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1.
Usamah A. Uthman 《Review of Political Economy》2013,25(2):209-222
Abstract This paper reformulates the Kaldor–Pasinetti model of income and profit distribution by introducing the interest rate from the very outset of the model but maintaining other Kaldor–Pasinetti assumptions intact. It is shown that the profit rate and the share of profits in national income are not independent from either the capitalists' or workers' propensity to save. Many contributors to the theory of income and profit distribution have erred in attributing a potentially positive impact of the interest rate upon profits. The interest rate is always and everywhere a tax on functional and personal incomes together. This result explains Schumpeter's observation that ‘Interest acts as a tax upon profit.’ In an alternative model, workers receive a share of profits instead of fixed contractual interest. It is shown that the profit rate and share are not independent from either propensity to save. Furthermore, the workers' share of profits has a positive impact on the rate and share of profits. This implies that a profit sharing regime could be more conducive to capital accumulation and job creation. It is found that Pasinetti's Cambridge Equation is more akin to a profit sharing regime. 相似文献
2.
Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
When price-cap rules determine the structure of prices for a long period, they suffer a credibility problem and introduce
an element of risk especially if a firm’s profits are “too large”. Profit sharing may be seen as a device to pre-determine
price adjustments and thus to decrease regulatory risk. We analyse the effects of profit sharing on the incentives to invest,
using a real option approach. Absent credibility issues, a well designed profit sharing system may be neutral relative to
a pure price cap. With regulatory risk, profit sharing is preferable to a pure price-cap one, if it intervenes for high enough
profit levels.
相似文献
Carlo Scarpa (Corresponding author)Email: |
3.
This paper develops a two stage game model with two competing firms in a mixed oligopolistic market, a public firm and a private
firm, and only the public firm giving its manager an incentive contract. The paper presents three types of public firm owner’s
objective function and each objective function corresponds to three types of delegation, either of a profit-revenue type,
or of a relative performance, or, finally, of a market share one. In an equilibrium, the public firm owner has a dominant
strategy to reward his manager with an incentive contract combining own profits and competitor’s profits. Different from Manasakis
et al. (2007), this paper suggests that the dominant strategy of the public firm owner is to reward his manager with a profit-revenue
type of contract or a market-share type of contract, that is to say profit-revenue is identical with market-share. Using relative-performance
type of contract will move the manager away from the owner’s true objective function when the public firm owner only pursues
maximizing the social welfare. The private firm will be crowded out and the public firm is the only producer of the market.
Under profits-revenues type of contract, the owner’s objective of maximizing the summation of the profit and consumer surplus
leads the manager more aggressive. Different combinations give us different results. By comparing the results, each type of
incentive contract is an owner’s best response to his decision. 相似文献
4.
How does the sharing economy affect the retail industry? This study investigates the impact of service sharing on the decisions and profits of two profit modes in the Online-to-Offline (O2O) retail market. We find that service sharing always improves the profit of the brand supplier as a service demander in both two profit modes, and improves the profit of the offline franchisee as a service provider in the profit-sharing mode under certain circumstances, but always reduces its profit in the non-profit-sharing mode. This is associated with the double marginalisation effect of the non-profit-sharing mode which leads to channel conflicts. Thus, a service-cost sharing mechanism is introduced to coordinate conflicts and achieve a win-win strategy, thereby improving the performance of the entire O2O supply chain. 相似文献
5.
Dimitrios P. Tsomocos Sudipto Bhattacharya Charles A. E. Goodhart Pojanart Sunirand 《Economic Theory》2007,32(2):381-398
We develop a multi-period general equilibrium model of bank deposit, credit, and interim inter-bank loan markets in which
banks initially specialize in their choices of debtors, leading to under-diversification, but nevertheless become entwined
via inter-bank markets, leading to the fortunes of one bank affecting the profits and default rates of the other in a sequential
manner. Lack of (full) diversification among credit risks arises in our model owing to a relative profit argument in each
banker’s utility function, which is otherwise risk- and default-averse. We examine its implications for the welfare of depositors
and debtors.
An erratum to this article can be found at 相似文献
6.
Paul Madden 《European Economic Review》2012,56(3):560-578
Motivated by aspects of European soccer club governance (members' clubs supporters' trusts), a first formal analysis of fan welfare maximization as a club objective in a sports league is provided, with comparisons to objectives studied previously (profit and win maximization). Positive comparisons focus on team qualities, ticket prices, attendances and the impact of capacity crowds; empirically observed ticket black markets and inelastic pricing are consistent only with fan welfare maximization. Normatively, social welfare (aggregate league surplus) is well-served by a league of fan welfare maximizers, or sometimes win maximizers, but not profit maximizers; leagues should not normally make profits. 相似文献
7.
