我国风险投资家面临的困境及出路

风险投资是促进高新技术发展的重要力量，但要使其高效运作，就必须给风险投资家提供比较适当的内外部环境，在我国目前的情况下，我国的风险投资家面临着多种困难。包括法律的，制度的，经济的，自身的等等方面，这就要求社会各个方面共同努力，为风险投资创造一个良好的发展环境。     

如何完善我国风险投资的金融环境

金融环境是风险投资环境的重要组成部分。本文从金融法规环境、融资环境、退出环境、金融人才环境、监管环境五方面分析了我国风险投资的金融环境,认为我国现阶段金融法规不健全、缺乏风险资本的生成机制、风险资本的退出机制不完善、缺乏风险投资家人才、缺乏监管和激励机制等,最后提出了改善我国风险投资金融环境的具体措施。     

风险投资机构与风险投资家评价要素研究

通过对原有风险投资机构与风险投资家排名数据的对比分析,本文设计了风险投资机构综合排名评价标准、地域排名评价标准、产业排名标准、单项排名标准、特色排名标准及风险投资家排名评价要素,形成了风险投资机构与风险投资家评价体系。该体系充分考虑了财务指标与人力指标,从这两个方面综合评价风险投资机构,能够全面反映风险投资机构的成长性,考察风险投资家对机构成长的贡献,这对完善相关评价机制及改善我国风险投资机构与风险投资家排名体系有一定的借鉴意义。     

投资人对风险投资家的制约机制研究

在风险投资中,代理人风险尤为突出,因为投资人与风险投资家存在着巨大的信息不对称,一方面风险投资家积极参与风险企业的管理;另一方面,有限合伙人的法律地位和实际情况使其无法监控每个投资项目的操作,因此,对于风险投资家的监控就显得尤为重要。一般而言,除了对风险投资家进行严格的筛选要求其具备一定的素质之外,还应在合同中加入相应地条款来进行制约。     

风险投资软环境中的风险投资家——性质、作用机理和筛选机制

在支撑风险投资制度成功移植的软环境因素研究问题上,从风险投资家生成和筛选机制这一研究视角出发,研究风险投资家人力资本的异质性质及其作为风险资本市场中心签约人的作用机理,认为优秀的风险投资家的生成和筛选机制是外生模仿型风险资本市场生成的关键的软环境。因此,我国需要建设系统的包括宏观和微观层面的生成和筛选机制。     

非对称信息条件下风险投资者与多个风险投资家的委托——代理分析

风险投资者与多个风险投资家建立合同关系,多个风险投资家共同为该投资者经营一个风险投资项目,易导致搭便车行为。在连续支付模式下,引入有效的激励机制能够提高各风险投资家努力的积极性,提高项目的投资效率和成功率。通过对风险投资者与多个风险投资家之间委托-代理关系的进一步分析可知,在连续基金周期中,各风险投资家只有充分地发挥自己的努力水平,才能达到一个马尔科夫完美均衡(MPE)。     

风险投资家对高科技初创企业商务模式的评价研究

商务模式是高科技初创企业在争取风险资金时,风险投资家考察的核心内容之一。通过风险投资家对商务模式的评价、初创企业商务模式设计中存在的问题分析,可以总结出商务模式可以由价值主张、价值支撑和价值保持来表征,按照这样的价值分析体系来进行商务模式的设计,就使得商务模式更具操作性和科学性,同时,也加深了风险投资家对商务模式的理解,更有效地选择初创企业。     

风险投资组织形式与风险投资家报酬设计研究

风险投资家报酬设计与风险投资组织形式密切相关。风险投资的组织形式不同,风险投资家的报酬设计会存在差别。文章通过分析有限合伙制、公司制和信托基金制三种组织形式,探索了与之对应的风险投资家报酬设计安排。     

论风险投资家的监督活动

风险投资对于科技型中小企业的发展具有显著的促进作用,由于不确定性、信息不对称性等原因要求风险投资家在对科技型中小企业进行风险投资时必须提供有效的监督。本文分析了风险投资家的事先、事中、事后监督的动机和作用。     

风险投资家的作用和应具备的素质

风险投资是由专业化人才（风险投资家）管理下的投资中介，吸收风险资本持有者的资金，通过合理的资金运作，投向其具有潜力的高科技风险企业的过程。风险投资家在风险投资业的发展中具有独特而核心的作用，能将风险资本与高新技术有效结合。因此，风险投资家应具备良好的个人综合素质，以此促进高新技术成果商品化产业化，从而取得高资本效益。     

创业投资家报酬激励机制的缺陷分析与对策研究

高素质的创业投资家是创业投资的灵魂,对创业投资家的激励具有重要的意义。在对创业投资家的“分成”报酬激励机制进行了分析后,了解了在投资者最大化收益时,创业投资家所付出的努力水平没有达到投资者所希望的水平,所以它并不是一种有效的激励机制。只有通过期权和声誉激励方式来提高创业投资家的努力水平,才能使其两者目标效用函数趋于一致。     

＂337＂ Lawsuit Is Our Motivation Forward--An Interview with An Lijun General Manager of JK Sucralose Inc

＂Winning the lawsuit has won the Chinese sucralose business 20 years of time and 200 billion of market opportunity＂, said An Lijun, CEO of JK Sucralose. JK Sucralose Inc. is located in Sheyang Economic Development Zone in Jiangsu Province. Established in January 2006, it is China＇s largest and the world＇s second largest company specializing the production of sucralose.     

