Too big to succeed or too big to fail?

It is often argued that smaller/younger firms are more innovative than older/larger firms—the latter may be “too big to succeed.” We show in the context of a simple industry model with consumer search frictions why evidence suggesting that smaller or younger firms are more successful at innovation may be subject to sample selection bias. Specifically, smaller more recent entrants may appear to innovate more successfully simply because unsuccessful larger incumbent firms’ size advantage enables them to survive when unsuccessful smaller ones cannot—they may be “too big to fail.”     

The relationship between venture capital backing and the top management team quality of firms going public and implications for initial public offerings

We make use of hand-collected data on a large sample of entrepreneurial firms going public to analyze the association between venture capital (VC) backing and the top management team (TMT) quality of firms at the time of their initial public offerings (IPOs), and the effect of both VC-backing and TMT quality on the growth in their post-IPO operating performance and IPO firm valuations. We first show that VC-backing is associated with higher TMT quality. We then show that both higher TMT quality and VC-backing lead to higher growth in post-IPO operating performance and higher IPO valuations. We find that the above two variables affect the growth in post-IPO operating performance through an “ability channel,” whereby the TMTs of such firms choose projects with higher equilibrium scale and implement them more ably. Further, TMT quality and VC-backing affect IPO firm valuations not only through the above ability channel, but also through a “certification channel,” whereby higher TMT quality and VC-backing credibly certify intrinsic firm value to the IPO market, thus reducing the extent of asymmetric information facing such firms in the IPO market and yielding these firms higher IPO valuations. Finally, we show that TMT quality and VC-backing act as complements in their effect on IPO firms' growth in post-IPO operating performance.     

Supporting innovation and venture development in established companies

Accumulated research findings call into question the ability of established corporations to develop and manage new ventures successfully. This article argues that the problem comes in large part from failing to differentiate between the requirements of administrative management—geared to managing existing activities and holding things in place to ensure continuation of already-developed activities—and the requirements of entrepreneurial management—designed to create change by developing something new. The two kinds of management are in tension and may interfere with each other, but every established organization needs both in order to get both innovation and efficiency.Innovations and new ventures have four particular characteristics that account for their special management requirements: uncertainty, knowledge-intensivity, competition with alternative courses of action, and boundary-crossing. Thus entrepreneurial management to support creation of the new puts a stress on such features as visionary leadership, “patient money,” planning flexibility, team continuity/stability, and interfunctional cooperation. But the usual requirements of administrative management in established corporations contradict these principles. Thus some companies try to set their new ventures apart from the old to avoid conflicts in management requirements. However, this this only partially solves the problem.All companies need both to manage ongoing activities and to create new ones—with the proportions of each depending on the nature of the business. They need to strike a balance between administrative and entrepreneurial management. The problem of venture development in established corporations occurs when administrative management comes to dominate and innovation is not valued sufficiently. The command system of administrative management needs to be replaced by a mutual adjustment system.High innovation companies build mutual adjustment into their design. They allow flexibility to move into an entrepreneurial mode. They are characterized by broader jobs: structures built around small business units or functionally complete project teams; cultures stressing the ability of people to contribute more over time; and easy access to the key “power tools” of information, support, and resources.A more entrepreneurial corporation minimizes hard-and-fast rules and procedures governed by a rigidly defined command structure and emphasizes instead flexibility and broadly-skilled sets of employees in flexible units that can be grouped or regrouped as changing circumstances require.Large corporations must institute deliberate programs to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship, including removing the roadblocks of unnecessary administrative requirements; encouraging integration across departments and functions: changing budgeting and accounting procedures and providing internal venture capital and special project funds; discretionary time; and new business performance measures.     

The use and abuse of executive powers in warding off corporate raiders

As corporate raids become more prevalent, top corporate executives have asked for and often received additional executive power to ward off raiders or “sharks”. For example, they have been given the use of “shark repellents” such as staggered elections for board members, cumulative voting, super majority voting requirements, and the power to sell off the firm's “crown jewels”. Are they abusing these powers as they attempt to save their jobs, at the expense of stockholders, by driving off the corporate raiders who might unseat ineffective management? In this article the practices being used by entrenched managers to make their firms less attractive to raiders and the defense tactics they are using in corporate takeover battles are examined from an ethical viewpoint.     

