基于融资瓶颈下的高科技企业孵化器与风险投资的关系

我国高科技企业孵化器和风险投资在支持创新创业活动和促进高新技术产业化发展等方面都取得突出成效，发挥了重要作用，二者之间存在很多共性，如何将风险投资与孵化器互补起来，用以改善孵化器资金不足，风险投资项目少的问题。两者都是创新性运行模式，均可以与创业高科技企业形成一种多赢互利的关系。孵化器在不断的发展中可以借助风险投资的资本实力来促成新经营模式的实现；而风险投资则可以通过孵化器发展壮大其投资业务，增加投资收益回报率。因此，企业孵化器与风险投资密切结合、协同发展存在了可操作的空间，其合作有必然趋势。     

实现孵化器、风险投资、创业企业的三赢

孵化器和风险投资都是创业企业成长的重要支持要素,尽管孵化器与风险投资具有一定的差异性,但孵化器和风险投资具有很强的一致性,这为他们的融合提供了可能。他们的融合互动将有益于实现三赢。目前我国在这方面存在很多不足,所以必须结合我国的实际,对风险投资在入孵企业进入不同阶段,以及在国家重点发展行业的专业孵化器中的投资给予程度不同的优惠政策,以此促进融合、优势互补。     

风险投资与孵化器融合对高新技术产业发展机制分析

新经济时代,海内外实践有力证实风险投资与企业孵化器的融合越来越成为一种必然的趋势.本篇文章首先分析了风险投资于孵化器融合点及其融合时需要具备的条件,由此来证明这两项技术融合的可行性与有效性.继而分析了风险投资与孵化器融合对高技术产业发展的机理,证明风险投资与孵化器融合将使高新技术产业实现项目选择、经营管理、资金运作及政策法规上的战略互动,届时也给高科技产业提供一条更为有效的发展途径.     

风险投资与孵化器效“联姻”

无论对于发达国家还是发展中国家来说，高新技术产业对经济的推动作用已是不容忽视。风险投资与孵化器作为高新技术产业的助推器，在其发展中都扮演着重要的角色。但两者功能上的互补性又被进一步证明，如果风险投资与孵化器能够融合发展，将会实现项目选择、经营管理、资金运作及政策法规上的战略互动，届时也给高科技产业提供一条更为有效的发展途径。笔者最后还为风险投资与孵化器有效“联姻”提出了政策建议。     

风险投资与孵化器有效"联姻"

无论对于发达国家还是发展中国家来说,高新技术产业对经济的推动作用已是不容忽视。风险投资与孵化器作为高新技术产业的助推器,在其发展中都扮演着重要的角色。但两者功能上的互补性又被进一步证明,如果风险投资与孵化器能够融合发展,将会实现项目选择、经营管理、资金运作及政策法规上的战略互动,届时也给高科技产业提供一条更为有效的发展途径。笔者最后还为风险投资与孵化器有效“联姻”提出了政策建议。     

科技企业孵化器综合支撑体系构建

科技企业孵化器综合支撑体系由公共技术平台、政策平台和融资平台构成。本文认为,通过重点资助高校、依托社会力量,以及合理选择运行模式来构建公共技术平台;通过完善国家孵化器政策、扶持民营孵化器发展等构建政策平台;融资平台构建需要创造与风险投资融合的宽松环境、开辟多元风险投资的来源渠道。     

创新工场的SWOT分析

本文主要运用SWOT分析方法,科学、系统、清晰的分析创新工场优势与劣势、机会与威胁；并以创新工场为案例,探讨我国科技企业孵化器与创投合作发展的新模式,并提出切实可行的对策及建议,旨在为我国科技企业孵化器、风险投资以及高科技产业的良性发展摸索出一条创新之径.     

