Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Policy Preferences

This paper uses campaign contribution data to examine trade policy preferences among political action committees. With perfect factor mobility, as the Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) model assumes, interest group trade positions should depend on their factor of production but not on their industry. We show, consistent with the 2 × 2 HO model, that capital groups consistently back representatives supporting trade liberalization while labor groups favor protectionists. Unlike previous work, we also measure the variation in trade policy preferences within capital and labor groups. We find evidence that the industry net export position significantly affects labor unions' trade policy preferences. Industry characteristics have no impact on capital group lobbying. The former result suggests that empirical analyses of labor PAC contributions that exclude industry characteristics may be misspecified.     

European Agricultural Biotechnology Preferences and Policy: Growth and Trade Implications

European Union policies effectively prohibit the production and consumption of genetically modified agricultural products. This paper examines the prohibition's effects on research and development, innovation, trade flows, and economic growth using a Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson trade model with a neo‐ Schumpeterian approach. Restrictive European Union policies on biotechnology production and consumption result in: an effective export subsidy of capital to the South; changing trade flows; North America being the dominant producer of biotechnology research and development; the South being a dominant producer of biotechnology products; and the European Union being the dominant producer of traditional agricultural products.     

Nonhomothetic Preferences and International Trade

This study examines whether nonhomothetic preferences underlie the “missing trade” problem associated with factor content of trade models. We first find that per capita income goes a long way in explaining differences in goods consumption across countries. We then find a striking correlation between the factor content of consumption and per capita income, and show that accounting for this is a key part of resolving the case of the missing trade. However, nonhomothetic preferences over broad categories of expenditure play only a small role in this phenomenon. Rather, we find that as income grows, spending is directed towards the relatively capital‐intensive version of a given good. Since recent research shows that capital intensity is correlated with quality ( Schott, 2004 ), our results suggest that within‐product quality differences are likely important for explaining the factor content of trade, whereas nonhomothetic preferences over broad categories of expenditure are much less so.     

Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences

Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population. Such interdependence between policy and preferences may limit (or enhance) the effectiveness of different policies. We demonstrate this idea with a simple model of subsidizing contributions to a public good. While the short‐run effect of such a subsidy will be an increase in the overall contribution, the subsidy triggers an endogenous preference change that results in a lower level of contribution to the public good, despite the explicit monetary incentives to raise that level.     

Individual Characteristics,Behavioral Biases,and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey in Japan

Import liberalization is one of the most actively debated issues in trade policy. This paper examines how trade policy preferences are related to individual characteristics based on a survey in Japan. Among 10,000 surveyed individuals, people working in non‐agricultural sectors, those working in managerial occupations, or those above retirement age tend to favor freer imports. This paper also finds that people who are influenced by the status quo bias are likely to oppose import liberalization even after controlling for each individual's various characteristics, suggesting that neither income compensation nor insurance schemes are sufficient for expanding support for free trade.     

The Political Economy of Trade Preferences

This articles tests the implications the Grossman and Helpman "protection for sale" model. The goal is to address some of the problems associated with previous empirical studies. These problems are addressed using a data set derived from decisions reached by the president in cases involving product or beneficiary eligibility under the Generalized System of Preferences. The results provide some support for the Grossman and Helpman model, but they also indicate that factors not accounted for in this model play an important role in GSP eligibility decisions. (JEL F13 , F14 )     

International Trade and Volume Patterns under Quasilinear Preferences

We formally analyze the pattern and volume of trade by embedding quasilinear preferences in the standard perfectly competitive, two‐factor, two‐good, two‐country trade model. Quasilinear preferences deliver a natural partition of the two goods into a luxury and a necessity, and preserve the validity of the Heckscher–Ohlin and Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek theorems. In addition, the predicted factor content of trade under quasilinear preferences is smaller (larger) than the predicted factor content of trade under homothetic preferences if and only if the luxury good is capital (labor) intensive. This result offers a novel explanation for the “missing‐trade” mystery.     

Trade and Industry Policy

This article consists of a review of changes in trade and industry policy, along with discussions of the determinants of change and the major problem areas. Policy between 1965 and 1985 is summarised, and the growth of unemployment in the 1970s is suggested as a key determinant of change. Higher protection in certain industries, and moves to more quantitative methods ot protection can be related to unemployment, in Australia as in other countries. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that protection is likely to prove ineffective in reducing unemployment. The reliance on protection in particular cases is ascribed to a wish by governments to preserve specific jobs, not to increase overall employment. Policy can have a role in facilitating or restricting structural change which can arise from several sources, such as changing trade patterns and preferences. The devices of policy are considered briefly to determine whether they are likely to facilitate change or not. It is concluded that they often provide incentives to avoid change. The scale problem is considered, and it is suggested that the cost of protection could be high in industries subject to significant scale economies. Scale and adjustments are considered in the light of two industries, motor vehicles and whitegoods, and the role of industry plans is examined. The actuality of trade and industry policy often differs from announced intentions, and this ambiguity can give rise to uncertainty which itself has a cost.     

