Market size and competition: A “hump-shaped” result

An active empirical literature estimates entry threshold ratios (ETRs), introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), to learn about the impact of firm entry on competition. We show that in the standard homogeneous goods oligopoly model, there is no monotonic relationship with the price-cost margin, one measure for the strength of competition. Regardless of the shape of demand, the ETR is hump-shaped in the number of active firms. It can also increase with entry in the Salop model of product differentiation or in a game of repeated interactions where collusion is possible. Empirical applications should use caution and only interpret changes in the ratio as indicative of a change in competition when the number of firms is sufficiently large.     

Measuring Market Power in the U.S. Aluminum Industry: A Residual Demand Approach

This paper applies a refined market power test to examine market power in the U.S. aluminum industry. The study conducts a two-step analysis in which the inverse residual demand facing the industry is first estimated to generate the associate elasticity to infer market power, and then the inverse partial residual demand facing the industry is estimated to produce the elasticity to measure the potential effect of inter-industry coordination. The results suggest that only the primary industry attains market power, and the market power can exert even without collusion between the primary and secondary industries.     

Efficient versus Responsive Supply Chain Choice: An Empirical Examination of Influential Factors

Contemporary strategies in operations management suggest that successful firms align supply chain assets with product demand characteristics in order to exploit the profit potential of product lines fully. However, observation suggests that supply chain assets often are longer lived than product line decisions. This suggests that alignment between supply chain assets and demand characteristics is most likely to occur at the time of initial market entry. This article examines the association between product demand characteristics and the initial investment in a supply chain at the time of market entry. We characterize supply chains as responsive or efficient. A responsive supply chain is distinguished by short production lead‐times, low set‐up costs, and small batch sizes that allow the responsive firm to adapt quickly to market demand, but often at a higher unit cost. An efficient supply chain is distinguished by longer production lead‐times, high set‐up costs, and larger batch sizes that allow the efficient firm to produce at a low unit cost, but often at the expense of market responsiveness. We hypothesize that a firm's choice of responsive supply chain will be associated with lower industry growth rates, higher contribution margins, higher product variety, and higher demand or technological uncertainty. We further hypothesize that interactions among these variables either can reinforce or can temper the main effects. We report that lower industry growth rates are associated with responsive market entry, but this effect is offset if growth occurs during periods of high variety and high demand uncertainty. We report that higher contribution margins are associated with responsive market entry and that this effect is more pronounced when occurring with periods of high variety. Finally, we report that responsive market entry also is correlated positively with higher technological demand uncertainty. These results are found using data from the North American mountain bike industry.     

Competition,Prices and Quality in the Market for Physician Consultations

Prices for consultations with General Practitioners (GP's) in Australia are unregulated, and patients pay the difference between the price set by the GP and a fixed reimbursement from the national tax‐funded Medicare insurance scheme. We construct a Vickrey‐Salop model of GP price and quality competition and test its predictions using individual GP‐level data on prices, the proportion of patients who are charged no out‐of‐pocket fee, average consultation length, and characteristics of the GP's, their practices and their local areas. We measure the competition to which the GP is exposed by the distance to other GP practices and allow for the endogeneity of GP location decisions with measures of area characteristics and area fixed‐effects. Within areas, GP's with more distant competitors charge higher prices and a smaller proportion of their patients make no out‐of‐pocket payment. GP's with more distant competitors also have shorter consultations, though the effect is small and statistically insignificant.     

Competitive Pressure and Innovation at the Firm Level

This paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between market competitive pressure and firms' innovation using panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990–2006. We depart from standard measures of competition, and construct variables capturing the fundamentals of competitive pressure (product substitutability, market size and entry costs) to test the theoretical predictions of Vives [2008, The Journal of Industrial Economics] for free entry. Our results line up favourably with these predictions. We obtain that greater product substitutability and higher costs of entry lead to more process innovation but less product innovation, whereas market enlargement spurs both product and process innovation.     

