Without judgment: An empirically-based entrepreneurial theory of the firm

Austrian ideas about the firm have grown rather naturally out of the central body of Austrian thought with its focus on entrepreneurship, subjectivism and market processes. In this paper we critically evaluate some Austrian ideas on the firm, with particular attention to the concept of entrepreneurial judgment. We then describe recent empirical work in entrepreneurship that has identified key elements of what might reside inside the “black box” of entrepreneurial decision making. We conclude that expertise in this type of decision making embodies procedural knowledge that is adaptive in the absence of substantive knowledge, i.e. without judgment.     

THE (NON)THEORY OF THE KNOWLEDGE FIRM

This paper argues that the mainstream approaches to the theory of the firm do not provide a theory of the human capital‐based or knowledge firm. We examine the neoclassical theory of the firm, the transaction cost model, the incentive‐system approach and the Grossman Hart Moore approach and argue that none of them is able to fully capture the changes to the firm that the movement towards a knowledge economy entails. We also consider the effects of knowledge on the organisation of production. Will production take place within a single large factory, or several smaller factories or even within households?     

Do firms plan?

The late F. A. Hayek is remembered for the argument that the decentralized price system has enormous advantages over planned systems in the critical areas of information transmission and the use of knowledge. In many minds, the recent fall of the Soviet-style economies in Eastern Europe has decisively made that case. But not all are persuaded. The model of central planning that originally impressed Lenin—the modern business corporation—remains in many minds a formidable piece of empirical evidence in favor of the possibility and desirability of centralized administrative control. This paper argues that Hayek's theory of spontaneous order can in fact include the case of such apparently purposive and extramarket forms as the business firm. It picks up a number of suggestions in Hayek's evolutionary theory of social institutions and uses them to draw a picture of the firm that is somewhat different from what one finds on the easel of neoclassical transaction-cost analysis. In the Hayekian picture, firms and markets are both systems of rules of conduct. And both are systems for economizing on knowledge in the face of economic change, albeit quite different kinds of knowledge and change. In the end, the firm is not a model for political planning for one very simple reason: the firm does not plan.When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it takes the ascendancy over that of execution, the internal organization of the productive group is no longer a matter of indifference or a mechanical detail. Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is imperative, a process of cephalization, such as has taken place in the evolution of organic life, is inevitable, and for the same reasons as in the case of biological evolution.There is no reason why a polycentric order in which each element is guided only by rules and receives no orders from a centre should not be capable of bringing about as complex and apparently as purposive an adaptation to circumstances as could be produced in a system where a part is set aside to preform such an order on an analogue or model before it is put into execution by the larger structure. In so far as the self-organizing forces of a structure as a whole lead at once to the right kind of action (or to tentative actions which can be retracted before too much harm is done) such a single-state order need not be inferior to a hierarchic one in which the whole merely carries out what has first been tried out in a part. Such a non-hierarchic order dispenses with the necessity of first communicating all the information on which its several elements act to a common centre and conceivably may make the use of more information possible than could be transmitted to, and digested by, a centre.     

Orchestrating knowledge-creating networks: lessons from Taiwan's health services sector

The purpose of this study is to integrate transaction cost theory and the knowledge-based view of the firm to explore why and how a network's hub organisations orchestrate their members to create knowledge in the health services setting. Guided by organisation theory, this study examines a theoretical model at the organisation level, through a qualitative case study of Taiwan's health services sector. In addition to the discovery of a new sub-construct, the findings provide preliminary evidence that, both, transaction cost and knowledge-based factors influence the health services network as per the study's propositions. This study contributes to strategic technology management research by providing a conceptual model to describe and evaluate health services networks' orchestrating process for knowledge creation. The framework also provides a better understanding of, and a practical approach to managing networks to improve knowledge creation.     

A dynamic model of firm behavior in a planned economy

Conclusion This paper presents a dynamic model of the interaction between the planning authority and a firm in a centrally planned economy with emphasis on the firm's decision-making process and its results, given the overall constraints imposed by the planners. For possible relationships between the actual and target levels of output over time, the model offers either the case of an initial period of under-fulfillment followed by a period of overfulfillment or the case of continuous overfulfillment. We have also determined how a firm reacts to the planning authority changing one of its overall constraints (the final target or the length of the time period) or one of the parameters of the firm's bonus function. It is crucial for the planning authority to have a good understanding of what a firm's response to any of these changes will be in order to be able to select an optimal strategy in light of the ultimate goals of the planning mechanism. The results of our paper offer useful insights for this selection process.     

Parchment,guns, and the problem of governance

The genuine problem of governance is one that pays equal attention to both incentive and knowledge issues in private and public contexts. This work brings together Austrian, Public Choice and theory of the firm insights to address such problem. By taking into account incentives and knowledge, it proposes a framework that accommodates comparisons not just of kind (firm or market), but also of degree (e.g., among different types of internal organization). Moreover, although the suggested framework derives from considerations about private governance, it equally accommodates public and private settings. (89 words.)     

替代、互补及互嵌:企业与市场关系的新考察

在现实世界中,企业市场关系呈现出替代、互补及互嵌等多种特征,使得单一的“替代”说或“互补”论均缺乏足够的解释力。本文从交易费用角度将交易关系分为三种类型并指出企业和市场谁更有利于交易费用的节约,主要取决于交易品的特征以及交易本身的具体职能。企业其实是一种通过非人力资本和人力资本、人力资本和人力资本间相互交易以实现生产功能的特殊履约机制。这样就不难理解,只有部分交易可以通过企业与市场间的相互替代来提高效率,而更多的交易则须通过改善企业内部管理或改进市场制度本身来提高其效率。     

科斯《企业的性质》之质疑

企业是资源所有者的取得更多的收益而建立起来的经济组织，交易成本的存在并不是企业存在的根本原因，科斯将企业定义为不同于价格调节机制的企业家计划调节机制，源于其错将企业计划混同于计划经济，事实上，企业是以市场合约为基础形成的，按市场运行原则运作的市场性组织，其资源配置并不独立于市场价格机制之外，价格调节机制与企业家调节机制是不可分割的两个方面，任何企业作为市场参与者与市场都是互动的。     

企业边界变迁的产业组织演化

交易成本理论从成本角度分析企业边界形成与变迁,企业能力理论则采用比较利益的方法从收入角度分析.短期中,如果企业能力有很大的差异,交易成本降低,位于价值链中上下游的企业将趋于专业化生产;如果企业能力均匀分布,交易成本降低,对专业化生产没有影响.长期中,企业能力、交易成本、企业边界形成互动循环的演化机制,并且在竞争过程中实现自然选择,引起产业组织演化.     

Can probability theory deal with entrepreneurship?

The Austrian theory of entrepreneurship emphasizes the importance of epistemic heterogeneity and the unlistability of the set of all possibilities. A similar concern with what has been called “the art of choosing the space of possibilities” is an important part of Bayesian model selection. Both Austrian and Bayesian authors view the common knowledge assumption as an unrealistic and unnecessary restriction. This coincidence of concerns leads to a joint theory of entrepreneurship. Three important benefits result from this merger: (1) the ability to use Itti & Baldi’s Bayesian theory of surprise to empirically measure radical surprise and improve the Betrand competition model as a consequence, (2) dealing with the unlistability problem, and (3) better understanding why the emergence of common knowledge is always the outcome of a social process rather than an inherent consequence of “rationality”.     

The limits to designed orders: Authority under “distributed knowledge” conditions

We examine the argument, put forward by modern management writers and, in a somewhat different guise by Austrian economists, that authority is not a viable mechanism of coordination in the presence of “distributed knowledge” We define authority and distributed knowledge and argue that authority is compatible with distributed knowledge. Moreover, it is not clear on theoretical grounds how distributed knowledge impacts on economic organization. An implication is that the Austrian argument that designed orders are strongly constrained by the Hayekian dispersed knowledge (Hayek, Kirzner, Sautet) is less decisive than it has usually been taken to be. The positive flipside of this argument is that Austrians confront an exciting research agenda in theorizing how distributed knowledge impacts economic organization. JEL Codes B53, L20     

The Austrian theory of the firm: Retrospect and prospect

Using as a focusing device the famous arguments of Coase (Economica 4(16), 386–405 1937) and Hayek (The American Economic Review 35(4): 519–530 1945), I sketch in bold strokes what an Austrian theory of the firm would look like. Such a theory would pay serious attention to issues of knowledge, uncertainty, change, and complementarity. I describe a literature in which much of this theory has already been constructed; make connections to closely related literatures in economics and management; and suggest directions for future development.     

Expectations in Austrian Business Cycle Theory: An Application of the Prisoner's Dilemma

The standard account of Austrian Business Cycle theory posits that central bank manipulations of interest rates fool bankers and investors into believing that there has been an increase in the real supply of loanable funds available for capital investment. However, reliance on foolishness ignores the entrepreneurial emphasis within the Austrian tradition and fails to produce the strongest possible case for Austrian Business Cycle theory. We use the prisoner's dilemma framework to model the profit maximizing behavior of bankers and the investors under uncertainty when the market rate of interest is below the underlying rate of time preference.     