Venture capital reputation: a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation—a contingent effect of industrial distance

This study investigates whether venture capital reputation is a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation by using data from 1553 observations of venture capital investments on entrepreneurial firms in China’s New Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market. Advantages that venture capital brings to entrepreneurial firms have been widely acknowledged in extant research. However, our research emphasizes the potential resource outflows rather than inflows when firms are embedded in a shared reputable venture capital, and finds that the curse effect of venture capital reputation on entrepreneurial firms is manifested. Furthermore, we develop the concept of venture capital “intra-industrial reputation” and “extra-industrial reputation” to give a contingent answer to the “blessing or curse” question. The conclusions are drawn indicating that the curse effect is contingent on industrial distance. Venture capital intra-industrial reputation is positively linked to entrepreneurial firm innovation, whereas extra-industrial reputation exerts a strong negative impact, which is responsible for the curse effect.     

The use of networks in human resource acquisition for entrepreneurial firms: Multiple “fit” considerations

This study proposes a multi-dimension, multi-contingent “fit” perspective for examining different practices adapted by entrepreneurial firms in acquiring human resources. We posit that while environmental constraints are important considerations for adapting recruitment practices through networks, strategic needs and interpersonal dynamics are the key drivers behind the evolution of such practices. As they transit from the startup to the growth phase, entrepreneurial firms utilize different network pools in search of diversity, yet cling to strong ties to find talents with common values and goals. Our findings carry important implications for future research in human resource management by integrating the macro- and micro-perspective, and at the same time, enhance the understanding of network effects and their strategic bearings in the entrepreneurial process, specifically in the acquisition of human resources.     

Predicting order and timing of new product moves: the role of top management in corporate entrepreneurship

In this study, we focused on new product move as a form of corporate entrepreneurial activity. We developed hypotheses relating the characteristics of the top management team (TMT) to the order and timing of new product moves made by firms. We analyzed 223 new product introduction moves from the personal computer, long distance telecommunication, and brewing industries from the period of 1975–1990. We found that firms with larger TMTs were more likely to be first movers. The hypothesis that firms with larger TMTs are more likely to respond quickly to new product moves received marginal support. The hypothesis that TMTs more heterogeneous in terms of organizational tenure of executives are more likely to be first movers as well as earlier in the order of new product moves received marginal support. We found contradictory results with TMT organizational tenure and TMT educational background heterogeneity as predictors of order and timing of new product moves. Subsequently, we conducted industry-wise analysis that revealed important differences in this new product entrepreneurial activity across the three industries.     

Linking two dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation to firm performance: The moderating role of environment and industry life cycle

The term “entrepreneurial orientation” has been used to refer to the strategy-making processes and styles of firms that engage in entrepreneurial activities. A popular model of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) suggests that there are five dimensions of EO—autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). This paper reports on two of those dimensions—proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness. Proactiveness refers to how firms relate to market opportunities by seizing initiative in the marketplace; competitive aggressiveness refers to how firms react to competitive trends and demands that already exist in the marketplace. Despite these distinctions, prior research has tended to equate these two concepts and argued that they have a similar effect on firm performance. This paper investigates how these two approaches are related to each other, how they are related to performance, and how their function differs in the environments in which firms exhibit these approaches to strategy making. These distinctions are important because proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness represent distinctly different avenues to entrepreneurial success.A field study was conducted in which 124 executives from 94 firms were surveyed. These were executives from non-affiliated, non-diversified firms who were actively involved in strategic decision making at the top level of the firm. All firms reporting had at least one respondent who was an owner. Analysis of the data was conducted in two phases. In phase 1, factor analysis was used to examine the distinctions between different dimensions of EO. Proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness emerged as two separate factors indicating that these two strategy-making modes were perceived differently by the executives in the study. In the second phase, the relationship of these two dimensions to performance was analyzed in various contexts. Initial tests found that proactiveness was positively related to performance but competitive aggressiveness tended to be poorly associated with performance.Subsequent tests of the EO-performance relationship indicated that the stage of industry life cycle tended to favor one entrepreneurial orientation over another. The performance of firms in the early stages of industry development was stronger when their strategy making was proactively oriented. In contrast, a competitively aggressive frame of mind was helpful to firms in more mature stages of industry development. These findings were supported by other tests of the business environment. In dynamic environments, characterized by rapid change and uncertainty, proactive firms had higher performance relative to competitively aggressive firms. In hostile environments, where competition is intense and resources are constrained, competitively aggressive firms had stronger performance.The findings suggest that these two different approaches to entrepreneurial decision making may have different effects on firm performance. The differences were particularly apparent in the way firms relate to their external environment. Proactiveness—a response to opportunities—is an appropriate mode for firms in dynamic environments or in growth stage industries where conditions are rapidly changing and opportunities for advancement are numerous. But such environments may not favor the kind of combative posturing typical of competitive aggressiveness. Firms in hostile environments, or in mature industries where competition for customers and resources is intense, are more likely to benefit from competitive aggressiveness—a response to threats. A further implication of this research is that the dimensions of an entrepreneurial orientation, often considered to be positively related to performance under all conditions, may not always be associated with successful outcomes. This study indicates that the dimensions of EO often vary independently rather than covary, suggesting that the extent to which an entrepreneurial approach to strategy making is useful will frequently depend on the organizational or environmental conditions under which such decisions are made.     

