Why peg? The role of capital mobility and financial intermediation

Many economists argue that the growth of international capital mobility has made the maintenance of pegged exchange rates more costly, forcing developing states to choose alternative arrangements. But some states do not simply abandon pegged exchange rates as their exposure to capital mobility rises. Some states abandon pegs long before a crisis can erupt, while others maintain pegs until the speculative pressures became unbearable. Why, in an environment of growing capital mobility, do some states maintain pegs longer than others do? One reason is that the more that bank lending dominates investment in a country, the more likely that state is to hold on to a pegged exchange rate. When banks have accumulated significant amounts of foreign debt they lobby for exchange rate stability. In a bank‐dominated financial system, a concentrated banking sector can organize easily and use its crucial role in the economy to exert influence over economic policy. This article presents new evidence from statistical tests on 61 developing countries that confirm that states with deeper banking systems are more likely to peg their exchange rates, in spite of growing capital mobility.     

Convergence of interest rates around the Pacific Rim

This article applies the panel data unit root tests provided by Im, Pesaran and Shin (Discussion paper, 1997) to examine the interest rate convergence of small-open Asian countries with major financial centres. With monthly data from 1988:1 to 1997:6, it was found that the nominal interest rates of these countries converge to the US rates rather than to Japan's. This finding is consistent with the view that the monetary authorities of non-Japan Asian economies pegged their exchange rates overwhelmingly to the dollar rather than the yen before the financial crisis of 1997.     

Currency Boards in the Baltic Countries: What Have We Learned?

Straightforward exchange rate arrangements known as currency boards have gained popularity during the past decade. Among transition economies, Estonia first introduced a currency board in 1992, followed by Lithuania in 1994 and Bulgaria in 1997. Currency boards have been useful in achieving macroeconomic stabilisation, and they may have helped the Baltics become the first countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) to achieve economic growth after the slump in production of the early 1990s. Moreover, Baltic inflation performance has been substantially better than in other FSU countries. Both in Estonia and Lithuania the present exchange rate system has been accompanied by strong real appreciation of the currency, although it is widely accepted that the currencies were very much undervalued when they were initially pegged. However, if rapid real appreciation is accompanied by increases in labour productivity, the present pegs can be maintained. Banking crises in Estonia and Lithuania have not been particularly severe, so apparently rigid currency pegs have not been accompanied by excessive financial sector instability. The tight fiscal policies pursued in both countries, especially Estonia, have been instrumental to the success of these currency board arrangements.     

A Tale of Two Currencies: the Asian Crisis and the Exchange Rate Regimes of Hong Kong and Singapore

Hong Kong has maintained a pegged exchange rate since 1983, while Singapore has been on a floating regime since the early 1970s. This paper provides an interpretation of the different performance of the Hong Kong and Singapore economy that could be attributable to the differences in their exchange rate regime. We develop a model that can help to interpret the differences in both the longer run trends in inflation and real exchange rates in Hong Kong and Singapore as well as the short differences in macroeconomic and real exchange rate volatility. The difference in the response of the two economies to the Asian crisis is also consistent with our model.     

Changing patterns of Asian currencies’ co-movement with the US dollar and the Chinese renminbi: Evidence from a wavelet multiresolution analysis

We extend the Frankel–Wei approach by using wavelet analysis to evaluate the relative importance of the dollar and the renminbi as anchor currencies at different time scales. We find that Asian currencies’ co-movement with the dollar weakened after the global financial crisis, while that with the renminbi strengthened particularly after China introduced a new exchange rate management system in 2015. The evidence suggests that emerging Asian economies have recently attached more importance to the renminbi as an anchor in exchange rate management.     

Measuring exchange rate misalignment in Turkey

Turkey has embarked an extensive dis-inflation and stabilization program in December 1999. The programme exclusively relied on a nominally pegged (anchored) exchange rate system for dis-inflation and on fiscal austerity. In February 2001, however, Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis which necessiated the dismantling of the exchange rate anchor and a switch to a regime of free float.

This article proposes a new methodology to measure exchange rate misalignment for Turkey over the period January 1992 to December 2001. In a single equation framework, the model estimates the real exchange rate within a time varying parameter model, where a return-to-normality assumption about the parameters is assumed. Contrary to common belief, it is found that, except the initial four months of the stabilization programme, the Turkish lira remained undervalued for most of 2000. Also, one observes a pattern where the lira has been overvalued after the financial crisis of 1994 until 1998, and has displayed a tendency of undervaluation after then.     

Terms‐of‐Trade Shocks and Exchange Rate Regimes in a Small Open Economy*

We examine the impact of terms‐of‐trade shocks on key macroeconomic variables by numerically solving a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. The model considers nominal price rigidity under different exchange rate regimes. The numerical solutions obtained are consistent with the empirical regularities documented by Broda (2004), in which output responses to shocks are smoother in floats than in pegs; in moving from pegs to floats, the rise in nominal exchange rate volatility is coupled by the rise in real exchange rate volatility; and in both exchange rate regimes, net foreign assets is the most volatile variable.     

