Big data pricing in marketplace lending and price discrimination against repeat borrowers: Evidence from China

In this work, we systematically investigate the pricing mechanism change from auction to big data pricing on one of the major marketplace lending platforms in China. We find that big data pricing reduces the average interest rate while the borrowers with delinquency or default histories are assigned higher interest rates. However, repeat borrowers are also faced with growing interest rates, even though they have been paying their debts on time. Further analysis shows that repeat borrowers have lower income and education levels. Moreover, investor returns become less dispersed after pricing with big data, which can be a result of homogeneous loans on the market. The implications of the above findings are discussed.     

我国房地产市场的投资性需求分析——基于供给锁定型市场结构理论

2004年是我国房地产市场的分水岭,2004年以前(至1998年),房地产市场运行总体平稳,2004年以后,房地产市场开始转折,投资性需求大量入场,将房价涨幅拉入快速通道,高房价问题即而出现.投资性需求从2OO4年开始泛滥并不是一个偶然的现象,而是市场结构发生变化所引发的必然反应.招挂拍等制度及政策的实施促成了供给锁定...     

The microstructure of the Chinese stock market

The auction principles, clearance, settlement, and depository (CSD) facilities of the Chinese stock market are described. An autoregressive model is found to characterize the time series properties of stock returns and volatility in the Shanghai market reasonably well. The extremely high volatility of the market is explained well by its lagged volatilities along with trading volumes. Further scrutiny reveals that trading volumes and volatility are endogenous in a vector autoregressive process (VAR) system for the Shanghai Composite Index (SHCI). Foreign shares are found to behave differently from domestic shares in several respects.     

An experimental investigation of bilateral oligopoly in emissions trading markets

Market power in emissions trading has been extensively investigated because emerging markets for tradable emissions permits, such as the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), can be dominated by relatively few large sellers or buyers. Previous studies on market power in emissions trading have assumed the existence of a subset of competitive players. However, a key feature of emissions trading markets is that emissions permits are often traded by a small number of large sellers and buyers. Using a laboratory experiment, our objective in this paper is to test the performance of an emissions trading market utilizing a double auction in a bilateral oligopoly. Our results suggest that the theoretical bilateral oligopoly models can better describe market outcomes of emissions trading. The effects of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function on market power in laboratory experiments are found to be consistent with those predicted by the theoretical bilateral oligopoly model. How market power is exercised depends on the curvature of the abatement cost function. If the marginal abatement cost function of buyers (sellers) is less steep than that of sellers (buyers), the price of permits is lower (higher) than that under perfect competition. This is because the market power of buyers (sellers) exceeds that of sellers (buyers). The price of permits is close to the perfect competitive price when all traders have the sameslope of the marginal abatement cost function.     

SMP与PAB电力竞价机制的激励性研究

电力市场的两种基本竞价机制为传统的统一边际价竞价机制(SMP机制)和按报价支付的竞价机制(PAB机制)。首先从拍卖角度出发讨论两种竞价机制激励性,并对两种机制下发电商行使市场力的机理进行了深入分析。分析得出,无论是统一边际价竞价机制还是按报价支付的竞价机制都缺乏让发电商按真实成本信息报价的激励相容性,存在发电商虚报高价的现象,影响电力系统的稳定运行和经济调度。因而需要设计一种新的具有激励相容特性的价格机制。     

Chinese block transactions and the market reaction

This paper examines block transactions in the Chinese equity market. We find that most of the block transactions are traded at prices at or below the closing price of the regular continuous auction market, and more than half are traded at or below the lowest price of the day. Consistent with the price pattern indicating that the block transactions are seller-initiated, the overall market reaction is negative. However, we find a different market reaction to block transactions when the buyer is represented by China International Capital Corporation (CICC), the number one investment bank in China which counts many foreign institutional investors as its clients. The positive reaction is consistent with the buyer-certification hypothesis, that is, the fact that some smart institutional buyers enter block trade indicates the buyers' assessment of undervaluation.     