产业集群视角下的武汉市科技企业孵化器发展对策探析

武汉市现已批准成立的各类科技企业孵化器已达数百家.科技企业孵化器如何企业其聚集起来产生集群效应,提高中小企业之间的合作与往来,提高产业集群的中小企业竞争力,提高了整个区域经济水平.文章从产业集群的视角来关注武汉市科技企业孵化器,探讨他的影响制约因素,并提出解决问题的发展对策.     

浅谈实质重于形式原则在会计中的应用

在国际经济形势疲软、国内经济改革深化的背景下,实质重于形式原则在企业会计工作中的应用,从企业发展的经济规律与会计工作本质层面有效地保障企业自身与会计的专业性和科学性。研究认为,尊重经济规律与市场规律是尊重企业交易或事项的经济实质的基础,通过企业会计实务工作发挥对企业交易或事项的保障、引导与监督作用,为企业发展和创新创造更优质的资源优化整合的会计工作环境。     

风险投资对企业发展的利弊分析

风险投资是企业日后发展的孵化器。国际贸易迅猛发展,以及我国进出口贸易规模的不断扩大,为国际贸易融资开辟了广阔的市场,更为风险投资开辟了更宽的道路。目前我国中小企业在国民经济中发挥着举足轻重的作用,在市场经济中,风险投资能够为企业资金问题寻找有效出路,并且堵住经营不善留下的缺口,使许多面临倒闭的中小企业重新崛起。但是,部分企业融资难、资金短缺的现状在风险投资中容易成为企业发展的绊脚石。因此本文通过分析风险投资对企业发展的利弊,找出企业发展风险投资的问题和不足,并提出一系列应对措施。     

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis.In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading.The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences.The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors.While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.     

Angels and non-angels: Are there differences?

The market for informal venture capital is an elusive and nearly invisible source of financing for entrepreneurial ventures. This market consists of a diverse set of high net worth individuals (business angels) who invest a portion of their assets in high-risk, high-return entrepreneurial ventures. The emerging consensus of the characteristics of the individual investor is that of a well-educated,middle-aged individual with considerable business experience and a substantial net worth. These informal investors appear to prefer investing in the early start-up stage of the venture and, if given a choice, prefer that their investments be located close to home. One consequence of this consensus is the tendency to assume that the traits of these business angels are as tightly clustered around the norm as are the traits of venture capital funds. They are not. In terms of their competence in the many areas of venture investing, these Individual investors range from the successful, cashed-out entrepreneur on the one hand to individuals with little or no experience with venture investing on the other. At the same time, little is known about the characteristics of high net worth individuals who never ventured where angels dare to tread, or about these non-angels' propensity to join the fold. Thus, this study seeks to fill the void by examining the characteristics of high net worth individuals regardless of their investment history or their interest in venture investing.An analysis of the data reveals three groups of high net worth Individuals: business angels with experience investing in entrepreneurial ventures, interested potential investors with no venture investment history but who express a desire to enter the venture investment market, and uninterested potential investors who under no circumstances would consider investing in entrepreneurial ventures as part of their investment strategy. Business angels and potential investors (both the interested and non-interested segment) share similar views about the economic significance of the entrepreneur and the difficulty in securing the equity capital for development of the venture. As the issues move from the general to the specific, divergence in investment attitudes takes place among the two groups, but this divergence is in terms of magnitude or intensity, rather than in contrasting or opposing views of the process. The potential investor tends to view investing in entrepreneurial ventures on a smaller scale than the active investor, especially in terms of the dollar amount committed to any one investment. While the business angel is more interested than the potential investor across all stages of financing, the interest for both groups increases as the type of financing progresses from the seed stage to expansion financing. In contrast, the potential investor is more likely to seek diversification as a motivation for venture investing than their angel counterparts.The potential investor pool is segmented into those potential investors who appear willing to take on the role of business angels and those individuals who have no desire to participate in the venture market. For the interested group to increase their interest in providing venture capital, these potential investors want assistance in monitoring the performance of the venture investment, followed by assistance in pricing and structuring. Both of these resources relate more to the technical aspects of venture investing and Indicate that these are the areas where the potential investor is least likely to have expertise. Other resources, such as finding and evaluating the investment opportunity, appear to represent less of a stimulus for the potential investor. In many respects, interested potential investors act like business angels across several dimensions. Both consider the later stages of the development of the venture as the preferred stage to invest. The business angel and interested potential investor prefer investments to be located relatively close to their primary residence and share similar views on the amount of the investment portfolio to allocate to venture investing. Where the interested potential investor and business angel clearly differ is on the scale of the commitment and the motivation for investing. The potential investor will commit a smaller dollar amount to any one venture, is more inclined to participate with other investors, and is more apt to see venture investing as a diversification strategy than is the seasoned business angel.     

