Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections

Do aid donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections? Are multiparty elections rewarded in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes? How do the rewards for institutional reforms compare to the rewards for substantive improvements in governance and political rights? These questions are of particular interest given both the spread of democracy and the emergence of autocracies with multiparty elections for the executive and legislature as the modal form of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, we examine temporal dynamics in aid flows before and after transitions to multiparty elections and the strategic allocation of aid rewards to specific sectors depending upon electoral competition and substantive improvements in governance and political rights. We find that, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors reward the adoption of multiparty elections in both democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes while also rewarding substantive improvements in governance and political rights. Sector specific analyses reveal that multiparty elections are rewarded with greater democracy aid and economic aid in both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the quality of elections matters: the adoption of democratic elections receives greater aid gains than the adoption of authoritarian elections.     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

Short and long run democracy diffusion

Does democracy diffuse across borders? If so, how long does it take? Can diffusion cause path dependence, such that if a region is initially democratic (or autocratic), it becomes increasingly so? In this paper I estimate short and long run regional democratic diffusion and account for feedback to and from other countries within the region. Although it is difficult to establish causality, I estimate that when regional democracy in year (t-1) increases, domestic democracy receives or “catches” 40–42% of the increase in the next 5 years, 55–61% in 10 years, and 68–85% in the long run prior to accounting for feedback. When I account for feedback, the average region converges to a unique long-run democracy level regardless of how democratic it is initially. I also provide region-specific and contiguous neighbor estimates, use the model to explain democratization waves, and estimate the alternative V-DEM dataset. In the V-DEM data, democracy diffuses much faster, although the long-run diffusion effects are comparable.     

参与机制对党内民主建设的价值考量

党内民主作为一种民主形式,与广大党员积极参与是不可分割的。党的代表大会制度是党内民主的根本制度,其本质就是一种党内参与机制;完善党内选举制度的方式就是让广大党员行使参与权利;保障党员民主权利是党内民主的最终归宿,其实现途径就是党内参与机制;扩大党务公开透明是党内民主的表现形式,其目的就是通畅党内参与渠道;党内监督制度是党内民主的重要功能,其制约作用需要通过参与机制来发挥。     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

When do neoliberal economic reforms cause democratic decline? Evidence from the post-communist Southeast Europe

Do neoliberal reforms (notably, austerity policy) facilitate democratic decline and the gradual deconstruction of democratic institutions? I examine the democratic development of the Western Balkan countries since 2008 by focusing on the two most recent cases of democratic rollback in Macedonia and Serbia. Neoliberal reforms may create a preference to shut down democratic institutions, because such reforms are socially costly and politically risky. However, democratic backsliding is not possible without opportunity. I illustrate this with reference to the examples of Hungary and Croatia. Croatia implemented some neoliberal policies after 2015, but did not see a drop in its democracy score. By contrast, Hungary moved towards centrally planned capitalism, nationalisation and state interventionism (all opposed to the neoliberal concept of reform), and yet saw a significant democratic decline after 2010. The opportunity to dismantle democratic institutions was a consequence of an electoral gap (a difference in vote share between former and new incumbents), which enabled the rise of authoritarian leaders in Macedonia, Hungary and Serbia.     

How do electoral and voice accountability affect corruption? Experimental evidence from Egypt

How far does democracy decrease corruption? And which specific aspects of democracy help generate such effects? Corruption is famously one of the strongest obstacles to social and economic development. Whereas there has been extensive research identifying the causes of corruption, there is little experimental research on the impact of political institutions on corruption using designs that control for significant confounders. This paper uses a series of laboratory experiments conducted in 2013 Egypt in which a government official decides whether to spend tax revenues paid by subjects on a self-serving good or a good that benefits everyone equally. We have two experimental manipulations: (a) whether the official is electorally accountable to subjects or not; (b) whether subjects could send messages of protests to the official (and one another). We find evidence that electoral accountability does decrease the probability of the official choosing the self-serving good by 17% whereas voice accountability generates such outcome only in the authoritarian treatment (a reduction of corruption by 29%). We also find suggestive evidence that, in the authoritarian treatment, the likelihood of funding the self-serving good decreases by 27% when taxes paid by citizens fall short of the official’s threshold. Our contribution to the literature is two-fold: (a) we are able to single out the effect of specific democratic mechanisms on government corruption; (b) we test outcomes of democratic mechanisms on a traditionally understudied subject pool.     

The effect of remittances on democratic institutions

Do remittances promote stronger democratic institutions in developing countries? We study the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democracy in developing countries, and examine how government spending mediates the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democratic institutions. Using a dynamic panel estimator on data from 133 developing countries over 1972–2012, we find that workers’ remittances improve the quality of democratic institutions. We also find that workers’ remittances are more effective in promoting democratic institutions in developing countries with low government spending.     

A few signatures matter: Barriers to entry in Italian local politics

Competition for public office is an essential feature of democracy but having many candidates competing for the same position might lead to voter confusion and be counterproductive. In current democracies, ballot access regulations limit citizens’ right to become candidates, seeking to balance this trade-off by discouraging frivolous contenders. This paper examines the causal effect of signature requirements – a widespread ballot access regulation – and finds that their impact goes beyond this goal. I use data on Italian local elections and apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the effects of these requirements on electoral competition, candidates’ selection, voter participation and administrative efficiency. I find that signature requirements reduce the number of candidates running for office, decrease electoral competition, lead to a more experienced pool of candidates, and reduce voter turnout. The positive effects of this policy are observed in municipalities with fragmented political systems, where signature requirements lead to fewer wasted votes and fewer spoiler candidates. The downside is observed in municipalities with concentrated political systems: signature requirements increase the frequency of uncontested races and reduce voter participation. Findings reveal how this barrier to entry impacts key dimensions of democracy and indicate that designing efficient electoral institutions requires a clear understanding of local political contexts.     

The Political Economy of Tax-Based Incomes Policy: Wealth Effects of Post Keynesian TIP

This paper explores the economics of electoral democracy, an almost entirely neglected subject. Running for office necessitates resources. But students of democracy have had almost nothing to say about how much money should be spent by candidates or where that money should come from. As a result, there is a gaping void in the theory of democracy. Joseph A. Schumpeter used a market analogy in his discussion of the electoral process, but even he did not discuss how electoral campaigns are to be paid for. In fact, the few citizens who largely fund campaigns for office in the United States purchase non-rivalrous influence. They obtain the ability to shape the policies that affect all citizens. In this way, political equality is undermined. The paper concludes that achieving a more representative political system can best be attained by treating political campaigns as a public good.     

社会资本、民主发展与政府治理——对69个国家的比较研究

社会资本被认为是社会的润滑剂和善治的社会基础。很多文献认为,高水平的社会资本能够提高政府的治理绩效。但是目前国内外的研究均忽略了社会资本发挥作用的制度环境。本文通过对全球69个国家的实证数据进行比较分析后发现,社会资本能否对政府治理产生影响,依赖于一定的制度环境。在民主制度建设不完善、民主发展水平较低的情况下,社会资本对政府治理并不能产生显著的影响;只有在民主发展水平比较高、民主制度比较健全的情况下,社会资本才能显著地促进政府治理绩效的提高。而且,民主制度建设得越完善、越充分,社会资本对治理的正面促进作用就越大。     

British colonialism and democracy: Divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies

Did British colonial rule promote post-independence democracy? We provide evidence that the relationship follows a strong temporal pattern. Former British colonies were considerably more democratic than other countries immediately following independence, but subsequent democratic convergence has largely eliminated these differences in the post-Cold War period. Existing theories expounding superior British culture or alternative colonial institutions cannot account for divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies. To explain the time-varying pattern, we analyze European powers’ varying policy approaches to decolonization as well as changes in the international system. Britain more consistently treated competitive democratic elections as a prerequisite for gaining independence, leading to higher initial democracy levels. However, nascent democracies that lacked deep-rooted societal transformation faced challenges to democratic consolidation because of Cold War superpower competition. Later shifts in the international system toward promoting democracy further contributed to convergence by destabilizing colonially rooted dictatorships.     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.     

当前中国发展基层民主的途径探索

发展基层民主、保障人民享有更多更切实的民主权利是发展社会主义民主政治的基础性工程。改革开放以来,学者们就如何推进和发展基层民主的方法、途径和措施等方面进行了深入地研究,取得了一系列成果。在把握当前中国基层民主发展现状的基础上,进一步探索有效发展基层民主的途径,对于加强社会主义民主政治建设具有重要理论和实践意义。     

Why does democracy need education?

Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.     

Does economic openness affect liberal and electoral democracy in a different way? Empirical evidence from developing countries

The focus of this paper was to empirically analyze the impacts of economic liberalization on the liberal and electoral democracy in a sample of 106 less developed and developing countries over the period 1970–2016. The economic relationship between these countries and the global trade and the financial system generates a crucial question of to what extent political conditions are affected by this changing relation. To test these relationships, this paper uses V‐Dem's liberal democracy and electoral democracy indices and nine economic liberalization variables. Utilizing two‐step system dynamic panel GMM estimation indicates that trade openness and economic globalization, de facto strongly affects electoral democracy.     

Vote buying and campaign promises

What explains the wide variation across countries in the use of vote buying and policy promises during election campaigns? We address this question, and account for a number of stylized facts and apparent anomalies regarding vote buying, using a model in which parties cannot fully commit to campaign promises. We find that high vote buying is associated with frequent reneging on campaign promises, strong electoral competition, and high policy rents. Frequent reneging and low party competence reduce campaign promises. If vote buying can be financed out of public resources, incumbents buy more votes and enjoy an electoral advantage, but they also promise more public goods. Vote buying has distributional consequences: voters targeted with vote buying pre-election may receive no government benefits post-election. The results point to obstacles to the democratic transition from clientelist to programmatic forms of electoral competition: parties may not benefit electorally from institutions that increase commitment.     

Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?

This paper argues that it is countries' historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together are responsible for 93.7% of global carbon emissions, suggests that the democratic capital stock has an important and robust effect on climate change policies. A history of executive constraints is particularly important. The current level of democracy does not play a role once democratic capital has been accounted for.     

The democratic transition

Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.     

Democratic revolutions as institutional innovation diffusion: Rapid adoption and survival of democracy

Recent ‘democratic revolutions’ in Islamic countries call for a re-consideration of transitions to and from democracy. Transitions to democracy have often been considered the outcome of socio-economic modernization and therefore slow and incremental processes. But as a recent study has made clear, in the last century, transitions to democracy have mainly occurred through rapid leaps rather than slow and incremental steps. Here, we therefore apply an innovation and systems perspective and consider transitions to democracy as processes of institutional, and therefore systemic, innovation adoption. We show that transitions to democracy starting before 1900 lasted for an average of 50 years and a median of 56 years, while transitions originating later took an average of 4.6 years and a median of 1.7 years. However, our results indicate that the survival time of democratic regimes is longer in cases where the transition periods have also been longer, suggesting that patience paid in previous democratizations. We identify a critical ‘consolidation-preparing’ transition period of 12 years. Our results also show that in cases where the transitions have not been made directly from autocracy to democracy, there are no main institutional paths towards democracy. Instead, democracy seems reachable from a variety of directions. This is in line with the analogy of diffusion of innovations at the nation systems level, for which assumptions are that potential adopter systems may vary in susceptibility over time. The adoption of the institutions of democracy therefore corresponds to the adoption of a new political communications standard for a nation, in this case the innovation of involving in principle all adult citizens on an equal basis.