International Entrepreneurship as a Dynamic Adaptive System: Towards a Grounded Theory

This paper is based on a primary assumption: That the internationalizing smaller firms are different from large international firms, such as multinational enterprises (MNEs); and therefore, the process of internationalization and growth of smaller firms may not follow processes stipulated in the extant theories of MNEs and international business processes (IBPs). Even the primary orientations and theoretical constructs used in IBP and the theory of multinationals are different from those in entrepreneurship: While the former focuses on the institution of the “firm” the latter concentres on the “entrepreneur” as internationalizing entities. This paper will suggest a theoretical framework capable of integrating this prevailing fragmentation. The framework is based on the tenets of dynamic open complex adaptive system (DOCAS), comprising three layers, reflecting entrepreneurs (or entrepreneurial teams), firms and markets to reflect their own dynamics as well as the inter-relations and interactions of entities within and across layers within the framework. After a brief review of the basic characteristics of a simple DOCAS and the major attributes of entities populating each layer in the framework, the interdependencies and interactions within and across layers are highlighted. This framework presents a coherent and comprehensive structure capable of housing the next six papers contained in this issue. They are reviewed and highlighted from the perspective of the proposed framework. These papers support the proposed framework substantively. The proposed grounded framework appears to lay the foundation for the research and theory necessary for enhancing our understanding of IBP and internationalization in smaller firms. Conclusion and implications of the papers are presented at the end.     

Limits to learning from the west: How western management advice may prove limited in Eastern Europe

The West's aid to the emerging Eastern European economies includes consultancy and education. This will have considerable impact on their economic and managerial activity, even though the theories of organization and management on which it is based are much criticized here. As these theories are applied in the extreme economic, social and political circumstances of the Soviet collapse, we are likely to be both surprised and pushed into a period of critical organizational theorizing. Much of the criticism comes from institutionalists who reject a generic approach to economics and management. They argue instead that organizations are embedded within a specific environment of social, legal, economic, and technological institutions which fashion their activities. They are saying “things are different over there and we should recognize that our advice presumes our own institutional arrangements.” The first part of this study reviews the reasoning behind this critique. It has two threads: (a) the institutional context and the way that shapes economic transactions and their costs; and (b) the way institutions develop as collective responses to social uncertainties. We look at organization theory's dependence on the social institutions, such as contract law, professional training, and the market for insurance. We take these and many other Western institutions for granted, and seldom stop to analyze them. In Eastern Europe, managers lack such institutional infrastructures and face uncertainties beyond our experience. This article's second part focuses on the processes by which organizations respond to uncertainties. There are many types of uncertainty and we pick out that of adopting a new technology. Problems arise because of “gaps” between the organization's in-place work practices, knowledge, and attitudes, and those which they must eventually adopt if they are to use the new technology effectively. Recent research into workplace know-how suggests that such gaps are bridged by workers developing a new “tacit” understanding of the technology through learning-by-doing. This knowledge generation (KG) works best when it is also communal, when creative teams form. By definition, this kind of team cannot be managed bureaucratically, in ways that depend on an understanding of the task in hand. We see that bureaucracy is a theory of knowledge application (KA) which breaks down in the absence of the necessary knowledge, rules, measurements, communications, and sanctions. Creative teams can operate under the conditions of bureaucratic failure because they are held together by institutional forces rather than by rational administration. The context of social institutions outside the organization becomes important because it defines the institutional bases for such teams. In the final section we look beyond creative teams as internal uncertainty resolvers. The new institutional economists argue that firms should internalize the uncertain transactions that are difficult to contract, and so precipitate market failure. We suggest that entrepreneurs also look outside the firm at those social institutions which enable them to externalize uncertainties. In general, the institutionalist critique reveals that entrepreneurs have several domains of action. The formal KA part of the firm, the focus of classical organization and management theory, is but one of these domains. Other equally important KG domains lie both within the firm and in the interorganizational networks and social institutions beyond its boundaries. The uncertainties of the Soviet collapse move us on from the simplicities of Western organization theory toward a richer set of ideas more relevant to our Eastern European colleagues—and to ourselves.     

The impact of residual government ownership in privatized firms: New evidence from China

This study investigates the determinants of residual government ownership and the impact of such ownership on post-privatization performance in China. Using hand collected data, we find that government shareholders are more likely to be present in small firms, while large firms are more likely to have politically connected CEOs on their boards. Contrary to the “political interference” hypothesis, our results show that residual government ownership has a positive impact on Tobin's Q. This study indicates that when the risk of expropriation by parent companies is high, government shareholders can add value to firms by signalling their commitment to privatization.     

Entrepreneurs' perceived chances for success

Entrepreneurs involved in planning or starting firms must engage in a continuing process of appraising prospects for success. These assessments presumably bear upon the preparations they make, as well as, at some later point, whether they decide to make major changes or even to discontinue the business. In this study, data from 2994 entrepreneurs who had recently become business owners were analyzed to determine their perceived changes of success.Although previous evidence on business survival led to the hypothesis that the entrepreneurs would only be cautiously optimistic, this was not the case. They perceived their prospects as very favorable, with 81% seeing odds of 7 out of 10 or better and a remarkable 33% seeing odds of success of 10 out of 10. In considering the prospects for other businesses like their own, they perceived odds which were significantly lower, but still moderately favorable.Based upon previous research on factors associated with new business success, it was hypothesized that those who were “more likely to succeed” (based upon their personal backgrounds and the nature of their new firms) would be more optimistic. However, this was not the case. Those who were poorly prepared were just as optimistic as those who were well prepared.At this point, shortly after having become business owners, the assessment by entrepreneurs of their own likelihood of success was dramatically detached from past macro statistics, from perceived prospects for peer businesses, and from characteristics typically associated with higher performing new firms.The psychological literature on “post-decisional bolstering” suggests that decision makers, in many settings, tend to bolster or exaggerate the attractiveness of an option after it has been chosen. This, coupled with the tendency of entrepreneurs to believe that they can control their own destinies, implies that the extreme optimism observed here is probably a typical occurrence.For entrepreneurs the findings suggest that it is probably natural to experience feelings of entrepreneurial euphoria when first becoming a business owner. With the available evidence, it is difficult to judge whether this leads to inadequate preparations or an inability to diagnose problems and make adjustments after the business is started. This extreme optimism probably does contribute to the heavy personal commitments observed here, in which the median entrepreneur devoted more than 60 hours per week to the business. The entrepreneur would seem well advised to form relationships with outsiders, such as board members and professional advisors, who can be objective and detached in diagnosing problems and assessing objectively the prospects for the business in its current form.     