Preferences,Country Bias,and International Trade

The paper analyzes international trade in a Ricardian world where consumer preferences exhibit country bias. In particular, consumers differentiate between identical physical goods by country of manufacture. In contrast to the classical Ricardian model, the pattern of international specialization in production depends on the preference structure. Possible equilibrium configurations include ones where both countries specialize incompletely and trade in both commodities, as well as situations where the pattern of specialization and trade is the reverse of that in the classical Ricardian world. Both interindustry and intraindustry trade can occur simultaneously, though there are no market imperfections or scale economies.     

Individual Preferences for Trade Partners in Taiwan

This article investigates economic factors and non‐economic factors of individual attitudes toward free‐trade agreements with different countries. Based on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, highly skilled workers in Taiwan should be more supportive of free trade with China and less supportive of free trade with the United States than should unskilled workers in Taiwan. Using survey data from Taiwan, we find that highly educated people in Taiwan are more supportive of free trade with both the United States and China, and the effects of education are much stronger with respect to free trade with China. We also find that individual risk attitudes, national identity, and ethnicity play important roles in explaining trade preferences.     

Results-Oriented Trade Policy

We construct a model of economic policy determination by an executive who controls a domestic policy instrument and who can influence, but not completely control, the conduct of trade policy. The executive exploits a polictical linkage between the policies. These circumstances can motivate implementation of a results-oriented trade policy by the government of a trading partner. We analyze the implications of such a policy under alternative situations.     

Comparative Trade Policy

Current research has found ambiguous theoretical and empirical results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper aims to reconcile the different views within a theoretical model. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared with proportional representation. Trade policy is more (less) protectionist under proportional electoral regimes, as compared with majoritarian institutions, if swing districts are populated by relatively more (less) factor owners with stakes in the exporting sector. It is also shown that politicians optimally apply a lower (higher) level of rent seeking under the majoritarian electoral rule if there are relatively more factor owners in the swing districts with stakes in the exporting (import‐competing) sector.     

贸易政策不确定性与公司现金股利决策

文章以2003-2019年A股制造业上市公司为样本,研究宏观贸易政策不确定性对公司现金股利决策的影响.研究发现:贸易政策不确定性上升时,公司支付现金股利的意愿和水平会明显下降;这种负面影响与公司风险承担能力、内部治理水平均相关,说明行为同时受风险预防动机和代理动机驱动.据此,文章认为,当外部贸易环境较不确定时,既要增强公司产业链上下游协调能力和提升企业家信心,也要加强外部监管、引导公司实施积极平稳的现金股利政策,进而提升资本市场活力和吸引力.     

Learning-by-Doing and Strategic Trade Policy

The paper models international rivalry between a domestic firm that is going through a learning-by-doing phase, and a mature foreign rival. It is shown that the optimal production subsidy for the domestic firm depends on the degree of strategic sophistication of the foreign firm. Optimal production subsidy rules are derived under various scenarios. They are shown to be very sensitive to the specification of the game between the domestic and the foreign firms. Whether the optimal subsidy should decrease over time depends on the strategic sophistication of the foreign firm.     

Merger Profitability and Trade Policy

We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez‐faire economy. A key element is a change in the governments’ incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.     

Environmental Policy Theory Given Bounded Rationality and Other-regarding Preferences

Established environmental policy theory is based on the assumption of homo economicus. This means that people are seen as fully rational and acting in a self-regarding manner. In line with this, economics emphasizes efficient policy solutions and the associated advantages of price incentives. Behavioral economics offers alternative, more realistic views on individual behavior. In this paper we investigate opportunities to integrate bounded rationality and other-regarding preferences into environmental policy theory to arrive at recommendations for more effective policies. For this purpose, we will address decisions made under risk and uncertainty, intertemporal choice, decision heuristics, other-regarding preferences, heterogeneity, evolutionary selection of behaviors, and the role of happiness. Three aspects of environmental policy are considered in detail, namely sustainable consumption, environmental valuation and policy design. We pay special attention to the role of non-pecuniary, informative instruments and illustrate the implications for climate policy.     

Strategic Trade Policy and Vertical Structure

We introduce intermediaries into the Brander-Spencer model of strategic trade policy. A key finding is that in regimes involving independent retailers, output competition and linear pricing (and two-part tariffs under certain restrictions), the optimal policy involves an export tax instead of a subsidy. If firms commit to vertical structure before governments commit to policy then under output competition firms choose integration, whereas if policy precedes structure then at least one firm chooses separation. Under price competition separation is a dominant strategy regardless of whether the structure decision is made before or after the policy decision.     

战略贸易政策新进展与发展中国家贸易政策

通过对战略贸易政策在贸易的政治经济学、不确定性、不完全承诺和不完全信息等四个方面的新进展进行讨论,得出结论:新贸易理论的新进展使得脱胎于发达国家的战略贸易政策更加接近发展中国家市场经常失灵的现实,从而对发展中国家的贸易政策有重要的指导意义。