Designing employment subsidies

The paper examines the relative effectiveness of two policy proposals in reducing unemployment and working poverty: hiring subsidies and wage subsidies. The hiring subsidies are targeted exclusively at the unemployed and are provided only for a limited period of time. The wage subsidies, on the other hand, are granted to all low-wage earners regardless of their employment history and are of limitless duration. Our analysis indicates that the relative effectiveness of the two policies depends on workers' prospective wage growth. The more upwardly mobile workers are (i.e. the more their wages rise with employment duration), the more effective will unemployment vouchers be relative to low-wage subsidies. Conversely, the greater the danger that workers come to be trapped in dead-end jobs with flat wage profiles, the more effective will low-wage subsidies be relative to unemployment vouchers.     

Nominal rigidities equilibria in a non-Ricardian economy

I consider a cash-in-advance economy with nominal price rigidities. Nominal interest rates are the cost of liquidity and fiscal policy sets nominal transfers that affect the distribution of wealth. Under a fiscal policy associated with an unequal distribution of wealth and for policies of low or even zero interest rates, coordination failures exist, that is, involuntary unemployment persist even if prices are set at full employment levels. Coordination failures exist if and only if nominal rates are below a threshold. Moreover, I demonstrate the following result on welfare: full employment allocations at a nominal rate equal to the threshold (high liquidity costs) are better, in terms of welfare, from unemployment allocations at any non-negative interest rates below the threshold. On the other hand, under a sufficiently progressive fiscal system that reduces the inequality in the wealth distribution, coordination failures do not exist.     

The distributive and welfare effects of product and labour market deregulation

This paper studies the effects of product and labour market deregulation on wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously distributed among sectors, I show that deregulation in goods market has mixed effects on inequality: the wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Moreover, deregulation in labour markets raises the aggregate level of employment and the average real wage but reduces the welfare of trade unions in sectors with a low level of competition.     

Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?

This paper investigates the possibility that the imposition of a minimum wage increases employment in the affected sector, measured in terms of hours of work, and lowers product prices. Unlike related prior theoretical research, I consider a neoclassical perfect information economy. Both labor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Workers choose the number of hours of work and their effort level. Workers can potentially, but not necessarily, differ in their preferences over income, leisure, and effort. Effort is perfectly observable by the employers. The general framework that highlights the channels through which a minimum wage can increase employment and reduce prices is introduced and necessary and sufficient conditions derived. The paper also develops a number of comparative statics and some illustrative examples. The results provide a simple theoretical foundation that explains some recent findings of the empirical literature on minimum wages. Auxiliary results help explain the effects of minimum wage on the entire wage distribution in a way that is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, welfare analysis shows that worker welfare and employment tend to go in opposite directions; in particular, if employment increases after the imposition of the minimum wage, worker welfare will be reduced, though not necessarily vice versa (the opposite is true for consumer welfare). Strikingly, if a minimum wage increases worker welfare, the chief beneficiaries are not the affected workers but those with incomes that exceed the minimum wage.     

The Rise in Danish Unemployment: Reallocation or Mismatch?*

The two main competing theories for the outward shift in the uv‐curve are investigated: increased separations from employment at a given employment level (reallocation) and decreased levels of hires, given unemployment and vacancies (mismatch). Shifts in the unemployment–vacancy (uv)‐curve and the hiring function are modelled by smooth transition functions, and the hypothesis of analogous shifts in the two curves is tested and accepted. This is interpreted as evidence in favour of the mismatch hypotheses.     

Public housing units vs. housing vouchers: Accessibility,local public goods,and welfare

We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.     

Does employment protection help immigrants? Evidence from European labor markets

High levels of employment protection reduce hiring and firing and have a theoretically ambiguous effect on the employment level. Immigrants, being new to the labor market, may be less aware of employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights, which may create a gap between the costs for employers of hiring a native relative to hiring an immigrant. This paper tests that hypothesis drawing on evidence for the EU and on two natural experiments for Spain and Italy. The results suggest that strict employment protection legislation (EPL) gives immigrants a comparative advantage relative to natives. Stricter EPL is found to reduce employment and reduce hiring and firing rates for natives. By contrast, stricter EPL has a much smaller effect on immigrants.     

