审计师对信息风险区别对待了吗?——基于“调增式变脸”与审计意见关系的证据

借鉴Francis等(2005)将信息风险区分为基本面、信号传递、机会主义行为与纯噪音四方面风险的思路,本文研究审计师是否对信息风险的不同构成进行了区别对待。结合相关理论,本文选择了管理层预测报喜的公司为样本,以报喜"无变脸"代表信号传递风险或无风险,以"调增式变脸"代表基本面与机会主义披露策略的混合风险,实证发现"调增式变脸"更容易得到非标意见。进一步地选择"调增式变脸"的公司为分样本,以"扭亏型变脸"代表基本面风险,以"其他调增式变脸"代表机会主义披露策略风险,实证发现"扭亏型变脸"更容易得到非标意见。研究结果表明,审计师对信息风险的不同构成进行了区别对待,且最关注基本面风险。     

数据·分析

228家公司业绩变脸 超七成向下修正 从公布业绩的公司整体情况看，上市公司2012年业绩明显不如往年，并且很多公司的业绩预告与后面所公布的业绩快报或年报数据不一致。据最新统计数据显示，将已公布业绩预告、业绩快报或年报的公司业绩前后数据对比发现，有228家上市公司业绩出现变脸程度在10％以上。     

供应商集中度影响管理层业绩预告行为吗？——基于业绩预告精确性及其预告态度的视角

基于中国企业间关系信任的历史禀赋与现实情境,以2010-2017年A股公司业绩预告为样本,考察供应商集中度对业绩预告精确性与预告态度的影响。研究发现：供应商集中度越高,管理层业绩预告的精确性越低,预告态度也越倾向乐观。进一步研究发现：供应商集中度对业绩预告的精确性负向影响在业绩预告修正情况下作用更明显,在业绩预告未修正时企业更倾向于乐观的业绩预告;同时企业在自愿披露业绩预告情况下,供应商集中度对业绩预告精确性的反向作用更为显著,企业越倾向于披露乐观的业绩预告。以上研究为理解外部利益相关者与企业未来盈利预测之间的关系提供了直接的经验证据,丰富和拓展了供应商关系型交易影响企业信息披露策略选择的研究。     

上市公司自愿性业绩预告的行业同群效应研究北大核心CSSCI

本文以2010—2019年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了上市公司自愿性业绩预告的行业同群效应。实证结果表明,A股上市公司的自愿性业绩预告行为存在显著的行业同群效应,即上市公司发布业绩预告的概率和精确度受到同行业其他公司的正向影响。进一步研究表明,规模较小、CEO缺乏经验、分析师关注度低、行业竞争激烈的公司,自愿性业绩预告的同群效应更显著。基于以上分析,本文提出了完善我国上市公司业绩预告制度的建议,包括加强行业协会建设、提高上市公司竞争性、聚焦行业龙头、完善监管部门激励与约束机制等。     

喜中选优——高预增公司大检阅

预喜公告纷至沓来根据Wind资讯统计,截至08年1月4日,沪深两市共有600家上市公司发布07年全年业绩预告,其中,预告业绩增长(包括扭亏、预增、略增续盈)的公司453家,占发布业绩预告公司总数的75.50%;预告业绩有     

对我国上市公司业绩预告制度的思考

我国的业绩预告制度是由业绩预警制度发展而来的,它的存在有利于提高上市公司的信息透明度,降低信息不对称程度,提前释放业绩风险,保护投资者的利益。本文以国内外研究为主线,对我国现有业绩预告制度的不足和相关研究的空白进行了思考,并对业绩变脸行为进行了分析,以期对进一步规范我国业绩预告制度、强化市场监管提供建议。     

