股价走势与实物经济相脱离的行为经济学分析

本文应用行为经济学的基本理论论证:与实物经济基本面因素相比,投资者损失规避行为是影响股票价格一个更为重要的因素,这在一定程度上可以解释股价走势与实物经济运行相脱离的现象.结论同时得到实证数据的支持,实证证实,与发达国家相比我国股市中投资者损失规避行为更为显著地影响股市的收益水平.本文进一步指出,在解决中国股市若干基础性问题的同时,积极输导和调控投资者行为因素也是关乎股市良性发展的一个重要问题.     

Incentive Contracts and Environmental Performance Indicators

A principal-agent (P-A) model is used to analyse the effect of environmentaldiligence, the principal (top management), having to use imperfectperformance indicators and fearing penalties for environmental damages,wants to avoid environmental harm and induce the agent (employeemanipulating hazardous materials) to take appropriate action. To motivatethe agent, the principal offers an incentive contract based onenvironmental stewardship performance (as measured by EPI).Environmental stewardship being difficult to measure, due to high levelsof uncertainty surrounding, EPI, creates impediments to the establishmentof an efficient P-A contract.     

技术许可中道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制研究

本文利用现代契约经济学基本理论，对同一技术条件下、由技术使用者替代性投入行为而产生的道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制进行了分析。分析结果表明，技术所有者总可以设计一种分离价格契约治理道德风险问题，其中，对自己偏好的高成本投入行为采用纯固定费用，而对低成本投入行为采用“固定费用＋提成费”。本文进一步认为，价格契约中提成费比率对成本效率较高的投入行为所造成的扭曲程度，要大干成本效率较低的投入行为。     

Performance Standards and Incentive Pay in Agency Contracts

When the presence of limited liability restricts a principal from imposing monetary fines on an agent in case of poor performance, the principal might use other kinds of punishment threats to deter the agent from shirking. We show that under the optimal contract in this case, the principal sets a performance standard and punishes the agent if the standard is not met, but rewards the agent on a profit-sharing basis if the standard is significantly exceeded. The optimal choice of performance standards for such contracts is discussed. It is shown that punishment threats, although inefficient, often help the principal to discipline the agent.
JEL classification : D 82     

Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Choice in Information Technology

Selecting the type of contract is an important aspect of governinginterfirm transactions. The purpose of this article is to examinethe use of fixed-fee and time-and-materials (T&M, or cost-plus)contracts and a hybrid contract that consists of a T&M contractwith a cap. In addition to uncertainty and measurement factors,we also address a relatively unexplored aspect of contracting—howthe prior relationship between the firms influences the typeof contract the firms select. Using data on 394 contracts fromthe information technology (IT) services industry, we show thatT&M contracts are preferred when the cost of measuring qualityex post is high and when it is difficult to estimate costs exante. We also find site-specific measures of relationship leadto a preference for low-powered T&M contracts.     

劳动合同对于进城务工人员收入影响的有效性分析

本文重点讨论了《劳动合同法》的颁布对于进城务工人员收入的影响,我们用博弈论模型证明了签订劳动合同可以提高务工人员的收入,并且在一定条件下企业也可以通过生产率的上升而获利,实现双赢。从统计上看,签订合同的工人月收入高出347.19元,小时收入高出2.16元,OLS回归结果也发现合同对于收入有显著的正影响。但同时我们注意到有合同的劳动者本身有着更好的素质,Probit和Logit模型都验证了这一点,基于这种可能的内生性偏误,我们使用了处置效应来控制这一问题,并发现签订合同依旧显著提高了收入,估计月收入提高14.0%—14.9%,小时收入提高18.2%—21.5%。     

信任、绩效评估与最优激励契约

客观契约经常是不完美的,因而,为了降低客观契约的扭曲,激励契约中常常包含主观成分。在单独处理隐性契约和显性契约的基础上,本文首先拓展了主观绩效评估和客观绩效评估措施,然后讨论了在信任环境下的主观和客观绩效评估及其最优激励契约,最后分析了分离信任行为和机会主义行为成本时的绩效评估模型。研究表明:主观评价机制使公司和员工双方利益最大化。在互不信任的情况下,员工最优奖金(显性契约)只取决于私人信息。在信任条件下,公司期望利润与贴现率成反比例变化。在分离信任行为和机会主义行为成本的情况下,隐性契约奖金取决于事后采取信任行为的概率,而显性契约奖金取决于私人信息以及先验概率。     

Inflation and Price Adjustment: An Analysis of Microdata

I use large datasets on prices by products and stores from recent inflationary periods in Israel to compare simple menu cost models with simple uncertain and sequential trade (UST) models. The main empirical findings are (a) price erosion due to inflation explains only a tiny fraction of the variation in nonzero nominal price changes, (b) stores whose last nominal price change was relatively low are likely to choose a nominal price change that is relatively high, (c) stores that reduce their nominal price charge a lower price relative to stores that increase their nominal price, and (d) relative price variability is not related to inflation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E300, E310, D210.     

我国电信管制绩效评价——评价指标体系及资费效应分析

我国电信业是在计划经济下成长起来的,政府监管长期更倾向于生产者利益.在放松管制的背景下,我国电信管制应以消费者利益为中心.基于消费者利益本文建立了电信管制绩效评价指标体系,而且运用1980～2005年数据分析了管制的资费效应.结果表明,自2000年以后我国电信资费总体水平下降幅度明显增大.     

从"囚徒困境"看价格大战

价格战是现代企业的一种非常重要的营销手段。本文从"囚徒困境"出发,通过分析两个寡头企业在价格大战中的博弈,提出了应对价格战的策略,探究了企业如何从价格战中解脱出来。     

金融契约的不完全性与企业融资行为:一个案例分析

金融契约是资本供求双方有关资本交易的约定，它是企业融资行为的基础。由于人的有限理性和机会主义倾向，金融契约不可能是一个完全契约。在金融契约不完全的情况下，融资行为是融资双方之间的博弈过程；管理者根据投资者的行为来选择努力水平和私人福利，而投资者则根据对管理者行为的预期来决定是否投资。案例分析表明，经济行为的契约化、契约完备程度以及社会履约环境与保障机制，对交易的规模和效率有着重要影响。     

Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence From China

Performance contracts (PCs)—contracts signed between thegovernment and state enterprise managers—have been usedwidely in developing countries. China's experience with suchcontracts was one of the largest experiments with contractingin the public sector, affecting hundreds of thousands of statefirms, and offered a rare opportunity to explore how PCs work.On average, PCs did not improve performance and may have madeit worse. But China's PCs were not uniformly bad; in fact, PCsimproved productivity in slightly more than half of the participants.PC effects were on average negative because of the large lossesassociated with poorly designed PCs. Successful PCs were thosethat featured sensible targets, stronger incentives, longerterms, managerial bonds, and were in more competitive industries.Selecting managers through bidding was not associated with performanceimprovement. Good PC features were more often observed in state-ownedenterprises (SOEs) under the oversight of local governments,that faced more competition, that were smaller in size, andthat had better previous performance.     

价格补贴的经济效应分析

价格补贴又被称为"负税收",是由价格因素引起的国家财政的一种无偿性支出.实施价格补贴基于价值补偿、社会福利、经济干预等三方面的原因和目的,但它会扭曲价格体系,增大管制成本,增加财政支出.在运用价格补贴的过程中,从总量上要控制价格补贴占财政支出的比重,从用途上要将"好钢用在刀刃上",从对象上要符合WTO<补贴与反补贴措施协定>,从效果上要加强与其他经济、政治、技术措施的配套协同.     

资源税的价格效应分析

2011年11月1日实施的资源税改革将原油和天然气由原来的从量计征改为从价计征,税率均为销售额的5％-10％,其他的资源税税日依旧是从量计征。这次的资源税改革使社会上普遍关注资源税税改后导致的资源性产品价格上涨．进而对居民消费价格指数CPI产生很大压力。文章采用实证分析方法分析资源税是否会严重影响CPI,研究结果表明资源税对CPI影响不大。     

房地产行业价格因素分析及实证研究

目前,房地产行业在迅速发展的同时,也产生了许多矛盾,其中房价快速攀升是一个突出问题。本文以萨洛普的圆形城市模型为工具,分析了房地产行业价格的主要决定因素,并在该理论模型的基础上选取合适变量指标,建立起计量模型进行计量实证研究。文章证明房价与空间移动成本正相关关系,房价与行业内企业数目成负相关关系。政府应在交通基础设施上增加投入,减少消费者在空间移动上的总成本,从而降低房地产开发商的空间垄断程度,达到降低房价的目的;同时采取措施增加房地产开发商的数量,提高竞争。     

Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective

We construct a model in which an investment opportunity arisesfor a first mover before it knows the identity of a second moverand in which joint location results in a negative externality.Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover cannotbargain over its ex ante investment decision with the anonymoussecond mover. Given this departure from the setting of the Coasetheorem, the allocation of property rights over the externalityhas real effects on social welfare. We investigate the relativeefficiency of property rights regimes used in practice: injunctions,damages, the ruling in the Spur Industries case, etc. The firstbest can be obtained by allocating property rights (in particularthe right to sue for damages) to the second mover. Allocatingproperty rights to the first mover, as a "coming to the nuisance"rule entails, leads to overinvestment. In contrast to conventionalwisdom, this inefficiency persists even if a monopoly landownercontrols all the land on which the parties may locate.     

我国矿产资源价格重构中的税收效应分析

现阶段我国矿产资源价格扭曲是导致资源配置效率低下和环境污染的重要诱因。本文在标准的动态霍特林模型分析框架下,对税收与资源价格之间的关系进行理论分析,重点对矿产资源征税应采取从量税还是从价税作出解释。最后针对我国矿产资源价格改革中存在的诸多税收问题,提出资源税收进一步深化改革的政策建议。     

新股上市首日爆炒成因分析及对策研究

深、沪市场存在新股上市首日爆炒的情况,其主要弊端在于扭曲了市场化定价机制,加大了二级市场运行风险和投资风险。影响新股上市首日爆炒的原因较为复杂,主要有制度层面、市场层面、上市公司层面和投资者层面等因素。新股上市爆炒不是简单的发行制度、交易制度改革或交易监管就能解决的问题,防控新股上市爆炒需要齐抓共管。