Technology commercialization, incubator and venture capital, and new venture performance

This study examines the effects of technology commercialization, incubator and venture capital supports on new venture performance from the resource-based view. This study uses regression analysis to test the hypotheses in a sample of 122 new ventures. The findings highlight the role of technology commercialization as a mediator between organizational resources, innovative capabilities, and new venture performance. Also, the empirical evidence indicates that incubator and venture capital supports moderate the effects of technology commercialization on the performance of new ventures. Finally, this study discusses managerial implications and highlights future research directions.     

The Size of the Informal Venture Capital Market in the United Kingdom

Despite its undoubted importance to the financing of entrepreneurial ventures, there are few reliable measures of the size of the informal venture capital market. This paper reviews three methods used to generate such estimates – market-based approaches, firm-based approaches and the capture-recapture approach – and develops an alternative approach that is based on scaling up from the visible segment of this market represented by business angel networks. This methodology is applied to provide the first formal estimate of the size of the informal venture capital market in the United Kingdom. Informal venture capital investment is shown to broadly equate to the amount of institutional venture capital provided to start-up and early stage ventures. Reflecting the smaller average size of investments in the informal venture capital market, however, eight times as many businesses raise finance from business angels than from institutional venture capital funds.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

Venture capital and high technology entrepreneurship

Venture capital clearly plays an important role in high technology entrepreneurship. The purpose of this article is to explain the differences among various venture capital complexes focusing on where venture capital is important to innovation and entrepreneurship and conversely where it is not. We do so through an empirical and historical examination of the seven most important venture capital complexes: California (San Francisco/ Silicon Valley), Massachusetts (Boston), New York, Illinois (Chicago), Texas, Connecticut, and Minnesota (Minneapolis).We establish a three-part tripartite typology for explaining the differences between these venture capital complexes: 1) technology-oriented complexes are located close to concentrations of high technology intensive businesses, invest most of their funds locally, and are net attractors of capital; 2) finance-oriented complexes are located around financial institutions and export their capital; and 3) hybrid complexes mix characteristics of both technology and finance-oriented venturing.Our findings have a series of important practical implications. Although venture capital is not absolutely necessary to facilitate high technology entepreneurship, well-developed venture capital networks provide tremendous incentives for entrepreneurship by lowering the difficulties of entering an industry. Venture capitalists use both their experience and their contacts to reduce many of the information and opportunity costs associated with new business formation. The importance of contact networks and information to both deal flow and investment monitoring goes a low way toward explaining why venture capitalists cluster tightly together. The availability of venture capital also attracts entrepreneurs and high quality personnel to a region creating a virtuous circle of new enterprise formation, innovation, and economic development.Private, nonprofit, and subsidized public efforts aimed at providing venture capital and stimulating high technology entrepreneurship must confront the fact that venture capital alone will not magically generate entrepreneurship and economic development. It is important that such efforts recognize the nonfinancial side of venture investing and attract experienced personnel who can tap into established entrepreneurial networks and secure coinvestors. More significantly, establishing public venture funding in an area lacking the requisite entrepreneurial climate or technology infrastructure may create a “catch 22” situation where locally oriented funds invest in bad deals or where venture capital is simply exported to established high technology regions.     

