Political regimes and foreign intervention

We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world.     

Fiscal Federalism and Legislative Malapportionment: Causal Evidence from Independent but Related Natural Experiments

We exploit three natural experiments in Argentina in order to study the role of legislative malapportionment on the biased federal tax sharing scheme prevalent in the country. We do not find support to attribute it to legislative malapportionment during periods when democratic governments were in place; nor did we find any evidence that the tax sharing distribution pattern became less biased under centralized military governments. We argue that these results are at least partly attributable to two of Argentina's institutional characteristics: first, the predominance of the executive branch over the legislature (main fiscal decisions are the outcome of a bargaining process among executive authorities); and, second, the lack of any significant difference in the pattern of geographic representation in the executive branch under democratic and autocratic governments. Thus, the observed biases in the distribution of tax revenues among the Argentine provinces are not caused by legislative malapportionment, but are probably the result of a more structural equilibrium that transcends the geographic distribution of legislative representation and even the nature of the political regime. Our findings illustrate the importance of informal institutions and de facto mechanisms to study fiscal federalism in developing countries.     

Birds of a feather: Evidence on commonality of corruption and democracy in the origin and location of foreign investment in Russian regions

We examine the effects of subnational variations in corruption and democratization on the location decisions of foreign investors in Russian regions using firm-level panel data for the period 1996–2007. We link these effects to the level of corruption and type of political regime in the country of origin of a foreign investor. We find a relationship between attributes of foreign investors' home countries and attributes of the regions in which investment takes place: foreign investors from less corrupt and democratic countries tend to invest in less corrupt and more democratic Russian regions, whereas those from more corrupt and non-democratic countries tend to invest in more corrupt and less democratic regions. An inference is that, in Russian regions with high corruption and with autocratic government, foreign direct investment appears driven by the personal interests of controlling regional political elites who collaborate for mutual gain with foreign investors from corrupt and autocratic countries. Our results suggest a general conclusion that origin and location of foreign investment are linked by common political culture.     

Do elites benefit from democracy and foreign aid in developing countries?

A popular argument for the absence of any beneficial effects of foreign aid is that it is skimmed by political elites in recipient countries. However, studies also suggest that aid may be more effective in relatively democratic developing countries. By exploring data on income quintiles derived from the World Income Inequality Database for 88 developing countries, a set of results indicate that foreign aid and democracy in conjunction are associated with a higher share of income held by the upper quintile. It thus appears that foreign aid, contrary to popular beliefs, leads to a more skewed income distribution in democratic developing countries while the effects are negligible in autocratic countries. The paper closes with a discussion of potential mechanisms generating this perverse effect.     

Foreign ownership and corporate income taxation: An empirical evaluation

Foreign ownership allows countries to effectively export part of their corporate tax burden. Hence, countries with high foreign ownership are expected to impose relatively high corporate taxes. The findings of this paper suggest that there indeed is an economically significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and tax burdens in Europe. Already significant foreign ownership levels in Europe offer an explanation for the absence of a ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate tax levels.     

Which countries become tax havens?

This paper analyzes the factors influencing whether countries become tax havens. Roughly 15% of countries are tax havens; as has been widely observed, these countries tend to be small and affluent. This paper documents another robust empirical regularity: better-governed countries are much more likely than others to become tax havens. Controlling for other relevant factors, governance quality has a statistically significant and quantitatively large association with the probability of being a tax haven. For a typical country with a population under one million, the likelihood of a becoming a tax haven rises from 26% to 61% as governance quality improves from the level of Brazil to that of Portugal. Evidence from US firms suggests that low tax rates offer much more powerful inducements to foreign investment in well-governed countries than do low tax rates elsewhere. This may explain why poorly-governed countries do not generally attempt to become tax havens, and suggests that the range of sensible tax policy options is constrained by the quality of governance.     