Financial intermediaries,ownership structure and the provision of venture capital to SMEs: evidence from Japan

This paper examines how the provision of venture capital to small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) is influenced by the ownership structure of the venture capital provider. We introduce a new and unique dataset from the Japanese venture capital market, comprising data on investment and venture capital activities of 127 Japanese venture capital funds. The data allow us to provide a direct comparison of the behaviour of individual owner-manager venture capitalists versus financial intermediation (e.g., bank’s venture capital divisions). The data indicate owner-manager venture capitalists (financial disintermediation) give rise to much smaller portfolios of SMEs and more advice to entrepreneurs. Across the scope of different financial intermediation structures, including banks, life insurance companies, securities firms, corporations and government bodies, there are further differences in the provision of governance and value-added advice provided to SMEs. Also, the data indicate US-affiliated funds in Japan are more likely to have smaller portfolios and tend to provide more advice to SMEs.

制度学习、网络中心性和市场进入——跨国风险资本在华投资的实证研究

在我国风险投资市场不断繁荣而且跨国风险投资大量涌进的背景下,本文主要运用清科数据库2001年1月1日到201 0年1 2月31日的数据进行分析,研究发现跨国风险投资机构的网络中心性对"制度学习一市场进入"的关系具有中介作用。跨国风险投资机构不同的联合投资网络中心性对制度学习正向影响市场进入的影响作用不同,其中中介中心性的影响作用最大,表明跨国风险资本充当其他风险投资机构网络联结的中介具有重要的作用。在此基础上,本研究对跨国风险投资机构和本土风险投资机构的实践及联合投资网络的运作提出相应的建议,以期推动我国风险投资产业的有序发展。     

论风险投资的收益机制

风险投资的收益机制是一种基于非对称、非充分信息的"合理预期的高收益"机制。风险投资合理预期的高收益来源于以转换的形式分享的被投资企业的"行业超额利润"和"垄断利润"以及基于这一基础条件和被投资企业管理素质而获得的"现值收益"和"透支收益"。     

Closing the regional equity capital gap: The role of informal venture capital

There is evidence from a number of countries that small firms encounter a shortage of long-term investment finance, particularly at start-up and initial growth. Expansion of the institutional venture capital industry has done little to fill this equity gap on account of its preference for making large investments in established companies and management/leveraged buyouts. Moreover, the supply of venture capital exhibits a high level of spatial concentration. Initiatives by state/provincial and local governments, most notably in economically lagging regions, to increase the supply of risk capital for start-ups and early stage businesses have at best provided a very partial, and often costly, solution. A more appropriate approach to increasing the supply of start-up and early stage finance is to facilitate the more efficient operation of theinformal venture capital market. Informal investors, or business angels, are private investors who provide risk capital directly to new and growing businesses in which they have no family connection. Most business angels are unable to find sufficient investment opportunities and so have substantial uncommitted funds available. There is also considerable scope for expanding the population of business angels. The most cost-effective means of closing the equity gap is therefore for the public sector to underwrite the operating costs of business introduction services whose objective is to overcome the two main sources of inefficiency in the informal venture capital market, namely the invisibility of business angels and the high search costs of angels seeking investment opportunities and entrepreneurs seeking investors, by the provision of a channel of communication between informal investors and entrepreneurs seeking finance.     

Determinants of Venture Performance in Singapore

Based on a survey of Singapore venture capital (VC)-backed firms, we find that environment, resource-based capabilities, strategy, and VC firms' involvement affect the venture performance significantly. The environment is a major constraint within which a firm's strategy is developed. While managers formulate and implement strategies, these strategies do not determine the eventual success directly. The strategy formulated should be complemented by a firm's resource-based capabilities. Firms that do not match their strategy and resources could lead to unfocused and unproductive efforts. Evidence shows that the "fit" between resource-based capabilities and strategy partially affects the venture performance. Our study provides implications for both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in finding the right partner and in cooperating with each other.     

风险投资组织形式与治理结构的有效性分析

风险投资组织形式和治理结构直接决定和影响风险投资效率。一种有效的风险投资组织形式其治理结构应解决的两个基本问题:激励约束机制问题和选择、监督的成本与效率问题。用三种不同组织形式治理结构效率的比较和有限合伙制为什么成为美国风险投资主流的分析,为我国各地兴起的风险投资及其组织形式提供借鉴。     

有限合伙的本质及适用

我国的新合伙企业法实施四年了,其亮点之一就是确立了有限合伙制度,而这一新制度确立的初衷是为了促进中国资本市场,特别是风险投资行业的发展。虽然有限合伙被广泛认为是风险投资机构的最佳组织形式,但是这也并不妨碍其他业务性质的企业采用这种形式。有限合伙不是风险投资机构的"专利",只有了解有限合伙的本质问题才能正确地适用这种企业组织形式,才能把这种企业组织形式推广得更好。     

Fast growing small entrepreneurial firms and their venture capital backers: An applied principal-agent analysis

First the empirical background of the U.K. venture capital industry is developed using a panel of major U.K. venture capital funds over the period 1988–92. Then a framework for applied principal agent analysis is developed, focusing on risk management and information. Under risk management it explores attitude to risk, risk sharing and bearing, and the effects of risk bearing on effort. Under information handling, it explores information systems, information asymmetries between investor (venture capitalist) and investee (entrepreneur), and ways of attenuating them, and information variance and costs. Finally, the contract between investor and investee is seen as a device for trading risk and information. The implications of this trading for risk bearing, effort and efficiency are explored. The whole analysis is supported by a detailed case study which reflects current practice in the U.K. venture capital industry. The evidence provides striking confirmation of the applicability of the principal-agent model to the venture capital financing of hightech ventures.