中韩两国相互直接投资：挑战与对策

随着中韩两国经贸关系日益密切，两国间的直接投资也不断发展。韩国对华投资虽然起步晚，但发展快，而中国对韩国投资尚处于起步阶段。从两国经济社会发展的前景看，两国直接投资面临着结构升级、转型和政策等方面的挑战，两国需要进一步采取措施，以促进直接投资的发展。     

ECFA框架下海峡两岸相互直接投资问题探讨

近年来,海峡两岸互相投资取得长足发展。《海峡两岸经济合作构架协议》的签署给海峡两岸贸易和投资带来巨大影响,为两岸的经贸往来加深奠定良好的基础。为促进两岸的进一步合作,应实施好两岸投资保护协议、积极改善投资的法律环境、利用好开放的投资领域、促进投资互动、协调分工和布局、加强两岸经济团体及机构的交流等措施。     

中国对外直接投资企业的竞争优势与投资绩效研究

近年来,中国对外投资加速发展,这在一定程度上反映了所有权优势在中国公司中逐渐形成。本文通过实证研究,考察处于改革开放环境下中国对外直接投资企业所特有的竞争优势,并探讨中国企业特有的竞争优势和海外区位优势对其海外子公司经营绩效和竞争地位的影响。研究结果显示中国对外投资企业最重要的两项优势是产品质量与技术优势以及国内市场的支持与经验。优秀的国际化管理人才和良好的合作者与企业海外子公司的经营绩效显著正相关。企业商品的知名度与其全球竞争地位正相关。区位因素中与绩效显著相关的指标包括“政府官员及公众对外资的态度”、“外资企业税率”、“政治稳定性”、“许可证的获得手续”和“短期资金的可获得性”。区位因素中与企业竞争地位显著相关的因素是当地政府的激励措施。     

海外直接投资的政治风险

一、政治风险的理论研究研究外商直接投资公司(FDIC)可能卷入的政治风险,始于50年代后期。自70年代起,对外直接投资的浪潮逐渐推及全球,许多国家确立了国际导向的经济发展战略。但是。     

技术累积、竞争策略与发展中国家对外直接投资

一、引言对发展中国家对外直接投资（ＦＤＩ）的理解必须从两个基本前提出发：（１）对业已存在的ＦＤＩ理论必须给予充分、准确的理解,同时在探索新的解释时必须注重同这些理论的继承和发展。（２）发展中国家的ＦＤＩ是一个长期的过程,因此必须考虑发展中国家谋求发展...     

竞争、市场结构与国际直接投资效应分析

国际直接投资对东道国市场的集中与竞争产生深刻影响 ,进而改变了该市场的市场结构 ,这种改变又进一步影响了国际直接投资的效果。文章首先分析了跨国并购和跨国战略联盟两种主要进入方式的发展趋势及其绩效 ,然后通过国际直接投资对市场集中、国内投资和生产率影响的分析来进一步阐述国际直接投资对东道国经济发展的作用。     

跨国公司竞争优势变迁与我国企业对外直接投资

跨国公司竞争优势具有动态性，跨国公司竞争优势的变迁主要取决于跨国公司自身经验和实力的积累，母国所在行业整体发展水平以及跨国公司经营环境的变化。其优势的加强既是一个历史发展过程，又为发展中国家的企业赶超提供了可能的机遇。我们既要尊重客观规律，坚持夯实产业竞争优势，不盲目追求跨国公司规模。又不能坐失机遇，忽视对发展中国家跨国公司竞争能力的培植。要以“走出去”为培植跨国公司竞争优势的基本手段，利用好经营环境变化给跨国公司竞争优势变迁所带来的机遇，积极发展中小跨国公司。     

我国海外直接投资政治风险初探

随着我国“走出去”战略的实施,我国经济发展出现了新情况,我国不再仅仅是全球最大的资本输入国。同时我国的海外直接投资也增长飞快。根据中国商务部、外汇管理总局与国家统计局联合公布的《2006年度中国对外直接投资统计公报》,2006年中国对外直接投资流量位于全球国家（地区）排名的第13位,如此巨大且快速增长的海外投资必然会面对相应的政治风险。     

跨国公司对外直接投资区位分布与地方政府竞争理论综述

随着国际经济全球化进程的不断加快,跨国公司的对外直接投资在国际经济的舞台上扮演着越来越重要的作用,外商直接投资的区位决策是一个复杂的多阶段过程,这一决策不仅与东道国政府有关,更多的直接投资则是直接与投资区位的地方政府发生关系。影响其决策的因素和条件也日益成为学术界讨论和研究的热点问题。本文就目前已有的有关跨国公司直接投资区位选择的理论做一个较全面的梳理和论述。     