政治庇护与改制:中国集体企业改制研究

公有产权的政治庇护理论认为拥有公有企业控制权的政府会从公有企业的持续经营中获取政治收益(就业、税收、企业利润以及个人福利等),政府或政府代理人的收益将会影响公有企业的改制决策。本文通过1998年至2003年全国规模以上集体企业的大样本数据,检验了政治庇护理论对公有企业改制原因的预测。结果表明,当集体企业为政府或政府代理人贡献的政治收益越高,集体企业在生产投入和产品销售上越依赖于政府,集体企业相对于地方经济越重要时,集体企业越不容易发生改制。这些结果有力地支持了政治庇护理论,并为企业改制政策制定和实施提供了重要的参考依据。     

The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation

Authoritarian regimes have surpassed democracies in foreign reserve accumulation since the Asian Financial Crisis. Two prominent institutionalist theories could explain this diverging trend in reserves: First, the political business cycle theory, suggesting that reserves are reduced before an election. Second, the veto player theory, implying that a high number of veto players increases the de facto independence of central bankers, who are reluctant to invest in reserves. A time-series cross-sectional analysis for up to 182 countries over the period 1990–2013 shows that democratic governments tend to reduce their reserves before elections. While veto players do not affect reserves directly, a high number of veto players tends to limit a political business cycle before an election. Elections and veto players do not have an influence in authoritarian regimes. Election cycles tend to explain why democracies have relatively fallen behind in a period of massive reserve accumulation.     

Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries

Focusing on developing countries in three geographical areas (South-East Asia, Latin America and European Union), we explore the relation between political variables and tax revenue, public spending and their structure. We build a new dataset for the 1990–2005 period with fiscal, political and socio-economic variables. Since democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept, we measure it using two variables, the political strength of democratic institutions, and the protection of civil liberties. We perform three sets of estimates: (i) cross-country pooled OLS regressions with region fixed effects, (ii) country fixed effects regressions and (iii) region specific regressions with country fixed effects. While the first model delivers some significant correlations between political variables and tax items, when controlling for country fixed effects we find that tax revenue and tax composition are in general not significantly correlated with the strength of democratic institutions and the protection of civil liberties. The only exceptions are indirect, trade and property taxes. A similar result applies to public spending, with the exception of defense expenditure. Overall, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect economic development.     

Is international tax competition only about taxes? A market-based perspective

This paper revisits tax competition among governments for foreign direct investment (FDI) by considering the role played by the economic dynamism of competitors on the setting of corporate tax rates (CTRs). Using a database with worldwide coverage over the period 1995–2014, we find that strong growth performance of neighbouring countries is associated with a lower CTR, especially in developed countries. This spatial effect is particularly manifest if competing countries are large and open to capital flows. These results appear to hold in most regions of the world and suggest that governments perceive foreign economic dynamism as a threat, leading them to reduce their CTRs to maintain their FDI attractiveness.     

An African Growth Trap: Production Technology and the Time-Consistency of Agricultural Taxation, R&D and Investment

Why do so many African governments consistently impose high tax rates and make little investment in productive public goods, when alternative policies could yield greater tax revenues and higher national income? The authors posit and test an intertemporal political economy model in which the government sets tax and R&D levels while investors respond with production. Equilibrium policy and growth rates depend on the initial cost structure. It is found that in many (but not all) African countries, low tax/high investment regimes would be time‐inconsistent, primarily because production technology requires relatively large sunk costs. For pro‐growth policies to become sustainable, new political commitment mechanisms or new production techniques would be needed.     

Does Aid Effectiveness Differ per Political Ideologies?

Despite the extensive empirical literature on aid effectiveness, existing studies have not addressed directly how political ideology affects the use of foreign aid in the recipient country. This study, therefore, uses a unique dataset of 12 democratic countries in Africa to investigate the impact of political ideologies on aid effectiveness. Our results indicate that each political party uses aid differently in peruse of their political, ideological orientation. Further analyses suggest that rightist capitalist parties are likely to use aid to improve the private sector environment. Leftist socialist on the other hand, use aid effectively on pro-poor projects such as short-term poverty reduction, mass education and health services. Our additional analysis on the lines of colonialisation shows that the difference in the use of aid by political parties is much stronger in French colonies than Britain colonies. The study provides insight on how the recipient government are likely to use foreign aid.     

