Trade and Real Wages: a Macroeconomic Model*

We offer a new paradigm to understand the effects of trade on factor rewards. It utilizes the classical‐Keynesian model, and shows that normally a country’s trade deficit hurts labor by lowering the real wage, but benefits the owners of capital. The effects of tariffs on factor rewards and employment are opposite to those of the trade deficit, which falls with a rise in the tariff rate. Countries with trade shortfalls unambiguously benefit from their tariffs, because laborers far outnumber capitalists, who suffer from the declining interest rate. Thus, tariffs lead to a rise in social welfare in trade‐deficit countries.     

Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area: The Case of Asymmetric Large Countries

The striking result has been shown by Richardson that tariff revenue competition between two symmetric member countries of a free trade area (FTA) results in complete elimination of external tariffs if there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium at all. Richardson also conjectures without building a model that if member countries are asymmetric in market size, there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in which both countries set positive external tariffs. We explicitly extend his tariff competition model into the case of asymmetric FTA member countries, and confirm his conjecture. We also show that there exists a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of symmetric countries.     

Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

Liberalization Agreements in the GATT/WTO and the Terms‐of‐trade Externality Theory: Evidence from Three Developing Countries

The terms‐of‐trade theory suggests that governments engage in trade negotiations with their trade partners in an effort to escape from a terms‐of‐trade prisoner's dilemma by mutually internalizing externalities that they impose on each other. In this paper, I use predictions of the terms‐of‐trade relationship to provide support for the theory based on the negotiating patterns of three developing countries during the Uruguay Round of the Generalized Agreements on Tariff and Trade. I use industry level import value as well as tariff schedules from these contracting party states that were graduated from the US Generalized System of Preferences list during the Uruguay Round. I exploit the rapid change in their tariff schedules from the best response to the optimal level within a single negotiation round to empirically test the terms‐of‐trade theory. I find that my estimates are consistent with the predictions of the theory as applied to these three developing countries that were compelled to negotiate for tariff concessions during the Uruguay Round.     

Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries

This paper explores the links between international trade theory and the practice of trade and industrial policy in open economies, with special attention to three areas where theoretical lessons have been misunderstood in policy debates. I argue that the "concertina rule" for tariff reform justifies reductions in high tariffs but not moves towards uniformity and particularly not increases in low tariffs. I show that the basic principles of tariff reform are the same in unilateral, multilateral and customs union contexts. Finally, I suggest that the theory of strategic trade policy does not justify subsidies to high-technology industries.     

Trade Sanctions and the Incidence of Child Labor

The purpose of this paper is to develop an imperfect competition model of a small open developing country to analyze the effects of trade sanctions on the incidence of child labor. We show that a uniform tariff levied by the developed countries on imports produced with the help of child labor is a failure in terms of reducing child labor. A more effective course of action would be a firm‐specific tariff where the tariff rate varies with the amount of child labor incorporated in a single good. While such an instrument reduces child labor, however, it worsens the children’s well‐being due to lower income and consumption. Contrary to expectations, the entrepreneurs in the developing countries, supposedly the main beneficiaries of child labor, are better off under trade sanctions as they realize higher profits.     

Reducing tariff evasion: The role of trade facilitation

Can simplifying customs procedures reduce tariff evasion? We measure tariff evasion as the mis-representation of import values in response to increasing tariffs. In a dataset covering 121 countries and the whole set of HS6 product categories in 2012, 2015, and 2017, we show that simplifying border procedures, that is trade facilitation, reduces tariff evasion. Holding tariff rate constant at its mean, improving a country’s overall trade facilitation performance from the 25th percentile to the median reduces tariff evasion by almost 20%. The moderating effect is especially due to improving the pre-shipment legal certainty of customs procedures. Among the potential mechanisms, improving trade facilitation performance is effective in reducing tariff evasion due to under-reporting of import prices, as well as in countries with weaker control of corruption. The results suggest that countries can gradually implement trade facilitation reforms to cost-effectively minimize tariff evasion.     

Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government

The authors study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The introduction of costly governments leads to lower non‐cooperative tariffs, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tariff war, and fully cooperative trade deals where countries lower tariffs but do not eliminate them, even with lump‐sum taxes and transfers.     

A PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN MAJORITARIAN POLITICS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

Do politics affect trade policy? Despite an extensive literature examining the relationship between trade policy and some political factors, relatively few studies have explored the role of a country's electoral system, arguably one of the most fundamental characteristics of a nation's political landscape. This paper examines the empirical relationship between tariffs and electoral systems across countries and over time. The broad theoretical framework is provided by Grossman and Helpman, which predicts a bias towards a non‐zero average tariff, i.e. a “protectionist bias”, in countries with majoritarian systems, since politicians in a majoritarian system aim to maximize the welfare of their home districts, as opposed to the welfare of the nation as a whole. I compare average tariffs of countries with majoritarian systems to those with proportional systems, using methods that address the omitted variables/sample selection problem inherent to this analysis. I find that countries with majoritarian systems do indeed appear to have higher average tariffs than do countries with proportional systems. This result holds after controlling for other country‐specific characteristics, such as a country's legal origins, colonial history, and geographic location.     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

Exempted sectors in free trade agreements

Almost all participants in free trade agreements (FTAs) exclude at least a few products or sectors from complete tariff removal on the exports of their FTA partners. The positive tariffs that remain within an FTA are often the highest tariffs that the countries apply on an MFN basis. It seems plausible that such exclusions may be chosen because the domestic producers of these products are viewed as especially vulnerable to competition from imports from the partner country. In brief, they are especially “sensitive sectors.” We develop this idea theoretically and then test it empirically on data from 37 countries in 240 importer–exporter pairs within FTAs. We find support for the sensitive‐sector hypothesis only in the high‐income countries. We find that low‐income countries, in contrast, exempt sectors where bilateral tariff removal would be more likely trade‐diverting and therefore harmful. Our explanation for this, supported empirically, is not that they are following the advice of trade economists, but rather that they are avoiding loss of tariff revenue and may also perhaps be influenced by the greater bargaining power of richer and/or larger partners in their FTAs.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Mergers: a Global Analysis*

We analyze the effects of bilateral tariff reductions on the profitability of cost‐reducing horizontal mergers. Given Cournot competition in a two‐country world, for any positive tariff below a certain threshold, marginal trade liberalization is shown to encourage only those domestic mergers with sufficiently large cost‐savings and to discourage the rest. For tariffs close to, but smaller than, the prohibitive tariff, however, marginal trade liberalization necessarily encourages all domestic mergers. Moreover, we show that for a given level of cost‐savings, the impact of marginal trade liberalization may not reliably predict that of nonmarginal liberalization. Although at high tariffs, domestic mergers are shown to be unambiguously more profitable than cross‐border mergers, near free trade, mergers which yield the most cost‐savings become the most profitable. Thus, when comparing domestic and cross‐border mergers, trade liberalization encourages the type which yields the most cost‐savings.     

Fortress Europe: Jericho or Château d’If?

Traditional analysis of customs union formation suggests that it leads to an increase in members' external tariffs. This paper stresses two aspects of European trade and trade policy—a large volume of intra-industry trade between similar countries and a political motivation for tariffs—and highlights a role for tariff coordination in a model of differentiated products in which tariffs affect domestic costs and thus export prices and the magnitude of monopolistic rents. We show that when workers choose the tariffs and receive but a small portion of tariff revenues, the union's tariff wall falls.     

The United States is a Small Country in World Trade*

Despite being the largest country in world trade and thus presumably having high optimal tariffs, the United States has long had low and declining levels of protection. This paradox suggests that the United States is failing to exploit its monopsony power by levying optimal tariffs. Using data on world output and trade flows, we find that the United States is a small country in world trade in that its trade policies have negligible impacts on world prices. In the median manufacturing industry, US tariffs reduce world prices by only 0.12%. United States optimal tariffs are also typically small (3.6% in the median industry) and are lower than existing US tariffs in most industries. It is no puzzle that the United States has been a champion of free trade since the 1930s—the United States, like other small countries, benefits economically from tariff reductions.     

Protection for maturing industries: Evidence from Canadian trade patterns and trade policy, 1870–1913

As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period.     

Reassessing the productivity gains from trade liberalization

This paper reassesses the impact of trade liberalization on productivity. We build a new, unique database of effective tariff rates at the country‐industry level for a broad range of countries over the past two decades. We then explore both the direct effect of liberalization in the sector considered, as well as its indirect impact in downstream industries via input linkages. Our findings point to a dominant role of the indirect input market channel in fostering productivity gains. A 1 percentage point decline in input tariffs is estimated to increase total factor productivity by about 2 percent in the sector considered. For advanced economies, the implied potential productivity gains from fully eliminating remaining tariffs are estimated at around 1 percent, on average, which do not factor in the presumably larger gains from removing existing non‐tariff barriers. Finally, we find suggestive evidence of complementarities between trade and FDI liberalization in boosting productivity. This calls for a broad liberalization agenda that cuts across different areas.     

Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?

Many nations have undergone significant trade liberalization even as they have increased their use of contingent protection measures. This raises the question of whether some of the trade liberalization efforts, at times accomplished through painful reforms, have been undone through a substitution from tariffs to non‐tariff barriers. Among the new forms of protection, antidumping is the most relevant. This paper examines whether the use of antidumping is systematically influenced by the reduction of applied sectoral tariffs in a sample of 29 developing and six developed countries from 1991 through 2002. Evidence is found of a substitution effect only for a small set of heavy users of antidumping among developing countries. There is no similar statistically significant result for other developing countries or developed countries. Robust evidence is also found of retaliation and deflection effects as determinant of antidumping filings across all subsamples.     

Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements

Using a general‐equilibrium model of world trade, this paper evaluates the benefits of most‐favored‐nation (MFN) treatment to developing countries in multilateral relative to bilateral or regional trade agreements, from three sources. First, developing countries may be able to free‐ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries in MFN‐based GATT/WTO rounds. Second, MFN benefits developing countries by restricting discriminatory retaliatory actions by other countries, evaluated here by a non‐ cooperative Nash tariff game. Finally, MFN changes threat points in bargaining and hence affects the bargaining solution of multilateral MFN‐based trade negotiation compared to a bilateral/regional arrangement. The authors find that the benefits to developing countries are small in the first case as the tariff rates are already low, and the benefits are small in the second case as the optimal tariffs under unconstrained retaliation are not very asymmetric. Benefits from the third case are large as large countries can extract large side‐payments if they bargain bilaterally.     

Effects of the Mexican Apple Tariff on the World Apple Market

In response to the USA blocking Mexican trucks from traveling to the inland part of the USA, Mexico imposed tariffs on US fresh apple exports. This study analyzes the impacts of the Mexican tariff on USA, Mexican and world apple markets by using theoretical analysis and developing a spatial equilibrium trade model. The results show that this tariff increases apple prices in Mexico, to the benefit of Mexican producers but harming Mexican consumers. Even though Mexico collects revenues from its tariff, the overall welfare impact is negative because consumers' loss outweighs producers' gain and tariff revenues. Since the USA exports less to Mexico, its prices and production decline, but consumption increases. To mitigate the export market loss to Mexico, the USA redirects its exports to other importing countries, displacing other apple exporting countries' trade with these importing countries.     

Domestic political competition and pro‐cyclical import protection

Governments, especially in developing countries, routinely practice binding overhang (i.e. setting applied tariffs below binding WTO commitments) and frequently move applied tariffs for given products up and down over the business cycle. Moreover, applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical in developing countries. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying between domestic interest groups. Applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical when high‐tariff interests (e.g. import‐competing industries) capture the government: these groups concede lower tariffs to low‐tariff interest groups (e.g. exporting firms or firms using imported intermediate inputs) during recessions because recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate a stronger lobbying threat.