The ambitious entrepreneur: High growth strategies of women-owned enterprises

During the last two decades, researchers have sought to develop categories of entrepreneurs and their businesses along a variety of dimensions to better comprehend and analyze the entrepreneurial growth process. Some of this research has focused on differences related to industrial sectors, firm size, the geographical region in which a business is located, the use of high-technology or low-technology, and the life-cycle stage of the firm (i.e., start-up vs. more mature, formalized companies). Researchers have also considered ways in which entrepreneurs can be differentiated from small business managers. One of these classifications is based on the entrepreneur's desire to grow the business rapidly. This is the focus of our study.To date, the media have paid considerable attention to rapidly growing new ventures. However, still lacking are large-scale research studies guided by theory through which we can expand our knowledge of the underlying factors supporting ambitious expansion plans. Some research has identified factors that enhance or reduce the willingness of the entrepreneur to grow the business. Factors include the strategic origin of the business (i.e., the methods and paths through which the firm was founded); previous experience of the founder/owner; and the ability of the entrepreneur to set realistic, measurable goals and to manage conflict effectively.Our study attempted to identify the strategic paths chosen by entrepreneurs and the relation of those paths to the growth orientation of the firm. The entrepreneurs sampled in this study are women entrepreneurs across a wide range of industrial sectors. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship research have suggested the need for more studies comparing high-growth firms with slower-growth firms to better delineate their differences in strategic choices and behaviors.Our study sought to answer the following questions: What characterizes a “high growth-oriented entrepreneur?” Is this distinction associated with specific strategic intentions, prior experience, equity held in previous firms, the type of company structure in place, or success factors the entrepreneur perceives are important to the business? Do “high growth” entrepreneurs show greater entrepreneurial “intensity” (i.e., commitment to the firm's success)? Are they willing to “pay the price” for their own and their firm's success? (i.e., the “opportunity costs” associated with business success and growth). Other relationships under investigation included different patterns of financing the business' start-up and early growth. Do “high-growth” entrepreneurs use unique sources of funding compared with “lower-growth” entrepreneurs?Eight hundred thirty-two entrepreneurs responded to a survey in which they were asked to describe their growth intentions along nineteen strategic dimensions, as well as respond to the foregoing questions. Some of the strategic activity measures included adding a new product or service, expanding operations, selling to a new market, and applying for a loan to expand operations. Actual growth rates based on sales revenues were calculated, and average annualized growth rates of the industrial sectors represented in the sample were obtained. This study showed that high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs were clearly different from low-growth-oriented entrepreneurs along several dimensions. The former were much more likely to select strategies for their firms that permitted greater focus on market expansion and new technologies, to exhibit greater intensity towards business ownership (“my business is the most important activity in my life”), and to be willing to incur greater opportunity costs for the success of their firms (“I would rather own my own business than earn a higher salary while employed by someone else”).The high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs tended to have a more structured approach to organizing their businesses, which suggests a more disciplined perception of managing the firm. In summary, results showed the group of high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs, labeled “ambitious,” as having the following distinctions: strategic intentions that emphasize market growth and technological change, stronger commitment to the success of the business, greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of the business, earlier planning for the growth of the business, utilization of a team-based form of organization design, concern for reputation and quality, adequate capitalization, strong leadership, and utilization of a wider range of financing sources for the expansion of the venture. The purpose in uncovering these differences is to enable entrepreneurs and researchers to identify more clearly the attributes of rapid-growth ventures and their founders and to move closer to a field-based model of the entrepreneurial growth process which will help delineate the alternative paths to venture growth and organizational change.     

A structural model of the effects of entrepreneurial characteristics on venture performance

