国际技术引进与环境规制的互动影响——基于省际面板数据的实证研究

采用2001—2007年全国28个地区的平衡面板数据,将国际技术引进分为国际贸易方式技术引进和FDI方式技术引进,在估算上述两变量技术存量的基础上,实证检验了国际贸易方式技术引进和FDI方式技术引进与环境规制之间的互动关系。研究表明,国际贸易方式技术引进与环境规制之间存在双向显著正效应;而FDI方式技术引进对环境规制作用不显著,但环境规制对FDI方式技术引进存在显著正效应;上期的环境规制水平对当期环境规制存在显著正效应。     

异质性环境规制策略互动如何影响碳排放？

中国式分权治理的制度背景下,环境规制成为地区间流动性资源争夺的博弈手段,明晰异质性环境规制的策略互动效应是解释环境规制非完全执行现象的关键所在。论文将环境规制策略互动与碳排放纳入统一的分析框架,就区域间环境规制的策略性行为及其对碳排放的影响进行规范性分析。研究发现：中国省域间异质性环境规制存在显著的空间策略互动,市场型和环保型环境规制呈现互补性策略互动,而行政型、公众型和技术型环境规制则表现为替代性策略互动;纯粹的环境规制整体上具有碳排放抑制效应,而异质性环境规制策略互动对碳排放的影响则存在明显差异,“以邻为壑”现象普遍存在;地方政府竞争参与进一步诱发环境规制策略互动的“逐底效应”和“绿色悖论”难题,最终表现出显著的碳排放促增效果。论文据此提出,中国在破解环境规制绿色悖论的过程中,需要匡正地方政府无序竞争行为并改革中国分权激励机制,建立区域协同治理模式,同时强化异质性环境规制的多元化实施路径,加速区域协同治理进程。     

环境规制约束下FDI对中国科技创新与经济高质量发展的影响——基于中介效应与门槛效应的机制检验

基于2003—2019年中国内地30个省份面板数据，运用中介效应、门槛效应模型实证检验FDI对我国技术创新与经济高质量发展的影响，并进行机制分析。研究发现：第一，在环境规制约束下，FDI技术溢出效应显著，FDI能够促进我国经济高质发展，现阶段环境规制具有“创新补偿”效应；FDI与环境规制的交互项能够显著促进经济高质量发展，环境规制对FDI发挥一定的正向筛选作用。第二，在考虑内生性后，FDI、环境规制及其交互项对经济高质量发展影响的核心结论依然成立，并且存在区域异质性。第三，两种中介效应检验结果显示，FDI通过技术创新机制作用于我国经济高质量发展。第四，整体而言，FDI通过技术创新水平这一中介路径对经济高质量发展产生负向影响，与理论预期不符。     

环境规制、外商直接投资与环境污染——基于中国城市面板数据的实证分析

选取中国2005—2018年的267个地级市作为研究对象,以FDI为中间变量,分阶段构建模型,实证分析了FDI在环境规制减排效应中的作用及其区域差异。研究发现,环境规制具有显著的减排效应;环境规制的增强对FDI的流入整体呈现正向效应,且存在显著的区域差异;FDI对环境污染的影响呈现倒“N”型曲线关系,目前中国FDI流入的整体水平处在第二个拐点之后,存在显著的减排效应;全国、沿海和内陆地区,FDI在环境规制的减排过程中显著发挥了间接影响作用,环境规制的增强会增加具有“污染光环”效应的FDI,减少具有“污染天堂”效应的FDI。因此,各地区应坚持招商引资与污染防治并举,通过提高环境标准,加大对企业排放水平的监管力度,充分发挥FDI在环境规制减排过程中的间接作用,进而改善环境质量。     

“绿色悖论”之谜:地方政府竞争视角的解读

文章利用中国2000—2011年省级面板数据,以地方政府竞争为切入点,基于地理邻接、地理距离和经济距离三种空间权重矩阵,构造动态空间面板模型检验了环境规制对碳排放的影响。研究显示:就纯粹的环境规制而言,本地区和相邻地区的环境规制能有效遏制碳排放,且环境规制的空间策略互动表现为"竞争向上"型;而在地方政府竞争的影响下,本地区和相邻地区的环境规制则显著促进了碳排放,引发环境规制竞争的"逐底效应"和"绿色悖论"现象。因此,为了有效规避"绿色悖论"现象,必须从匡正地方政府竞争行为入手,改革"中国式分权"下的激励机制,完善环境绩效考核制度与监督体系。     

FDI、环境规制与产业结构优化——基于空间计量模型的实证

本文利用空间计量模型实证检验了我国FDI和环境规制对产业结构优化的作用,研究发现:FDI和环境规制均显著促进了我国产业结构优化升级;环境规制对产业结构调整具有倒逼效应,对FDI促进产业结构优化升级具有正向引导作用.同时,区域产业结构和环境规制存在空间外部性,影响周边区域产业结构布局和调整.上述结论有着重要的政策含义,即我国在经济转型升级进程中,在借助环境规制引导FDI促进区域产业结构优化的同时,应进一步深化区域间环境规制的协调与合作,形成共赢的合理化产业结构空间格局.     