A model of sliding-scale regulation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Thomas P. Lyon 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》1996,9(3):227-247
Price caps, while widely touted, are less commonly implemented. Most incentive schemes involve profit sharing and are, thus, variants of sliding-scale regulation. I show that, relative to price caps, some degree of profit sharing always increases expected welfare. Numerical simulations show that welfare may be enhanced by large amounts of profit sharing and by granting the firm a greater share of gains than of losses. Simulations also suggest profit sharing is most beneficial when the firm's initial cost is high and cost-reducing innovations are difficult to achieve but offer the potential for substantial savings.This paper has benefitted from the comments of Mark Bagnoli, Jim Burgess, Michael Crew, Steve Hackett, Paul Kleindorfer, Michael Riordan, Ted Stefos, Ingo Vogelsang, Dennis Weisman, two anonymous referees, and workshop participants at the First Annual Northeastern Health Economics Conference, the Fourth Annual Health Economics Conference, GTE, Indiana University, the Rutgers Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Public Utility Economics, and the 20th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference. Financial support from the Management Science Group of the Department of Veterans Affairs and from Indiana University is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
8.
Satya P. Das 《Review of International Economics》1996,4(2):141-151
Positive and normative aspects of trade policy are examined when firms offer incentive pay to workers, such as piece-rate pay and profit sharing, to deal with worker moral hazard. Protection increases the incentive pay rate. Its effect on effort depends upon the degree of labor mobility and the type of the incentive pay. In the presence of a piece-rate pay, protection induces second-order welfare losses. But in the presence of profit sharing, there is a direct impact of protection on the incentive-compatibility constraint facing firms and hence there is a first-order positive effect on welfare. 相似文献
9.
We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned
public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm
when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm
that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public
firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization
under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations
or partial privatization of the public firm.
相似文献
10.
Yasuhiko Nakamura 《Journal of Economics》2011,104(1):49-89
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the market structure in equilibrium and the most preferred
structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, when all existing firms can freely merge
with each other in an international oligopoly under the segmented market assumption in three cases: the case wherein all the
firms are entrepreneurial and the cases wherein they use two different types of managerial delegation contracts. We focus
our attention on the coincidence/non-coincidence between the equilibrium market structure (EMS) and the most socially preferred
structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, as each firm’s production efficiency
varies. When each firm’s production efficiency is relatively low, in all the three cases, the EMS coincides with the most
socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare in a large area of the
physical trade cost. On the other hand, when each firm’s production efficiency is relatively high, in the cases wherein they
use the two different types of managerial delegation contracts, there exists an area of each firm’s production efficiency
such that the EMS does not coincide with the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare
and total social welfare. Therefore, as each firm’s organizational structure proceeds from entrepreneurial to managerial delegation,
a more active merger policy is needed with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare. 相似文献
11.
Summary. We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders’utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise prices, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices. 相似文献
12.
Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Karl-Martin Ehrhart Christian Hoppe Ralf Löschel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,41(3):347-361
In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product
markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based
mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish
output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority
of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’
surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should
not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options
in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.
相似文献
13.
在考虑养老服务集成商营销努力的情况下,通过设计成本分担契约、收益共享契约激励养老服务提供商改善服务质量,分析了两类激励契约的适用条件;比较了对养老服务质量、营销水平决策和各成员利润的改善作用。研究结果表明:提供商的服务质量、利润会随着成本分担比例的增加而递增,随着收益共享比例的增加而递减;集成商的营销水平会随着成本分担比例的增加而增加,而随着收益共享比例的增加而递减,利润水平会随着成本分担比例和收益共享比例的增加而递减;需求影响系数对三种情境下的提供商和集成商利润产生正向作用,签订成本分担契约对提供商较为有利,集成商可能更倾向于收益共享契约;成本影响系数则对利润产生负向作用,签订收益共享契约对提供商较为有利,对于集成商来说,其利润在三种情境下的差异不大;成本分担契约对激励提供商改善服务质量和集成商提升营销水平具有最佳的激励作用。在大多数情况下,提供商获得的利润总是高于集成商。 相似文献
14.
Weerachart T. Kilenthong 《Economic Theory》2011,46(3):475-501
A competitive general equilibrium model with complete collateralized contracts under limited commitment is proposed and analyzed.
With limited aggregate collateral, risk sharing is imperfect. There exists a minimal spanning set of finite collateralized
contracts that generates the feasible space and that contains more than the complete set of collateralized Arrow securities.
Examples show that exogenously restricting feasible contracts has a significant impact on agents’ welfare. I prove that constrained
optimal allocations can be decentralized as a general equilibrium with collateral constraints, and vice versa. Because a capital
good serves as collateral, it has an additional value, called collateral premium. The collateral premium is zero if and only
if risk sharing is perfect. This is a testable implication of the model. 相似文献
15.
