自然垄断中政府微观规制的失灵与政策分析

随着技术进步,自然垄断的边界也在不断改变。市场需求的扩大,自然垄断激励规制和一些竞争新理论的提出都为自然垄断产业规制改革和引入竞争创造了条件,规制失灵是引发规制改革的最主要原因和最强劲动力。本文以电信产业为案例,根据中国的实际状况,结合对经济发达国家政府电信和电力产业规制政策与规制改革的理论分析,提出了自然垄断产业发展与规制改革的相关产业组织政策。     

刍然垄断产业市场化改革后的政府规制探析

自然垄断产业实行市场化改革,并没有消除其自然垄断性。由于自然垄断产业的经营主体由单一国有制转变为多种所有制,政府也必然要进行一系列配套改革,改变原来的干预方式,并重新界定政府规制的边界。本文从规制需求与供给的角度探讨政府规制的合理界限,并结合我国具体情况,对我国自然垄断产业市场化改革后的政府规制的设计和实施提出自己的思考和建议。     

自然垄断产业进入规制成本与相关政策分析

对于自然垄断产业的进入规制，经济学界一直是有争议的。本文在分析并估计自然垄断产业进入管制的成本及其对规制效率的影响后，重新审视了自然垄断行业的规制和竞争，并以电信行业为例作了简要的实证分析。我们期望进一步透视自然垄断产业的“自然性”本质。     

自然垄断产业市场化改革后的政府规制探析

自然垄断产业实行市场化改革，并没有消除其自然垄断性。由于自然垄断产业。的经营主体由单一国有制转变为多种所有制，政府也必然要进行一系列配套改革，改变原来的干预方式，并重新界定政府规制的边界。本文从规制需求与供给的角度探讨政府规制的合理界限，并结合我国具体情况，对我国自然垄断产业市场化改革后的政府规制的设计和实施提出自己的思考和建议。     

我国自然垄断行业的政府规制

以自然垄断与政府规制的相关性分析为基础,分析政府规制在自然垄断行业中失灵的表现及原因,并提出纠正政府规制失灵的政策建议。     

西方经济性规制理论研究

规制是政府干预市场经济活动的重要组成部分,是政府为了实现某种公共政策目标,对市场中微观经济主体的活动进行的一种制约与规范.经济性规制是针对特定产业,例如电信、电力、自来水等产业所进行的规制,由于很大一部分受规制的产业都和自然垄断有关,因此经济性规制主要是对自然垄断产业的规制,其目的在于确保社会福利的实现及保证必需品的供应.     

政府规制垄断价格的基本模式与选择

价格规制是政府规制自然垄断行业的一个重要手段.在自然垄断行业,各国政府都不同程度地控制垄断经营者的价格.     

自然垄断行业的政府规制及其优化路径探析

自然垄断行业是典型的市场失灵领域,政府规制不可或缺.本文通过对自然垄断的内涵和规制的含义进行理论上的分析,进一步明确了在自然垄断行业中政府规制的必要性.当前,自然垄断行业的政府规制仍存在一些不足,主要表现在法律体系不完善、 缺乏可操作性,监管主体与客体之间关系微妙,规制手段效率低下等方面.因此,应进一步完善法律法规体系,成立具有相对独立性的规制机构,引入激励性规制方式等.     

我国当前行业收入失衡问题分析

收入失衡影响了当前社会的效率和公平,其中行业收入失衡的问题尤为突出。行政垄断与自然垄断交织以及制度缺陷加剧了行业收入失衡。规制垄断行为、健全社会保障体系、充分发挥市场机制的调节作用,是解决行业收入失衡的基本思路。     

行政垄断的行政法规制问题探究

行政垄断是我国市场经济正常运行不得不规制的问题。它是我国由计划经济体制向市场经济转轨的产物,是行政权扩张和人类自然趋利性的结合。行政垄断是行政权力滥用的行政违法行为,这意味着控制行政垄断应当从控制行政权滥用的角度出发,以法律规制途径为重点,强化行政责任,规范行政程序,建立专门机构。而其复杂的社会性又意味着不能忽视政治手段与经济手段的协同作用。     

Regulating a Manager‐controlled Natural Monopoly with Unknown Costs

We study the regulation of a manager‐controlled natural monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled by the owner. We consider the case where the regulator can tax the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We find that the optimal price schedule generally lies below the one in the BM model and that it can be as low as the marginal cost if the compensation parameter is sufficiently small and the regulator cannot tax the monopoly owner. We also identify the cases where the monopoly owner prefers to delegate the control to a manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE NORTH AMERICAN BLACKOUT AND ELECTRICITY POLICY: ALTERNATIVES TO TRANSMISSION CONSTRUCTION

It is time to stop regulating the electricity industry as if it were a natural monopoly. Technology has moved on and competition must not be discouraged by regulation. Competition is not only necessary for lower prices to consumers: the particular technological developments that have taken place in recent years mean that competition can diversify supply sources and contribute to increased security of supply.     

