Funding conditions and insurance stock returns: Do insurance stocks really benefit from rising interest rate regimes?

We examine funding conditions and U.S. insurance company stock returns. Although constrained funding conditions, signaled by restrictive Federal Reserve monetary policy, correspond with increases in the future payouts of fixed‐income securities held by insurance firms and potentially provide value through the liability side of insurer balance sheets, they also decrease the values of securities currently held in insurer portfolios. Prior research finds that restrictive policy has a negative effect on equity returns in general. Our results suggest the negative impacts of constrained funding environments outweigh the potential positives, as insurance company stock returns are significantly lower during periods of constrained funding. This effect varies within a given funding state and also across insurer type. The effect is strongest during the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment and for life and health insurers—insurer types with longer portfolio durations. For property and liability (P&L) insurers, lower stock return performance only exists in the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment. In the subsequent months, P&L insurers actually have higher stock returns during constrained periods, consistent with their typically shorter duration asset portfolios, which are more quickly rolled over into new higher‐yielding securities.     

Valuation of tax loss carryforwards

Tax loss carryforwards (TLC) are a valuable asset because they can potentially reduce a company’s future tax payments. However, there is often a great deal of uncertainty regarding the probability and timing of these tax savings. We propose a contingent-claim model to value this asset. The value is determined primarily by the size of accumulated carryforwards relative to earnings. We show that, for poorly performing firms with large TLC, (1) the realizable (or fair) value of the tax losses can be significantly smaller than the book value, and (2) the tax losses can account for a significant fraction of the company’s equity value. The model is illustrated by calibrating it to a couple of companies with large carryforwards. Finally, we show how the model can be used to compute the marginal tax rate of a company with carryforwards.     

Geometric Brownian Motion Models for Assets and Liabilities: From Pension Funding to Optimal Dividends

Abstract

In this paper asset and liability values are modeled by geometric Brownian motions. In the first part of the paper we consider a pension plan sponsor with the funding objective that the pension asset value is to be within a band that is proportional to the pension liability value. Whenever the asset value is about to fall below the lower barrier or boundary of the band, the sponsor will provide sufficient funds to prevent this from happening. If, on the other hand, the asset value is about to exceed the upper barrier of the band, the assets are reduced by the potential overflow and returned to the sponsor. This paper calculates the expected present value of the payments to be made by the sponsor as well as that of the refunds to the sponsor. In particular we are interested in situations where these two expected values are equal. In the second part of the paper the refunds at the upper barrier are interpreted as the dividends paid to the shareholders of a company according to a barrier strategy. However, if the (modified) asset value ever falls to the liability value, which is the lower barrier, “ruin” takes place, and no more dividends can be paid. We derive an explicit expression for the expected discounted dividends before ruin. From this we find an explicit expression for the proportionality constant of the upper barrier that maximizes the expected discounted dividends. If the initial asset value is the optimal upper barrier, there is a particularly simple and intriguing expression for the expected discounted dividends, which can be interpreted as the present value of a deterministic perpetuity with exponentially growing payments.     

Reprint of: Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

融资流动性与债券资产流动性的互动特征——基于MS-VAR模型的时变分析

依据2015-2021年货币市场和债券市场的时间序列数据,运用MS-VAR探究了不同违约风险环境下融资流动性与债券资产流动性间的互动关系。研究发现：无论是利率债还是信用债,其资产流动性与货币市场的融资流动性存在互为正反馈的流动性螺旋。此外,两类流动性间的互动特征存在非对称性和异质性,在风险时期,融资流动性与利率债资产流动性互动特征比较明显,而在平稳时期,融资流动性与信用债资产流动性互动特征比较明显。     

Comparing Costs and Risks of Retirement Plans for Sponsors

This stochastic simulation analysis compares funding costs and volatilities for private sponsors of traditional defined benefit (DB), pension equity (PE), cash balance (CB), and defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. Plan provisions of equivalent benefit generosity in the different plan types are determined. The modeling includes current funding requirements and practices as well as a comprehensive set of uncertainties in asset and labor markets. The results show that costs and risks for sponsors vary significantly with plan types, investment and funding strategies, and participant demographics. The hybrid PE and CB plans exhibit characteristics of cost efficiency, as in the DB plan, and risk reduction, as in the DC plan, for plan sponsors under conventional investment strategies. These features are more saliently observed in the CB plan, but it is also more difficult to implement effective asset–liability management strategies for it.     

The Cost of Debt

We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.     

Book‐to‐Market Equity,Asset Correlations and the Basel Capital Requirement

This paper examines the effect of book‐to‐market equity (BE/ME) on asset correlations under the Basel capital requirement. We find that BE/ME captures variations in asset correlations after controlling for firm size, default probability and industry effects from 1987 to 2011. Obligors with higher BE/ME exhibit lower asset correlations compared to those with lower BE/ME. Decomposing BE/ME into assets‐in‐place and growth options based on the asset pricing literature shows that obligors with more assets‐in‐place or more fixed assets have higher BE/ME and lower asset correlations than those with more growth options. Overall, our findings suggest that BE/ME is an additional important factor that may improve the estimates of asset correlations and thereby banks’ capital adequacy.     

