DO POLITICS CAUSE REGIME SHIFTS IN MONETARY POLICY?

Whether or not politics cause changes in monetary policy is controversial in the literature. This article re‐examines the link between politics and regime shifts in monetary policy using two alternative approaches. First, empirical results show that both the presidential and Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) chairmanship regimes do not influence monetary policy under the assumption that the Fed closely follows an interest rate rule. On the other hand, evidence also suggests that changes in political regimes are able to account for the deviations from the optimal Taylor rule. (JEL E52, E58, D78)     

Understanding the deviation of Australian policy rate from the Taylor rule

This investigation aims to explain and quantify the deviations of the Australian policy rate (set by Reserve Bank of Australia) from the Taylor Rule. A three-step econometric procedure designed to reflect the data-rich environment in which central banks operate is proposed using information for 229 macroeconomic series. This procedure can be applied to data for any economy with inflation targeting monetary rule. Our application with Australian data shows that approximately 65% of Australia’s policy rate deviation from the Taylor Rule can be explained systematically, with international factors and a domestic factor accounting for 41.9% and 22.5%, respectively, of the total variation in deviation from the rule.     

A comparison of optimal policy rules prior to and during inflation targeting: empirical evidence from Bank of Canada

We examine policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting (IT) framework in a small macroeconomic model of the Canadian economy. We set up an optimal linear regulator problem and derive policy rules to compare the dynamics of pre-IT and IT eras. We find that while the optimal monetary policy rule in the pre-IT period is best described with a loss function that attaches equal weight to price stability, financial stability and output stability; the IT era is dominated by the price stability objective followed by the financial stability and output stability, consecutively. Moreover, we do not find an explicit role for exchange rate stability in the objective function of the Bank of Canada for both monetary policy eras. We, then, compare the properties of the derived optimal rules with those of an ad hoc Taylor rule for the IT period. In response to inflationary shocks, Taylor rule brings down inflation rates more quickly compared to the derived policy rules, but at the cost of a higher sacrifice ratio and more volatile interest rates.     

Does the monetary policy committee still care about inflation? Some evidence from a small macroeconomic model

This article derives an optimal Taylor rule for the UK economy using a simple estimated model based on data prior to the financial crisis of 2008. Optimal policy rules are calculated using simulation of the model over a long time period coupled with a search for optimal Taylor rule parameters using the Newton-Raphson loss minimization algorithm. The weights in the pre-crisis loss function are then inferred from the Taylor rule parameters estimated from the period corresponding to Bank of England independence, i.e. 1997–2008. These estimates are consistent with a low weight on inflation relative to output stabilization even before the crisis. The model is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that there has been no change in Bank of England preferences and that the Bank has responded to the crisis in a way which would have been predicted on the basis of its pre-crisis behaviour.     

Monetary Policy with Parameter Uncertainty in Small-Open Economy

This paper computes optimal robust monetary policy in a new Keynesian small-open economy model with Knightian uncertainty about the degree of price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Due to the simple model structure used in the paper, I can derive analytical results for the min–max solution under discretion and assess how a robust optimal Taylor rule must be set in small-open economy. I find that, in an optimal robust discretionary equilibrium, the central bank should assume that the degree of price stickiness and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods take on their highest numerical values. In terms of interest rate setting, if the optimal discretionary robust equilibrium is implemented with a Taylor rule, the policy rate should react to inflation in a less aggressive way than in the case of complete information.     

基于标准泰勒规则的我国货币市场利率偏离估算

本文利用泰勒规则方法对我国货币市场利率偏离程度进行了估算。对我国货币政策反应函数的经验分析表明,我国货币政策并不符合稳定货币政策规则要求。标准泰勒规则具有良好的稳健性。根据泰勒规则原式及稳定货币政策规则最低条件计算结果表明,我国货币市场利率长期存在负的利率缺口,货币政策对通胀和产出缺口并不是稳定的,更不是最优的,货币政策存在着长期偏误。这对进一步理解我国的通货膨胀和宏观经济波动,合理评价货币政策,提供了新的视角。     

