多边贸易谈判中的政策协调与交易

针对目前多边贸易谈判过程中出现的愈演愈烈的双边(诸边)合作和发展中国家的不断边际化问题,通过从国家和议题的视角对多边贸易谈判中的政策协调与交易进行分析,指出国际经济领域将长期表现为多边合作和双边(诸边)合作的并行发展,建议发展中国家应充分利用谈判议题的互换来影响国际经济规则的制定。     

国际经贸规则变局与中国-海合会的合作

多哈回合谈判迟滞不前,全球区域贸易协定迅速增加,国际经贸规则呈现新变局,区域化趋势的内在致因是各国的多重利益博弈,议题扩展化的直接动力是全球价值链分工。中国与海合会国家贸易结构互补性强,贸易交往密切,有良好贸易合作基础。2014年始的国际油价暴跌给海合会国家经济发展带来巨大影响,亦促使其积极调整国内经济政策,为中海合作带来诸多契机。中国-海合会经贸合作发展应积极扩展合作领域,尽快达成双边区域贸易协议,实现利益双赢;加深能源、信息技术等重点领域合作,重视诸边贸易协定的合作途径;共同维护多边贸易体制,为建立客观、公正的国际经贸新秩序而努力。     

中澳自由贸易区建立对中国农业的影响与对策

自由贸易是国际潮流,多边贸易谈判的停滞促使各国走向双边自由贸易的谈判中。中澳自由贸易协定即将签署。文章借鉴其他发展中国家贸易自由化对农业及农民产生的影响,分析了中澳农产品贸易自由化可能产生的问题,结合中国的实际提出了我国农业的应对策略。     

国际劳工标准法律问题的经济学分析

国际劳工标准问题是世界贸易组织所讨论的新议题之一。早在关贸总协定乌拉圭回合的谈判中,以美国为代表的一些西方国家认为发展中国家的廉价劳动密集型产品冲击了发达国家市场,抑制了工资增长和导致失业率的提高,因此提出将劳工标准问题纳入乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判,但是遭到发展中国家的强烈反对而未能如愿。     

中国加快发展双边FTA探析

在WTO多边贸易谈判进展缓慢和区域经济合作再掀高潮的背景下,我国迅速调整对外贸易政策,加快发展双边FTA。目前,中国已经与东盟和智利签署了自贸协定,并且将一系列国家和地区确定为合作对象。本文主要分析我国加快发展双边FTA的现实原因。     

布什政府的贸易自由化战略与中国贸易安全

布什政府的贸易自由化战略包括两方面内容,一是利用全球多边贸易谈判迫使发展中国家开放市场;二是通过与贸易伙伴国进行双边与地区性自由贸易协定谈判推动以美国为中心的双边与地区贸易自由化。这种战略具有典型的霸权主义色彩,严重危害了发展中国家的利益。中国必须采取有效措施积极应对美国单边主义贸易自由化战略,才能有效地维护国家贸易安全。     

中国与上海合作组织成员国开展经贸合作前景分析

在当前以WTO为代表的多边贸易自由化谈判不甚理想的情况下，以区域贸易协定为代表的双边或区域贸易自由化的谈判却发展迅速。我国在区域经济合作方面是个后来者，但发展步伐却很快。上海合作组织就是我国在西北地区参加的一个重要的区域合作组织。     

WTO多哈回合谈判的前景

本文分析了发达国家和发展中国家在农业问题、新加坡议题等方面的分歧,并指出发展中国家和发达国家的利益冲突是导致坎昆会议失败的直接原因.坎昆会议失败的背后也反映出WTO的谈判和决策机制缺乏民主.今后,多哈回合谈判能否顺利进展、多边贸易体系的合法性能否提高,取决于WTO体制是否能够进行改革,以便使其更具有民主性.     

美国对多边贸易体制的态度演变及中国应对思路分析

美国是二战以来多边贸易体制的创建者和主导者,它的积极推动促进了多边贸易自由化的发展。近年来,随着区域和双边自由化的兴起、发展中国家在WTO中力量的增加和美国在多边贸易体系中主导地位下降等原因,美国日益消极对待WTO框架下的议程,积极推动区域和双边贸易自由化发展。美国态度的转变将导致多哈回合谈判难度加大,因此中国应调整思路,积极参与区域和双边贸易自由化议程。     