高等教育投入与黑龙江省老工业基地振兴

随着社会主义市场经济体制的确立和完善，我国高等教育投入逐步形成了以财政拨款为主、多渠道筹措教育经费为辅的体制，这种多元投入体制是由我国发展社会主义市场经济的客观要求所决定的。建立适合老工业基地振兴的高等教育投入体制是深化黑龙江省高等教育改革的一项重要任务。     

浅析“招拍挂”与地价的关系

2009年是"地王"频发的一年,土地价格惊心动魄地上扬,甚至一些地方出现了"面粉比面包贵"的非正常现象。"招拍挂"引入市场竞争机制对土地资源进行配置,是实现土地价值的良好途径,但其供给垄断和需求竞争的模式及"价高者得"的特点,同时也会推高地价,对价格机制产生破坏,造成市场失灵的情况发生。本文从介绍城市土地配置方式的转变入手,基于土地价格机制理论分析了"招拍挂"与地价的影响,最后提出了改良"招拍挂"的建议。     

基于拍卖理论构建物流采购在线交易系统研究

瞬息变化的市场资金流、信息流、物资流的综合作用使大量物流项目具有不同的服务供需特征,从而要使物流市场资源实现最优配置需要解决信息的传播和成本揭示的问题。在这信息结构下拍卖是最为简单易行的交易方式之一,文章探讨了基于现代互联网技术,构建汇聚整个区域市场的物流供需信息的拍卖交易平台的重要功能及理论。     

Does School Quality Matter? Evidence from the Hong Kong Experience

This paper analyses the differential returns to education and to language ability of natives and Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong. The large difference in quality between Hong Kong schools and Chinese schools provides a natural experiment for evaluating the effect of school quality on students' performance in the labor market. We show that the rate of return to schooling is more than three times higher among local-born workers than among Chinese immigrants to Hong Kong. Our analysis also suggests that English language education is one important component of the success of the Hong Kong education system.     

A Simulation model of the Taiwan security market

Since continuous trading and call systems are implemented by many stock exchanges, we conduct a simulation to evaluate stock market performance under different auction mechanisms. Our simulation ignoring confounding factors demonstrates that: (1) a continuous market incurs higher execution cost but with shorter liquidity time and better price discovery than a call market; and (2) as the stock market becomes thinner, execution cost rises and price discovery slows. (JELG15, CIS)     

我国城乡居民收入差异的现状及对策

在市场经济中 ,民办高等教育和其他学校教育一样 ,其商品特殊性和精神产品方面的特性导致其富有正外部性即公共品属性 ;现阶段义务制教育和包括民办高等教育在内的非义务制教育是国家主要从国情出发进行的制度安排 ,不影响民办高等教育公共品属性的客观存在 ,相反 ,这一公共品     

Instability of Equilibria in Experimental Markets: Upward-Sloping Demands,Externalities, and Fad-Like Incentives

The objective of the paper is to study markets in which the value of the activity to any one person increases with the level with which the activity is undertaken by others. The general interpretation could be fads, mimicking behavior, or some sort of belief formation process in which the beliefs or expectations of agents about some underlying state of nature are influenced by the buying behavior of other agents. The result is to create a market that can be modeled as having an upward-sloping market demand curve. The questions posed are (i) in the fad-like environment, does the classical concept of equilibrium (as an equating of market demand and market supply) accurately predict market behavior; (ii) can both stable and unstable equilibria be observed; and (iii) which of the two classical concepts of stability best describes the conditions under which instability is observed? Under the conditions of a fad-like demand side externality in a market organized by the multiple unit double auction (MUDA), market equilibration occurs at a point where demand equals supply. The disequilibrium behavior follows the dynamics of the Marshallian model of dynamics, as opposed to the Walrasian model. These results confirm and extend the major findings of Plott and George who studied a similar environment with a downward-sloping supply.     

Economic returns to schooling for China's Korean minority

This paper examines economic returns to schooling for China's Korean minority in the urban labour market using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares. The OLS estimates of the returns to schooling are similar to findings from recent studies for the Chinese urban labour market. We use parents’ education and spouse's education to instrument for education as well as exploit heteroskedasticity to aid in identification. The two-stage least squares estimates using parents’ and spouse's education are considerably higher than the OLS estimates for returns to schooling, while the estimates which exploit heteroskedasticity for identification lie between the OLS and conventional two-stage least squares estimates. The economic returns to schooling reported in this study assist in explaining why private demand for education is strong among the ethnic Koreans in China. It also provides a justification for the Korean minority's focus on educational attainment.     

Experiments on Electronic Double Auctions and Abnormal Trades

The flash crash experienced by U.S. markets in May 2010 provided stark evidence that a large trade can have a powerful influence. We explore the impact of an unusual trade on behavior in experimental bubbles markets. We chose the experimental design proposed by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) because replication shows it produces markets prone to mispricing. After several rounds of trading, our markets receive a large quantity order at an extreme price. In a standard double auction bubble market, pricing is unaffected by an abnormal order. However, with increased uncertainty about the underlying economic value of the asset, over‐pricing weakens on arrival of a negative price shock.     

Water Externalities: Tragedy of the Common Canal

Laboratory experiments are used to investigate alternative solutions to the allocation problem of a common‐pool resource with unidirectional flow. Focus is on the comparative economic efficiency of nonbinding communications, bilateral “Coasian” bargaining, allocation by auction, and allocation by exogenous usage fee. All solutions improve allocative efficiency, but communication and bilateral bargaining are not generally as effective as market allocations. An exogenously imposed optimal fee results in the greatest allocative efficiency, closely followed by an auction allocation that determines the usage fee endogenously.     

突破“柠檬市场”探索危机形势下二手车行业的发展出路

经济学家称二手车交易市场是一个"柠檬市场",由于信息的极度不对称,买卖双方博弈将导致二手车的品质将会越来越差、流通速度会越来越慢,蕴含了自我破坏、自我毁灭机制。2008年爆发的金融危机对高速增长的二手车行业产生巨大影响,"柠檬市场"特性凸显,对并不成熟和完善的二手车行业来说如何度过这个阶段非常关键。通过对日本、台湾二手车行业发展历程及成功模式进行分析,对比我国二手车行业现状,基于金融危机形势下特定的消费环境,以及"柠檬市场"特性根源,从现实条件出发,通过改善法律环境、加强从业人员的专业管理以及经营者审慎报价来提高在售二手车的品质保障,解决消费者"不信任"的核心问题,通过改变经营思路、大力推进拍卖业的发展、开拓CtoC、BtoB商务平台等手段加快二手车流通速度,将是非常有效的途径。     

城市土地出让中的问题与对策探讨

现代拍卖理论的研究表明,市场环境因素会对不同拍卖方式的效率产生影响。本文根据拍卖理论的一些研究成果,从受让人对土地估价的价值类型,招标拍卖中存在的“赢者诅咒”、“合谋”现象,以及事后土地交易合同的可执行性等方面,对不同的土地出让方式进行了比较分析。分析结果表明,在选择最有效率的开发商以及最大化收入等方面,市场环境因素对不同的交易方式产生不同的影响,因此,提高土地交易效率和效益,还必须进一步完善土地出让市场。     

我国出租车牌照拍卖机制研究

论文以有效分配、促进竞争、实现经济价值为目标，建立了公开升价拍卖+密封拍卖的两阶段牌照拍卖模型，证明了其有效性和最优性。并以北京市为例讨论了牌照数量的确定、进入密封拍卖阶段的时机和牌照的流通等实际问题。这些讨论将有利于拍卖机制在现实中的操作实施。     

Auctions with options to re-auction

A seller has one unit to sell using an English auction mechanism similar to internet auction markets, such as eBay. Bidders appear according to a random arrival process. The seller chooses a reserve price and duration for each auction. If the reserve is not met, the seller passes in the object and conducts another auction with a new, randomly chosen, set of bidders. We distinguish reserves that embody an institutional commitment not to sell below that price, from those that do not. In each case, we find the optimal reserve price and the optimal auction duration. Without price commitment, the equilibrium reserve is too low for allocative efficiency, whereas the optimal reserve with commitment is shown to be too high when the distribution of bidder valuations exhibits an increasing hazard rate. It might even be socially preferable to allow reserve price commitments. With respect to duration, a version of the Diamond paradox afflicts sellers who cannot commit to price; auctions facilitate valuable duration commitments that increase buyer competition and raise expected revenue. With commitment, price posting (equivalent to a zero-length auction) is the dominant selling mechanism.