, 对外直接投资为投资国和对外直接投资者带来巨大利益, 而不会导致国内产业“空心化