WTO未来谈判、我国的作用及其对我国地方的影响

一、多哈回合谈判停滞评述(一)多哈回合进展简述。多哈回合谈判是1995年世界贸易组织(WTO)成立后,于2001年11月在卡塔尔首都多哈举行的第四次WTO部长级会议,并计划在2005年1月1日前结束。其目的是为了完善多边贸易体制,谈判的地点为卡塔尔首都多哈,因此被称之为多哈回合谈判;本次谈判的核心是促进发展中国家的发展,因此也被称之为“发展回合”谈判。谈判内容包括农业、非农产品市场准入、新加坡议题、服务贸易、与贸易有关的知识产权、规则、争端解决、贸易与环境、贸易与发展等一揽子协议。与以往的多边谈判相比,这是一轮议题范围最广、…     

Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements

Using a general‐equilibrium model of world trade, this paper evaluates the benefits of most‐favored‐nation (MFN) treatment to developing countries in multilateral relative to bilateral or regional trade agreements, from three sources. First, developing countries may be able to free‐ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries in MFN‐based GATT/WTO rounds. Second, MFN benefits developing countries by restricting discriminatory retaliatory actions by other countries, evaluated here by a non‐ cooperative Nash tariff game. Finally, MFN changes threat points in bargaining and hence affects the bargaining solution of multilateral MFN‐based trade negotiation compared to a bilateral/regional arrangement. The authors find that the benefits to developing countries are small in the first case as the tariff rates are already low, and the benefits are small in the second case as the optimal tariffs under unconstrained retaliation are not very asymmetric. Benefits from the third case are large as large countries can extract large side‐payments if they bargain bilaterally.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION*

Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation.     

Does it Matter Who You Sign With? Comparing the Impacts of North–South and South–South Trade Agreements on Bilateral Trade

Free trade agreements (FTAs) lead to a rise in bilateral trade regardless of whether the signatories are developed or developing countries. Furthermore, the percentage increase in bilateral trade is higher for South–South agreements than for North–South agreements. The results are robust across a number of gravity model specifications in which we control for the endogeneity of FTAs (with bilateral fixed effects) and also take account of multilateral resistance in both estimation (with country‐time fixed effects) and comparative statics (analytically). Our analytical model shows that multilateral resistance dampens the impact of FTAs on trade by less in South–South agreements than in North–South agreements, which accentuates the difference implied by our gravity model coefficients, and that this difference becomes larger as the number of signatories rises. For example, allowing for lags and multilateral resistance, a four‐country North–South agreement raises bilateral trade by 53% while the analogous South–South impact is 107%.     

Preferential trade agreements and manufactured goods exports: does it matter whom you PTA with?

This article explores two questions. First, do preferential trade agreements (PTAs) affect manufactured goods exports of developing countries? Second, does it matter for developing countries whom they sign the PTAs with? We find that the answer to both questions is yes. Using bilateral manufactured goods exports data from 28 developing countries during 1978–2005; we find that South–South PTAs have a significantly positive effect on manufactured goods exports. In contrast, no such effect is detected in the case of South–North PTAs. We confirmed the robustness of these findings to estimation methodology, sample selection, time period, zero trade flows and multilateral trade resistance.     

Liberalization Agreements in the GATT/WTO and the Terms‐of‐trade Externality Theory: Evidence from Three Developing Countries

The terms‐of‐trade theory suggests that governments engage in trade negotiations with their trade partners in an effort to escape from a terms‐of‐trade prisoner's dilemma by mutually internalizing externalities that they impose on each other. In this paper, I use predictions of the terms‐of‐trade relationship to provide support for the theory based on the negotiating patterns of three developing countries during the Uruguay Round of the Generalized Agreements on Tariff and Trade. I use industry level import value as well as tariff schedules from these contracting party states that were graduated from the US Generalized System of Preferences list during the Uruguay Round. I exploit the rapid change in their tariff schedules from the best response to the optimal level within a single negotiation round to empirically test the terms‐of‐trade theory. I find that my estimates are consistent with the predictions of the theory as applied to these three developing countries that were compelled to negotiate for tariff concessions during the Uruguay Round.     

Make Trade Not War?

This paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and trade. We show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is economically beneficial, military conflicts reduce trade, and leaders are rational. When war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information, the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains. However, countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict. We test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950–2000 period. Using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues, including instrumental variables, we find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness. For proximate countries, we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military conflict.     

中俄经贸关系发展及其战略决策

中俄两国是世界公认的"成长最快的经济体",2007年中国和俄罗斯经济仍继续保持增长。经济的发展创造了两个充满活力的巨大市场,为两国的商品、资源、技术和资本进入对方市场提供了广阔前景,中俄经贸关系面临前所未有的发展机遇。双方应当抓住时机,充分挖掘潜力,加强合作与交流,促进双边经贸关系持续稳定发展,把两国经贸合作推向一个新的高度。     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis

Why is a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries observed instead of progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? This paper answers this question by exploring the enforceability of different types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an infinitely repeated game framework. The authors search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under different conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, differences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which is shown to be the first‐best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare.