Critical levels and the (reverse) repugnant conclusion

It is well-known that there is a trade-off among the properties of population principles that are used to make social evaluations when the number of people in the society under consideration may vary. The commonly used principles either lead to the repugnant conclusion (which is the case for classical utilitarianism), or they violate the Pareto-plus principle and related properties (average utilitarianism is an example of such a principle). This paper examines the nature of this trade-off and shows that the incompatibility between avoiding the repugnant conclusion and the Pareto-plus principle is fundamental and not restricted to the commonly used population principles.     

Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice

This paper formalizes two different principles to socially rank allocations under efficiency-equity trade off. The efficiency-first social preference relation ranks an allocation x higher than an allocation y if and only if (i) x is Pareto-superior to y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equity-superior to y. The equity-first social preference relation reverses the order of application of the two criteria. We show that the efficiency-first relation may have a cycle, whereas the equity-first relation is transitive. We also characterize and compare the sets of maximal elements for these social preference relations in the Edgeworth box and examine the nonemptiness of the sets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D63, D61.     

Social insurance and social justice—Another look at the antipoverty effects of social insurance programs

This paper analyzes social insurance programs in the United States to determine if they support the principles of social justice, with special emphasis on the principle of preferential treatment of the poor. The paper also examines the antipoverty effects of social insurance programs. The major conclusions are the following: (1) social insurance programs generally are consistent with the principles of social justice, but parts of certain programs clearly violate the norms of social justice; (2) social insurance programs are especially powerful in reducing the poverty rate and poverty gap for the elderly, but are generally ineffective in reducing the poverty rate for single-parent families with related children under age 18; (3) social insurance programs have only a minor impact in reducing the poverty rate among married-couple families with related children under age 18; and (4) although the Social Security payroll results in a small increase in the poverty rate, social insurance programs are especially effective in reducing income inequality.     

A social economist’s search for justice: Comment

This paper analyzes social insurance programs in the United States to determine if they support the principles of social justice, with special emphasis on the principle of preferential treatment of the poor. The paper also examines the antipoverty effects of social insurance programs. The major conclusions are the following: (1) social insurance programs generally are consistent with the principles of social justice, but parts of certain programs clearly violate the norms of social justice; (2) social insurance programs are especially powerful in reducing the poverty rate and poverty gap for the elderly, but are generally ineffective in reducing the poverty rate for single-parent families with related children under age 18; (3) social insurance programs have only a minor impact in reducing the poverty rate among married-couple families with related children under age 18; and (4) although the Social Security payroll results in a small increase in the poverty rate, social insurance programs are especially effective in reducing income inequality.     

Transfer principles in income redistribution

Dalton's principle of transfer for income redistribution says that society will be better off when a unit of income in transferred from a richer to a poorer individual. This paper investigates the conjunction of a natural extension of Dalton's principle — which says that any combination of a socially desirable transfer with its inverse at uniformly higher levels of income will have positive social benefit — and a traditional utilitarian-egalitarian formulation of social welfare. The transfer principles involved in the extension of Dalton's rule correspond to stochastic dominance relations between income distributions with a common mean, and lead to the conclusion that, when ? and g are income distributions, the social welfare of ? is larger than that of g if $\text{Σe}{}^{\mathrm{-ax}}\text{?(x)<Σe}{}^{\mathrm{-ax}}\text{g(x)}$ for all positive a. This conclusion is intimately connected with a measure of income inequality studied by Kolm.     

Allowing disagreement in evaluations of social welfare

There is no consensus on how to measure interpersonally comparable, cardinal utility. Despite of this, people repeatedly make welfare evaluations in their everyday lives. However, people do not always agree on such evaluations, and this is one important reason for political disagreements. Thus, to keep in control of the normative premises, decision makers may prefer information which can be used as input to an arbitrary social welfare function to information which is the output from a social welfare function specified by the analyst. In this paper we try to identify and simplify sufficient welfare indicators; information which enables decision makers to arrive at welfare evaluations of social states or projects, according to their own ethical beliefs. Our conclusion is that providing factual information about different population groups, their social state, size, and characteristics, may be better for this purpose than the more traditional approach of focusing on ordinal utility information.     