Determinants of Chinese direct investments in the European Union

This article analyses the determinants of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) activities in the European Union (EU). Evidence is based on panel Poisson models drawing on two investment monitors at the individual project level. Greenfield investments (GI) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are distinguished. The findings indicate that market size and bilateral trade are the main factors for Chinese investment in the EU. In contrast, business-friendly institutions do not foster FDI. Probably, Chinese investors are risk averse, and prefer regions with less competitive markets. The striking difference between GIs and M&As is related to unit labour costs. Higher costs make the host country less attractive for the establishment of new firms, but do not affect the involvement in existing firms. The sectoral dispersion of Chinese FDI in the EU did not change much since the global financial crisis. Most relevant shifts have occurred in research and development (R&D), where low-income EU countries have become increasingly attractive.     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

On the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments

This paper investigates welfare effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise. One of the competing regions benefits more from the inward investment but, in the absence of incentives, the multinational's preferred location is the other, more advanced region. The paper shows that subsidies, by making the multinational switch location, may increase aggregate welfare. If the multinational exports in the absence of incentives, the welfare effects of subsidy competition may look very different. Allowing subsidies attracts the direct investment, which otherwise would not take place, in one of the two regions. Further, it intensifies competition in the market. The paper shows that the welfare increasing role of incentives may be amplified, but also that the competition effect, by hurting domestic firms, may cancel out any other positive role of incentives.     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.     

Effects of horizontal consolidation under bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers

This article considers bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers to estimate the trade off between market power and cost efficiency. The model is based on pricing rules from a firm's profit maximization and nests both oligopoly and oligopsony models. An empirical analysis for US beef processors and retailers suggests that processors tend to exercise oligopsony market power in procuring cattle, but they are unlikely to exercise market power on retailers. When retailers and processors are considered as one integrated sector, efficiency effects from the increased concentration in the US beef packing industry are slightly larger than market power effects. When processors’ market power is considered separately from retailers’ market power, the difference between cost saving and market power effects becomes greater. The cost elasticity estimate, 0.99, indicates that a further merger would result in little economies of scale in the future. Therefore, although we find that efficiency effects are currently larger than market power effects, a further increase in concentration in the US beef processing industry could narrow the gap between the two effects.     

Economic freedom and bilateral direct investment

Economic freedom (freedom from the intervention of government) is essential for doing business, so economic freedom of both the home country and the host country are important for bilateral foreign direct investment. However, though some literature has investigated the role of host country's economic freedom in bilateral direct investment, no literature has studied the role of home country's economic freedom. This paper has studied this issue in a gravity model with a sample of 155 countries. This paper has also employed some effective estimation techniques of gravity model to incorporate the zero observations and adopted quantile regression method. The findings indicate that economic freedom of both the home country and the host country are positively correlated with bilateral direct investment, and the economic freedom of home country has even stronger explanatory power for foreign direct investment. Hence, promoting the economic freedom may encourage more outward foreign direct investment than inward direct investment.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.     

Behavioural heterogeneity in wine investments

We introduce a heterogeneous agent model to explain the dynamics of fine wine investments. Our results show evidence of the existence of both fundamentalists – those who trade on mean-reversion towards a fair value – and chartists – those who extrapolate recently observed price trends – in the wine market. Moreover, we document that market participants switch between the two trading strategies, allocating more weight to the strategy that has been the most accurate in forecasting wine index values in the recent past. This switching behaviour can explain the large variations in index values (bubbles and crashes) that are observed in the fine wine market.     

Foreign direct investment in economic transition: the changing pattern of investments

Foreign direct investment into transition economies is reviewed in detail, both from aggregate data and from a survey of senior managers in 117 western manufacturing companies. It is found that host country transition progress, political stability and perceived risk influence FDI inflows as well as the predominant type of investment.     

Cyclical comovements in energy-related venture capital investments

This article examines the cyclical comovements of venture capital investments in the energy sector and key macroeconomic variables. In particular, we decompose the cyclical component of two venture capital investment series (clean technology and industrial/energy) and several macroeconomic factors including oil prices. A number of important cyclical relationships are documented such as increases in crude oil prices tend to signal future venture capital investment in both energy-related sectors and these investments tend to move concurrently with movements in the overall economy