Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.     

Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking

In cross sections of US banks before the deposit-insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation. Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. We test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. In the case of unsystematic risk, we find no evidence of significant changes for any of the three. In the case of systematic risk, we find that risk-taking associated with lower charter values and larger size is indeed significantly weaker after reform. Risk-taking associated with capital ratios is also weaker after reform, though not significantly so. Since systematic risk is undoubtedly the more appropriate measure, reform seems to have reduced moral hazard.     

实行显性存款保险制度的必要性和可行性分析

无论隐性和显性存款保险制度,在增强公众信心,维护金融体系稳定的同时,都增加了银行的道德风险。从隐性存款保险制度向显性存款保险制度转变是否具有可行性?本文从银行的特许权价值、显性存款保险的可信性、被保险存款占负债总额的比例、“大而不倒”的现实性、不良贷款水平等角度分析这一转变过程中银行道德风险的变化。     

存款保险制度诱发道德风险的理论解析

存款保险制度的设计必须考虑到对市场约束、银行稳定性、金融发展和解决金融危机的影响,还要因地制宜地考虑一国的制度和契约环境。在没有解决好信息与监管环境缺陷的条件下,仓促实施显性存款保险制度将会后患无穷。本文对西方近年来的相关研究成果作一管窥,以期有助于中国特色的存款保险制度的审慎设计与适时出台。     

The Bankruptcy Cost of the Life Insurance Industry Under Regulatory Forbearance

Abstract

In this study the Taiwan Insurance Guaranty Fund (TIGF) is introduced to investigate the ex ante assessment insurance guaranty scheme. We study the bankruptcy cost when a financially troubled life insurer is taken over by TIGF. The pricing formula of the fair premium of TIGF incorporating the regulatory forbearance is derived. The embedded Parisian option due to regulatory forbearance on fair premiums is investigated. The numerical results show that leverage ratio, asset volatility, grace period, and intervention criterion influence the default costs. Asset volatility has a significant effect on the default option, while leverage ratio is shown to aggravate the negative influence from the volatility of risky asset. Furthermore, the numerical analysis concludes that the premium for the insurance guaranty fund is risk sensitive and that a risk-based premium scheme could be implemented, hence, to ease the moral hazard.     

Moral Hazard and Health Insurance When Treatment Is Preventive

We consider a two‐period model under moral hazard when treatment is preventive. In the second period, the treatment level under moral hazard is higher than that under no moral hazard. However, it may be lower than that under moral hazard when overinsurance is not allowed. In the first period, the treatment level is higher when treatment is preventive than when it is not. Treatment level is also higher as the discount factor increases. We demonstrate that a treatment increase following a coverage increase does not necessarily imply moral hazard. These findings imply that moral hazard is possibly overemphasized in the literature.     

On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard

This paper expounds on the importance of identifiabilty of subjective probabilities in agency theory with moral hazard. An application to insurance is examined.     

农险市场中的保险公司道德风险研究

在过往十余年我国农业保险的跨越式发展中,保险公司的道德风险问题日益凸显。本文通过微观案例界定保险公司道德风险的内涵与类别,基于博弈视角分析其产生机理,结果发现:在政府和保险公司的委托代理关系中,由于二者的目标诉求不同,若政府对保险公司的农业保险业务不能给予有效监管,则保险公司不遵守经营规范所得收益要大于其遵守经营规范所得收益,从而导致保险公司出现违规经营业务的道德风险问题;相关部门可以通过完善监管政策、整合监管资源、优化协办机制、加大监管力度、设置差异化保险合约等措施来减少农业保险市场中保险公司的道德风险。     

Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance

We study a dynamic insurance market with asymmetric information and ex post moral hazard. In our model, the insurance buyer's risk type is unknown to the insurer; moreover, the buyer has the option of not reporting losses. The insurer sets premia according to the buyer's experience rating, computed via Bayesian estimation based on buyer's history of reported claims. Accordingly, the buyer has strategic incentive to withhold information about losses. We construct an insurance market information equilibrium model and show that a variety of reporting strategies are possible. The results are illustrated with explicit computations in a two‐period risk‐neutral case study.     