The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin

Before the crisis of 1997/98, the East Asian economies—except for Japan but including China—pegged their currencies to the US dollar. To avoid further turmoil, the IMF argues that these currencies should float more freely. However, the authors’ econometric estimations show that the dollar's predominant weight in East Asian currency baskets has returned to its pre‐crisis levels. By 2002, the day‐to‐day volatility of each country's exchange rate against the dollar had again become negligible. Most governments were rapidly accumulating a “war chest” of official dollar reserves, which portends that this exchange rate stabilization will come to extend over months or quarters. From the doctrine of “original sin” applied to emerging‐market economies, the authors argue that this fear of floating is entirely rational from the perspective of each individual country. And their joint pegging to the dollar benefits the East Asian dollar bloc as a whole, although Japan remains an important outlier.     

High Interest Rates and Exchange Rate Stabilization in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand: An Empirical Investigation of the Traditional and Revisionist Views

The paper seeks to determine whether high interest rates have had the effect of appreciating nominal exchange rates in three Asian countries. The authors use high-frequency data for Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand during the recent crisis and its aftermath to examine the relationship between the increase in interest rates and the behavior of exchange rates. It is found that raising interest rates has had a small impact on nominal exchange rates during the crisis period.     

Revisiting the interest rate–exchange rate nexus: a Markov-switching approach

In this paper the interest rate–exchange rate nexus and the effectiveness of an interest rate defense are investigated empirically. I present a reduced form evidence which characterizes the empirical relationship between interest rates and exchange rates. I use a Markov-switching specification of the nominal exchange rate with time-varying transition probabilities. Empirical evidence from six developing countries: Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Mexico, and Turkey indicates that raising nominal interest rates leads to a higher probability of switching to a crisis regime. Thus, the empirical results presented here may support the view that a high interest rate policy is unable to defend the exchange rate. Unlike other studies which consider linear models only, my findings are robust and consistent over different countries and crisis episodes (Asian 1997 crises, Mexico 1994 crisis, and Turkey 1994, 2001 crises). In order to explain the empirical findings, I construct a simple theoretical model by incorporating an interest rate rule in the model proposed by Jeanne and Rose (2002) [Jeanne, O., Rose, A.K., 2002. Noise trading and exchange rate regimes, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 117 (2) 537–569]. The model has multiple equilibria, and under plausible conditions, higher exchange rate volatility is associated with higher interest rates.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Crises: an Evaluation using Extreme Value Theory*

We test whether the exchange regime in place has an impact on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. Our paper is distinguishable from others (i) in its use of extreme value theory to identify currency crisis periods and (ii) in using two separate designations for the exchange regime in place. The first is the self‐reported or announced exchange rate system. The second classification scheme, by Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger, is based on the relative movements of international reserves and exchange rates. The Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger procedure is intended to reveal the actual as distinct from the “legal” exchange arrangement. We find, interestingly, that the announced exchange regime has an impact on the likelihood of currency crises, while the “true” or observed regime does not. Announced pegged exchange regimes increase the risk of currency crisis even if, in reality, the exchange rate system in place is not pegged.     

A Fiscal Theory of Currency Crises

An exchange rate crisis is caused when the fiscal authority lets the present value of primary surpluses, inclusive of seigniorage, deviate from the value of government debt at the pegged exchange rate. In the absence of long-term government bonds, the exchange rate collapse must be instantaneous. With long-term government bonds, the collapse can be delayed at the discretion of the monetary authority. Fiscal policy is responsible for the inevitability of a crisis, while monetary policy determines its characteristics, that is, the timing of the crisis and the magnitude of exchange rate depreciation.     

Crisis and recovery: Role of the exchange rate regime in emerging market economies

Following the recent global financial crisis, questions about the mechanisms that can help countries cope with large shocks have resurfaced. This paper examines the role of the exchange rate regime in explaining how emerging market economies fared in the recent global financial crisis, particularly in terms of output losses and output rebound. After controlling for regime switches during the crisis, using alternative definitions for pegs, and taking account of other likely determinants, we find that the growth performance for pegs was not different from that of floats during the crisis. The picture is different for the recovery period 2010–2011, as pegs appear to be faring worse, with growth recovering more slowly than floats. These results suggest an asymmetric effect of the regime during and recovering from the crisis. We also find that proxies of the trade and financial channels are important determinants of growth performance during the crisis, while only the trade channel appears important for the recovery thus far.     