Estimating default barriers from market information

Brockman and Turtle [J. Finan. Econ., 2003, 67, 511–529] develop a barrier option framework to show that default barriers are significantly positive. Most implied barriers are typically larger than the book value of corporate liabilities. We show theoretically and empirically that this result is biased due to the approximation of the market value of corporate assets by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities. This approximation leads to a significant overestimation of the default barrier. To eliminate this bias, we propose a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation approach to estimate the asset values, asset volatilities, and default barriers. The proposed framework is applied to empirically examine the default barriers of a large sample of industrial firms. This paper documents that default barriers are positive, but not very significant. In our sample, most of the estimated barriers are lower than the book values of corporate liabilities. In addition to the problem with the default barriers, we find significant biases on the estimation of the asset value and the asset volatility of Brockman and Turtle.     

Optimal constrained investment in the Cramer-Lundberg model

We consider an insurance company whose surplus is represented by the classical Cramer-Lundberg process. The company can invest its surplus in a risk-free asset and in a risky asset, governed by the Black-Scholes equation. There is a constraint that the insurance company can only invest in the risky asset at a limited leveraging level; more precisely, when purchasing, the ratio of the investment amount in the risky asset to the surplus level is no more than a; and when short-selling, the proportion of the proceeds from the short-selling to the surplus level is no more than b. The objective is to find an optimal investment policy that minimizes the probability of ruin. The minimal ruin probability as a function of the initial surplus is characterized by a classical solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We study the optimal control policy and its properties. The interrelation between the parameters of the model plays a crucial role in the qualitative behavior of the optimal policy. For example, for some ratios between a and b, quite unusual and at first ostensibly counterintuitive policies may appear, like short-selling a stock with a higher rate of return to earn lower interest, or borrowing at a higher rate to invest in a stock with lower rate of return. This is in sharp contrast with the unrestricted case, first studied in Hipp and Plum, or with the case of no short-selling and no borrowing studied in Azcue and Muler.     

Double leverage cycle,interest rate,and financial crisis

We view mortgage as a risky derivative of its underlying house collateral and combine no-arbitrage valuation with equilibrium valuation approaches to develop a dynamic model of leverage cycle and interest rate. This model provides a unified explanation to pro-cyclical optimism, asset prices, and leverage, and counter-cyclical volatility and interest rate. In addition, the model shows that tightening funding margin in the mortgage securities market dampens optimism, asset prices, and leverage, whereas it raises volatility and interest rate in the housing market. A double leverage cycle leads to more volatile markets and a severe leverage cycle, thus resulting in worse financial crises.     

Foreign exchange exposure of “domestic” corporations

Unlike prior studies on foreign exchange risk that have focused on multinational companies, this paper documents that domestic companies face significant foreign exchange exposure. Indeed, we document that on average domestic company foreign exchange exposure is not significantly different from the exposures faced by multinational firms. As expected, the number of domestic firms with significant foreign exchange exposure increases with the exposure estimation horizon. More interestingly, the level of domestic firm exposure is significantly negatively related to firm size and asset turnover, and positively related to the market to book ratio and financial leverage. Our results have important implications for managers, policy makers, and accounting standards.     

The Role of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans

The Enron situation has caused the retirement income policy community to focus increased attention on the desirability of current law and practices regarding company stock in 401(k) plans. Several proposals have been advanced to limit the exposure of 401(k) participants to company stock. I suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the introduction of company stock into 401(k) plans is not simply more risk for no additional (expected) return. Rather, the introduction of this asset class into the 401(k) participant's portfolio may have beneficial influences via the differential asset allocation. I create a model to simulate the likely financial impact of prospectively eliminating company stock from 401(k) plans and find that average balances are expected to be between 4.0 and 7.8 percent larger if company stock is retained.     

Procyclicality of U.S. Bank Leverage

In light of the current debate about the link between accounting and financial stability, we investigate the determinants of procyclical book leverage for U.S. commercial and savings banks. We find that total asset growth and GDP growth are both positively related to book leverage growth. Our evidence is not consistent with the notion that fair value accounting contributes to procyclical leverage or that historical cost accounting reduces procyclicality. Overall, the business model of banks is more important for procyclical leverage than accounting or regulatory risk weights.     

Risk reporting: A study of risk disclosures in the annual reports of UK companies

The concepts of risk and risk management have received considerable attention lately, but this has yet to be reflected in empirical research examining firms’ risk reporting practices. This study seeks to address this gap in the literature and explores risk disclosures within a sample of 79 UK company annual reports using content analysis. A significant association is found between the number of risk disclosures and company size. Similarly a significant association is found between the number of risk disclosures and level of environmental risk as measured by Innovest EcoValue`21™ Ratings. However, no association is found between the number of risk disclosures and five other measures of risk: gearing ratio, asset cover, quiscore, book to market value of equity and beta factor. The paper also discusses the nature of the risk disclosures made by the sample companies specifically examining their time orientation, whether they are monetarily quantified and if good or bad risk news is disclosed. It was uncommon to find monetary assessments of risk information, but companies did exhibit a willingness to disclose forward-looking risk information. Overall the dominance of statements of general risk management policy and a lack of coherence in the risk narratives implies that a risk information gap exists and consequently stakeholders are unable to adequately assess the risk profile of a company.     

PRIVATE EQUITY: SOURCES AND USES

Private equity capital is playing a large and growing role in the funding of small to medium-sized, high-growth businesses. Today's private equity investment typically takes the form of purchase of a minority interest in a post-start-up, high-technology company followed by an IPO a few years later. A large number of such investors are scouring the markets for new investment possibilities and the competitive pressures are growing.
Although private equity investors can and often do add significant value to a company, private equity is potentially expensive, in terms of both loss of ownership and loss of control over long-term strategic decisions of the company. Owner-managers who want to retain as much of both as possible are advised to install more formalized business procedures, expand the company's outside relationships, and become more familiar with the company's financial needs and options. These changes should reduce capital needs, reduce the costs of private equity funding, and increase negotiating leverage when dealing with large, sophisticated private capital investors.     

Profitability,Value, and Stock Returns in Production‐Based Asset Pricing without Frictions

In a production‐based asset pricing model without adjustment costs and with decreasing returns to scale following Brock (1982), stock returns at the firm level are determined by profitability, the book‐to‐market ratio, and the change in future profitability prospects. Although firms with low book‐to‐market ratios are normally more profitable and profitable firms are predicted to have higher returns, the stylized fact that book‐to‐market ratios positively forecast returns still holds theoretically, but with specific predicted exceptions. These implications are confirmed empirically.     

Trends in Organizational Form and their Relationship to Performance: The Case of Foreign Securities Subsidiaries of U.S. Banking Organizations

Debate about the effects of permitting U.S. commercial banks to expand their range of activities has intensified in recent years. Some observers worry that banks with access to a federal safety net have strong incentives to use new opportunities to take greater risks and increase their likelihood of failure at possible cost to the FDIC and taxpayers. Others fear that the safety net might give banks a competitive advantage relative to nonbank rivals. A key element of this debate is whether a holding company structure does a significantly better job of mitigating against these potential problems than a bank subsidiary alternative and should be made mandatory for banking organizations that want to engage in nontraditional activities. Unfortunately, hard, current empirical evidence on the benefits and costs of alternative structures generally is lacking. The purpose of this paper is to provide this sort of evidence. In the study, annual financial data for the 1987–1997 period for an unbalanced panel of foreign securities subsidiaries of U.S. banking organizations are used to investigate two questions: What factors influence how bank holding companies organize securities activities when they have a choice? And are the observed differences in organizational form related to significant differences in key measures of subsidiary performance? This sort of study is possible because U.S. banking organizations can and do engage in securities activities through subsidiaries of the bank as well as holding company affiliates. These subsidiaries also file financial reports with bank regulators. A probit model is used to empirically identify important factors influencing structural choice. Univariate and multivariate statistical techniques are used to determine whether or not differences in subsidiary structure are related to differences in subsidiary risk, funding costs, and efficiency. Simultaneity is investigated to a limited extent. In brief, the empirical results do not support the position of the holding company proponents. Safety net subsidy incentives don’t appear to be a primary determinant of structural choice. The evidence does not indicate that bank-owned securities subsidiaries tend to be more risky than holding company securities subsidiaries. Bank securities subsidiaries also do not appear to enjoy any funding advantage relative to holding company subsidiaries. These two results are particularly noteworthy because section 23A and 23B restrictions on intracompany funding currently do not apply to transactions between banks and their direct and indirect bank subsidiaries. Finally, some evidence indicates that bank subsidiaries tend to be more efficient.     

Collateralizing liquidity

I develop a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why financial assets are used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds. Firms need funds to invest in risky projects with nonobservable returns. Since holding these assets allows firms to raise these funds, investing firms value the asset more than noninvesting ones. When assets are less than perfectly liquid and investment opportunities are persistent, collateralized debt minimizes asset transfers from investing to noninvesting firms and thus is optimal. Frictions in asset markets lead to an illiquidity discount and a collateral premium, which increase with the asset’s illiquidity.     

The good and bad news about the new liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries

New liquidity rules phased in under Basel III define the new net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to promote sustainable funding structures at financial institutions. In this paper, we analyze characteristics and drivers of NSFR for a sample of 921 Western European banks between 1996 and 2010. We find that a majority of banks have historically not fulfilled NSFR minimum requirements, in particular larger and faster growing institutions as well as banks also active in asset management and investment banking. Many of them have started increasing NSFR with the onset of financial crisis 2008 while this ratio had been sliding in earlier years. Interestingly, potential advantages in funding costs for low NSFR banks do not seem to translate into higher profitability and results of these banks are more volatile.