The impact of two different economic systems on dishonesty

Using an artefactual field experiment, this paper tests the long-term implications of living in a specific economic system on individual dishonesty. By comparing cheating behaviour across individuals from the former socialist East of Germany with those of the capitalist West of Germany, we examine behavioural differences within a single country. We find long-term implications of living in a specific economic system for individual dishonesty when social interactions are possible: participants with an East German background cheated significantly more on an abstract die-rolling task than those with a West German background, but only when exposed to the enduring system of former West Germany. Moreover, our results indicate that the longer individuals had experienced socialist East Germany, the more likely they were to cheat on the behavioural task.     

Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical actions that benefit others

In three experiments, we propose and find that individuals cheat more when others can benefit from their cheating and when the number of beneficiaries of wrongdoing increases. Our results indicate that people use moral flexibility to justify their self-interested actions when such actions benefit others in addition to the self. Namely, our findings suggest that when people's dishonesty would benefit others, they are more likely to view dishonesty as morally acceptable and thus feel less guilty about benefiting from cheating. We discuss the implications of these results for collaborations in the social realm.     

Social Preferences in the Lab: A Comparison of Students and a Representative Population

We report from a lab experiment conducted with a sample of participants that is nationally representative for the adult population in Norway and two student samples (economics students and non‐economics students). The participants make choices both in a dictator game (a non‐strategic environment) and in a generalized trust game (a strategic environment). We find that the representative sample differs fundamentally from the student samples, both in the relative importance assigned to different moral motives (efficiency, equity, and reciprocity) and in the level of selfish behavior. It is also interesting to note that the gender effects observed in the student samples do not correspond to the gender effects observed in representative sample. Finally, whereas economics students behave less pro‐socially than non‐economics students, the two student groups are similar in the relative importance they assign to different moral motives.     

The victim matters – experimental evidence on lying,moral costs and moral cleansing

In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.     

Dishonesty: From parents to children

Acts of dishonesty permeate life. Understanding their origins, and what mechanisms help to attenuate such acts is an underexplored area of research. This study takes an economic approach to explore the propensity of individuals to act dishonestly across different contexts. We conduct an experiment that includes both parents and their young children as subjects, exploring the roles of moral cost and scrutiny on dishonest behavior. We find that the highest level of dishonesty occurs in settings where the parent acts alone and the dishonest act benefits the child. In this spirit, there is also an interesting, quite different, effect of children on parents’ behavior: parents act more honestly under the scrutiny of daughters than under the scrutiny of sons. This finding sheds new light on the origins of the widely documented gender differences in cheating behavior observed among adults, where a typical result is that females are more honest than males.     

Tolerance of Cheating: An Analysis Across Countries

Cheating is a serious problem in many countries. The cheater gets higher marks than deserved, thus reducing the efficiency of a country's educational system. In this study, the authors did not ask if and how often the student had cheated, but rather what the student's opinion was about a cheating situation. They investigated whether attitudes differ among students in Russia, the Netherlands, Israel, and the United States and conclude that attitudes toward cheating differ considerably between these countries. They offer various explanations of this phenomenon. In addition, they find that the student's attitude toward cheating depends on the student's educational level (high school, undergraduate, postgraduate). Finally, they show that the data from the sample can be aggregated in a natural and elegant way, and they suggest a tolerance-of-cheating index for each country.     

Cheating,emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion

The economics-of-crime approach usually ignores the emotional cost and benefit of cheating. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between emotions, deception, and rational decision-making by means of an experiment on tax evasion. Emotions are measured by skin conductance responses and self-reports. We show that the intensity of anticipated and anticipatory emotions before reporting income positively correlates with both the decision to cheat and the proportion of evaded income. The experienced emotional arousal after an audit increases with the monetary sanctions and the arousal is even stronger when the evader’s picture is publicly displayed. We also find that the risk of a public exposure of deception deters evasion whereas the amount of fines encourages evasion. These results suggest that an audit policy that strengthens the emotional dimension of cheating favors compliance.     

Fair play in contests

The aim of this paper is to incorporate fair play norms into the analysis of contests where players have the ability to cheat in order to improve their chances of winning. We propose a utility function integrating fair play norms and apply it to a stylized model of rank-order tournament with cheating. We study how the set of equilibria is affected by the presence of fair play values. These values are shown to have an ambiguous impact on the incentives to cheat so that it may happen that there is more cheating with fair play values than without. We also study the impact of the number of contestants, with results suggesting that fair play norms may be effective in closed tournaments with few competitors (such as, for example, promotions in firms), but not in large-scale tournaments such as worldwide athletic or academic contests.     

Test Information: An Application of the Economics of Search

The author reports on an experiment that permits cheating behavior to be observed rather than self-reported as in a questionnaire survey. In two sections of a course examined on the same day, 50 percent of the questions were repeated on the second exam. It was found that an average of 36 percent of the students on the second test had used information acquired from the first test. Several predictions about cheating behavior were tested by a multivariate technique. The main result was to be expected: majors, better students, and those voluntarily in the course cheated relatively less. But working students also cheated less.

The author does not think this behavior, although not considered “serious” cheating, is entirely victimless, and calls into question the equity of grades.     

An experimental analysis of moral self-regulation

This article examines the validity of the moral self-regulation hypothesis in a laboratory setting. The experiment is comprised of a public good game preceded or followed by a matrix task. The data show that the recall of an immoral action (cheating in the matrix task) motivates the individual to do morally right thing (contributing to group account) and the recall of a moral action (contributing to group account) motivates the individual to act out self-interest (cheating in the matrix task). Both moral licensing and moral cleansing hypotheses are confirmed by the results of the experiment. Additionally, the findings indicate that the subjects who had been given a chance to cheat ‘at first’ allocated more funds to the group account; and the subjects who had been given a chance to voluntarily contribute ‘at first’ cheated more in the matrix task.     

