Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.     

Do bad risks know it? Experimental evidence on optimism and adverse selection

Subjects who overestimate their performance in experimental tasks unrelated to travel are less willing to insure against failing in the task and also less inclined to buy travel insurance. This suggests intrinsic optimism influences insurance demand and diminishes adverse selection.     

Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion

A recent experimental literature shows that truth-telling is not always motivated by pecuniary motives, and several alternative motivations have been proposed. However, their relative importance in any given context is still not totally clear. This paper investigates the relevance of pure lie aversion, that is, a dislike for lies independent of their consequences. We propose a very simple design where other motives considered in the literature predict zero truth-telling, whereas pure lie aversion predicts a non-zero rate. Thus we interpret the finding that more than a third of the subjects tell the truth as evidence for pure lie aversion. Our design also prevents confounds with another motivation (a desire to act as others expect us to act) not frequently considered but consistent with much existing evidence. We also observe that subjects who tell the truth are more likely to believe that others will tell the truth as well.     

Do small pecuniary incentives motivate residential peak energy reductions? Experimental evidence

This article evaluates demand-side interventions aimed at reducing residential consumption during the peak energy periods. The interventions were applied to a sample of high-income households and included a set of text message reminders advising participants to reduce electricity use during peak hours. One group of participants received accompanying intra-day increases in peak-hour kWh rates, while another group of participants did not receive any price incentives. We find that intra-day price increases, though small in absolute magnitude, produced significant reductions in peak energy use. Reductions in use, as compared to a control group, were significantly higher among the pricing group compared to the group only receiving text messages, suggesting that pricing played a central role in influencing behaviour. Our results contribute to ongoing policy discussion about the effect of dynamic pricing on consumer energy demand.     

Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings

The rapid growth of online retail in the last decade has led to widespread use of consumer-generated ratings. This paper theoretically and experimentally identifies influences that drive consumers to rate products and examines how those factors can create distortions in product ratings. By manipulating payoffs and effectively “deactivating” either the buyer or seller side of an artificial laboratory market, raters' behavior is decomposed into buyer-centric and seller-centric components. The cost of providing a rating also plays a major role in influencing rating behavior, with high and low quality sellers being rated more often than those of moderate quality.     

Exchange asymmetries for bads? Experimental evidence

This study provides the first incentivized test of exchange asymmetries for unpleasant items, the so-called bads. While prospect theory predicts an endowment effect for goods and bads, attention-based theories predict an endowment effect for goods, but a reverse exchange asymmetry (that is, a particularly high willingness to switch) for bads. The investigation of exchange asymmetries for bads is a key element to distinguish between the validity of loss aversion- and attention-based theories. As we find a strong endowment effect for bads, our results speak in favor of prospect theory.     

Experimental evidence on the ‘insidious’ illiquidity risk

This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total risk of a collective investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the first place. Hence strategic uncertainty compounds its effect with the “intrinsic risk” of the project. Results confirm the insidious nature of illiquidity: as long as a first collective default does not occur, investors accept high intrinsic risk projects. After a first default, they become extremely prudent and come back to market only gradually. After several defaults, private agents manage to coordinate on a relatively low intrinsic risk above which they refuse to participate in the project. Macroeconomic policy implications follow.     

Does hidden information make trade liberalization more fragile?

Abstract This paper focuses on the impact of hidden information on strategic interaction in the context of trade agreements. In the presence of informational asymmetry it is possible that a tradeoff between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation emerges. It is shown that it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization associated with a strictly positive ex ante probability of deviation occurring. In that case, cooperation will break down in finite time, and the optimal degree of liberalization cannot be applied indefinitely.     

Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence

It has been shown that both formal existence and actual use of direct democratic institutions have effects on a number of variables such as fiscal policies, quality of governance but also economic growth. Further, it has been argued that direct democratic institutions would not only have an impact on policy outcomes but influence citizen participation and attitudes toward politics. For the first time, these conjectures are tested in a large cross-country sample here. Overall, we do not find strong effects and some of the significant correlations are rather small substantially. In contrast to previous studies, voter turnout is not higher when direct democracy is available or used. Further, and also in contrast to previous studies, citizens do not express a greater interest in politics in countries with direct democracy institutions. Finally, they display lower trust in government and parties but not in parliament. These results shed some doubt on the hope that direct democracy would make for better citizens.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

Does the paradox of plenty exist? Experimental evidence on the curse of resource abundance

There is conflicting evidence about whether abundant resources are indeed a blessing or a curse. We make use of specially designed economic experiments to investigate how resource abundance affects cooperation in the absence or presence of regulatory institutions. We observe that in the absence of regulatory institutions, there is less cooperation in groups with access to large resource pools than in groups with access to small resource pools. However, if regulatory institutions are present, we show that there is more cooperation in groups with access to large resource pools than in groups with access to small resource pools. Our findings also reveal that resource users are more willing to regulate access to abundant than to small resource pools. These findings provide causal evidence for the “paradox of plenty” and identify the causes for the pitfalls and potentials of resource wealth.     

Do employers avoid hiring workers from poor neighborhoods? Experimental evidence from the real labor market*

We investigate whether employers avoid hiring workers who live in neighborhoods with low socio-economic status and/or with long commuting times. In a large-scale field experiment in the Swedish labor market, we sent more than 4,000 fictitious résumés, with randomly assigned information about the applicants' residential locations, to firms with advertised vacancies. Our findings show that commuting time has a negative effect on the likelihood of being contacted by an employer, while the socio-economic status of a neighborhood does not appear to be important. These results offer guidance for policymakers who are responsible for reversing segregation patterns.     

Do constitutions cause large governments? Quasi-experimental evidence

How do constitutional rules for elections and legislation affect the size of government? We ask this question in a new sample of about 80 countries in the 1990s. In addition to conventional regression methods, we use quasi-experimental, matching methods, which more convincingly address legitimate criticisms of causal inference from cross-country data. Both sets of estimates suggest that presidential regimes and majoritarian elections produce smaller governments.     

Do we lie in groups? An experimental evidence

We study whether there is a difference between individual and group unethical behaviour in an experimental study among adolescents. We find that on average, groups cheat more than individuals, but there are important differences across age. Younger groups cheat more than younger individuals but there is no difference between older individuals and groups. The way in which groups are formed and friendship ties among group members do not seem to matter.     

Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence

This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverse effect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications of these results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace.     

Gender and climate change: Do female parliamentarians make difference?

This paper investigates whether female political representation in national parliaments influences climate change policy outcomes. Based on data from a large sample of countries, we demonstrate that female representation leads countries to adopt more stringent climate change policies. We exploit a combination of full and partial identification approaches to suggest that this relationship is likely to be causal. Moreover, we show that through its effect on the stringency of climate change policies, the representation of females in parliament results in lower carbon dioxide emissions. Female political representation may be an underutilized tool for addressing climate change.     

Do previous good deeds to a third party make people more tolerant of bad deeds against them? An experimental investigation

How do people react to a mix of good deeds to a third party and bad deeds against them? A modified ultimatum game shows that previous good deeds make responders substantially more tolerant to unfair proposals.     

Do execution moratoriums increase homicide? Re-examining evidence from Illinois

This article revisits the event study by Cloninger and Marchesini (2006), who find that the declaration of the Illinois’ death penalty moratorium on 31 January 2000 had a homicide-promoting effect and resulted in 150 additional homicides over the period 2000–2003. We reassess the author’s identification strategy, which they refer to as ‘portfolio approach’ and which draws upon event studies in finance research. We argue that their methodology is not applicable in crime studies. Instead, we apply univariate time-series methods to test for a structural break at a known and unknown break date. We allow for unknown break points as the structural break might have occurred slightly earlier (criminals might have anticipated the moratorium) or later (due to persistence in criminal behaviour). In addition, we implement the synthetic control estimator which approximates the counterfactual homicide series by a weighted average of homicide outcomes in other US states. Based on various testing methods and two distinct data sets, we conclude that there is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the Illinois’ execution moratorium significantly increased homicides.     

Does market participation promote generalized trust? Experimental evidence from Southern Africa

Does market participation promote generalized morality and trust, as postulated by some recent theories? We use experimental data from Zimbabwe and Mozambique to probe into one specific component of this question, and find evidence to the contrary. The short-term effect of market integration appears to be to lower generalized trust. However, this finding is not robust across all countries.