公平相容约束与集体行动

This paper extends the work of Zhu Xianchen and Li Yulian (2007) by introducing the fairness compatibility constraint. Our work strengthens the explanatory power of their model. Whether a collective action can be realized depends not only on the organizer and followers’ individual rationality constraints, but also on their fairness compatibility constraints. Collective actions that meet the organizer’s individual rationality constraint but do not meet his fairness compatibility constraints cannot be realized. Furthermore, free-riders play a destructive role, which should not be ignored. Translated and revised from Jingjixue Jikan 经济学 (季刊) (China Economic (Quarterly)), 2007, 6(2): 597–606     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

Subjectivism,joint consumption and the state: Public goods in Staatswirtschaftslehre *

Abstract

On the basis of F.B.W. Hermann's Staatswirthschaftliche Untersuchungen and of major German, Austrian and Swedish contributions to public economics, two specific claims with regard to the Germanic influence in the development of public expenditure theory are put forward in this paper. It is contended that the German achievements concerning the conceptual clarification of public goods are: (i) important as conceptual ingredients of the modern ‘micro-based’ theory of the public sector: (ii) less closely linked to some historical and intellectual German Sonderweg (culminating in historism, a collectivistic view of social entities and a mystical glorification of the State) than is often suggested.

It is argued that these achievements rather were to a large extent inspired by the more cosmopolitan tendencies in German thought. An important influence is Kantian liberalism. Kant construed a kind of foundational interdependence between the public and the private sector. This prepares the ground for a framework of complementary institutions instead of explaining public institutions in terms of a market failure-perspective based on non-excludability: the view developed in German Idealism gives non-rivalry the pivotal role: the explanation of public institutions systematically hinges upon the existence of goods, the benefits of which are necessarily universal and hence are necessarily made available in a non-rival mode.     

Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare

This paper provides a systematic analysis of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government by studying jointly its effects on electoral discipline and selection, in a setting where, realistically, voters only have limited information about fiscal policy in other jurisdictions, ruling out yardstick competition. Fiscal centralization reduces the extent of electoral discipline, as a corrupt (rent-seeking) incumbent can target good behavior only at a “minimum winning coalition” of regions (selective rent-diversion) in order to retain office, but thus makes it more profitable for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral discipline occurring at all. Voters tend to prefer centralization when politicians are low quality i.e. more likely to be corruptible. Centralization with uniform taxes can dominate both unconstrained centralization and decentralization, explaining why uniform taxes are so widely observed.     

为什么不同时期不同国家提供的公共产品不同?——兼论中西公共财政的异同

本对不同时期不同国家公共产品（Public Goods)提供的不同状况的原因作了分析,认为公共产品提供的差异是公共选择的结果。并在个人理性与集体理性的一致性的前提下,从技术、传统化等角度对公共产品提供这一制度变迁过程进行了探讨。最后,本指出公共产品提供的差异性对我国建立公共财政框架的启示意义。     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

集体行动的理论综述

集体行动是人们历来关注的焦点之一。特别是在社会学领域,结构主义、功利主义和构建主义都对集体行动做出了理论上的解释;在经济学界,对于集体行动的研究还刚刚开始,特别是还缺少针对具体经济现象中的集体行动的研究。从社会学和经济学两方面对研究集体行动的理论做一个梳理,以期对研究具体的经济现象有所指导意义。     

Gender Disparity in Access to the Rwandan Mutual Health Insurance Scheme

While there is a body of research on the gendered penalties of user fees within health systems in low-income countries, what is less well understood is the gendered experience of community-based health insurance (CBI) programs, which have replaced user fees for basic healthcare. This study examines the uptake of a Rwandan CBI scheme five years after the program was scaled up nationwide. Using the Enquete Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages de Rwanda (EICV2) for 2005–6, the study finds evidence that members of female-headed households are less likely than those of male-headed households to be enrolled in the CBI program. Additionally, it finds strikingly different patterns of equity effects of CBI by gender of household head by examining consumption income and wealth. These findings suggest the need for greater attention to equity, particularly gender equity, concerning the way in which voluntary CBI programs are initially implemented and evaluated.     

全球公共物品理论研究

全球公共物品理论为全球化问题的解决提供了新思路。然而,中国的学术界对于全球公共物品理论的理解,还存在莫衷一是的现象,并倾向于把全球公共物品理论与国际公共物品理论混为一谈。这不仅制约了全球公共物品理论运用的效果,也影响了该理论的发展。为此,本文通过对全球公共物品理论和国际公共物品理论的辨析,提出了应该从三个维度来理解和认识全球公共物品理论的观点,进而对全球公共物品理论对传统公共物品理论的拓展问题进行了研究,旨在为全球化问题的解决提供正确的理论基础。     

Learning to Punish: Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Step-Level Public Goods Game