The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries

This paper examines the influence of government ideology, political institutions and globalization on the choice of exchange rate regime via panel multinomial logit approach using annual data over the period of 1974-2004 in a panel of 180 countries: 26 developed and 154 developing.We provide evidence that government ideology, political institutions and globalization are important determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime. In particular, we find that left-wing governments, democratic institutions, central bank independence and financial development increase the likelihood of choosing a flexible regime, whereas more globalized countries have a higher probability of implementing a fixed regime. More importantly, we find that political economy factors have different effects on the choice of exchange rate regime in developed and developing countries. All our results are robust to panel ordered probit model.     

Political budget cycles: Evidence from Italian cities

The introduction of a new real estate taxes in Italy in 2011 provides a natural experiment, which is useful to test for political budget cycles. The new real estate tax allowed discretion to local governments. This generates a random variation in the distance of municipalities from the following elections when they choose the level of the tax rate. We do find substantial evidence of political budget cycles, with municipalities choosing lower tax rates when close to elections. We observe this budget cycle for smaller municipalities where the tax was more likely to be the single most important issue for the local government. Cities close to elections with large deficits did not set lower rates and so did municipalities with a lower average value of properties. Finally, the political budget cycle is stronger in the South.     

Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’

This paper empirically examines the idea that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are more likely to be signed by governments playing ‘endgames’; that is, when governments are about to lose power. Two empirical strategies shed light on this hypothesis. One relies on events that increase the probability of political turnover, the other on term limits. I find that countries are more likely to sign FTAs after the unexpected exit of their leaders, when political instability is high. The key finding is partly confirmed in the term-limits strategy as governments are found to form more FTAs during their last term in office.     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

Attracting Fdi in a Politically Risky World*

Conventional wisdom holds that lack of government commitment deters foreign investment in developing countries. Yet this explanation is not convincing because some econometric studies have found little support for the role of political risk and host governments can offer upfront subsidies that compensate foreign investors for their sunk cost. This paper shows that a second commitment problem upsets the argument. A multinational firm cannot credibly commit to invest in only one country. Since countries differ in production costs and government credibility, this article explains the pattern of investment in a politically risky world.     

The demand for tax haven operations

What types of firms establish tax haven operations, and what purposes do these operations serve? Analysis of affiliate-level data for American firms indicates that larger, more international firms, and those with extensive intrafirm trade and high R and D intensities, are the most likely to use tax havens. Tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income. The evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate taxable income, whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign income. Firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the most from using tax havens, an effect that can be evaluated by using foreign economic growth rates as instruments for firm-level growth of foreign investment outside of tax havens. One percent greater sales and investment growth in nearby non-haven countries is associated with a 1.5 to 2% greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation.     

中国式分权下地方政府FDI税收竞争的策略性及其经济增长效应

中国式分权机制下,政治和经济双重激励使地方政府竞相降低税率吸引FDI流入,本文考察了这种税收竞争的策略性及其对FDI经济增长效应的影响。模型表明地区间策略性税收竞争将通过降低外资质量影响FDI经济增长效应。使用1999-2006年省级面板数据进行实证分析,回归结果表明,经济发展水平相近的地区间外资企业实际所得税率具有显著的空间正相关性;税收优惠对FDI经济增长效应具有明显的阻碍作用;并且税收优惠幅度越大,阻碍作用越强。因此,我国需要加大对地方政府招商引资行为的监督和约束,以使地方政府放弃对FDI的盲目追捧,转而注重FDI质量,提高FDI对国民福利的促进作用。     

Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy in Latin America over the period 1990 ‐ 2015

Latin American countries experienced important changes in the 2000s. The implementation of fiscal reforms, public debt reduction and the high level of accumulated reserves gave them more policy space than in the past. As a result, Latin American countries were able to implement countercyclical policies to face the negative economic and social consequences associated with the recent macroeconomic shock. Some countries performed better than others. In particular, Social Democratic and Centrist governments enjoyed more fiscal space; they had realized larger budget surpluses over the good years and were able to cope with the crisis without impairing their fiscal conditions. Yet, Latin America has experienced a public finance deterioration in the most recent years. While governments are showing an increasing ability on taxation they are still facing some problems on the expenditure side. As a result, fiscal policy returned acyclical after the period of the crisis. The sustainability of public accounts may be strengthened increasing tax pressure on the richest, reducing tax evasion and improving current spending efficiency. However, the increasing political problems are putting many questions about future trends of public finance in the region.