Targeting and political support for welfare spending

This paper investigates the political support for social assistance policies in a model in which incomes are stochastic (so that welfare policies have an insurance benefit) and unequal ex ante (so that welfare policies have a redistributive effect). With self-interested voting, narrow targeting may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits for the majority that the majority prefers to eliminate benefits altogether, even though the cost of narrowly targeted benefits is close to zero. In contrast, a majority of self-interested voters always supports positive welfare benefits when the policy is targeted sufficiently broadly. If voters are somewhat altruistic, the impact of targeting on political support for welfare spending diminishes but does not disappear. Received: July 1999 / Accepted: May 30, 2000     

Innovation dynamics and fiscal policy: Implications for growth,asset prices,and welfare

We study the equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities and welfare by utilizing an endogenous growth model that matches asset pricing data well. The fiscal instruments of interest are (i) subsidies to R&D expenditure, consumption and capital investment, and (ii) cuts in labor and corporate tax rates. Our equilibrium analysis provides new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy. Importantly, we find growth and welfare to be inversely related when changing R&D subsidies. However, this depends on how well the model reproduces asset pricing dynamics. Moreover, only subsidies to capital investments and cuts in the corporate tax rate have the potential to increase both growth and welfare.     

Employment,Inequality and the UK National Minimum Wage over the Medium‐Term*

We assess the impact of the national minimum wage (NMW) on employment and inequality in the UK over the decade since its introduction. We evaluate its effects in each year, using an incremental differences‐in‐differences (IDiD) estimator. Identification is based on variation in the bite of the NMW across local labour markets and the different sized year on year up‐ratings. We find that an increased bite of the NMW is associated with falls in lower tail wage inequality. While the average employment effect over the entire period is broadly neutral, there are small but significant positive NMW effects from 2003 onwards.     

Do Employers Respond to the Costs of Continued Search?*

An analysis of US and Slovenian vacancy data sets reveals that an employer who is searching to fill a job vacancy is more likely to fill the vacancy by hiring an under‐qualified worker when the search costs are higher; when, at the start of the search, the employer has less time to search at low cost; and during the week following an increase in search costs. These are interesting findings not only about the effects of search costs on employers’ hiring decisions, but also because they suggest that search frictions in the two labour markets may be considerable.     

Are contingent jobs dead ends or stepping stones to regular jobs? Evidence from a structural estimation

The proportion of part-time, dispatch, and temporary workers has increased in many developed economies in recent years. These workers receive lower average wages and benefits, and are subject to lower employment stability. This paper analyzes the effects of initially taking such jobs on the employment careers of young workers. We build an on-and-off-the-job search model, using Japanese data to perform a structural estimation of the model parameters and simulate career paths, in order to study the effects of the initial choice of employment on the probability of having a regular job in the future and on the welfare of the worker. We find that although contingent jobs are neither stepping stones towards regular employment nor dead ends, starting a career in a contingent job has a lasting effect on the welfare of the individual in Japan.     

Labor force participation and pair-wise efficient contracts with search and bargaining

A “constant” wage is pair-wise inefficient in a standard search model when workers endogenously separate from employment. We derive a pair-wise efficient employment contract that involves workers paying a hiring fee (or bond) upon the formation of a match. We estimate the constant wage and pair-wise efficient contract assuming the hiring fee is unobservable, and find evidence to reject the pair-wise efficient contract in favor of the constant wage rule. A counterfactual experiment reveals the current level of labor force participation to be 9.6% below the efficient level, and a structural shift to the pair-wise efficient contract improves welfare by roughly 3.5%.     