业绩预告"变脸"的思考——以洛阳玻璃为例

我国证券市场的业绩预告制度是管理层为提高上市公司信息披露透明度而提出的一项重要措施。然而大量的研究发现,上市公司业绩预告披露质量不客乐观,及时性、准确性不高。本文以洛阳玻璃股份有限公司发布的2007年年度业绩预告为典型案例,对上市公司业绩预告变脸现象做一个深入分析,以期为投资者、上市公司、证券监管部门、会计师事务所提供一些有价值的信息。     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

女性高管能否改善业绩预告质量？

近几年业绩预告相关问题频发,利用业绩预告误导市场、牟取私利的案件屡见不鲜,引发投资者、债权人对业绩预告质量的担忧,如何有效解决这一问题成为眼下实务界与学术界共同关注的一大热点。在女性高管群体日益壮大、影响力逐步提升的大背景下,本文以我国A股上市公司数据为样本,考察女性高管对管理层业绩预告的影响。研究发现：女性高管有助于提高管理层业绩预告质量,具体包括业绩预告的准确度、业绩预告的精确度以及业绩预告的积极性。进一步,通过异质性分析发现内部寻租动机较强的企业,或外部治理环境较差的企业,或核心岗位高管为女性的企业,女性高管对业绩预告准确度和精确度的提高作用更为明显。本文不仅丰富了女性高管的相关研究,拓展了业绩预告分析的文献,也对提高上市公司质量的监管机制具有重要启示。     

高管持股、择时披露与市场反应

基于2001至2008年间A股公司业绩预告的样本,本文研究了高管持股对择时信息披露策略的影响,以及市场对择时披露信息的反应。研究发现,A股公司在业绩预告时存在择时披露的行为:好消息①更倾向于在交易日披露,坏消息更倾向于在休息日披露。高管持股比例会显著影响择时披露策略:高管持股比例越高的公司,进行择时披露的可能性也越高。从市场反应角度看,休息日披露的坏消息与交易日披露的坏消息没有显著差异,休息日披露的好消息反而会产生更加显著的正面市场反应。本文的研究意味着,高管持股比例会显著提高上市公司进行择时信息披露的可能性,但是市场在一定程度上能够识别择时披露策略,本文的研究结果支持了"信息消化"假说。     

Financial reporting language in financial statements: Does pessimism restrict the potential for managerial opportunism?

This study shows that the proportion of total pessimistic language is higher for companies with lower earnings manipulation and higher leverage. In contrast, high growth companies display less pessimism. Companies with higher levels of pessimism tend to display higher conservatism even if they experience bad news or low cash flows. Companies that use pessimistic language tend to display stronger corporate governance. The use of pessimistic language is positively associated with forecast accuracy and analyst coverage. Annual reports tend to be more pessimistic in order to guide analysts downward and reach target earnings. Companies that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts tend to use less pessimistic language. On the other hand, they are likely to use pessimistic language in order to reduce the magnitude of a negative market reaction to underperformance. This study also shows that the change of the reporting tone to pessimistic as well as the use of unexpected pessimistic language reduces the cost of equity.     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.     

Are more able managers good future tellers? Learning from Japan

Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.     

How do financial analysts interpret industrial firms' corporate refocusing announcements?

This study investigates how analysts perceive the effect of corporate refocusing announcements on UK industrial firms' future earnings by examining current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions, current-year target price revisions and earnings forecast errors in the five years surrounding a refocusing announcement year. The results reveal that analysts adjust their earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year and the following two years, predicting that operating performance in the post-refocusing period is likely to decline relative to their former earnings forecasts. Secondly, there is no evidence that analysts issue biased earnings forecasts after refocusing announcements or that their forecasts appear less accurate. Thirdly, they adjust their earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year with downward market movement. However, they do not similarly adjust their earnings forecast upward with upward market movement. The magnitude of downward adjustments exceeds that of upward adjustments. They also adjust current-year target price forecasts downward with downward market movement in the year prior to a refocusing announcement.     

Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm‐ and forecast‐specific variables that are often associated with security prices.     

