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1.
We consider first-price and second-price auctions with asymmetric buyers, and examine whether pre-auction offers to a subset of buyers are profitable. A single offer is never profitable prior to a second-price auction, but may be profitable prior to a first-price auction. However, a sequence of offers is profitable in either type of auction. In our model, suitably chosen pre-auction offers work because they move the assignment when bidder valuations are “near the top” closer to the optimal, revenue-maximizing assignment. 相似文献
2.
Auctioning divisible goods 总被引:13,自引:0,他引:13
Summary. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse
bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and
explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply
that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory
auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected
revenue than a discriminatory auction.
Received: November 4, 1999; revised version: March 9, 2001 相似文献
3.
Kala Krishna 《Economic Theory》1999,13(2):377-391
Summary. This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many
units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient
to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.
Received: March 14, 1997; revised version: December 1, 1997 相似文献
4.
Bernard Lebrun 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):435-453
Summary. Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge
in the literature. Authors have also searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some
probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends
continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as
well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.
Received: February 1, 1999; revised version: July 27, 2001 相似文献
5.
The multiple unit auction with variable supply 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
Yvan Lengwiler 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):373-392
Summary. The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption
is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply as a function of
the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller
who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport
their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both
auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders
are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders
may or may not enhance efficiency.
Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: January 13, 1999 相似文献
6.
Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):473-478
Summary. In this paper I give a method for finding long-run-average policies in the undiscounted economic growth problem using approximations
by finite horizons. Required hypothesis is the strong interiority of T-horizon solutions.
Received: March 25, 1996; revised version: July 29, 1997 相似文献
7.
Tito Pietra 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):649-659
Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets
with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff
matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1).
Moreover, the map from states o
f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium.
Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000 相似文献
8.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献
9.
Summary. The paper investigates the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable
good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically,
in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower
quality. The main result is that for any distribution of quality there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market.
Received: December 21, 2000; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
10.
Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Indranil Chakraborty 《Economic Theory》1999,13(3):723-733
Summary. Auctioneers often face the decision of whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey
auction (or any other revenue equivalent auction form) there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that
when the number of bidders is fewer than that critical number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are
more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated
for a given bidder. The results have been proved using a mathematical technique of quantiles that can be extremely useful
for similar analysis.
Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: January 21, 1998 相似文献
11.
Summary. This article considers a two-sector model of economic growth with “labour-augmenting” intersectoral external effects stemming
from the aggregate capital stock. It is shown that equilibrium balanced growth paths with a non-trivial labour allocation
scheme become available. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibrium growth rays is provided
and their determinacy properties are then characterised. Finally, examination of a parameterised C.E.S. economy illustrates
the central role of non-unitary values for the elasticity of substitution in the multiplicity issue.
Received: October 31, 2000; revised version: September 25, 2001 相似文献
12.
Joaquim Silvestre 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):413-425
Summary. Starr (1973) showed that, if people have different subjective probabilities, ex ante and ex post efficiency conflict. Conversely, under the simple preferences that he considered, the discrepancy between ex ante and ex post efficiency disappears when subjective probabilities are identical. Here I consider identical subjective probabilities, but
more general preferences. First, risk attraction is admitted. Second, I dispense with the double requirement (dubbed IZU)
of additive separability and state-independence of the utility of zero-date consumption, an unrealistic requirement when modeling
the investment in durable goods. I find that, under IZU, and as long as ex post preferences satisfy the natural assumption of quasiconcavity (and satisfy some technical qualifications), an ex ante efficient allocation is indeed ex post efficient, but the converse is not necessarily true under risk attraction. If, on the other hand, IZU is violated, then one
can have ex ante efficient allocations that are not ex post efficient, and vice-versa, even under risk aversion.
Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: March 2001 相似文献
13.
Utility and entropy 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Juan C. Candeal Juan R. De Miguel Esteban Induráin Ghanshyam B. Mehta 《Economic Theory》2001,17(1):233-238
Summary. In this paper we study an astonishing similarity between the utility representation problem in economics and the entropy
representation problem in thermodynamics.
Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: October 16, 2000 相似文献
14.
Indrajit Ray 《Economic Theory》2001,17(1):223-231
Summary. This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which
are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.
Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: November 23, 1999 相似文献
15.
Summary. Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that
a player believes that with small probability her opponents choose strategies that are irrational, or assuming that their
is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same refinement if strategy perturbations
are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and if there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and
Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243–267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of
weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Received: 10 December 1998; revised version: 26 April 1999 相似文献
16.
Roman Inderst 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):419-429
Summary. This paper considers bargaining with one-sided private information and alternating offers where an agreement specifies both
a transfer and an additional (sorting) variable. Moreover, both sides can propose menus. We show that for a subset of parameters
the alternating-offer game has a unique equilibrium where efficient contracts are implemented in the first period. This stands
in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining
theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer.
Received: September 10, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I benefitted from discussions with Benny Moldovanu, Holger Müller, and Roland Strausz, and from comments made by an
anonymous referee. 相似文献
17.
Georgia Kosmopoulou 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):229-237
Summary. An efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent
to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search
for mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules by pointing to a class of Groves mechanisms. It eliminates the strict
requirement of common knowledge of priors and can be applied to many problems of incomplete information.
Received: October 22 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997 相似文献
18.
Patrick Bajari 《Economic Theory》2001,18(1):187-205
Summary. Collusion is a serious problem in many procurement auctions. In this research, I study a model of first price sealed bid
procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. I demonstrate that the equilibrium to the model is unique and describe three
algorithms that can be used to compute the inverse equilibrium bid functions. I then use the computational algorithms to compare
competitive and collusive bidding. The algorithms are useful for structural estimation of auction models and for assessing
the damages from bid-rigging.
Received: January 14, 2000; revised version: February 28, 2001 相似文献
19.
Summary. This paper proves the C
1,1 differentiability of the value function for continuous time concave dynamic optimization problems, under the assumption that
the instantaneous utility is C
1,1 and the initial segment of optimal solutions is interior. From this result, the Lipschitz dependence of optimal solutions
on initial data and the Lipschitz continuity of the policy function are derived, by adding an assumption of strong concavity
of the integrand.
Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997 相似文献
20.
Summary. This note provides an alternative proof for the equivalence of decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) in the expected utility
framework and in a two-parametric approach where utility is a function of the mean and the standard deviation. In addition,
we elucidate that the equivalence of DAP and the concavity of utility as a function of mean and variance, which was shown
to hold for normally distributed stochastics in Lajeri and Nielsen [4], cannot be generalized.
Received: November 27, 2000; revised version: November 26, 2001
Correspondence to: T. Eichner 相似文献