Sticky Norms,Endogenous Preferences,and Shareable Goods

The Internet has reduced the cost of borrowing and lending “shareable goods,” including tools, gear, toys, lodging, and vehicles. Online platforms can better match people with underutilized goods, but it may take time for people to develop sticky norms and endogenous preferences that are conducive to greater peer-to-peer sharing. This study estimates the current and potential value of sharing items across households. Data from the General Social Survey, the website NeighborGoods, and a new survey show that peer-to-peer borrowing is already worth at least $179 a year for 30% of Americans. Spending on shareable goods provides an upper bound on the potential gains from sharing. The consumer expenditure survey reveals that the average household spends $9,090 each year on shareable goods. Private vehicles account for 80% of these expenses, which suggests that the largest opportunities may be in greater car-sharing and ride-sharing.     

国际合作、外部性与全球性公共品融资

全球性公共品存在供给不足,而融资是其中的一个重要环节。从全球性公共品融资的特点与存在的问题、国际合作的视角、外部性观点出发,分析了全球性公共品融资的相关机制,对目前的融资状况作了简要评论。     

Hiding in Plain Sight: A Note on Public Goods,Information Technology,and Productivity

This research note advances a conjecture that may help to explain the “paradox” of productivity and information technology (IT). Conventional measures of the economic output of the IT sector may substantially understate the actual value of IT because software is a public good, which is largely unpriced. I provide a simple exploratory calculation that lends plausibility to this explanation. I hope that this conjecture may inspire research by those with greater expertise in the evolution of software.     

Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods

We examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may reduce free-riding. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in uncertainty will increase donations, to a public good. Journal of Economic Literature C72, D81, H41.     

财政分权、公共品供给与城乡收入差距

基于1994年～2004年间省级面板数据的估计结果显示,农村公共品供给增加对降低城乡收入差距有显著的作用.而地区间预算外收入和宏观税负的提高都是拉大城乡收入差距的因素.财政分权程度、政府财政支出的结构也对城乡收入差距有显著的影响.另外,中国持续扩大的城乡收入差距与农村发展落后有关,城市化未能带来城乡收入差距的缩小.     

融资激励和融资约束对PPP模式下公共产品提供效率的影响——基于不完全契约理论的一般均衡分析

通过构建不完全契约理论下的一般均衡模型,对比分析了PPP模式中的融资约束和融资激励对公共产品提供效率和社会福利的影响,并探讨了融资约束条件下的效率损失。结果显示:私人融资的专业性可以提高公共产品合意程度,但是私人部门的融资约束会抵消其专业性带来的好处,导致社会福利损失。最后针对民营企业参与PPP项目对政府提出建议:必须打破融资约束和制度歧视,完善和规范金融市场,在公平、竞争的市场环境下引入专业机构参与公共产品提供的各个领域。     

Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement, 1981–1995

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) gives states the option to enforce federal occupational safety and health standards on their own instead of relying on the federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). This legislative provision provides an opportunity to analyze a homogenous set of regulatory standards enforced by heterogeneous agents engaged in interjurisdictional competition. This study finds important differences in the effectiveness of enforcement options measured by occupational mortality. State-administered OSHA programs are associated with fewer workplace fatalities than states regulated at the federal level. This finding is consistent with regulatory federalism and government-as-facilitator models of OSHA enforcement.