Is it worth it? The rates of return from informal venture capital investments

Despite growing interest in venture capital, there is a paucity of information on the rate of return to these investments and the limited research that is available refers almost entirely to portfolio returns for venture capital funds. The investment returns to business angels have been virtually ignored. This paper provides the first attempt to analyse the returns to informal venture capital investment using data on 128 exited investments from a survey of 127 business angel investors in the UK. The paper finds that the distribution of returns is highly skewed, with 34% of exits at a total loss, 13% at a partial loss or break-even, but with 23% showing an IRR of 50% or above. Trade sales are the main way in which business angels harvest their investments. The median time to exit for successful investments was 4 years. Large investments, large deal sizes involving multiple coinvestors, and management buyouts (MBOs) were most likely to be high-performing investments.     

风险投资国际化影响因素研究综述

风险投资长期以来被视为是一项高度本土化的行为,但是近年来越来越多的风投机构开始走出国门进行远距离的跨境投资。这一现象引起了学者们的极大兴趣,许多学者开始致力于考察跨境风险投资的动因,即为什么本土化特征如此明显的风险资本开始热衷于进行跨越国境的远距离投资。尽管相关研究近几年才刚刚开始,但已迅速成为学术研究的热点。文章从国家环境因素、社会网络和风投机构主体因素三个层次,对风险投资国际化影响因素的最新文献进行了梳理和评述,并在此基础上对未来研究进行了展望。     

风险投资是新三板市场"积极的投资者"吗

定向增发在新三板创业企业的股权融资中发挥着中坚作用,而风险投资正是其中重要的参与者.本文选择2013 —2016年新三板企业定向增发为研究样本,实证检验了风险投资介入的动因及经济后果.研究发现,整体而言,风险投资参与新三板定向增发会选择财务绩效较好、创新能力较强的企业介入,结论支持了风险投资的事前筛选职能.大股东参与定向增发在一定程度上会减弱风险投资介入与企业财务绩效和创新能力之间的敏感性.当面对优质企业标的时,风险投资将选择联合投资的方式"抱团"进入,体现了其在新三板市场更为谨慎的投资风格.但风险投资进入所投企业后,受制于本身能力和投资意愿,并未显著提升被投企业财务绩效和创新能力,没有发挥事后监督职能.考虑新三板独特的做市商制度和分层制度,本文再次验证了风险投资事前筛选职能的履行和事后监督职能的缺失.本文不仅揭示了风险投资参与新三板企业定向增发的动因及经济后果,同时也为国家利用新三板市场推进创新战略、构建和完善多层次资本市场提供了经验证据.     

Closing the regional equity capital gap: The role of informal venture capital

There is evidence from a number of countries that small firms encounter a shortage of long-term investment finance, particularly at start-up and initial growth. Expansion of the institutional venture capital industry has done little to fill this equity gap on account of its preference for making large investments in established companies and management/leveraged buyouts. Moreover, the supply of venture capital exhibits a high level of spatial concentration. Initiatives by state/provincial and local governments, most notably in economically lagging regions, to increase the supply of risk capital for start-ups and early stage businesses have at best provided a very partial, and often costly, solution. A more appropriate approach to increasing the supply of start-up and early stage finance is to facilitate the more efficient operation of theinformal venture capital market. Informal investors, or business angels, are private investors who provide risk capital directly to new and growing businesses in which they have no family connection. Most business angels are unable to find sufficient investment opportunities and so have substantial uncommitted funds available. There is also considerable scope for expanding the population of business angels. The most cost-effective means of closing the equity gap is therefore for the public sector to underwrite the operating costs of business introduction services whose objective is to overcome the two main sources of inefficiency in the informal venture capital market, namely the invisibility of business angels and the high search costs of angels seeking investment opportunities and entrepreneurs seeking investors, by the provision of a channel of communication between informal investors and entrepreneurs seeking finance.