Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.     

相对绩效评价的绩效形式研究

本文针对以往相对绩效评价实证研究中单一指标度量企业绩效的不足,选取了13个指标,采用因子分析的方式构建了企业绩效指标体系,并选取774家A股上市公司1999-2006年的年报数据计算出各公司的综合绩效指数。相对于单一指标,基于绩效指标体系计算的综合绩效评价指数不仅能全面衡量企业绩效,为相对绩效评价的验证提供新视角,还能帮助公司经营者了解公司的优劣势,找出公司的相对竞争优势所在,取长补短,发挥企业的优势,提高公司的综合竞争力。     

Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section

Little evidence exists that firms index executive compensation to remove the influence of marketwide factors. We argue that executives can, in principle, replicate such indexation in their private portfolios. In support, we find that market risk has little effect on the use of stock‐based pay for the average executive. But executives' ability to “undo” excessive market risk can be hindered by wealth constraints and inalienability of human capital. We replicate the standard result that there is little relative performance evaluation (RPE) for the average executive, but find strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and executives with less financial wealth.     

CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand‐collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90^th to the 10^th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.     

The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation

Japanese firms report both parent-only and consolidated financial statements. Because of the unique business environment in Japan, there is a widely held view that parent-only data provides a better means for assessing the value of the entire firm. We find that both parent-only and subsidiary earnings are important in predicting future consolidated earnings. However, while stock prices accurately reflect the persistence of parent-only earnings, the Japanese stock market appears to underestimate the persistence of subsidiary earnings, causing a significant positive relation between changes in subsidiary earnings in year t and stock returns in year t +1. This relation between subsidiary earnings and future stock returns does not persist beyond year t 7plus;1. Taking a long (short) position in firms with large, positive (negative) changes in subsidiary earnings results in an average annual abnormal return of 7.06% with positive returns in 12 of the 13 years in the test period.     

媒体报道与高管薪酬契约有效性

本文利用2003-2011年中国A股上市公司11567个年度观察样本数据,实证检验了媒体报道对公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响关系,并进一步考察这一影响关系在不同产权性质公司中和不同制度环境下的差异。结果发现:(1)媒体报道水平与高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性之间存在显著的正向影响关系,说明媒体报道提高了高管薪酬契约有效性。(2)区分产权性质后发现,媒体报道的上述正向影响作用仅在国有上市公司样本才显著成立,意味着媒体报道主要提高了国有企业高管的薪酬契约有效性。(3)上市公司所处地区的制度环境水平越高,媒体报道的上述正向影响作用越强,表明制度环境是媒体报道有效发挥上述作用的重要条件。     

管理报酬契约与会计政策选择——兼论我国上市公司管理报酬契约的设计

由于管理报酬契约中对会计数字的依赖 ,分红计划假设显示经理人员具有机会主义会计政策选择的强烈动机 ,但往往效率性却有着更强的解释力。在一系列有效的激励约束机制的作用下 ,会计政策选择可以成为一种有效率的制度安排方式。基于此 ,我国上市公司管理报酬契约的设计除了要保证报酬契约方案本身具有激励兼容的功能之外 ,加强上市公司内外治理也是不可或缺的。     

Relative Pricing of Eurodollar Futures and Forward Contracts

Past research explains observed spreads between futures and forward Eurodollar yields as being due to the futures contract's mark-to-market feature. We derive closed form solutions for this yield spread and show that, theoretically, it should be small. Also, differences in liquidity, taxation, and default risk cannot account for the large spreads observed. We also present evidence that the spreads, which are nonnegligible primarily in the first half of the sample period, are likely to be attributable to the mispricing of futures contracts relative to the forward rates and that the mispricing was gradually eliminated over time.     

The Effects of Outside Directors and Board Shareholdings on the Relation Between Chief Executive Compensation and Firm Performance

Critics of corporate governance have suggested that improvements in board monitoring will arise from more independent boards consisting of outside directors and from increased stock ownership by directors. Presumably these changes should result in more rational, more defensible compensation decisions in which pay is clearly tied to results. In this paper, we test the premise that boards with a relatively higher proportion of outsiders and boards with significant shareholdings maintain a closer link between corporate performance and executive pay than do boards with fewer outsiders and boards holding little stock. The results of the study, based on a sample of 268 large corporations, are mixed. As expected, boards with significant shareholdings maintain a stronger linkage between compensation and firm-level performance. This finding persists even after controls are included for CEO and outsider shareholdings. Contrary to expectations, however, evidence was not found that firms with a higher proportion of outsiders on the board of directors relate compensation more strongly to firm results.     

国企改革背景下的企业创新和相对绩效评价——基于中国上市国有企业的实证研究

"创新驱动战略"和"激励约束机制"成为本轮国企改革的关键词。基于此背景,本文选取2008-2018年中国上市国有企业数据,探究了企业创新和相对绩效评价(RPE)之间的关系,得到两个结论:第一,得益于我国薪酬制度改革的不断深入,RPE在上市国有企业的薪酬合同中得到广泛应用;第二,由于创新投入对企业绩效有滞后效应,当企业增加研发投入时,企业高管可能会出于自利动机而减少RPE的使用。对此,本文从政府和企业两方面提出了解决建议。     

Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

I show that share repurchases increase pay-performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation.     

