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1.
How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. In this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72. 相似文献
2.
Masaki Aoyagi 《Journal of Economic Theory》1996,70(2):444-469
The paper formulates a simple two-person model of learning with pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the asymptotic behavior of players' beliefs when the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.Journal of Economics LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83. 相似文献
3.
We study implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms. (An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy. A mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy.) We identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation. These conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments, and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature. For economic settings, we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 025, 026. 相似文献
4.
Tristan Tomala 《Games and Economic Behavior》1999,28(2):208
We study a model of repeated games with imperfect monitoring where the payoff vector is observable. In this situation, any profitable deviation is detectable by all the players but the identity of the deviator may be unknown. We design collective punishments directed against the set of potential deviators. A particular class of signals is studied for which a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73. 相似文献
5.
We consider two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. The characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained by Hart allows for complex strategies, which are actually required by some equilibrium payoffs in some games. We show that appropriate one-shot public communication mechanisms make Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable by means of simple strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms satisfy a notion of self-fulfillment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72. 相似文献
6.
Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilibria of extensive form
games. Players make choices based on a quantal-choice model and assume other players do so as well. We define an agent quantal
response equilibrium (AQRE), which applies QRE to the agent normal form of an extensive form game and imposes a statistical
version of sequential rationality. We also define a parametric specification, called logit-AQRE, in which quantal-choice probabilities
are given by logit response functions. AQRE makes predictions that contradict the invariance principle in systematic ways.
We show that these predictions match up with some experimental findings by Schotter et al. (1994) about the play of games
that differ only with respect to inessential transformations of the extensive form. The logit-AQRE also implies a unique selection
from the set of sequential equilibria in generic extensive form games. We examine data from signaling game experiments by
Banks et al. (1994) and Brandts and Holt (1993). We find that the logit-AQRE selection applied to these games succeeds in
predicting patterns of behavior observed in these experiments, even when our prediction conflicts with more standard equilibrium
refinements, such as the intuitive criterion. We also reexamine data from the McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) centipede experiment
and find that the AQRE model can account for behavior that had previously been explained in terms of altruistic behavior.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
7.
A formula is derived for the probability that a "randomly selected" n-person matrix game has exactly k pure strategy equilibria. It is shown that for all n ≥ 2, this probability converges to e−1/k! as the sizes of the strategy sets of at least two players increase without bound. Thus the number of pure strategy equilibria in large random n-person matrix games is approximately Poisson distributed with mean one. The latter is a known result obtained by a new proof in this note. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. 相似文献
8.
Abderrahmane Ziad 《Bulletin of economic research》2003,55(3):311-317
We consider an n ‐person non‐zero‐sum non‐cooperative game in normal form, where the strategy sets are some closed intervals of the real line. It is shown that if the pay‐off functions are continuous on the whole space and if for each pay‐off function the smallest local maximum in the strategy variable is a global maximum, then the game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
9.
Quan Wen 《Games and Economic Behavior》1996,13(2):286-300
This paper studies renegotiation-proof equilibria of Beno?̂t and Krishna (1993) in finitely repeated games with more than two players. We provide a simple characterization of the set of average payoffs from renegotiation-proof equilibria: the limiting set of average equilibrium payoffs is either efficient or dimensionally small as the horizon of the repeated game goes to infinity. Two sufficient conditions for the former to occur are provided. An example shows that those conditions cannot be weakened.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C73. 相似文献
10.
This article shows that the Pareto efficient frontier of the Nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition-proof under the following conditions: (1) the game has three players, or, alternatively, a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum (but not on the composition) of other players' strategies; (2) an increase in a player's strategy either raises all other players' payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically; and (3) each player's payoff is strictly concave in her own strategy. Under these conditions, the Pareto dominance refinement is equivalent to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. 相似文献
11.
ALEJANDRO SAPORITI 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2008,10(5):827-857
This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two‐party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game, referred to as the hybrid election game, is shown to be payoff secure and reciprocally upper semi‐continuous. Conditional payoffs, however, are not quasi‐concave. Hence, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psne ) is ensured only if parties have homogenous interests in power. In that case, an equilibrium not only exists, but it is also unique. Instead, if parties have heterogeneous motivations, depending upon the relationship between the electoral uncertainty, the aggregate opportunism, and its distribution across parties, a psne may or may not exist. The mixed extension, however, is always better reply secure. Therefore, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does indeed exist. 相似文献
12.
WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ RICHARD CORNES WOLFGANG PETERS 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2006,8(3):401-408
In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions leading to an interior Cournot–Nash equilibrium in which all individuals contribute to the public good. Furthermore, we give an estimate for the frequency that all members of a certain subgroup of the population are contributors. 相似文献
13.
Nicolaas J. Vriend 《The Journal of economic education》2013,44(4):358-362
This study reviews the status of student outcomes assessment in departments of economics at colleges and universities across the country. 相似文献
14.
We consider the class of all abstract economies with convex and compact strategy sets, continuous and quasi-concave payoff functions, and continuous and convex-valued feasibility correspondences. We prove that the Nash correspondence is the unique solution on the foregoing class of abstract economies that satisfies nonemptiness, rationality in one-person economies, and consistency.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D50. 相似文献
15.
Informationally robust equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (Games Econ Behav 7: 233–245, 1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for strategic games. Such equilibria are limits of a sequence of (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibria in perturbed games where with small probability information about the strategic behavior is revealed
to other players (information leakage). Focusing on bimatrix games, we consider a type of informationally robust equilibria
and derive a number of properties they form a non-empty and closed subset of the Nash equilibria. Moreover, IRE is a strict
concept in the sense that the IRE are independent of the exact sequence of probabilities with which information is leaked.
The set of IRE, like the set of Nash equilibria, is the finite union of polytopes. In potential games, there is an IRE in
pure strategies. In zero-sum games, the set of IRE has a product structure and its elements can be computed efficiently by
using linear programming. We also discuss extensions to games with infinite strategy spaces and more than two players.
The authors would like to thank Marieke Quant for her helpful comments. 相似文献
16.
TAKESHI YAMAZAKI 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2008,10(2):317-327
There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent‐seeking contest. First, effectiveness of player's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent‐seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. This article proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in a general asymmetric rent‐seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players. 相似文献
17.
Alejandro M. Manelli 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,102(2):480-484
It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C6, C7, D8. 相似文献
18.
Associated with each component of the Nash equilibria of a game are its index and degree. Its index is the local degree of the displacement map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of the game. Its degree is the local degree of the projection map from the Nash graph to the space of games. We show that the index and the degree of each component are the same. Further, they are invariant to adding or deleting redundant strategies, so they depend only on the reduced normal form of the game. Applications include Kohlberg and Mertens' existence theorems for stable sets and a simple procedure for calculating the degree of a component.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. 相似文献
19.
Michael R. Caputo 《Games and Economic Behavior》1996,13(2):201-224
The Envelope Theorem for Nash equilibria shows that the strategic reaction of the other players in the game is important for determining how parameter perturbations affect a given player's indirect objective function. The fundamental comparative statics matrix of Nash equilibria for theithplayer in anN-player static game includes the equilibrium response of the otherN−1players in the game to the parameter perturbation and is symmetric positive semidefinite subject to constraint. This result is fundamental in that it holds for all sufficiently smooth Nash equilibria and is independent of any curvature or stability assumptions imposed on the game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C61. 相似文献
20.
YEW-KWANG NG 《The Economic record》1981,57(3):238-250
The acceptability of the Nash Social Welfare Function is questioned because a minute (perhaps hardy perceivable) welfare change of someone with a very low welfare level might overwhelm enormous welfare changes of others. The axiomatic derivation of the Nash SWF by Kaneko and Nakamura is analyzed. Arguments for and against social welfare as separable in, linear in, and an unweighted sum of individual welfares are critically discussed. Separability follows from the individualistic ethics (Fleming, Sugden and Weale). Linearity follows from the ‘logic’ of rational choice in the face of risk (Harsanyi). (Diamond's counter-example is rejected.) Unweighted sum follows from either (i) informational restriction precluding interpersonal comparison of welfare levels (D'Aspremont and Gevers, Maskin); or (ii) with finite sensibility, equation of just-perceivable increments of welfare across persons (Edgeworth) or the Weak Majority Preference Criterion (Ng). 相似文献