环境规制、外商直接投资与“污染避难所”假说——基于中国30个省份面板数据的实证研究

本文基于1998—2008年我国30个省份的面板数据对我国外商直接投资与环境规制之间的关联进行了实证研究。结果表明,环境规制对我国各个地区外商直接投资的流入存在一定的负面影响,但这种影响并不显著;相对而言,经济规模、基础设施状况和外资的集聚效应等对外商直接投资的影响更为显著。而且,环境规制和FDI的格兰杰检验结果表明,环境规制和FDI之间不存在因果关系。因此,可以认为,"污染避难所"假说在中国成立的证据不足。     

地方政府竞争与FDI区位分布——基于我国省级面板数据的实证研究

本文利用1993—2004年省级地区面板数据重点分析了地方政府竞争对FDI在我国区位分布的影响。研究发现:(1)地方政府竞争和区位特征变量一道触发了FDI的初始地理集聚,而由于集聚效应的作用,地方政府竞争的经济后果会被持续加强,导致了FDI在我国省级地区的不均衡分布。(2)从长期来看,单纯的税费优惠手段对FDI区位选择整体上不起作用;各地区在交通、通讯和能源等硬件基础设施上的投资对吸引FDI流入具有重要作用,成为各地经济竞争的主要手段,并导致科教文卫等软件公共物品投资不足;此外,旨在提高地方政府治理水平的制度优化竞争对吸引FDI流入也具有积极作用,应成为未来地方政府竞争的主要方向。本研究为各地招商引资活动提供了有益的启示,除了地方政府竞争因素以外,FDI的区位选择还要受到地方市场规模、市场开放度等区位条件,以及集聚经济效应的影响。     

异质性FDI绿色技术溢出环境规制门槛效应研究

在测度2003-2018年中国工业36个细分行业绿色全要素生产率的基础上,采用线性模型和门槛模型实证比较诱导劳动型FDI和资本型FDI发挥绿色技术溢出效应的环境规制强度。结果表明：FDI并不会自动发挥绿色技术溢出效应,需借助环境规制的调节作用,但环境规制强度应保持在合理区间。静态门槛模型结果表明,当环境规制强度超过第二门槛值后,两类FDI均能发挥绿色技术溢出效应,但仅资本型FDI显著。动态面板模型结果表明,当环境规制强度提高到第三门槛值后,两类FDI均能够发挥显著的绿色技术溢出效应。此外,异质性检验结果表明,为诱导FDI发挥正向绿色技术溢出效应,应在资本密集型行业、劳动密集型行业和污染密集型行业设置较高的环境规制强度,而在清洁生产型行业设置较低的环境规制强度。     

双向FDI协调发展、绿色创新与环境规制——基于绿色创新中介效应研究

利用全国30个省（自治区、直辖市）2000—2020年数据，在中介效应中考虑调节效应，以绿色创新为中介变量、环境规制为调节变量，探究了双向FDI协调发展与环境污染的关系。实证结果发现：在不考虑环境规制时，双向FDI协调发展对环境污染的抑制作用存在直接效应；双向FDI协调发展具有通过绿色创新抑制环境污染的部分中介效应，但是在沿海与非沿海地区中介效应具有异质性。考虑环境规制的调节作用，发现环境规制对双向FDI协调发展抑制环境污染的调节作用明显，同时环境规制会影响绿色创新对环境污染的作用，而对双向FDI协调发展与绿色创新之间的关系基本没有影响。因此，应该因地制宜进行环境规制，发挥双向FDI协调发展抑制环境污染的作用。继续扩大沿海地区双向FDI协调发展的同时，改善非沿海地区营商环境，扩大FDI规模，促进绿色创新对双向FDI协调发展抑制环境污染的中介效应。     

International production chains and the pollution offshoring hypothesis: An empirical investigation

Most analyses of the impact of heterogeneous environmental policy stringency on the location of industrial firms have considered the relocation of entire activities – the well-known pollution haven hypothesis. Yet international enterprises may decide to only offshore a subset of their production chain – the so-called pollution offshoring hypothesis (POH). We introduce a simple empirical approach to test the POH combining a comprehensive industrial mergers and acquisitions dataset, a measure of sectoral linkages based on input-output tables and an index score of environmental policy stringency. Our results confirm the impact of relative environmental policy stringency on firms’ decisions to engage in cross-country M&As. Our findings also indicate that environmental taxation have a stronger impact on international investment decisions than standards-based policies. Further, we find that transactions involving a target firm operating in a sector upstream of the acquirer are more sensitive to environmental policy stringency, especially when that sector is highly pollution-intensive. This empirical evidence is consistent with the pollution offshoring hypothesis.     

