Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’

A major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction — convergence of platforms to the median voter's ideal — is seldom observed. One reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes. Here we associate voters' expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements, and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their ‘reputations’ are perceived as less risky than challengers. In equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms. Typically neither adopts the median voter's ideal point. Either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent's reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively ‘risky’ the electorate perceives the challenger to be.     

How elections affect fiscal policy and growth: revisiting the mechanism

This paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower is the probability of reelection, the greater is the incentive of incumbent politicians to choose short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model of economic growth, in which fiscal policy is endogenously chosen under electoral uncertainty. Political parties can value possible economic benefits differently depending on whether they are in or out of power, and—by contrast with the literature—the relevant preference coefficient is a choice variable rather than an exogenous taste parameter. The main result is that, when political parties choose both economic policy instruments and preference coefficients, the fundamental reason for short-sighted policy is the extra rents from being in power per se.     

Impact of electoral competition,swing voters and interest groups on equilibrium policy platforms: Exploring the strategic forces at work

This paper constructs a stylized model of election between two opportunistic candidates who can influence equilibrium policy platforms in exchange for monetary contributions provided by two distinct lobby groups. Two key features are embedded which give rise to a dual uncertainty in the model: the existence of partisan spread across voter groups as well as the embezzlement of campaign funds received by the electoral candidates from the interest groups. We derive and compare the equilibrium platforms of the two office-seeking candidates in three scenarios: none of the above uncertainties exist (benchmark case), only uncertainty about voters’ preferences exist (swing-voter case), and both the uncertainties exist (swing voters and lobby groups case). We find that an opportunistic candidate’s swing-voter tax platform is always lower than the benchmark tax platform. Additionally, the equilibrium tax choice of electoral contenders in the swing voters and opposing lobby groups case is found to be greater than the tax level chosen under the swing-voter case if the lobby group advocating a greater level of tax is sufficiently well-organized such that it outweighs the relative swing-voter effect in that group. Furthermore, we find that when an electoral candidate transitions from being highly corrupt to becoming relatively more honest, the equilibrium level of public good provision adjusts in conformity with the well-organized group’s economic preferences. Finally, if the strength of relative lobbying effect is weaker, a lower partisan bias within that group induces an electoral candidate to choose a tax platform closer to that group’s policy bliss point.     

Political activism and polarization

I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically inclined activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly support for their respective candidates. The presence of activists always moderates the platform choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. The central finding of the paper is that the relationship between partisanship of activists and polarization is ambiguous. As activists become increasingly partisan, polarization of candidate platforms reduces or widens depending on the costs of activism. I present normative conditions under which the presence of activism and increased partisanship among activists are both welfare‐improving for voters. Finally, introducing a public funding option for candidates increases polarization in the political process.     

Vertical product differentiation and two-sided markets

We model platform competition in a market where products are characterized by cross network externalities. Consumers differ in their valuation of these externalities. Although the exogenous set-up is entirely symmetric, we show that platform competition induces a vertical differentiation structure that allows for the co-existence of asymmetric platforms in equilibrium. We establish this result in two set-ups: in the first one platforms commit to prices, in the second one they commit to network sizes.     

IMPERFECTLY INFORMED VOTERS AND STRATEGIC EXTREMISM

We analyze a two‐candidate Downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts (e.g., interest‐group/media endorsements) to infer candidates' policy platforms. That is, voters do not observe candidates' exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist/rightist platform (relative positions). In equilibrium, candidates' behavior tends to maximum extremism, but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates. When the tie‐breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair, candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter, but when it strongly favors a certain candidate, each candidate specializes in a different extreme.     

A NOTE ON NEGATIVE ELECTORAL ADVERTISING: DENIGRATING CHARACTER VS. PORTRAYING EXTREMISM

In this expository note, we extend the model of Harrington and Hess (1996) by incorporating valence advertising. There is a two‐candidate electoral contest. Candidates inherit a certain position indicating their ideological platform in an unidimensional policy space. They also inherit a certain valence index which is a comprehensive term for personal traits that are desirable to all voters such as integrity. The candidates can subsequently influence these using negative advertising with regard to both ideological and valence factors. We find that when the available resources are sufficiently small and certain reasonable assumptions are fulfilled, the candidate with the higher initial valence index will run a relatively personal campaign while the candidate with the lower initial valence index will run an ideological campaign.     

面向分类的科技创新服务平台绩效实证研究

科技创新服务平台是我国落实创新驱动发展的关键组成部分，具有重要的战略地位。按照浙江省科技创新服务平台分类方式，制定3套绩效评估指标体系，并运用DEA-Malmqusit指数分析方法对2014—2016年平台资源投入产出绩效进行测算。结果发现：①浙江省3类平台的整体绩效均处于中等水平，有较大提升空间；②引起3类平台绩效差异的因素不同，基础平台、区域平台存在投入冗余，资源闲置及浪费现象严重。行业平台有传统平台与新型平台之别，两者在绩效上表现出较大差异；③近年来，3类平台全要素生产率持续攀升。最后，从创新驱动发展战略落实、分类管理机制建立、平台自主创新和服务能力提升3个方面提出对策建议。     

Optimum currency area in South Asia: A state space approach

This paper is an empirical investigation of the feasibility of an optimum currency area (OCA) in South Asia. Countries are good candidates for forming an OCA if their economies are similarly structured and if their economies share similar responses to exogenous shocks. That is, among other characteristics, good candidates for forming an OCA will share a coincident pattern of economic booms and recessions. We use a state space time series model with a stochastic trend to explore the extent to which the Indices of Industrial Production for South Asian nations share common dynamic responses to exogenous shocks.     

Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Summary. We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.Received: 20 Februay 2003, Revised: 25 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D72, H2.Nicolas Sahuguet: Correspondence toWe thank Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite for their comments. We also thank the editor Dan Kovenock and an anonymous referee. The second author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SES-0078870.     

Politico-economic cycles of regulation and deregulation

This paper considers politico-economic cycles that do not depend on the exogenous electoral cycles. More precisely, the paper develops a positive model of intertemporal subsidy strategies for an authoritarian and dynastic government. It will be shown — applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem — that cyclical strategies, i.e. waves of regulation, populism alternating with deregulation, cuts in social programmes, etc., may be optimal.     

Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality

I consider a model in which candidates of differing quality must win a primary election to compete in the general election. I show that there is an equilibrium in which Democrats choose liberal policies and Republicans choose conservative policies, but higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies than lower quality candidates. In this equilibrium, higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies if they have a larger quality advantage or there is less uncertainty about the median voterʼs ideal point in the general election, and the candidates in a given primary choose closer policies to one another when there is a smaller quality difference between the candidates in a primary. I further show that if the candidates have policy motivations, then a low quality candidate may strategically choose to enter a primary even if running for office is costly and the candidate will lose the primary election with certainty in equilibrium.     

Consumption dynamics under information processing constraints

This paper studies how “rational inattention” (RI)—a type of information processing constraint proposed by Sims [Sims, C.A., 2003. Implications of rational inattention, Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (3), 665–690]—affects the joint dynamics of consumption and income in a permanent income model with general income processes. Specifically, I propose an analytical approach to solve the multivariate permanent income model with RI and examine its implications for optimal consumption, saving, and welfare. It is shown that RI can affect the relative volatility of consumption and provide an endogenous propagation mechanism that disentangles the short-run and long-run responses of consumption to exogenous income shocks. I also explore how aggregation reduces the impact of the RI-induced endogenous noise on consumption and thus increases the smoothness of aggregate consumption. Finally, I compare RI with four alternative hypotheses (habit formation, signal extraction, robustness, and inattentiveness) by examining their implications for the joint behavior of consumption and income.     

A general-equilibrium intertemporal model of an open economy

Summary This paper develops a very general (general-equilibrium) intertemporal model of a country engaged in international trade which can be used to address a wide variety of issues of interest — in particular, econometric application — under the assumption that prices of tradable commodities (consumer goods and capital goods) and the interest rate are exogenous to the country. It allows for an arbitrarily large number of commodities which are distinguished into seven categories and for finite or infinite periods of time. This model can be used to draw various policy conclusions. We investigate how current net imports, the balance of payments on current account, current consumption expenditure, next-period bondholdings, current wealth, and current internal prices will react to exogenous changes in current external prices, the current interest rate, current taxes, current factor endowments, and current-period bondholdings. This paper also considers the integrability of net-import demand functions.Work supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-8607652. We wish to thank the editor and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis‐à‐vis Cost of Betrayal

This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.     

The binary policy model

We introduce a model of electoral competition with office-motivated candidates who are exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues, while they choose positions for the remaining issues. A position is majority-efficient if a candidate cannot make a majority of the electorate better off, given his fixed positions. We characterize existence conditions for majority-efficient positions. The candidates' fixed positions in our framework imply that only some voters are “swing voters,” and we analyze how the distribution of swing voters determines whether candidates choose majority-efficient positions. We also analyze plurality and runoff elections with multiple candidates in our framework.     

Capital income taxation,tax criteria,and intergenerational welfare

In a two-period overlapping-generations model, residence criteria are shown to be optimal with lump-sum transfers to the younger generation in a dynamically efficient open economy even if all wage income, corresponding to rent income under exogenous labor supply, is not taxed away. When tax revenues are also distributed to the older generation — which indeed may be desirable for short-term intergenerational welfare distribution reasons — a weighted average rule is derived for optimal international taxation. The taxation of domestic savings income follows the inverse elasticity rule in respect to savings and, surprisingly, higher investment elasticity increases the tax level. Finally, for a small open economy and for large identical economies, tax competition with a mixed scheme of residence-based taxes and source-based subsidies yields the same tax policy as tax cooperation with no restrictions on the domestic and international capital income tax instruments.     

Unfolding Social Hierarchies

Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a ρ-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their life. This choice is made, with some noise, by imitating one of the strategies adopted at the highest level.  In this setup, the unique long-run behavior of the system is fully characterized for the whole class of 2×2 coordination games and two alternative variations of the model. The results crucially depend on the key “institutional” parameters ρ and n. In particular, it is shown that inefficient behavior prevails in the long run (even when risk-dominated) if promotion is only mildly selective—high ρ—and the social system is quite hierarchical—large n. In a stylized manner, these parameter conditions may be viewed as reflecting a sort of institutional deficiency that impairs economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C73, D72.     

Flip-flopping from primaries to general elections

I consider a model in which candidates must win a primary election to compete in the general election. Candidates may choose different policies in the primary and the general election, but doing so results in accusations of flip-flopping. I show that candidates adopt extreme policies in the primaries but then try to move closer to the center for the general election even though primary voters are forward-looking and anticipate this policy moderation. The extent to which candidates move closer to the center is constrained by flip-flopping costs, and candidates choose divergent policies in the general election. I obtain comparative statics results on candidate policy choices in terms of voter preferences.