This paper studies how subjects in a three-person sequential step-level public good game learn to punish free riders more over time. Our current work makes several additions to the literature on other regarding behavior. First, our experiment provides evidence that subjects care about the actions that lead to an outcome as well as the outcome itself, replicating the results of A. Falk, E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher (Economic Inquiry, in press), J. Brandts and C. Solà (Games and Economic Behavior, 36(2), 138–157, 2001.) and J.H. Kagel and K. Wolfe (Working paper, Ohio State University, 1999). Second, our experiment provides one of the first tests of the newer theories of reciprocity by A. Falk and U. Fischbacher (Working paper, University of Zurich, 2000) and G. Charness and M. Rabin (Quarterly Journal of Economics, in press) that take a psychological games approach. We find that these theories fail to explain the experimental data. Finally, we examine the mechanism by which subjects learn to punish free-riding more ofter over time.     

公共池塘资源自主治理理论与我国农村社区公共产品治理的研究

埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆的公共池塘资源自主治理理论完善了准公共产品理论,结合社会资本因素的集体行动及制度供给理论给我们提供了研究农村社区公共产品供给及治理新的视角。基于此,在简要回顾目前国内农村社区公共产品治理研究及其不足之处的基础上,借鉴公共池塘资源自主治理理论,提出今后我国农村社区公共产品治理研究中需要进一步加强研究的内容及方向,以促进农村公共事业的可持续发展。     

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.     

经济增长中非经济性公共物品需求分析

利用2003—2010年我国29个省(自治区、直辖市)的面板数据,对教育支出、医疗卫生支出、科技支出、社会保障补助支出和环境保护支出五类非经济性公共物品支出需求函数进行了估计,实证检验了与公共支出需求相关的因素。结果显示:非经济性公共物品需求与人均收入、人口规模和城市化率正相关;在温饱问题解决后,随着居民收入的增加,即使居民的税收负担有所上升,居民对教育、医疗和科技的需求也会不断增加;失业率的上升会减少居民对教育、科技和医疗的需求,但会增加对社会保障的需求;环境保护关系到城市的可持续发展,产业结构调整可能有助于缓解环境保护支出与需求的矛盾。     

Innovation and its diffusion: process,actors and actions

Seeking to understand factors affecting innovation diffusion, research has increasingly focused on process, actors and activities. After two decades of research, however, a systematisation of these three sets of studies is still lacking. Thus, this paper contributes to the existing literature providing a comprehensive framework of factors affecting innovation diffusion between organisations. Specifically it evidences phases of innovation diffusion process, clarifies the role of innovator, adopters and intermediaries and evidences actions that policy-makers can implement to support it.     

效应溢出与地方公共产品供给的权限

基于地方公共产品理论,探讨了具有溢出效应的地区间地方公共产品最优供给效率,尝试性地测度了地方性公共产品不同的供给形态对帕累托效率的偏离,并在此基础上指出经济权限和政治权限的耦和是实现地方公共产品最优供给的重要途径,最后借助外部性内在化的理论分析框架探讨了实现经济权限和政治权限耦合的相应制度安排。     

Learning by Trial and Error: A Case for Moot Courts

This article describes the development of a computer tutorial for use in a history of economic ideas class. An early version of the tutorial contained ten topics, ranging from early Mercantilist thought to Jevons's marginal utility analysis. These concepts were presented in three ways: verbally, graphically, and in summary form. Student critiques were used to extend the content and revise the mode of presentation.     

中国公共品供给制度的缺陷分析

中国公共品供给制度的显特征是政府调节是其公共部门的过度垄断，市场机制及私人部门和第三部门在公共品供给中的参与程度较低。因公共品供给过程中垄断代替了竞争，单一的政府调节和公共生产，导致公共部门规模膨胀，财政负担过重，公共咨询配置效率低下，公共品供给不足以及寻租行为猖獗，腐败现象蔓延等诸多积重难解的问题。本在简要回顾中国公共品供给制度变迁的历史过程的基础上，着重分析中国现行公共品供给制度的缺陷及其成因，理出中国公共品供给制度创新的基本思路。     

The Italian approach to the theory of public goods *

Abstract

The subject of needs is the centre of attention of Italian public finance scholars. The financial activity of the State is justified by the existence of collective or public needs to whose satisfaction collective or public goods and services are linked. Italian economists have studied the problems of public goods in a general context, taking into consideration concurrently both taxes and public expenditure and giving prominence to positive analysis. Italian theorists have always been far removed from the classical approach, which denies the productivity of public services, and have deemed it necessary to take into account the political context in which fiscal structures operate. Their models include the State as a major factor. Herein lies the main value of the Italian tradition in public finance, which puts in coercion into the market mechanism via State intervention.     

论城市准公共物品的合理提供

城市准公共物品在城市经济发展中起着十分重要的作用。我国城市准公共物品的供给方式已多样化,但仍存在总量供给不足和供给结构不合理等现象。本文以满足公共需要、注重效率和公平作为依据,提出几种改进措施,以促进城市准公共物品的合理提供。