泰勒规则及其在中国货币政策中的检验

本文运用历史分析法和反应函数法首次将中国货币政策运用于检验泰勒规则。通过计算中国货币政策中利率的泰勒规则值 ,并与其实际值进行比较表明 ,泰勒规则可以很好地衡量中国货币政策 ,利率规则值与实际值的偏离之处恰恰是政策操作滞后于经济形势发展之时。这表明泰勒规则能够为中国货币政策提供一个参照尺度 ,衡量货币政策的松紧。对中国货币政策的反应函数GMM估计表明 ,通胀率对利率的调整系数小于 1 ,这是一种不稳定的货币政策规则 ,在这一制度下 ,通货膨胀或通货紧缩的产生和发展有着自我实现机制。     

房地产价格、泰勒规则与宏观经济调控——基于2000-2010年我国宏观经济数据的检验

央行是否应该针对房地产价格制定货币政策进行调控,一直是学者们关注的焦点,但研究结果仍存在分歧。基于2000-2010年我国季度经济数据,对比检验了融入房地产价格的泰勒规则与标准泰勒规则对我国制定货币政策调控宏观经济的适用性。实证结果表明,依据标准泰勒规则所制定的利率政策,可以降低央行损失函数值,提高利率政策有效性。这一结果意味着,在房地产价格波动不影响物价稳定和经济增长的情况下,央行不应针对房地产价格进行调控。也就是说,央行需考虑房地产价格波动与通货膨胀和产出之间的相关关系,判断其对政策目标的潜在影响,制定利率政策对宏观经济进行调控。     

Credible enough? Forward guidance and perceived National Bank of Poland’s policy rule

Forward guidance effectiveness is conditional upon its credibility. This policy, when taken as credible, should reduce the perceived impact of macroeconomic variables on the interest rate. Using the Taylor rule framework and employing micro-level data set, we test the perception of monetary policy in Poland among professional forecasters. Our results show that the Taylor principle is violated in the forward guidance period, which provides evidence for forward guidance credibility.     

Wage rigidities and unemployment fluctuations in a small open economy

This study analyzes the implications of the monetary policy for the unemployment rate in a small open economy. We introduce nominal wage rigidities and unemployment into the small open economy version of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We derive three main findings. First, under nominal wage rigidities, the cyclical properties of the calibrated model, in response to a productivity shock, are consistent with the empirical evidence on a decrease in employment and an increase in real wages. Second, for all the variables considered, the Taylor rule tracks the optimal policy better than the simple rule with unemployment as an argument. Third, regardless of the output or unemployment gap being targeted, it is not optimal that central banks respond to nominal exchange rate variations.     

The powers that are: central bank independence in the Greenspan era

This paper investigates political pressure from incumbent Presidents and Congress on US monetary policy during the period that Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal Reserve. We propose an expectations-augmented Taylor rule in which we replace realized values with expectations, and use the unemployment gap instead of the output gap. We apply a state-space framework that allows the use of mixed frequency data. Our findings suggest that the Federal Reserve under Greenspan did not create election driven cycles, but also did not strictly follow the Taylor rule. The deviations from the Taylor rule are not driven by partisan politics, but are rooted in the expected economic conditions.     

Bernanke versus Taylor: a post mortem

Our analysis sheds light on the issue of whether the monetary policy contributed to the recent housing boom and bust. We have estimated and analysed a model that allows a comparison between the actual policy and several alternative Taylor rules. When the Taylor rule path was computed using revised data and the deflator for the GDP, we found a notable impact on key housing market variables, supporting Taylor’s critique of the Fed policy. However, the bulk of our evidence suggests that the policy as it would have been conducted under our real-time Taylor rules would not have had any significant impact on the housing market variables. This conclusion is robust with regard to the price index used as well as the relative weights used on the inflation and output gaps.     

Capital Inflows,Dutch Disease Effects,and Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy

This paper studies the role of monetary policy in a small open economy that experiences Dutch disease effects as a result of capital inflows, and examines the issue of whether such a policy should seek to address these effects from a welfare perspective. I find that Dutch disease effects occur under a fixed nominal exchange rate regime. However, a monetary policy regime characterized by generalized Taylor interest rate rules featuring either the real exchange rate or the nominal exchange rate avert Dutch disease effects. Welfare results reveal that the optimal rule is a generalized Taylor rule consistent with nominal exchange rate flexibility.     