Venture capitalists, “angel” investors, and experienced, successful entrepreneurs, when asked to identify the most important determinant of new venture performance, will undoubtedly answer “the entrepreneur.” Likewise, prominent academic scholars responsible for the accelerating development of entrepreneurship theory and research would almost always agree. Unfortunately, empirical and theoretical understanding of the influence of the entrepreneur on new venture performance (NVP) has long been stymied. Studies of entrepreneurial characteristics have failed to demonstrate convincing links with entrepreneurial states of being or with NVP, though studies of the former have shown more promise than have those of the latter. In an attempt to explain the failure to link entrepreneurial characteristics with performance and thus to stimulate and modify research agendas, this paper derives a structural, causal model of the relationships between entrepreneurial characteristics and performance. This derivation draws upon current psychological, management, economic, and entrepreneurship theory.Though there is considerable controversy in the field of psychology concerning the ability of personality traits to explain behavior, it is accepted by many that such traits do exist, that they are stable over time, and that they explain behaviors if the level of aggregation is wide enough. In 1988, Hollenbeck and Whitener noted that one of the problems in using personality traits to explain job performance was that such traits are mediated by motivation and moderated by abilities in their causal connection to performance. Thus personality traits are somewhat removed from performance in the causal chain of events. Applied to the study of the entrepreneur, this research suggests that an initial model of the “entrepreneurial characteristics → NVP” relationship must include the mediating role of motivation and the moderating role of entrepreneurial management abilities.This paper further redefines this emerging model of “entrepreneurial characteristics → NVP” by drawing upon other literature from the field of psychology. This literature suggests that “entrepreneurial behavior” and the context in which it is performed both intervene between motivation and ability in their relation to NVP. The paper concludes this section with a psychology-based model of the “characteristics → NVP” relationship that is more comprehensive and realistic than prior models in the entrepreneurship literature.The paper next draws from strategic management, entrepreneurship, and economics literature along with Sandberg's (1986) model of NVP [NVP = f(E,IS,S)] to show that any model of the connection between entrepreneurial characteristics and NVP must further recognize the relationship between strategy and NVP as well as industry structure and NVP. The resultant model suggests strategy and industry structure are “context” variables that interdependently interact with entrepreneurial behaviors to influence NVP. This adaptation of the model is reinforced and expanded by reviewing the management literature on matching managers to situations which in turn implies that the effects of entrepreneurial behaviors on NVP are contingent upon strategy and industry structure. Thus strategy and industry structure, though ultimately determined by entrepreneurial behavior, are themselves important inputs to the behavioral context of entrepreneurship.The last part of the paper examines decision-making, skills, aptitudes, and training as components helping to refine our understanding of the role of motivation as a mediator and ability as a moderator in a model of the “entrepreneurial characteristics → NVP” relationship. The intent here is to identify specific variables that can be studied or acted upon [in an applied sense] to improve the NVP impact of entrepreneurial behaviors.It is hoped that explication of this model will encourage future entrepreneurship research that seeks to examine causes of NVP to reintroduce “the entrepreneur” as the focus or a focus of the research. Hopefully a more fully developed model that includes motivations, abilities, skills, aptitudes, and training as elements in “modeling” entrepreneurial behavior along with the need for strategy and industry structure contexts provides a more compelling and risk-worthy starting point for such research. This should provide an impetus to put the entrepreneur back. into a central position in entrepreneurship research, where both theory and practitioners say he/she belongs.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Internationalization and entrepreneurial orientation of family SMEs: The influence of the family character

Internationalization is an important entrepreneurial strategy for promoting the long-term growth and survivability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Family involvement in top management teams (TMTs) can explain the heterogeneous behaviors of these firms’ international entrepreneurship process. This paper analyzes the moderating effects of the family’s influence on the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and internationalization with two TMT diversities found only in family firms: the family TMT ratio and generational involvement. An analysis of 191 Spanish family SMEs indicated that entrepreneurial orientation plays a significant role in explaining the degree of internationalization in family firms and that a diversely formed TMT shapes this relationship. A high concentration of family members in managerial positions hinders the international entrepreneurship process. This fact highlights the importance of hiring non-family managers to promote internationalization. The results also reveal that involving multiple generations in decision-making hampers entrepreneurial internationalization, generating control and coordination problems.     

Exploring the relationship between strategic reactiveness and entrepreneurial orientation: The role of structure–style fit

Theory suggests that firms may derive the greatest benefits from an entrepreneurial orientation (EO) when they concurrently exhibit a high degree of strategic reactiveness. This paper explores the relationship between strategic reactiveness and EO as well as the moderating effect of structure–style fit on this relationship. Data collected from 110 manufacturing firms indicate that strategic reactiveness is not significantly related to EO. However, firms that exhibit theoretically-congruent alignments between their organization structures and top management decision-making styles tend to have positive strategic reactiveness–EO relationships.     