责任保险道德风险防范问题研究

本文主要研究责任保险的道德风险防范问题。首先,介绍责任保险的道德风险是如何产生的,以及该类风险的特点;其次,对责任保险中道德风险的常见表现进行分析;第三,指出主要责任保险险种的道德风险防范中所存在的问题;在上述分析的基础上,最后提出了包括强调损失补偿原则、完善侵权方面相关法律政策、甄别第三方索赔者的类型、提高法庭判决的公平性、提高业务员综合素质以抑制承保风险、合理设计责任保险合同条款等有关建议。     

责任保险:市场失灵、立法强制与道德风险管理

责任保险看起来能够解决安全事故受害者的补偿问题,但单靠市场力量很难形成有规模的责任保险交易.为保证对受害人的赔偿,政府可以在一些关乎百姓生存权的领域实行强制责任保险.不幸的是,强制责任保险会带来被保险人(致害人)的道德风险问题,从而可能降低整个社会的安全水平.鉴于保险人控制被保险人(致害人)道德风险的目标与社会安全目标的一致性,政府和社会应该允许保险人使用社会已有的风险监控系统、支持建立有效的信息共享系统、给予保险人拒绝承保的权利以及由保险人对特殊行业进行强制风险监控.     

Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: A Continuous-Time Approach

This article presents a continuous-time agency model in thepresence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk-averseagent and a risk-neutral principal. Under the model setup, weshow that the optimal controls are constant over time, and thusthe optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in thefinal outcome. We also show that when a moral hazard problemadds to an adverse selection problem, the monotonicity conditionwell known in the pure adverse selection literature needs tobe modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for informationrevelation. The model is applied to a few managerial compensationproblems involving managerial project selection and capitalbudgeting decisions. We argue that in the third-best world,the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and thesensitivity of the contract depends on interactions betweenthe managerial cost and the firm’s production functions.Contrary to conventional wisdom, sometimes the higher the volatility,the higher the sensitivity of the contract. The firm receivinggood news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less thanit does with bad news. We also examine the effects of the observabilityof the volatility on corporate investment decisions.     

Disease‐Specific Moral Hazard and Optimal Health Insurance Design for Physician Services

This article analyzes disease‐specific moral hazard effects in the demand for physician office visits and explores whether optimal insurance for physician services should be designed to have disease‐specific cost sharing. Generalized method of moments is implemented to address the endogeneity of private health insurance, and the nonnegativity and the discreteness of physician services use. The results indicate that the moral hazard effect varies considerably across disease‐specific specialist care. The strongest moral hazard (for no‐condition related specialist visits) is almost twice the moral hazard effect of the weakest (for chronic condition related specialist visits). Although the findings indicate some variation in the moral hazard effect across disease‐specific general practitioner visits, the variation is less considerable. The main policy implication is that optimal insurance for physician services should be designed to have differential cost sharing based on disease status rather than to have uniform cost sharing.     

信息披露与存款保险制度:论上市商业银行道德风险

本文将商业银行道德风险以业务类型为依据划分为资产和负债两个方面,基于信息披露程度与银行道德风险负相关、加强信息披露能为存款保险制度"保驾护航"的假设,选取我国16家上市商业银行2013年第二季度至2017年第一季度数据,采用面板固定效应模型实证考察信息披露程度、存款保险制度的建立与银行道德风险的关系,并探索二者是否存在协同效应。研究表明:信息披露力度的增大可有效降低银行道德风险;存款保险制度在发挥金融安全网作用的同时,亦可诱发资产业务道德风险;充分的信息披露可降低存款保险制度所引致的负债业务道德风险;能否降低存款保险制度中的资产业务道德风险,关键在于银行信息披露力度及相应的制度和市场环境。     

存在道德风险的医院等级选择与最优公共医疗保险合同

通过构造一个医疗服务系统的均衡模型,分析了医院等级、居民道德风险与最优公共医疗保险合同之间的关系。研究表明只存在公共医疗保险体系时,如果政府部门之间缺乏协调机制,各自为政,中国的公共医疗保险支付方式将不能实现社会最优并消除道德风险;公共医疗保险合同可能引起社会福利的损失或引致道德风险。政府应该完善医院评价系统,对不同医院的水平给予准确的评级,特别是要建立起政府各部门之间的协调机制;理顺医疗服务价格体系;鼓励更多市场参与主体进入医疗保险领域,建立合理的疾病风险分担机制。     

论金融道德风险

本文对金融道德风险的内涵进行了深刻的分析,并从九个方面做出了准确的定义.提出了规范性、社会性、个体性的道德风险分类标准,并分别进行了分类和论述.     

Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance

Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicatesthat a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates thecost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14economies to assess the relationship between the risk-takingbehavior of banks and their corporate governance structure.The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tendto take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownershipengage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, asa proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has somepower in predicting bank distress.     

信用评级机构及其道德风险

本文对信用评级机构加剧金融市场波动的成因进行了分析,指出现有机制下信用评级机构存在道德风险的必然性,并就化解道德风险提出了个人的看法。