Letter from the Editors

The authors explore academic misconduct in various forms and consider the role of student perceptions. They gather data from students in introductory economics courses regarding 31 types of misconduct. They estimate the relevance of various determinants of misconduct, acknowledging that they may vary across misconduct type and that students' perceptions may influence their behavior. Their estimates reveal that although there are determinants that influence student behavior across misconduct type, some types of misconduct have a unique set of determinants. They find that a student's perception of what constitutes misconduct is an important component of this behavioral decision. These results imply that to reduce a particular type of cheating, one must consider its specific determinants and ensure that students believe that the act is misconduct. In addition, students must believe that the probability of being caught is high.     

On the optimality of escalating penalties for repeat offences against the academic honour code

Although academic dishonesty has a long history in academia, its pervasiveness has recently reached an alarming level. Academic dishonesty not only undermines the purpose of education and the assessment process but also threatens the creditability of academic records. We propose a framework for analysing students’ behaviour with respect to academic policies and honour codes. We draw an analogy between law enforcement and academic integrity enforcement and highlight similarities and differences. The proposed framework captures major determinants of academic dishonesty reported in the literature, namely detection probability, punishment severity, class average and record of academic deviance. The framework models both students’ development of nonacademic skills to improve their grades and teaching assistants’ development of detection skills, which both affect the detection probability. Our analysis demonstrates that the optimality of escalating penalties is conditional on the offenders and academic policy enforcers learning. Use-case scenarios are presented to facilitate the implementation of our results in classrooms.     

Encouraging Tutorial Attendance at University Did Not Improve Performance

When tertiary education is subsidised the cost of poor student performance in university subjects falls not only on the individual student but also on society in general. Society therefore has an interest in promoting student performance. There is evidence in the literature that absenteeism from university classes is widespread and that absenteeism adversely affects student performance. In this paper I describe an incentive scheme that increased attendance of business and economics students in an introductory statistics subject at a typical Australian university. Like other authors I find a strong positive association between attendance and academic performance, both in the presence and absence of the scheme. However, there is no evidence that the incentive scheme caused student performance to improve. Although students attended more classes they did not perform better than students in the previous year's class who had the same observable characteristics and attendance levels but who were not exposed to the scheme.     

The Effect of Attending a Small Class in the Early Grades on College-test Taking and Middle School Test Results: Evidence from Project Star

This paper provides a long-term follow-up analysis of students who participated in the Tennessee STAR experiment. In this experiment, students and their teachers were randomly assigned to small, regular-size, or regular-size classes with a teacher aide in the first four years of school. We analyse the effect of past attendance in small classes on student test scores and whether they took the ACT or SAT college entrance exam. Attending a small class in the early grades is associated with an increased likelihood of taking a college-entrance exam, especially among minority students, and somewhat higher test scores.     

Programmed Learning-Policy Analysis: An Experiment in Teaching Principles of Economics

Darnton reports on an experiment using programmed instruction in macroeconomics. He also explains how assignments to write “position papers” on economic policies are used. An analysis of the experiment deals with the time devoted to the course by students and instructor, student understanding of economics and student attitude toward this approach. The TUCE was used as the testing instrument, and Darnton asserts that the experimental group did better than the control group on complex application questions. The experimental approach proved to be popular with the students, and the author claims that it provided for a more efficient use of faculty resources.     

Resources and Student Achievement—Evidence from a Swedish Policy Reform*

A policy change is used to estimate the effect of teacher density on student performance. We find that an increase in teacher density has a positive effect on student achievement. The baseline estimate—obtained by using the grade‐point average as the outcome variable—implies that resource increases corresponding to the class‐size reduction in the STAR experiment (a reduction of seven students) improves performance by 2.6 percentile ranks (or 0.08 standard deviations). When we used test‐score data for men, potentially a more objective measure of student performance, the effect of resources appears to be twice as large.     

Do Morning Classes Improve Student Learning of Microeconomics Principles?

This article analyzes the impact of class time on students’ grades by using data from Middle Tennessee State University. The data cover a period of six years and are based on a sample of 5803 individuals who enrolled in 133 sections of principles of microeconomics. To identify the causal impact of class time on students’ grades, I used a bootstrapping method which allowed assigning measures of accuracy to sample estimates. For males, the estimated coefficients were negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, and the coefficients suggested that a male student in an afternoon class could expect to earn a letter grade that is 0.029 points lower than he would have earned by taking the class in the morning. For females, the estimated coefficients were not statistically significant.     

Subject pool effects among the general population and students: a choice experiment example

Rising costs of conducting research coupled with limited budgets are forcing researchers to use samples of convenience. Students represent one such sample, but are students an appropriate population? The objective is to ascertain how students’ willingness to pay (WTP) differs from the general public’s WTP. Students and county residents are surveyed. Results suggest the study’s goal may determine if student responses are generalizable to the general population. The samples are similar in many characteristics, but WTP amounts vary. The student samples show some inconsistencies. If the goal is general behavioural inferences, the results provide support for the use of students. If the goal is to estimate specific WTPs for use in policy analysis, the use of students may not be advisable.     

On the peer effects of star students

We estimate the effect that star students have on their siblings’ learning outcomes, measured by their high school grade point average (GPA) and their math grades. To this end, we couple administrative school data on grades with an unusual natural experiment in Peru that generates exogenous variation in the presence of star students at home. We find that star students increase their siblings’ GPA by 0.33 SDs and their math grades by 0.22 SDs. The effect size is inversely related to number of siblings, suggesting that the remaining siblings act as substitutes for the star student.