The exchange rate regime in Asia: From crisis to crisis

Prior to the Asian financial crisis, most Asian exchange rates were de facto pegged to the US Dollar. During the crisis, many economies experienced a brief period of extreme flexibility. A ‘fear of floating’ gave reduced flexibility when the crisis subsided, but flexibility after the crisis was greater than that seen prior to the crisis. Contrary to the idea of a durable Bretton Woods II arrangement, Asia then went on to slowly raise flexibility and reduce the role for the US dollar. When the period from April 2008 to December 2009 is compared against periods of high inflexibility, from January 1991 to November 1991 and October 1995 to March 1997, the increase in flexibility is economically and statistically significant. This paper proposes a new measure of dollar pegging, the “Bretton Woods II Score”. We find that Asia has been slowly moving away from a Bretton Woods II arrangement.     

Analysis of shock transmissions to a small open emerging economy using a SVARMA model

Using a parsimonious structural vector autoregressive moving average (SVARMA) model, we analyse the transmission of foreign and domestic shocks to a small open emerging economy under different policy regimes. Narrower confidence bands around the SVARMA responses compared to the SVAR responses, advocate the suitability of this framework for analysing the propagation of economic shocks over time. Malaysia is an interesting small open economy that has experienced an ongoing process of economic transition and development. The Malaysian government imposed exchange rate and capital control measures following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Historical decomposition and variance decomposition allow contrast of shocks propagating under different policy regimes. Malaysia is highly exposed to foreign shocks, particularly under the managed float exchange rate system. During the pegged exchange rate period, Malaysian monetary policymakers experienced some breathing space to focus on maintaining price and output stability. In the post-pegged period, Malaysia's exposure to foreign shocks increased and in recent times are largely driven by world commodity price and global activity shocks.     

Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: Currency Board (Hong Kong) or Monitoring Band (Singapore)?

Following the East Asian crisis, a number of observers have advocated that small and open economies in Asia adopt an irrevocably fixed regime. Such a hard peg, it is argued, signals greater commitment to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments as well as the authorities’ willingness to subordinate domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate. But is this a reasonable position to adopt? In order to answer this question, we consider and contrast the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore. While both of these economies share a number of broad similarities, the former operates a US dollar–linked currency board arrangement and the latter maintains an adjustable peg in the form of a monitoring band arrangement with the central parity based on an undisclosed trade–weighted currency basket.     

FEAR OF FLOATING IN EAST ASIA?

Abstract.  We examine the de facto exchange rate arrangements in eight East Asian countries during the post-Asian crisis period. The empirical results suggest that three countries adopted a hard peg or a peg with capital account restrictions, whereas five countries moved toward a more flexible exchange rate arrangement in the post-crisis period. Three of these five countries (Korea, Indonesia and Thailand) achieved a level of exchange rate flexibility close to the level accomplished in a free floater such as Australia. These results suggest that 'fear of floating' in East Asia is not prevalent in the post-crisis period, supporting the bipolar view of the optimal exchange rate regime.     

The effects of exchange rate regimes on real exchange rate misalignment

The literature on exchange rate regimes has paid little attention to the effects of exchange rate policies on real exchange rate misalignments. This paper contributes to filling that gap by exploring such relation empirically. Because the underlying model is probably not linear and the treated individuals differ from non-treated individuals, we rely on Matching models rather than on standard regressions. Our main finding is that pegs are associated with more overvaluation. The results are robust to different exchange rate regime classifications, misalignment indexes, and matching estimators. The evidence presented suggests that policy-makers concerned with overvaluation should avoid sticking with rigid arrangements for too long.     

THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND THE VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES BEFORE AND AFTER THE ASIAN CRISIS: A COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS*

This paper carries out a counterfactual analysis of the impact of alternative exchange rate regimes on the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and the bilateral rate against the US dollar for nine East Asian countries, both before and after the Asian financial crisis. Our hypothetical regimes include a unilateral basket peg (UBP), a common basket peg (CBP) and a hard peg against the $US, but in contrast to previous counterfactual exercises which compute the weights for effective exchange rates on the basis of simple bloc aggregates, we apply a more disaggregated methodology using a larger number of trade partners and utilise ARCH/GARCH techniques to better capture the time‐varying characteristics of volatility. Our results suggest that a UBP would minimise effective exchange rate volatility for all countries both before and after the crisis and provides the highest regime gains compared to actual. Although the gains for a CBP are always less than those for a UBP the absolute differences between the two regimes appear to be small. In terms of bilateral exchange rates against the dollar the gains from a UBP or CBP could also be quite significant for the non‐dollar peggers, especially post‐crisis, since a fall in effective instability would be accompanied by a fall in bilateral instability.     

Pegging emerging currencies in the face of dollar swings

The aim of this article is to study ruptures of exchange rate pegs by focusing on the fluctuations of the anchor currency. We test for the hypothesis that currencies linked to the USD are more likely to loosen their peg when the USD is appreciating, while sticking to it otherwise. To this end, we estimate smooth-transition regression models for a sample of 28 emerging currencies over the 1994–2011 period. Our findings show that while the real effective exchange rates of most of these countries tend to co-move with that of the USD in times of depreciation, this relationship is frequently reversed when the US currency appreciates over a certain threshold.