Revenue Recycling and the Welfare Effects of Road Pricing

This paper explores the interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion and pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labor market. A congestion tax raises the overall costs of commuting to work and discourages labor force participation. The resulting welfare loss in the labor market can easily exceed the Pigouvian welfare gain from internalizing the congestion externality. However, if congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the net impact on labor supply is positive, and this can raise the overall welfare gain from the congestion tax by around 100 percent. Nonetheless the optimal congestion tax still equals the Pigouvian tax.
JEL classification R 41; H 21; H 23     

Voting over selfishly optimal tax schedules: Can Pigouvian tax redistribute income?

This paper studies pairwise majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who differ in privately observable skills and make consumption comparisons, which creates a negative positional externality. It shows that the tax schedule preferred by the median skill type will win the voting contest. Given a reference consumption defined as the average consumption in the population, all skills face the same Pigouvian tax rate in the utilitarian optimum, whereas in selfish optima high skills face a Pigouvian tax rate larger than that facing low skills, generating a novel income redistributive effect. Under a constant elasticity of labor supply, two more results are obtained. First, for Pareto, Champernowne, Weibull, and lognormal skill distributions, the selfishly optimal tax schedule facing high (low) skills tends to be more progressive when the bottom‐skill's (top‐skill's) status concern intensifies. Second, it identifies the conditions under which, in the voting equilibrium, high skills face higher marginal tax rates while low skills face lower ones than what they face in the utilitarian optimum.     

Relative Consumption Concerns and the Optimal Tax Mix

This paper studies the optimal tax mix (taxes on income and commodities) under asymmetric information in a two‐type model, when individuals make relative consumption comparisons. The model includes both positional and nonpositional goods, taking into account the fact that relative concerns matter for some but not for all commodities. We find that in general the whole tax system is affected by the externalities caused by the consumption of positional goods, notably also the taxes on income and on a nonpositional good. The tax rates on positional goods are higher than in the absence of status effects, reflecting their Pigouvian role. The sign of the Pigouvian part in the income tax schedule is ambiguous and depends crucially on whether status goods are complements or substitutes to leisure.     

Pigouvian Taxes in General Equilibrium with a Fixed Tax Redistribution Rule

This paper establishes existence of a first-best emission tax in a general equilibrium model with pollution, when the redistribution rule of the tax income is chosen fixed and independently of the Pigouvian tax rate. It is known that under standard convexity assumptions each Pareto efficient allocation can be implemented by simultaneously choosing a Pigouvian tax rate and an appropriate lump sum redistribution of income. In real politics, however, tax redistribution schemes are often restricted to a small feasible set. Nonetheless we show that for any given lump sum redistribution rule, being continuous in overall tax income, an emission tax rate exists that leads to a Pareto efficient equilibrium.     

Can Trade Be Good for the Environment?

We analyze the impact of trade in a differentiated good on environmental policy when there is local and transboundary pollution. In autarky, the (equivalent) pollution tax is set equal to the marginal damage from own emissions. If the strategic policy instrument is a tax, leakage occurs under trade and tends to lower the tax. The net terms of trade effect, due to the exportable and importable varieties of the differentiated good, tends to increase the tax. We derive conditions under which pollution taxes under trade are higher than the marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., higher than the Pigouvian tax and than that under autarky. Then, pollution falls under trade relative to autarky. When countries use quotas/permits to regulate pollution, there is no leakage, while the net terms of trade effect tends to make pollution policy stricter. The equivalent tax is always higher than the marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., always higher than the Pigouvian tax and than that under autarky; hence, pollution always falls under trade. Our analysis provides some insight into the findings in the empirical literature that trade might be good for the environment.     

Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy

This paper develops a climate–economy model to study the joint design of optimal climate and fiscal policies in economies with overlapping generations (OLGs). I demonstrate how capital taxation, if optimal, drives a wedge between the market costs of carbon (the net present value of marginal damages using the market interest rate) and the Pigouvian tax (the net present value of marginal damages using the consumption discount rate of successive OLGs). In contrast to deterministic infinitely lived representative agent models, at the optimum, the capital income tax is positive, the carbon price equals the market costs of carbon but it falls short of the Pigouvian tax when (i) preferences are not separable over consumption and leisure; and (ii) labor income taxes cannot be age-dependent. I also show that restrictions on climate change policy provide a novel rationale for positive capital income taxes.     