MIGRATION THEORIES AND EVIDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT

Abstract. This paper presents a critical survey of theories of migration, their welfare and policy implications and their empirical relevance. We also develop some extensions to the theory beginning with the Harris and Todaro (HT) model. In particular, the HT model is extended to examine risk averse behaviour within families where the migration of members of families serves to diversify risk. The welfare implications of the individual migration decision and government intervention in the form of employment subsidies are examined. Recent evidence on international migration is presented. It is shown that migration does not flow automatically in response to wage differentials. Characteristics of migrants and the process of self-selection are found to be important determinants of the rate of migration.     

Quasi-structural estimation of a model of childcare choices and child cognitive ability production

This article evaluates the effects of maternal vs. alternative care providers’ time inputs on children’s cognitive development using the sample of single mothers in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. To deal with the selection problem created by unobserved heterogeneity of mothers and children, we develop a model of mother’s employment and childcare decisions. We then obtain approximate decision rules for employment and childcare use, and estimate these jointly with the child’s cognitive ability production function. To help identify our selection model, we take advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation in employment and childcare choices of single mothers generated by the variation in welfare rules across states and over time created by the 1996 welfare reform legislation and earlier State waivers.     

Public service restructuring in the UK: the case of the English National Health Service

This article overviews welfare state retrenchment in the UK under the Conservative‐led coalition government that formed in May 2010 and has centred its response to economic crisis on rapid public deficit reduction through public expenditure austerity targeted increasingly on the welfare benefits budget. It locates the coalition's reforms of public services and public sector employment relations in the long trajectory of public sector restructuring in the UK: the policies of New Right governments in the 1980s and New Labour from 1997 to 2010 that installed marketisation and privatisation in a permutation of forms, intensifying challenges for trade union organising. Focusing on the English NHS, the article identifies the respects in which the coalition's reforms continue and depart from New Labour's.     

Skill shortages and labor market outcomes in Central Europe

The new Central European members of the EU have been characterized by low employment rates, especially among unskilled workers, despite the GDP recoveries and large private sector shares in output and employment. Evidence points at skill shortages in Central Europe as a key impediment to faster labor reallocation and convergence to the EU-15 employment structures. In this paper, we develop a simple model of labor reallocation with transaction costs and show how skill shortages can inhibit firm creation and increase income inequality. We use the model to examine the impact of training subsidies and their financing on skill acquisition and start-ups of new private firms, and show that the positive effect of subsidies would be mostly offset by high wage taxes. Shifting financing from wage to consumption taxes would improve incentives for workers’ training and firm start-ups, while relying more on income taxes could reduce the income gap between workers and entrepreneurs.     

Can child care policy encourage employment and fertility?: Evidence from a structural model

We develop a structural model of female employment and fertility which accounts for intertemporal feedback effects between these two outcomes. To identify the effect of financial incentives on employment and fertility we exploit variation in the tax and transfer system, which differs by employment state and number of children. Specifically, we simulate in detail the effects of the tax and transfer system, including child care costs. The model provides estimates of the structural preferences of women that can be used to study the effect of various policy reforms. Results show that increasing child care subsidies, conditional on employment, increases the labor supply of all women as well as the fertility rates of the childless and highly educated women.     

Moving on up: The Rooney rule and minority hiring in the NFL

Detecting and quantifying racial discrimination in the labor market is difficult. The sports industry offers a wealth of data and specific hiring practices which mitigates this difficulty. The Rooney Rule requires National Football League teams to interview at least one minority candidate when hiring a head coach. We examine a unique data set of high-level assistant coaches (offensive and defensive coordinators) from the beginning of the 1970 season through the beginning of the 2009 season to determine whether race is a factor in NFL teams' decisions to promote these assistants to head coach. Using logit and hazard models that control for age, experience and performance, we conclude that conditional on a coach reaching coordinator status, there is no evidence that race influences head coach hiring decisions. We also find no evidence that the Rooney Rule has increased the number of minority head coaches.     

The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining

This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital.