Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

Which border taxes? Origin and destination regimes with fiscal competition in output and emission taxes

This paper posits a two-stage game in tax regime and tax rates to study the property of second-best emission and output taxes in a two-country world with an atmospheric externality. It shows that (i) either the destination–destination or the origin–origin tax regime may constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game; (ii) either regime may Pareto-dominate the other; (iii) it is possible to have a prisoner's dilemma game where the origin–origin regime Pareto-dominates but the choice of the destination regime is the dominant strategy for each country. Other results include (iv) under origin–origin regime: the output tax is used for fiscal competition; the emission tax is set at a rate equal to the (national) marginal social damage of emissions; and public goods are provided suboptimally. (v) Under destination–destination regime: the output tax is ineffective as an instrument for fiscal competition; the emission tax is used not only for combating pollution but also for tax competition; the tax is set at a rate below the (national) marginal social damage of emissions; emissions are pushed above their closed-economy level; the provision of public goods are optimal.     

On the Double Dividend under Imperfect Competition

We investigate whether, and under which conditions, a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform may yield an employment double dividend, i.e., an improvement of environmental quality and an increase in aggregate employment. Using a model with two market imperfections – a rigid real wage and imperfect competition in one industry – we show that an employment dividend is plausibly obtained. However, for countries where labor taxes are high and households spend a large share of their income in favor of environmentally harmful consumption goods a double dividend can nevertheless not be obtained, for under these conditions environmental quality deteriorates.     

THE EFFECTS OF TAXES ON LABOUR IN A DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY WAGE MODEL*

This paper studies the impact of wage and employment taxes in an intertemporal efficiency wage model. Cases with fixed, linear and quadratic adjustment costs associated with job creation are considered. In general, the model shows that an increase in the employment tax leads to an increase in unemployment, reducing job creation, and has ambiguous effect on wages; whereas an increase in the wage tax reduces wages and has ambiguous impact on unemployment and job creation.     

On Environmental Taxation under Uncertain Environmental Damage

This paper addresses optimal taxation, when therelationship between the consumption of a`dirty' good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers. The main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty, measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable, affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good. Incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality, and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion, we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty. If, on the other hand, thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump-sum tax in addition to the commodity tax,it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty, evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion. A similarresult emerges, although for different reasons,if the lump-sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax.     

Company tax reform with a water's edge

This paper analyzes the effects of switching from a corporate tax system based on separate accounting (SA) towards a system in which two countries form a formula apportionment (FA) union while a third country sticks to SA (water's edge). Our analysis draws a positive picture on the water's edge regulation. In the short-run, for given tax rates, the transition from SA to FA is likely to reduce profit shifting from the FA union to non-FA tax havens. In a long-run tax competition analysis, we find a negative water's edge externality under FA that tends to be less detrimental than the profit shifting externality under SA and may offset other externalities under FA.     

Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes

This paper examines an endogenous timing game in product differentiated duopolies under price competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium outcome in a private duopoly under significant (insignificant) environmental externality, but this result can be reversed in a mixed duopoly. We also show that when environmental externalities are significant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and that public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, but this worsens welfare.     

Capital tax,minimum wage,and labor market outcomes

Often an increase in the minimum wage is accompanied by a reduction in the capital tax. This paper analyzes the effects of interactions between the minimum wage and the capital tax in the general equilibrium framework. The analysis is conducted in an inter-temporal search model in which firms post wages. A (binding) minimum wage provides a lower support for the distribution of wages. The paper finds that the interaction of these two policy instruments significantly modify labor market outcomes and welfare cost. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a decrease in the capital tax leads to an increase in wage dispersion. In contrast, when it is not binding, a lower capital tax may reduce the dispersion in wages. A binding minimum wage magnifies the positive effects of a lower capital tax on labor supply, employment, and output. It also enhances the welfare cost of capital tax. A policy change which involves an increase in the minimum wage and a fall in the capital tax such that employment level remains constant increases welfare and output.     

Environmental Policy, Tax Incidence, and the Cost of Public Funds

This paper studies under what conditions a double dividend may occur in the sense that both environmental quality and employment rise. A simple static general equilibrium model is employed in which tax policy faces the dual task of internalising a negative environmental externality and raising revenue to finance public consumption. The model features a clearing labour market with both labour demand and supply and a fixed factor of production (e.g. capital). Hence, we can study tax incidence and its effect on employment, environmental quality, and the marginal cost of public funds. It is shown for the case of an upward sloping labour supply curve and less than full tax shifting by employers that a shift towards greener preferences cannot yield a double dividend, even if the fixed factor is important. However, if labour supply curve bends backwards, more environmental concern confers a double dividend.     

TAXATION AND CENTRALISED WAGE SETTING: THE CASE OF ENDOGENOUS LABOUR SUPPLY

The implications of centralised wage setting for the relationship between taxation, wages and employment are studied allowing for endogenous adjustment in work hours. We show that centralisation promotes wage moderation, makes wages and employment less sensitive to changes in wage taxation and reduces the hours worked. With an individual supply of working hours, a wage tax can even improve employment if wage setting is centralised and marginal utility from a public good is sufficiently high. Moreover, if a profit tax is used to finance public expenditure, higher tax reduces wages and improves employment.     

Poverty alleviation and tax policy

This paper examines public good provision and tax policy—optimal non-linear income taxation and linear commodity taxation—when the government departs from purely welfarist objective function and seeks to minimise poverty. This assumption reflects much policy discussion and may help understand some divergences of practical tax policy from lessons in optimal tax analysis. In contrast to Atkinson and Stiglitz (J. Public Econom. 6 (1976) 55), it may be optimal to use differentiated commodity tax rates, including the taxation of savings, even if preferences are separable in goods and leisure. The optimal effective marginal tax rate at the bottom of the distribution may be negative, suggesting that wage subsidy schemes can be optimal. Finally, optimal provision of a public good is analysed under poverty minimisation.     

Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies With Externality

We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous‐move (sequential‐move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.     

Tax Principles and Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies Under Imperfect Competition

We construct an exporting monopoly model to compare destination‐ and origin‐based commodity taxes in a context of a trade and domestic tax reform. We show that an export tax reduction and a change in destination (resp. origin) tax that fix the world price is strictly Pareto‐improving (resp. deteriorating), which holds whether markets are integrated or segmented. This result may provide a new rationale for preferring the destination‐based consumption tax to the origin‐based production tax that has been discussed in the literature of tax harmonisation and tax competition.     

Taxation and Labor Markets

We exploit the common features of models such as union, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used to analyze the effects of any revenue-neutral tax reform on employment. In particular, we show that taxes paid by workers are not equivalent to taxes paid by firms when taxes are non linear. Moreover, we show that the positive impact of tax progressivity on employment is attributable only to a limited set of hypotheses. Received May 2, 2001; revised version received November 27, 2001 Published online: December 5, 2002     

Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.     

The impact of tax reforms on unemployment in a SMOPEC

This paper analyzes revenue-neutral tax reforms for a small open economy which is constrained to a balanced current account and whose producers have market power on the world market. We consider origin-based and destination-based commodity taxes as well as taxes on income, the payroll, and on an imported factor of production. Our main findings are the following. First, the strength, and for some parameter constellations, even the sign of the employment effect of tax reforms varies with the degree of openness of the economy. Second, the indeterminacy of the sign of the employment effect crucially hinges on the presence of an internationally mobile factor. The central mechanism underlying our results are adjustments of the real exchange rate which have repercussions on wage and price setting and therefore on employment.     

Tax Evasion and the Time Consistency of the Government's Income Tax Policy

It is shown that it is not necessarily optimal for the government to tax capital income at a high rate even when capital is in fixed supply because the supply of capital for tax purposes may be elastic if capital income tax evasion occurs. An example is given where the wage tax rate is positive and greater than the interest income tax rate even though capital is in fixed supply. Conditions are also derived under which the capital income tax rate is lower in the closed-loop policy game, where capital is fixed, than in the open-loop game, where it is not.
JEL Classification Numbers: E61, H26.     

Commodity taxation and parallel imports

We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle. We show that, as the volume of parallel imports increases, non-cooperative origin taxes converge, while destination taxes diverge. Moreover, origin taxes are more similar and lead to higher aggregate welfare levels than destination taxes.     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.