Flows of Air Pollution,Ill Health and Welfare

We provide a theoretical framework for measuring welfare when pollution influences economic growth by impairing health and driving up defensive medical expenditures. We demonstrate the usefulness of our framework in practice by applying it to data from Swedish valuation studies designed according to the accounting principles suggested here. We estimate that the negative health effects of nitrogen dioxide emissions amount to 0.6% of GDP in Sweden. We also show that a corrective Pigouvian tax should internalize the direct disutility, reduced labor productivity, and increased healthcare expenditures caused by pollution. According to our calculations, harmful health impacts alone (excluding ecosystem effects) justify 65% of the current Swedish tax on nitrogen dioxide.      

Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation

This paper studies the design of couples’ income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses’ utilities; bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple. Information structure and labor supply decisions follow the Mirrleesian tradition. However, while the household's total consumption is publicly observable, the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable. With a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses’ marginal income tax rate includes a “Pigouvian” (paternalistic) and an incentive term. The Pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy (tax) for the high-weight (low-weight) spouse, whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low (high). The sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples. In some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low-weight spouse (who may be female) and a negative one for the high-weight spouse (possibly the male). This is at odds with the traditional Boskin and Sheshinski results. Our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions. Finally, we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model. The calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower (and possibly even negative) marginal tax rate.     

Efficient Climate Policy with Internationally Mobile Firms

A major concern in the design of an incomplete climate agreement is thatfirms that use fossil fuels intensively may respond to emission regulationsby relocating their plants from cooperating to non-cooperating countries.This paper analyses how the cooperating countries might deal with the issueof firm delocation through emission taxes, trade provisions and alocalisation subsidy to mobile firms. It is shown that firms should not beinduced to stay in the cooperating countries by lowering emission taxesbelow the Pigouvian tax rate. Incentives to stay should be given partlythrough trade provisions and partly through a localisation subsidy. A secondbest solution without localisation subsidies is also discussed. In thatcase, the efficient emission tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax rate.Finally, the paper discusses the implications of the first best and thesecond best policy regimes for the pattern of firm localisation.     

Water applications and Pigouvian taxes to control irrigation-induced soil degradation

Salt and water transport external costs of irrigation are borne disproportionately by lower elevation farmers. The relationship between fields for an optimal Pigouvian tax plan varies considerably as the amount of available water changes, demonstrating that a simple rule cannot be relied upon. A numerical example demonstrates the optimal application pattern and Pigouvian tax plan in contrast to the sequential Nash equilibrium. Shadow values for water are used to argue that between distributaries, the second best optimum is unlikely to be equal allocation. Physical measures of soil state are also shown to be worse under the optimal plan, throwing doubt on their usefulness.     

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some predefined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes.     

Second-Best Pigouvian Taxation: A Clarification

This paper argues that the search for a “purely environmental” component of a tax on goods or factors of production that impact the environment—separate from its redistributive and distortive effects—is fraught with difficulties. The quest is often impossible because of the interconnectedness between labor supply, consumption decisions and the environmental quality. The paper differentiates between two conceptualization for “the Pigouvian tax” that have been employed in the literature and argues that each has tried to isolate the environmental component in its own way. One conceptualization, due to Cremer et al. (J Public Econ 70:343–364, 1998) does so by ruling out direct feedback from changes in environmental quality on the incentive effect of the tax. In the second conceptualization, due to Bovenberg and Ploeg’s (J Public Econ 55:349–390, 1994), incentive effects are ruled out by making consumers’ valuation of environmental quality independent of the labor supply. This is achieved by assuming separability between labor supply and other goods (including environmental equality). To convey its message, the paper studies the properties of optimal polluting and non-polluting non-labor input taxes in a Mirrleesian model with endogenously determined wages.     

Unequal Longevities and Lifestyles Transmission

Whereas studies on the optimal taxation under endogenous longevity assume a fixed heterogeneity of lifestyles, this paper analyses the optimal tax policy in an economy where unequal longevities are the unintended outcome of differences in lifestyles, and where lifestyles are transmitted across generations. For that purpose, we develop a three-period OLG model where the population, who ignores the negative impact of excessive work on longevity, is partitioned in two groups with different tastes for leisure, and follows an adaptation/imitation process  à la   Bisin and Verdier (2001) . The optimal short- and long-run Pigouvian taxes on wages are shown to differ, because the latter correct agents' myopia, but also internalize intergenerational externalities due to the socialization process. The internalization of composition effects raises the Pigouvian tax on the wage of one type of agents, but reduces it on the other type, in such a way as to induce the optimal long-run partition of the population.     

Nonseparable Utility and the Double Dividend Debate: Reconsidering the Tax-Interaction Effect

The literature on the use of environmental taxes inthe presence of distortionary (labor) taxes warns thata partial-equilibrium Pigouvian tax analysis is notappropriate because increasing the price of dirtygoods can futher aggravate the prexisting distortions. This argument is most frequently made assuming thatlabor is taxed to meet a fixed revenue requirement.When a dirty good is also taxed, others argue thatthis lowers workers' real wages, causing people toreduce their labor supply below its already suboptimallevel, aggravating labor market distortions. However,most papers ignore the effect that a cleanerenvironment can have on labor supply. That is, mostpast work has assumed that the quality of theenvironment is weakly separable in the utilityfunction. We argue that a cleaner environment canincrease labor supply, at least partially offsettingany incentive for workers to decrease their laborsupply. Further, we show explicitly how relaxing theseparability assumption affects the standardresults.     

Nuclear Power, Externalities and Non-Standard Pigouvian Taxes

The external effects arising from the use of nuclear power are, in a fundamental way, related to uncertainty. In this paper we locate these external effects and derive a dynamic Pigouvian tax in order to make the decentralized economy support the command optimum. Another interesting result is that a small constant energy tax (which we interpret as a second best policy) can take the decentralized economy reasonably close to the command optimum.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a dynamic multicountry world with public services

The authors construct a dynamic one‐good multicountry growth model with productive government spending and perfect capital mobility to study fiscal interdependence among countries. In the case of a source‐based tax, it is found that there is no strategic interaction and that the equilibrium spending/tax mix coincides with the optimal one. In the case of a residence‐based tax system, however, there is strategic interaction across countries and, under noncooperation, countries tend to spend and tax over and above the optimal Pigouvian level.     

Taxation, Bequests, and Short and Long Run Timber Supplies: An Overlapping Generations Problem

This paper uses an overlapping generations model with one-sided altruism to study the effects of several forest taxes that target bequests and affect timber supply. Unlike previous work, we investigate bequests and timber supply in both the short and long run when bequests are costly (e.g., taxed). The landowner's problem is examined in the short run, while the government's problem is examined in the long run assuming the existence of a steady state. We also consider taxes targeting harvests, growth, savings and bequests. Several new results are established concerning the interactions of taxes that might be used by a government to alter short and long run forest capital stocks: (i) the presence of a forest bequest tax affects the neutrality of harvest tax in both the short and long run, (ii) in the long run the bequest tax decreases bequests and timber supplies. When the bequest tax is not present, the capital income tax is neutral with respect to bequest and timber supply, while the harvest tax is neutral only if forest productivity is also not taxed. Finally, (iii) in the short run, the substitution and total effects of taxes in landowner decisions generally depend on the presence of the bequest tax. The results have implications for Pigouvian tax design and second best tax choice.     

Involuntary Unemployment and Environmental Policy: The Double Dividend Hypothesis

An environmental tax reform might bring about gains over and above improved environmental quality. In particular, if tax revenues from environmental taxes are used to reduce the tax on wage income, positive employment effects can result in second-best economies. An efficiency wage model is used to analyze the impact of an ecological tax reform on involuntary unemployment. The government controls emissions by selling emission permits. Employment of labor and wages are determined endogenously. Conditions are identified under which an environmental tax reform reduces unemployment and increases welfare.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation

Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.