Networking and growth of young technology-intensive ventures in China

More often than not, new ventures lack established products, known technologies, longstanding customer relations, experienced managerial teams, sufficient capital, and strong reputations. Almost by definition, small, new firms lack the resources of many larger, established firms. The task of an infant firm, and a measure of its success, is to make a transition from being resource weak to being resource strong.How can resources that are critical for profitable growth be acquired for the resource weak new venture? Researchers have found that entrepreneurs can gain access to valuable resources and they can seek to achieve competitive advantage through “networking activities.” Forming and utilizing available relationships with external organizations can allow entrepreneurs to build credibility, gain advice, financing, and customer access, build a positive image and obtain resources at below-market prices, and obtain channel access, information, and innovations. Business relationships with other organizations allow an entrepreneur to achieve desired business results through “asset parsimony.”A favorable view toward networking for new ventures leaves a number of unanswered questions, however. Relevant research questions might include, who should the entrepreneur seek as a business partner? Are all inter-organizational relationships equal, or are some types more valuable to new ventures than other relationships? Do firms relying on high levels of networking activities actually outperform firms that less actively seek resources through external organizational relationships?The present study provides a specific understanding of the concept of networking for entrepreneurs. We propose that networking can be understood in terms of “range,” the number of external relationships to obtain resources, and of “intensity,” the frequency of contact of and amount of resource obtained from these relationships. This research project evaluates the range and intensity of networking among high-growth and low-growth entrepreneurial ventures.Extensive interviewing with managers of six young technology-oriented firms in the People's Republic of China (PRC) affirmed the importance of entrepreneurial networking. Managers in the three high-growth firms reported greater range and intensity of business networking than did managers of three low-growth firms, matched by industry and age. Moreover, the relationship between networking activities and growth transcended the stage of firm development.Where networking range and intensity are deemed important in the growth process, new venture success may call for entrepreneurs to reach out deliberately to external organizations to capture needed resources. To a certain extent, such networking activities run counter to important entrepreneurial motivations of independence and autonomy. The concept of networking, and the results of this study, imply that entrepreneurs need to combine the spirit of independence with the reality of resource dependence, and they need to balance personal autonomy with strategic business relationships.This study also contributes to the understanding of entrepreneurship in our increasingly global economy, particularly in the PRC. Business relationships between the United States and the PRC have been expanding rapidly in the last decade. Many foreign businesses seek license agreements, joint venture partners, equity participation, or channel relationships with young ventures in that country. Do the same rules of networking apply in the PRC as the literature suggests apply in the United States? New ventures in this study were found to engage in processes of networking activities consistent with those in the West. Although networking activities may have different cultural roots, firm success appeared influenced by the same principles of networking.     

The network of relationships between the economic environment and the entrepreneurial culture in small firms

In this article we maintain that the cultural evolution processes of small firms are strongly influenced by the type of relationships that they establish with the economic environment.In the first part of the article, the main points of the discussion are set forth. Here, the theoretical debate is presented and the existing relations between the entrepreneurial culture and the interaction of firms with their economic environment is analyzed. In the second part of the article, the methodologies adopted for the statistical analysis are explained, and the results of the empirical analysis are presented. Finally, in the third part the implications for practitioners, industrial policies, and future directions in research are discussed.The importance of openness to change in the entrepreneurial culture is a basic assumption in this study. It is well known that in small and medium firms, entrepreneurs often demonstrate “a resistance to change” that limits the firm's competitiveness. In some observed territorial and industrial contexts this resistance to change is determined by a cultural entrepreneurial homogeneity. This homogeneity is a result of the similarity of the social, educational, and entrepreneurial experiences of the subjects observed. Indeed, the entrepreneurs studied had, for generations, received the same education, lived in the same area, and come from the same social setting. This entrepreneurial culture is typified by distrust of innovation and discontinuity, which leads these entrepreneurs to favor already proven solutions and initiate the behaviors of others, rather than take innovative actions. Principal component analysis has been used to identify the influences that various factors, within and external to the firm, have in the forming of an entrepreneurial culture and thus on the openness of entrepreneurs and firms to learning. In the sample, a trade-off emerged between tendencies to homologous behaviors and the spirit of initiative. Through cluster analysis we identified categories of entrepreneurs with a different propensity to innovation regarding established firm routines. “Learning entrepreneurs” belong mainly to industries that serve the final consumer while “bounded entrepreneurs” tend to specialize in commodities more often for export.The implications of our results might interest new entrepreneurs who can include this element when analyzing the viability of new ventures. Small, already operational firms, can evaluate opportunities arising from export processes or might adjust their position on the production filiére to be closer to the final market.This empirical analysis should be reapplied to firms in areas with different environmental characteristics or to production filiéres where the relationship between customer and supplier is different, as for example in high-tech-industries, so as to verify whether the intensity of the relations with the market differs according to external factors or the technological intensity of the industries examined.