Entrepreneurial failure: Statistical and psychological explanations

Research summary : Entrepreneurial start‐ups suffer high rates of business failure. Previous research on entrepreneurial failure has focused on two kinds of explanations: statistical and psychological. Statistical explanations attribute excess entry to random errors made by boundedly rational entrepreneurs attempting to estimate business opportunities in risky markets. Psychological explanations focus on entrepreneurial overconfidence and competition neglect. These explanations emerged independently and have not been tested or compared in the same study. In this experimental study, we distinguish entrepreneurial markets from other types of markets and test statistical and psychological hypotheses for all market types. We find that excess entry is significantly greater in small, risky markets than in other market types, and that confidence levels account for excess entry, over and above the effects of unbiased statistical errors. Managerial summary : How can we explain the fact that most entrepreneurial ventures fail within five years? Market risk, inadequate capital and inexperienced management certainly play a role. However, from an economic point of view, it seems odd that inexperienced, under‐funded people continue to engage in risky behavior that is widely known to fail. We conducted experiments that tested two explanations of entrepreneurial failure. The first explanation – the statistical hypothesis – argues that entrepreneurship involves high uncertainty, so random errors are inevitable and can produce excess entry (or under‐entry). The second explanation – the psychological hypothesis – says that entrepreneurs' mistakes are not random but skewed heavily toward excess entry; hence, their decisions are distorted by psychological factors such as overconfidence. Our experiments found support for both of these explanations. Random errors under uncertainty explained 60% of the excess entry in our experiments. However, the overconfidence hypothesis correctly predicted that excess entry exceeds under‐entry, and our psychological measures of overconfidence found support in the data. We also found that the markets that most often attract entrepreneurial investment – emerging markets with high uncertainty – were the markets most conducive to excess entry, due to a combination of psychological and market factors. Hence, we conclude that potential entrepreneurs should pay less attention to their own abilities and aspirations, and more attention to the external realities of competition in the marketplace. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Note on Endogenous Market Structure under Heterogeneous Firms*

Industries, such as semiconductors and biotechnology, are characterized by heterogeneous research productivity and vertically differentiated products. In this note, I relax the assumption of symmetric R&D costs in Sutton [1998] and derive the lower bounds to market concentration when entry and R&D investments in product quality are jointly determined. I show that the lower bound to concentration depends on the degree of vertical differentiation, which is a function of market size and quality choices. My findings imply that empirical applications that fail to account for differences in quality will be biased towards the null hypothesis of exogenous entry costs otherwise.     

The impact of industry environment on early market entry decisions by B2B managers in the U.S. and Japan

Managers form simplified mental models to cope with market environment uncertainties and to process information. A critical decision is whether to enter a high-potential market early. Large innovation and development investments involved in this decision increase uncertainty. We examine the importance ascribed by U.S. and Japanese managers to competitive forces when making early market entry decisions. We expect that the competitive forces will have different effects on the likelihood of early market entry in the U.S. versus Japan due to cultural and business environment differences, and we thereby develop several propositions. We develop a decision-making exercise simulating early market entry decisions, and tested our propositions with managers in medium to large business-to-business (B2B) firms from both countries. We assessed impacts of the competitive market forces on entry strategy selection via relative weights, repeated-measures analysis of variance, and frequency analysis. Our findings revealed differences in the mental models of Japanese and U.S. managers. Buyer power had a larger effect on the decision to make an early market entry for Japanese managers, while threat of new firm entry had a larger effect for U.S. managers; these findings were consistent with our propositions. We also found several areas of agreement between U.S. and Japanese managers. We conclude with theoretical implications and recommendations to B2B management.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

中国药品市场的需求实证分析

以经济学理论中的弹性理论为前提,在采用计量经济学方法研究药品需求量与人均可支配收入、人们的健康水平、药品价格等因素间的相关性的基础上,应用excel软件构建药品需求的线性需求函数模型以及对数线性需求函数模型。最终得出结论:随着人们生活水平的提高,药品需求量将显著上升,而药品价格的变化对药品需求影响较小。     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

A Note on Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets

This note studies third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. I show that whether a more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher or lower price than a less efficient firm depends on the shape of the demand function. Different from the case in which final market demand is linear, the usual assumption in the literature, constant elasticity demand, for example, results in a more efficient firm's receiving a discount.     

Savings and Loan Demand for Liquid Assets: Theory,Evidence and Implications for Policy*

In this study a model of liquid asset management for individual savings and loan associations is developed. The model combines features of portfolio theory and inventory theory and is used to draw hypotheses on the relationship between the demand for excess liquidity and a variety of independent variables. Pooled cross section-time series equations are estimated for the demand for excess liquidity of 198 S & Ls over the period 1974–1978. In addition to conclusions on the role of individual variables, the estimated equations reveal that the FHLBB can affect the portfolios of some, but not all, S & Ls. This implies that FHLBB liquidity policy can have an effect on the mortgage market.     

Firm resources and entry-related advantages: An empirical study in China

The majority of research on order of market entry has focused on market pioneer advantages or the specialized assets that industry incumbents would need to possess. However, relatively little attention has been paid to whether and how certain firm resources or capabilities may provide latecomers with entry-related advantages. This issue is of particular interest when multinational organizations decide to enter emerging markets, such as China, where the transitional economy provides both opportunities and challenges. This study attempts to bridge this gap by discussing the entry-related advantages in terms of pioneer advantages, early follower advantages, and late entrant advantages, and by investigating how each of the entry-related advantages has unique impacts on market performance. In particular, this study examines the relations between innovation management, firm resources, entry-related advantages, and market performance simultaneously with cross-sectional data from 191 firms in China. Our findings reveal that technical resources and skills (R&S), marketing R&S, and market intelligence are associated with different advantages for market pioneers, early followers, and late entrants. Technical R&S is also found to have significant impacts on order of market entry as pioneers. Furthermore, the findings show that remarkable differences exist among the three entrant types (i.e., market pioneers, early followers, and late entrants) in their strategic approaches to attain market performance. We offer implications to foreign firms operating in China or intending to enter China's markets.     