Pierre Desrochers 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,41(4):519-539
The idea that properly designed environmental regulations can improve a firm’s competitiveness while simultaneously contributing
to a cleaner environment through the development of so-called ‘win-win’ innovations (i.e., that reduce environmental damage
while simultaneously increasing profits) is usually credited to Porter (1991). Numerous studies have since attempted to assess
the validity of the concept, with mixed results. This paper contributes to this debate by surveying a nearly forgotten body
of literature written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that discussed the impact of market incentives on
the development of valuable by-products out of industrial waste. Based on the opinions held by several industrial chemists,
engineers, technical journalists and economists, the development of ‘win-win’ manufacturing practices seems to have been primarily
the result of the profit motive, although actual or potential legal actions based on private property rights and/or government
regulations occasionally triggered this process. After reviewing some important historical writings on the latter issue, a
suggestion is made that perhaps the best way to craft ‘well-designed’ environmental regulations is to return to a private
property rights approach to mitigating pollution problems whenever possible.
相似文献
16.
‘Just one of us’: consumers playing oligopoly in mixed markets 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Consumer cooperatives represent a highly successful example of democratic form of enterprises operating in developed countries.
They are usually medium to large-scale companies competing with the profit-maximizing firms in the retail sector. This paper
describes this situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer cooperatives maximize the utility of consumer-members and,
in return, refund them with a share of the profits corresponding to the ratio of their individual spending to the cooperative’s
total sales. We show that when consumers possess quasi-linear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically differentiated goods,
and companies operate using a linear technology, the presence of consumer cooperatives positively affects total industry output,
as well as welfare. The effect of cooperatives on welfare proves to be even more significant when goods are either complements
or highly differentiated, and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand. 相似文献
17.
网络外部性下基于投资溢出的企业合作研发博弈模型 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文建立了网络外部性环境下基于投资溢出的企业合作研发博弈模型,研究了企业合作研发策略,分析了网络外部性、兼容性以及投资溢出等对企业合作研发动机、企业利润和社会福利等的影响。研究表明,合作研发能提高企业利润和社会福利;兼容性较大或外部性较小时,提高产品外部性会增强企业合作研发意愿;提高兼容性或投资溢出则始终会增强企业合作研发意愿,提高企业利润和社会福利。因此,政府应鼓励企业生产高网络外部性和高兼容性的产品,并增强投资溢出效应,激励企业投入更多研发资源,提高企业利润和社会福利。 相似文献
18.
Joaquín Andaluz 《Journal of Economics》2011,102(2):123-136
Developing a location-price spatial model in a unionized mixed-duopoly, we find that the welfare-maximizing nature of the
public firm implies a lower degree of product differentiation such that, in contrast to the private duopoly, the “Principle
of Maximum Product Differentiation” is not reproduced. Considering two different wage-regimes for the public firm, this paper
examines the effects of wage regulation imposed on civil servants. It is shown that, when a public firm’s union is prohibited
from collective bargaining, the firm is more competitive, and the degree of differentiation is less. Moreover, regulation
always reduces both the private firm’s profit and the level of social welfare. 相似文献
19.
Timothy J. Brennan 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2010,38(1):49-69
Distributing electricity to users has been covered through the charge per kilowatt-hour for electricity used. Conservation
advocates have promoted policies that “decouple” distribution revenues or profits from the amount of electricity delivered,
claiming that usage-based pricing leads utilities to encourage use and discourage conservation. Because decoupling separates
profits from conduct, it runs against the dominant finding in regulatory economics in the last 20 years—that incentive-based
regulation outperforms rate-of-return profit guarantees. Even if distribution costs are independent of use, some usage charges
can be efficient. Price-cap regulation may distort incentives to inform consumers about energy efficiency—getting more performance
from less electricity. Utilities will subsidize efficiency investments, but only when prices are too low. If consumers fail
to adopt energy efficiency measures that would be individually beneficial, decoupling can increase welfare, but only if all
energy revenues are separated from use, not just those associated with distribution. 相似文献
20.
《Journal of Comparative Economics》2022,50(1):293-320
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can increase productivity and wages. However, it is also often accompanied by primary income deficits as foreign-owned firms repatriate their profits. The welfare effects of FDI are thus ambiguous. A particularly illustrative example of this phenomenon are the Visegrád 4 (V4) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). This paper investigates whether FDI can be beneficial in the presence of profit repatriation using a general equilibrium model calibrated to the V4 economies. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the benefits of FDI outweigh the costs for these countries. On average, a 1% increase in the share of foreign firms is associated with a 0.17% increase in welfare. However, incentivising foreign firms to reinvest more of their profits domestically is, ceteris paribus, welfare-improving. A 10-percentage-point increase in the profit repatriation rate is associated with a 1.06% welfare gain on average. 相似文献