Management earnings forecasts and IPO performance: evidence of a regime change

Companies undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) in Greece were obliged to include next-year profit forecast in their prospectuses, until the regulation changed in 2001 to voluntary forecasting. Drawing evidence from IPOs issued in the period 1993–2015, this is the first study to investigate the effect of disclosure regime on management earnings forecasts and IPO long-term performance. The findings show mainly positive forecast errors (forecasts are lower than actual earnings) and higher long-term returns during the mandatory period, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure requirement causes issuers to systematically bias profit forecasts downwards as they opt for the safety of accounting conservatism. The mandatory disclosure requirement artificially improves IPO share performance. Overall, our results show that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts can impede capital market efficiency once it goes beyond historical financial information to involve compulsory projections of future performance.     

Additional Evidence on Analysts’ Decision to Issue Disaggregated Earnings Forecasts: Strategic Biasing

This study examines why analysts issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S. Some recent studies suggest that analysts with superior forecasting ability issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to build reputation in the marketplace and stop forecast disaggregation once their reputation has been established. Based on an analysis of I/B/E/S forecast data for U.S. firms from 1998 to 2008, we find that, in a given year, about 20%–34% of analysts disaggregate for some, but not for all the firms that they follow. This evidence of selective disaggregation by analysts suggests that reputation building alone does not fully explain the decision to disaggregate forecasts. We hypothesize that the decision to disaggregate earnings forecasts is at the firm‐level as well and is systematically related to the analysts’ bias in the issued forecasts. Our findings are that (a) analysts’ overall optimistic bias and forecast errors decrease monotonically with the level of forecast disaggregation, and (b) analysts that selectively disaggregate their forecasts for some firms or who do not persistently disaggregate a given firm's forecasts exhibit more positive bias and larger forecast errors. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the analysts who issue biased forecasts, for example, to curry favour with the management, are less likely to provide disaggregated information as part of the forecast.     

Truth claims and explanatory claims—An ontological typology of futures studies

Classifications of futures research are usually based on epistemological differences, but we complete these with ontological considerations. The article presents a typology of forecasts, i.e. statements on future events or states. It has two dimensions, truth claim and explanatory claim; each dimension has two values, making the claim or not making the claim. The four outcomes are: forecasts which make both truth claims and explanatory claims (predictions); forecasts which make truth claims, but not explanatory claims (prognoses); forecasts which make explanatory claims, but not truth claims (science fiction); and forecasts which make neither truth claims nor explanatory claims (utopias or dystopias). We regard each outcome as an ideal type, against which forecasts can be measured. We illustrate the use of the typology by presenting an example of each outcome.     

The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis

We study how corporate boards and audit committees are associated with voluntary financial disclosure practices, proxied here by management earnings forecasts. We find that in firms with more effective board and audit committee structures, managers are more likely to make or update an earnings forecast, and their forecast is less likely to be precise, it is more accurate, and it elicits a more favorable market response. Together, our empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that effective corporate governance is associated with higher financial disclosure quality.     

Enforcement actions and their effectiveness in securities regulation: Empirical evidence from management earnings forecasts

Due to resource constraints, securities regulators cannot find or punish all firms that have conducted irregular or even illegal activities (hereafter referred to as fraud). Those who study securities regulations can only find the instances of fraud that have been punished, not those that have not been punished, and it is these unknown cases that would make the best control sample for studies of enforcement action criteria. China’s mandatory management earnings forecasts solve this sampling problem. In the A-share market, firms that have not forecasted as mandated are likely in a position to be punished by securities regulators or are attempting to escape punishment, and their identification allows researchers to build suitable study and control samples when examining securities regulations. Our results indicate that enforcement actions taken by securities regulators are selective. The probability that a firm will be punished for irregular management forecasting is significantly related to proxies for survival rates. Specifically, fraudulent firms with lower return on assets (ROAs) or higher cash flow risk are more likely to be punished. Further analysis shows that selective enforcement of regulations has had little positive effect on the quality of listed firms’ management forecasts.