Monetary Union Enlargement,Fiscal Policy,and Strategic Wage Setting*

This contribution develops a framework for studying the effects of the enlargement of a monetary union on macroeconomic performances in the presence of strategic interactions between non‐atomistic labor unions, monetary, and fiscal authorities. We show that the integration of new identical member countries may have beneficial effects, depending on the fiscal policymaking structure. Qualifications to this result are provided under cross‐country asymmetries in the size of the economies, the structure of the labor markets, and the fiscal authorities' preferences.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Price and Wage Rigidities

In this paper, I search for an optimal configuration of parameters for variants of the Taylor rule by using an accurate second‐order welfare‐based method within a fully microfounded dynamic stochastic model, with price and wage rigidities, without capital accumulation. A version of the model with distortionary taxation is also explicitly tested. The model is solved up to second‐order solution. Optimal rules are obtained by maximizing a conditional welfare measure, differently from what has been done in the current literature. Optimal monetary policy functions turn out to be characterized by inflation targeting parameter lower than in empirical studies. In general, the optimal values for monetary policy parameters depend on the degree of nominal rigidities and on the role of fiscal policy. When nominal rigidities are higher, optimal monetary policy becomes more aggressive to inflation. With a tighter fiscal policy, optimal monetary policy turns out to be less aggressive to inflation. Impulse‐response functions based on second‐order model solution show a non‐affine pattern when the economy is hit by shocks of different magnitude .     

Monetary Policy Delegation and Optimal Wage Indexation

This note shows that delegation of policy to a central banker who puts more weight on inflation stabilization than does the rest of society could reduce the alleged social inefficiency of private wage indexation decisions that arises in models of discretionary monetary policy.     

Inflation and Openness with Non‐Atomistic Wage Setters

This paper analyses the impact of trade openness on inflation in a strategic framework characterised by monopolistic production in the domestic sector and unionised labour markets. By stressing the interplay between internal and external sources of economic distortion, we show that the economy's inflationary bias reduces up to a critical level of trade openness. Beyond this threshold, wage setters may be induced to behave more aggressively in open economies, leading to higher equilibrium inflation. Based on a regression analysis that investigates the combined effect of labour market institutions and openness on inflation across nineteen OECD economies, we show that inflation is negatively related to openness when wage bargaining is decentralised, while there is virtually no link between openness and inflation at higher levels of wage centralisation.     

Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters

This paper shows that—in contrast to the received wisdom—uncertainty about the parameters in a dynamic macroeconomic model may lead to more aggressive monetary policy. In particular, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it may be optimal for the central bank to respond to shocks more aggressively in order to reduce uncertainty about the future development of inflation. Uncertainty about other parameters, on the other hand, dampens the policy response.
JEL classification : E 43; E 52     

货币市场与货币政策

一国货币市场的建设不能仅仅依赖一、二个子市场,而应该货币市场建成一个子市场多元化的体系,各个子市场之间相互关联、形成统一体。只有这样,中央银行才能在货币上配套利用不同的信用工具实现货币市场的功能,贯彻货币政策的宗旨,体现货币政策的取向。本将在研究货币市场发展的基础上,分析货币市场与货币政策之间的关系。     

Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area

This paper reviews recent work on macroeconomic management with varying organization of wage/price bargaining and degrees of credible monetary conservatism. The emerging literature synthesizes and extends theory and empirics on central bank independence (CBI) and coordinated wage/price bargaining (CWB), arguing that the degrees of CBI and CWB interact with each other and with other political-economic conditions (sectoral composition, international exposure, etc.) to structure the incentives facing actors involved in monetary policy and wage/price bargaining. The core implication, theoretically surprising but empirically supported, is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-run, equilibrium, on-average real effects, even with fully rational expectations, and that these effects depend on the organization of wage/price bargaining. Conversely, wage/price-bargaining structure has real effects that depend on the degree of credible conservatism reflected in monetary-policy rules. Each also has interactive nominal effects though this is less surprising. Some disagreement remains over the precise nature of these interactive effects, but all emerging theory and evidence agree that a common, credibly conservative European monetary policy has nominal and real effects that depend on the Europe-wide institutional-structural organization of wage/price bargaining. Indeed, the one specific piece of theoretical and empirical agreement suggests that, for many member countries, the nominal gains from monetary-policy delegation to a credibly conservative European Central Bank will worsen these bargaining-policy interactions.     

Federal Monetary Policy

What is the optimal institutional structure for a federal central bank? The framework developed in this paper is used to analyze under what conditions an individual region will prefer a monetary union to be organized according to regional or common influences and how a combination of both can be rationalized. The implications of an enlargement of a monetary union for changes in its institutional setup are also derived.     

Optimal Monetary Policy

Optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent, given frictions in the economic environment. Constructing a model with two sets of frictions—costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods—we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familiar principles. First, the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low, as suggested by Milton Friedman, that there should be deflation on average. Yet, the Keynesian frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive. Second, as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors, the price level should be largely stabilized, as suggested by Irving Fisher, albeit around a deflationary trend path. Since expected inflation is roughly constant through time, the nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the Fisherian determinants of the real interest rate. Although the monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in our model economy, it chooses real allocations that closely resemble those which would occur if prices were flexible. In our benchmark model, there is some tendency for the monetary authority to smooth nominal and real interest rates.     

Wage Determination and Economic Policy

This article is a revised version of the Giblln Memorial Lecture presented on 1 September 1977 by Dr. J. E. Isaac, Deputy President of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. It is published by permission of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science and the text of the lecture is to appear in Search , Volume 8, No 11/12.     

货币政策操作

谢平指出:中国人民银行实行稳健的货币政策,在促进国民经济持续快速增长中发挥了重要作用。     

Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union

This paper studies alternative patterns of wage bargaining in an open two-country monetary union. Wages are fixed by trade unions for two periods, either at the national or at the monetary union level. It is shown that the best solution with regard to unemployment depends on the nature of externalities and dynamic strategic interactions between the monetary union's countries; namely on the degree of openness of the monetary union, and the differentiation index between national goods.     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.     

Monetary Policy with Parameter Uncertainty in Small-Open Economy

This paper computes optimal robust monetary policy in a new Keynesian small-open economy model with Knightian uncertainty about the degree of price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Due to the simple model structure used in the paper, I can derive analytical results for the min–max solution under discretion and assess how a robust optimal Taylor rule must be set in small-open economy. I find that, in an optimal robust discretionary equilibrium, the central bank should assume that the degree of price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods take on their highest numerical values. In terms of interest rate setting, if the optimal discretionary robust equilibrium is implemented with a Taylor rule, the policy rate should react to inflation in a less aggressive way than in the case of complete information.     

基于最优货币状况指数的政策评估：方法与应用

最优货币状况指数是以最优货币政策下所选择的各政策工具的实施力度之比作为相应权重而构建的货币状况指数。基于这个定义,本文构建了最优货币状况指数,分析了它在货币政策评估上的应用,得出几点主要结论：首先,不同于一般货币状况指数,最优货币状况指数除受原指数中相关参数的组合影响外,还受政策目标变量实际值与目标值偏离额的影响。其次,最优货币状况指数可以作为衡量货币政策实施效果的判断标准。再次,汇率和信贷政策与通货膨胀的关系及其在政策目标中的相对干预力度决定了名义或实际货币状况指数权重下货币政策的实施效果。     

Strategic Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Costs

The paper examines optimal strategic trade policy under a heterogeneous cost oligopoly. The first‐best policy involves a structure of firm‐specific export subsidies/taxes in which the government favours the most efficient firms only with a sufficiently low social cost of public funds.