Exploring Mediating and Moderating Influences on the Links among Cycle Time,Proficiency in Entry Timing,and New Product Profitability*

Development cycle time is the elapsed time from the beginning of idea generation to the moment that the new product is ready for market introduction. Market‐entry timing is contingent upon the new product's cycle time. Only when the product is completed can a firm decide whether and when to enter the market to exploit the new product's window of opportunity. To determine the right moment of entry a firm needs to correctly balance the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry. Proficient market‐entry timing is therefore defined as the firm's ability to get the market‐entry timing right (i.e., neither too early nor too late). The literature has produced divergent evidence with regard to the effects of development cycle time and proficiency in market‐entry timing on new product profitability. To explain these disparities this study (1) explores the mediating roles of development costs and sales volume in the relationships among development cycle time, proficiency in market‐entry timing, and new product profitability, respectively; and it (2) explores the moderating influence of product newness on the relationship between development cycle time and development costs and that of new product advantage on the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results from a survey‐based study of 72 manufacturers of industrial products in the Netherlands suggest that development costs mediate the relationship between development cycle time and new product profitability and that sales volume mediates the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and new product profitability. In addition, the findings indicate that new product advantage strengthens the positive relationship between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results provide no evidence for a moderating effect of product newness. These results have important implications because to maximize new product profitability managers need to distinguish between costs and demand side effects of development cycle time and market‐entry timing on new product profitability. Keeping this distinction in mind should help them to better determine the relative profit impact of investments in cycle time reduction or improved entry timing. Moreover, the findings suggest that highly advantaged products that enter the market at the right time may have a highly attenuated sales volume. It also implies that new products with lower advantage may have very little leeway in hitting the “sweet spot” in market. The message is that “doing the right thing” (i.e., to develop a highly advantaged new product) may be at least as important as correctly balancing the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry.     

股权分置改革与股票需求价格弹性——基于供给需求的理论框架和经验证据

股票需求的完全价格弹性这一假设是许多金融理论的基础。然而,真实市场上的股票并非是相互替代的,股价与市场供给有关。本文在中国股权分置改革的背景下,建立股票供给和需求的理论模型,分析在需求和供给变动两个冲击下,流通股股东的累积超额收益。我们进而利用市场模型和市场调整模型,计算流通股股东在股改复牌前后的累积超额收益,并分析检验其截面影响因素。实证检验发现,累积超额收益和远期股票供给量成负相关关系。在控制流通股供给冲击效应之后,我们还发现公司盈利能力和非流通股集中度与股改价格效应负相关。进一步考虑市场时机和内生性问题后,结论仍然稳健。本文创造性地度量了股权分置改革经济价值的市场预期,并提供了需求曲线斜率为负的经验证据。     

OPERATING SYSTEM PRICES IN THE HOME PC MARKET*

Because the demand for OS is a derived demand revealed through the demand for PCs and because its elasticity is relatively small, the profit‐maximizing price of DOS/WIN that would result from a static equilibrium is much higher than the observed price. We investigate this assertion empirically by fitting a differentiated‐products model of the home PC market to panel data of all PC brands sold in the G7 countries over the period 1995–1999. The results confirm that the low value of the aggregate elasticity of demand for PCs is the result of differentiation and substitution among PCs.     

Market Power and Technology

It is well known that market power depends on the price elasticity of demand and the intensity of competition. It is also well known that technology can influence market power through its effect on market structure. However, there is limited research on the direct link between market power and technology. In this paper, we investigate this relationship. We find that the monopoly price can be constrained to be identical to marginal cost under certain technological conditions. We also show how market power depends directly upon technology, holding constant demand conditions, market structure, and the degree of competition.     

Demand for coffee in Sweden: The role of prices, preferences and market power

There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand function is estimated for the period 1968–2002 and used, together with information on import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports.     

Bank regulation and market structure

In our model, banks, heterogeneous in terms of entry costs, compete à la Salop for depositors on the unit circle. When capital requirements, intended to prevent risk shifting, are increased, the resulting costs are passed on to depositors in the form of reduced deposit rates or quality of service. This may induce depositors to migrate to unregulated shadow banks, the consequence being a change in the market structure for regulated banks: for low levels of capital requirements we observe monopolistic competition, while for higher levels constrained oligopoly and, finally, local monopoly. Under the latter two types of market structure, higher capital requirements reduce the profit margins and franchise values of banks, which may have the unintended effect of inducing banks to increase the riskiness of their investments.