Urban Planning,Smart Growth,and Economic Calculation: An Austrian Critique and Extension

This paper takes a critical look at the Smart Growth movement and its reliance on traditional central planning to achieve its goals. Using statewide planning in Oregon, Florida, and Washington State as examples, the paper examines the planning focus of recent efforts to manage growth through land-use planning at the state level. It then applies the Austrian critique of economic planning to the contemporary Smart Growth movement in the United States as it is reflected in statewide planning laws. The calculation debate focused primarily on the technical question of whether bureaucratic planning could, in fact, achieve market outcomes. In the current debate over Smart Growth, planning combines political and bureaucratic decisionmaking. The political context in which planning decisions are made fundamentally alters the decision making process, shifting the emphasis to articulate knowledge as the foundation for policymaking. To be relevant in the current debate over planning, the calculation debate needs to be extended to include a political dimension to its critique of planning.     

Governance and competence: how can they be combined?

Transaction cost economics faces serious problems concerningthe way it deals, or fails to deal, with bounded rationality,the efficiency of outcomes, trust, innovation, learning andthe nature of knowledge. The competence view yields an alternativeperspective on the purpose and boundaries of the firm. However,the competence view cannot ignore issues of governance and,in spite of serious criticism, transaction cost economics yieldssome useful concepts to deal with them. This paper aims to contributeto the development of theory and empirical research that connectsgovernance and competence perspectives.     

Aligning Knowledge Strategy and Knowledge Capabilities

This paper outlines a framework that links knowledge strategy and knowledge capabilities in a similar way as prior studies for the more generic concepts of strategy and capabilities. Existing theory in knowledge strategy is fragmented and focused on competitive positioning. We utilize concepts of good strategic management and the theory of the firm to place knowledge strategy on a more theoretically sound basis. This expands knowledge strategy beyond competitive positioning to include internal organization and the boundaries of the firm. This expanded view of knowledge strategy is compared to a conceptualization of knowledge capabilities that focuses on different capabilities for internal, collaborative and competitive situations. Using this perspective highlights the interconnection between knowledge capabilities and knowledge strategy—they are often jointly determined. It also provides a basis for integrating competence- and knowledge-based views of the firm in an empirically testable model. Suggestions for further research are proposed.     

Methodological interactionism: Theory and application to the firm and to the building of trust

Recent insights from the “embodied cognition” perspective in cognitive science, supported by neural research, provide a basis for a “methodological interactionism” that transcends both the methodological individualism of economics and the methodological collectivism of (some) sociology and is consistent with insights from social psychology. It connects with a Mengerian exchange perspective and Hayekian view of dispersed knowledge from Austrian economics. It provides a basis for a new, unified social science that integrates elements from economics, sociology, social psychology, and cognitive science. This paper discusses the roots of this perspective, in theory of cognition and meaning, and illustrates its application in a summary of a social–cognitive theory of the firm and an analysis of processes by which trust is built up and broken down.     

INDIRECT PRICING THEORY OF THE FIRM: A GENERAL-EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS INVOLVING PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT SERVICE

Abstract.  This paper develops a general-equilibrium model that involves production technology and management service to study the emergence of firms from the perspective of saving transaction costs. Inframarginal analysis is used to formalize Coase and Cheung's theory of the firm and to generalize Yang and Ng's indirect pricing theory of the firm. Not only the emergence of firms, their growth and contraction, but also the relevant conditions for the existence of technology entrepreneurs and professional management are also investigated.     

The Austrian Tertius Gaudens: A Revisit of Competition Theory in Light of Georg Simmel

Austrian market process theory stands out in assigning particular importance to the role of the customer. This is however not really salient as competition is discussed save for in a few particular instances. This is a pity since the market process discourse thereby deprives itself of a firm progressive footing concerning further elaborations of how market dynamics evolve. By drawing on the reasoning that originates some hundred years ago with the works of Georg Simmel, this paper brings forward an Austrian version of his idea on Tertius Gaudens. In a market context this is the alert buyer who benefits from the disunion that prevails between sellers to the extent that market intimacy, conceived of as supplier specificity, is low. In this manner some of the inner workings of the market process, what promotes competition subject to which institutional constraints, are discussed to the benefit of yet another important Austrian demarcation, that of competition as being geared by the customer.     

Intraday trade in dealership markets

We develop and test a structural asymmetric information transaction model to characterize the price impact of information when markets are thin. Since orders are accepted individually, the model allows for transaction costs and brokerage fees. Equilibrium demands mixed entry strategies on the part of potentially informed traders. Estimation of the structural parameters is performed using a maximum likelihood procedure on NYSE data. The structural model is rejected primarily because the nonlinear restrictions do not allow for sufficient correlation between price movements and pricing errors. This leads to unreasonably low estimates of the probability of informed trade relative to an unrestricted alternative. The price impact of information is found to be positive and significant, but economically small. This is because although the amount of private information is substantial, the quality of the information signals is poor, particularly in the middle of the trading day. Informed agents do not trade small quantities, which suggests that their ability to divide orders is limited by transaction costs.