FDI and pollution havens: Evidence from the Norwegian manufacturing sector

This is an empirical study of the firm and country determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and how it is affected by the stringency of environmental regulations in host countries. We employ disaggregated data on sales by Norwegian multinationals' affiliates from 1999 to 2005 that allow such affiliates to be categorized as either efficiency-seeking (vertical) or market-seeking (horizontal) FDI. While the environmental stringency of a host country and its enforcement are found to have no effect on the average investment, we find a significant negative effect on multinationals with vertical motives. Compared to those located in lenient countries, the efficiency-seeking affiliates in more environmentally regulated countries receive less investment from their parent companies in terms of (i) equity capital, (ii) capital stock, and (iii) assets. We further find that the total exports from affiliates to parent companies in Norway decrease with the level of enforced environmental stringency in the host countries.     

Policy choice for end-of-pipe abatement technology adoption under technological uncertainty

Regulators have increasingly become concerned about end-of-pipe abatement technologies because they not only play a crucial role in air pollution control but also ensure the achievement of the deep carbon emissions reduction target. This paper investigates the effect of emission taxes and standards on the adoption of end-of-pipe abatement technology when the arrival time and degree of improvement of the new emissions abatement technology are uncertain. We find that the ranking of emission taxes and standards in terms of motivating early adoption depends on the policy stringency. More specifically, for high levels of environmental stringency, standards induce an earlier technology adoption than taxes, while the opposite conclusion holds for low levels of environmental stringency. The sensitivity analysis shows that these findings are robust to various relevant crucial parameters. Finally, the implications for the choice of environmental policy have been provided.     

Environmental regulation and investment: Evidence from European industry data

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of environmental regulation on investment. In particular, we ask whether and how strongly an industry's investment responds to stringency in environmental regulation. Environmental regulation is measured as (i) an industry's total current expenditure on environmental protection, and (ii) a country-industry's revenue from environmental taxes. Focusing on European data of manufacturing industries between 1998 and 2007, we estimate the differential impact of environmental stringency on four types of investment: gross investment in tangible goods, in new buildings, in machinery, and in ‘productive’ investment (investment in tangible goods minus investment in abatement technologies). Both environmental variables enter positively, and their quadratic terms exhibit significantly negative parameter estimates. This, in turn, indicates a positive but diminishing impact of environmental regulation on investment.     

Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective

The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement policy increases the polluters’ expected financial burden, and induces them to exert greater political pressure on reducing the stringency of environmental regulation, thereby resulting in a larger amount of pollution emissions. We also show that tightening the enforcement policy can reduce efficiency. We highlight the possibility of policymaking being misguided due to overlooking the political effect of enforcement policy.     

Are clean technology and environmental quality conflicting policy goals?

We analyze the effects of an environmental policy on the diffusion of a clean technology. Compared to previous articles we consider that the polluting firms are competitors on the output market and we analyze the effects of the policy on the share of adopting firms in the economy. We show that this share is not monotonic with the stringency of the environmental policy. We also compare the effects of an emission tax and tradable pollution permits and we show that, depending again on the stringency of the policy, either the tax or the permits yields a higher degree of technology adoption.     

Trends and determinants of energy innovations: patents,environmental policies and oil prices

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationship between energy innovations, environmental policies and oil prices. With a panel of 19 OECD countries over the period 1990–2013, we test how the stringency of environmental policies has affected the intensity of energy patents, while controlling for the effect of oil prices and other country-level variables. We found that the overall level of policy stringency has exerted a more significant impact than individual country measures. Moreover, the recent reduction of energy patenting is discussed, especially in the light of the staggering drop of oil prices.     

Do environment regulations matter for EU-MENA trade?

This study examines the impact of environmental regulations stringency on agricultural trade between European Union (EU) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA countries). Using a gravity model and applying the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model, we estimate the impact of environmental regulations stringency on bilateral agricultural exports between 28 EU and 20 MENA countries during the period 2001–2014. The results have showed that environmental regulations do matter for agricultural trade between both regions because in the presence of excessive zero trade observations, they act as significant fixed export costs that affect the probability of trade. More stringent environmental regulations stimulate innovative efforts in cost-saving green technologies, which increase productivity and positively affect agricultural exports. The results have favoured the revisionist Porter hypothesis (PH), according to which environmental regulations may stimulate innovative efforts, which mitigate the negative effects of higher fixed abatement costs and enhance trade competitiveness.     

Environmental regulation and the productivity of Japanese manufacturing industries

This paper attempts to provide empirical evidence on issues concerning: (a) the effect of the stringency of environmental regulations (as measured by pollution control expenditures) on innovative activity (as measured by R&D expenditures) and on the average age of capital stock and (b) the productivity enhancement effect of environmental regulations in Japanese manufacturing industries. The empirical findings in the paper show that the pollution control expenditures have a positive relationship with the R&D expenditures and have a negative relationship with the average age of capital stock. It is also shown that increases in R&D investment stimulated by the regulatory stringency have a significant positive effect on the growth rate of total factor productivity.     

Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”*

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.