会计信息与管理者报酬激励契约研究综述

本文对会计信息在管理者报酬激励契约中的作用及对报酬激励机制目标的影响等相关研究进行综合评述,探讨会计信息在管理者激励契约中的应用趋势和指标的选取,最后对完善我国管理者报酬激励契约提出具体建议。     

Relative Performance Evaluation of Mutual Funds: A Non-Parametric Approach

We propose an alternative mutual fund performance index which addresses the benchmark problem and controls for economies of scale in managing mutual funds. We advance a new concept of 'return-cost' efficiency as another important element in evaluating portfolio management, in addition to the mean-variance efficiency concept. Our index based on a non-parametric estimation is shown to be similar to the Sharpe index with multiple slopes (or factors). We have shown that all fund categories, except income funds, have similar average efficiency scores after controlling for economies of scale. Most funds operate in increasing returns to scale and seem to be successful in holding mean-variance efficient portfolios, but unsuccessful in allocating transaction costs efficiently, evidenced by excessive turnovers and loads.     

相对业绩差距评估对基金经理风险承担的激励研究

基金经理在选择投资组合风险时,不仅会考虑基金的业绩排名,同时会考虑基金业绩之间的差距,由此提出了业绩差距排名,并提出了新的实证方法,即线性回归的方法来研究业绩差距排名对基金经理风险承担的影响,同时验证了BHS结论在中国基金市场中的适用性。结果表明BHS结论在中国基金市场中是不成立的,同时表明在中国基金市场中基金经理具有相对业绩排名目标,但此相对业绩排名是本文中所提出的业绩差距排名,此结论可以为监管部门规范基金投资行为以及为投资者选择基金提供参考。     

Renegotiation and Relative Performance Evaluation: Why an Informative Signal May Be Useless

Although Holmström's informativeness criterionprovides a theoretical foundation for the controllability principleand interfirm relative performance evaluation, empirical and fieldstudies provide only weak evidence on such practices. This paperrefines the traditional informativeness criterion by abandoning theconventional full-commitment assumption. With the possibility ofrenegotiation, a signal's usefulness in incentive contractingdepends on its information quality, not simply on whether the signalis informative. This paper derives conditions for determining when asignal is useless and when it is useful. In particular, theseconditions will be met when the signal's information quality iseither sufficiently poor or sufficiently rich. (JEL C72,D82).     

Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System

In Germany, as in many OECD countries, such as the United Kingdom, unemployment compensation consists of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance. Unemployment assistance is provided subsequent to the expiration of entitlement to unemployment insurance and is lower. The effects of this two-tier unemployment compensation system are studied in a general equilibrium job search model with endogenous distributions of income, wealth, and employment which is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the German economy. Our results are as follows: (i) employment is a decreasing function of both unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance. (ii) Aggregate savings are (not) a monotone decreasing function of unemployment assistance (unemployment insurance) payments. (iii) Optimal unemployment compensation payments are found to be a decreasing function over time.     

Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts

We consider the choice between stocks and options to provideeffort incentives to a risk-averse manager. We show that stockscan dominate options as a means of motivation only if nonviabilityrisk is substantial, as in financially distressed firms or start-ups.Options dominate stocks for other firms. These results holdregardless of the existing portfolio of the manager. We provideempirical evidence that higher bankruptcy risk is indeed correlatedwith more use of stock.     

Market Cycles and the Performance of Relative Strength Strategies

We study the effect of market cycles on both medium‐run and long‐run relative strength trading strategies. We find that payoffs for both strategies tend to be relatively higher within a market state (rising or falling markets), but substantially lower over transitions between states. Since shorter duration strategies are relatively less likely to include market transitions, our results help reconcile the puzzling fact that medium‐run strategies are profitable, but long‐run strategies are not. We find that the market's cross‐sectional return dispersion: 1) tends to be higher around market transitions, and 2) is negatively related to the subsequent payoffs for both medium‐run and long‐run strategies.     

M&A Decisions and US Firms’ Voluntary Adoption of Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

We examine whether US firms’ M&A decisions influence the likelihood of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts and whether clawback adoption improves subsequent M&A decisions. Because prior research finds that poor M&A decisions are associated with future earnings restatements, we predict that clawback adoption is more likely after these transactions. We further conjecture that M&A decisions will improve after clawback adoption, as its presence reduces executives’ willingness to manipulate post‐acquisition earnings. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (1) firms with more negative M&A announcement returns are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (2) firms that acquire targets with relatively poor accounting quality are more likely to adopt clawbacks; (3) clawbacks improve investor perception of M&A quality; and (4) executives are more responsive to the market when completing M&A deals if their compensation contracts include clawbacks. These results suggest that boards take a pro‐active approach and consider factors that may lead to restatements when adopting clawbacks. Our results have implications for US policymakers, as the Dodd‐Frank Act of 2010 requires mandatory adoption of clawbacks. Our results also suggest that non‐US firms can reduce managerial incentives to manipulate post‐takeover earnings by using clawbacks.