网络效应与自然垄断产业的分拆：以电信业为例

针对我国自然垄断产业的分拆改革有两种相反观点,这些观点大多是从自然垄断产业的规模经济性、范围经济性及成本次可加性等特征来展开论述的。文章试图从自然垄断产业的网络效应出发,认为对待这些自然垄断产业的分拆改革应慎行。改革的关键在于引入替代品竞争和企业改制。     

制定成本会计准则的必要性——基于价格管制和政府采购的视角

文章运用垄断价格管制理论和福利经济学相关理论分析了当前出现垄断行业的"三高"以及政府采购成本偏高的现象,指出成本会计准则的制定是对垄断行业进行价格管制的前提,同时成本会计准则的制定必将有利于对政府采购成本实行有效控制,最后就如何制定成本会计准则提出了一些建议。     

Rent-seeking in a unionised monopoly

A unionised monopoly firm, benefitting from some kind of anti-competitive regulation, and its corresponding trade union have a common interest in spending resources to protect the monopoly rents created by the regulation. In the present paper, a situation in which the unionised monopoly is challenged by a consumer organisation fighting for deregulation is analysed as a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest. With unequal sharing of monopoly rents, the free-riding incentives among the rent-defending players turn out to be overwhelming, in the sense that the unique Nash equilibrium is characterised by zero effort contribution by the player with the lower valuation of the contested prize. This implies that being “strong”, in terms of bargaining strength, is not necessarily an advantage for neither player in a unionised monopoly that is threatened by deregulation. Received: June 2000 / accepted: January 2001     

公用事业产品定价的市场机制与政府规制

城市公用事业是典型的垄断性产业,通过城市公用事业地域与网络垄断性、外部性、公益与营利双重性分析,论证了政府价格规制之必要。其次分析了以新古典经济学和凯恩斯经济学作为逻辑理论基础的西方国家城市公用事业价格规制,及其逐步形成的公共利益理论、俘获理论、寻租理论以及放松规制乃至取消规制的演化过程。最后深入剖析我国城市公用事业存在的规制单一、价格倒逼、补偿缺位,监管虚设等问题,继而提出了强化市场定价、设计经济杠杆、完善社会监督、加强政府监管、构建价格体系等政策建议,以期实现政府规制与市场化融合,提升规制的公平、公正与效能。     

IS UNIVERSAL SERVICE JUSTIFIED BY THE PUBLIC INTEREST? FROM THE EARLY DAYS TO THE DIGITAL AGE

It is commonly accepted that universal service is clearly justified by reference to the public interest, and this understanding stems from the natural monopoly paradigm. However, telecommunications monopolies have never been ‘natural’, and the alternative to regulation has always been a competitive marketplace. The liberalisation movement had a chance to create a genuinely competitive industry but failed to do so. This article argues that the universal service dogma has played a significant role in the formation of the ordered competition regime of modern telecommunications, and explains this phenomenon in terms of public choice theory.     

On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information

This paper deals with the optimal regulation for cost-reducing R&D and pricing in natural monopoly that is privately informed on its efficiency. We extend the work of Cantner and Kuhn (Rev Econ Des 4:191–204, 1999) and then we are able to analyse the entire effects of the interplay between agent’s efficiency and investment in R&D particularly considering the substitutability case.     

反垄断与行业管制的体制冲突与改革路径

中国垄断性行业具有"三重垄断"交织在一起的特点,理顺反垄断机构和行业管制机构之间的职权配置和法律关系就成为关键.反垄断机构和行业管制机构之间的协调运行的核心原则是依法行政和职能分离,反垄断机构与行业管制机构分权合作的多元执法体制是中国反垄断与行业管制混合体制的模式选择,并确立反垄断法的优先适用.     

LIFE INSURANCE: REGULATION AS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT1

Debating the minutiae of insurance regulation without a clear understanding of why insurance companies are regulated is futile. In this article I discuss the economic rationale for insurance business regulation and conclude that the appropriate role of the regulator is to enforce contracts which might otherwise be broken. I argue that if this is the case, regulation should be optional, and that it need not be a monopoly activity.