Decomposable Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

This article shows that a social choice function defined on a domain of separable preferences which satisfies a relatively weak domain-richness condition on a product set of alternatives is (i) strategy-proof and only depends on the tops of the individual preferences if and only if (ii) the range of the social choice function is a product set and the social choice function can be decomposed into the product of one-dimensional, strategy-proof, nontop-insensitive social choice functions.
JEL Classification Number: D71.     

Securing basic well-being for all

The purpose of this article is to examine the possibility of a social choice rule to implement a social policy for “securing basic well-being for all.” The article introduces a new scheme of social choice, called a social relation function (SRF), which associates a reflexive and transitive binary relation over a set of social policies to each profile of individual well-being appraisals and each profile of group evaluations. As part of the domains of SRFs, the available class of group evaluations is constrained by three conditions. Furthermore, the non-negative response (NR) and the weak Pareto condition (WP) are introduced. NR demands giving priority to group evaluation, while treating the groups as formally equal relative to each other. WP requires treating impartially the well-being appraisals of all individuals. In conclusion, this article shows that under some reasonable assumptions, there exists an SRF that satisfies NR and WP.     

Relative Performance Evaluations in a Model of Financial Intermediation

This paper focuses on the delegation by bank managers of lending decisions to their agents, typically subordinate employees of the bank. We assume that agents may base their decisions about lending to borrowers on decisions other banks have made about these same borrowers. Then we show that there exist some lazy or negligent agents who neither directly monitor the borrower nor imitate the other banks if managers use relative performance evaluations as incentive schemes. In addition, it is shown that the learning or adjustment process of agents exhibits cyclical dynamics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D83.     

Intergenerational transfers and the social discount rate

This paper investigates the relationship between intergenerational asset transfers and the choice of the discount rate for use in cost-benefit analysis in a model of a competitive overlapping generations economy constrained by a socially managed exhaustible resource. Provided that there are no distortions in capital markets and that all agents hold perfect foresight, cost-benefit techniques will result in a Pareto efficient resource allocation if the discount rate is set equal to the market rate of interest. But since the path of the interest rate depends on the level of intergenerational transfers, cost-benefit techniques do not ensure a socially desirable distribution of welfare between generations; a social optimum will result only if intergenerational transfers are properly chosen and enforced. Decentralized private altruism may result in intergenerational transfers that both present and future individuals would agree are too small if members of the present generation attach positive weight to the general welfare of future generations, not simply their personal descendants. In a world where intergenerational transfers are non-optimal, second-best policy-making may imply a constrained optimum that is inefficient. Together, these findings suggest that cost-benefit analysis is at best a partial criterion to policy formulation that should be used only in conjunction with ethical principles that define the proper distribution of welfare between present and future generations.     

Banking,incentive constraints,and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns

Summary This paper presents two results regarding banking theory: (1) demand deposit contracts are essential in providing insurance against preferences shocks, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), if and only if the incentive compatibility conditions bind at the social optimum; and (2) for additively separable preferences with random discount factors, demand deposit contracts have the realistic feature that the interest rate paid is an increasing function of deposit balance.This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Minnesota. I am indebted to Neil Wallace for his advice and guidance. I thank an anonymous refree for comments on a previous version of the paper. The comments from Edward Green, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Antonio Merlo, and Arijit Mukherji are appreciated.     

Work Ownership Implications of Recent Papal Social Thought

This paper examines a particular employment inference of recent Papal social thought, for a Western developed economy context. The Papal documents studied are Centesimus Annus (1991), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987), and Laborem Exercens (1981). The first and shortest section of the paper outlines a number of principles from the encyclicals aiming to guide employment organisation and policy relevant to Western and all economies. To permit their full consideration, an illustration is given how implications affecting forms of employment organization might be drawn from just one of the principles--the right to private property ownership. Private property ownership rights are argued to be constrained in specific ways, to relate instrinsically to employment organization, and to underpin other principles emphasized in the encyclicals, such as the priority of labor over capital. A selection of recent non-official-Church Catholic Social Thought is compared with the approach here. Since the encyclicals deal with issues only at the level of principle, the paper notes cases where attempts have been made to apply some of the employment organizational implications in practice.     

Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting

This paper derives a necessary condition for unanimous voting to converge to the perfect information outcome when voters are only imperfectly informed about the alternatives. Under some continuity assumptions, the condition is also sufficient for the existence of a sequence of equilibria that exhibits convergence. The requirement is equivalent to that found by Milgrom [1979, Econometrica47, 679-688] for information aggregation in single-prize auctions. An example illustrates that convergence may be reasonably fast for small committees. However, if voters have common preferences, unanimity is not the optimal voting rule. Unanimity rule makes sense only as a way to ensure minority views are respected. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, D82, D44.     

Counter-Factual Geopolitics: President Al Gore,September 11th and the Global War on Terror

In this paper, a counter-factual geopolitics is addressed with specific reference to the US presidential election of November 2000. What difference would it have made if President Al Gore had been confirmed as holder of that office rather than George W. Bush? Would we have had a very different kind of response to September 11^th for example? By focusing on some of the speeches and remarks given by Al Gore, we consider how a different strategy might have emerged following that momentous event. It is contended, however, that despite what the anti-Bush critics might have wished for, the geopolitical and spatial consequences of a Gore administration might have differed only on tactics and strategies rather than fundamental principles. By way of conclusion, the paper considers how counter-factualism might contribute to the further development of critical geopolitical scholarship.     

Is social justice for or against liberty? The philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty

By comparing the philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty, this paper shows that some similarities in the economic theories of Mill and Hayek are actually based on different rationales. It follows that any attempt to find a common thread in Mill and Hayek to provide reasonable guidance for social policy can be promising only if we can find the common ground from their social philosophy. While analyzing the rationales behind their opinions regarding the role of government and taxation policies, this paper will focus on exploring the role of two philosophical ideas, liberty, and justice. This will clarify the relationship between social justice and liberty as well as their status in relation to the ultimate principle of rules in the philosophy of Mill and Hayek. This paper will offer an explanation why, in Mill’s utilitarian philosophy, the pursuit of social justice aligns with the real freedom of everyone, but in Hayek’s philosophy, it is a hindrance.     

Strategic niche management of social innovations: the case of social entrepreneurship

Strategic niche management (SNM), a tool to understand and manage radical socio-technical innovations and facilitate their diffusion, has always departed from a technical artefact. Many radical innovations, however, do not revolve around such an artefact. Social entrepreneurship is a new business model that combines a social goal with a business mentality and is heralded as an important new way to create social value such as sustainability. This study examines if and how SNM can be applied to such a social innovation. It identifies theoretical and practical limitations and proposes solutions. The main conclusion is that SNM can be used to analyse radical social innovation, although it requires rethinking the initial entry point for research and management. Exemplifying quotes are proposed as an alternative. Second, this paper suggests using values to describe niche–regime interaction as a better way to anticipate future niche–regime interactions.     

Social welfare for an economy of angelic agents

This paper analyzes an economy in which all agents are pursuing the common good (or social welfare) but choices are decentralized, i.e., each agent can choose his/her action in the set of the actions that he/she can perform. One wonders if it is enough the common goal of maximizing social welfare to their will be achieved. The paper examines both the cases in which the choice made by each agent does not directly influence those of other agents, as in the competitive equilibrium analysis, and the case in which there is a direct influence, as in the game theory analyses. In the first case, we get that the common goal of maximizing social welfare is not enough to reach it, but it is necessary to coordinate the actions of individual agents by extending information to redistribute initial endowments and by introducing an appropriate social organization. We get the maximum social welfare without further intervention for the cases describable with the theory of games, but only for games of complete information. If the information is incomplete, some further coordination is generally required.     

On myopia as rationale for social security

It has been argued that “paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems.” This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.     

Comparison of excess social rates of return to product and process R&D

This paper reports results for a well established production function that includes research and development (R&D). By assuming zero depreciation, it can be used to provide estimates of excess social rates of return to R&D. The estimates distinguish spending on product and process innovations for three US manufacturing industries. The results suggest that, while excess social rates of return are found to be negative for product R&D, they are positive for process in each of the industries. They therefore suggest some scope for public R&D subsidies or tax benefits to process R&D but not to product R&D.