TAYLOR RULE REACTION COEFFICIENTS AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE PERSISTENCE

Recent literature has established a link between the persistence of real exchange rates and the degree of inertia in Taylor rule monetary policy reactions functions. This paper provides a different view on this link by investigating how the size of Taylor rule reaction coefficients impacts the adjustment dynamics of the real exchange rate. Within a stylized sticky‐price open‐economy macro model, it is demonstrated that a stronger interest rate reaction to inflation in the Taylor rule raises the convergence speed of the real exchange rate. Conversely, raising the coefficient on the output gap or attending to the exchange rate in an open‐economy version of the Taylor rule slows down real exchange rate adjustment. In all cases, more rapid convergence comes at the cost of stronger initial real exchange rate misalignments in the wake of monetary policy shocks.     

China's regime-switching monetary policy

To understand Chinese monetary policy, we estimate a forward-looking Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function. The novelty of our paper lies in two aspects. The first is to use a composite overall indicator (the Sun-MP index) to tackle the measurement uncertainty and hence the model selection problem (i.e., a Taylor versus McCallum rule). The second is to capture nonlinearities in the PBC's policy responses with the multiple-regime threshold regression model. We find strong evidence that the PBC's policy reaction function is asymmetric during the post-2000 period and switches across three different regimes. When expecting high inflation, the PBC tightens by adjusting various policy tools; while facing an expected economic slowdown, it eases. However, it is tolerant to low inflation and economic overheating; it barely reacts to them. These findings highlight the importance of allowing for regime switches in modelling the policy response function of a “young” and fast evolving central bank in emerging countries like China.     

泰勒规则在中国的协整检验

本文在全面分析泰勒规则的理论含义和实际应用的基础上 ,运用协整分析方法估计我国泰勒规则的具体形式。检验结果表明 ,泰勒规则可以恰当地描述我国银行间拆借利率的具体走势 ,并充当央行货币政策的决策依据。考虑到货币政策的时滞问题 ,本文尝试引入前瞻性泰勒规则 ,用预期通货膨胀率缺口代替原有的通货膨胀率缺口作为估计变量 ,对泰勒规则作进一步修正     

Taylor Rule implementation of the optimal policy at the zero lower bound: Does the cost channel matter?

This paper analyzes the implementation of the optimal policies at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) by the Taylor rule in the presence of a cost channel. We find that, the presence of a cost channel significantly impairs the ability of the Taylor rule to implement optimal policies when economy is subject to the ZLB. The main findings of the paper are, (i) the Taylor rule with optimally chosen inflation target partially implements the optimal discretionary policy but cannot implement the optimal policy under commitment, and (ii) the T-only policy, which follows discretion after an optimally chosen exit date from the ZLB, is the best that can be implemented by the Taylor rule in the presence of cost channel.     

Estimating Central Banks’ preferences from a time-varying empirical reaction function

We estimate monetary policy reaction functions for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, using a Markov-switching model that allows for shifts in the coefficients of the central bank's reaction function as well as for independent shifts in the residual variance. The results indicate that central bank policy can be characterized as falling into a low- and a high-inflation regime. Over time all central banks have assigned changing weights to inflation and the output gap. Switching in the residual variance turns out to be important for the fit of the model. As a reaction function is a reduced form, coefficients embody preference parameters as well as parameters characterizing the structure of the economy. To recover the central banks’ preferences, we estimate the preference parameters jointly with a small model of the economy. The results show that the Bundesbank has placed a relatively higher weight on inflation than the Fed. Moreover, for the Bundesbank and the Fed the differences between both regimes seem to originate mainly from a changing preference for interest rate smoothing.     

Taylor Rule in Practice: Evidence from Turkey

This paper estimates the backward-looking and forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) by considering the post-crisis period from August 2001 to September 2006, with a special emphasis on inflation targeting. Policies which the CBRT applied are analyzed according to the Taylor rule. The empirical results indicate that the CBRT followed the Taylor rule in its interest setting behaviour. In forward-looking models, the response coefficient of inflation and the output gap is greater than that of backward-looking models. The results of forward-looking models reflect, the policies conducted in Turkey. In the post-crisis period, expected inflation has been the main reaction variable for the CBRT. This suggests that monetary policy over the post-crisis period was not accommodating increases in expected inflation. The main conclusion is that ‘Taylor rule’ based monetary policies were effective in inflation targeting in Turkey.