Beyond Sharpe ratio: Optimal asset allocation using different performance ratios

As the assumption of normality in return distributions is relaxed, classic Sharpe ratio and its descendants become questionable tools for constructing optimal portfolios. In order to overcome the problem, asymmetrical parameter-dependent performance ratios have been recently proposed in the literature. The aim of this note is to develop an integrated decision aid system for asset allocation based on a toolkit of eleven performance ratios. A multi-period portfolio optimization up covering a fixed horizon is set up: at first, bootstrapping of asset return distributions is assessed to recover all ratios calculations; at second, optimal rebalanced-weights are achieved; at third, optimal final wealth is simulated for each ratios. Eventually, we make a robustness test on the best performance ratios. Empirical simulations confirm the weakness in forecasting of Sharpe ratio, whereas asymmetrical parameter-dependent ratios, such as the Generalized Rachev, Sortino–Satchell and Farinelli–Tibiletti ratios show satisfactorily robustness.     

Aggregate uncertainty, money and banking

This paper addresses the problem of monitoring the monitor in a model of money and banking with private information and aggregate uncertainty. There is no need to monitor a bank if it requires loans to be repaid partly with money. A market arises at the repayment stage and generates information-revealing prices that perfectly discipline the bank. This mechanism also applies when there exist multiple banks. With multiple banks, competition of private monies improves welfare. A prohibition on private money issue not only eliminates money competition but also triggers free-rider problems among banks, which is detrimental to welfare.     

Financial advisors: A case of babysitters?

We use two data sets, one from a large brokerage and another from a major bank, to ask: (i) whether financial advisors are more likely to be matched with poorer, uninformed investors or with richer and experienced investors; (ii) how advised accounts actually perform relative to self-managed accounts; (iii) whether the contribution of independent and bank advisors is similar. We find that advised accounts offer on average lower net returns and inferior risk-return tradeoffs (Sharpe ratios). Trading costs contribute to outcomes, as advised accounts feature higher turnover, consistent with commissions being the main source of advisor income. Results are robust to controlling for investor and local area characteristics. The results apply with stronger force to bank advisors than to independent financial advisors, consistent with greater limitations on bank advisory services.     

Comments on Orphanides and Williams’ “Robust monetary policy”

Comments on the paper by Orphanides and Williams from the November 2006 Carnegie-Rochester conference.     

Optimal learning and new technology bubbles

It is widely believed that there is a fundamental linkage between major technological innovations, speculative fever, and wasteful overinvestment. This paper presents an equilibrium model of investment in a new industry, whose return-to-scale is not known in advance. Overinvestment relative to the full-information case is then optimal as the most efficient way to learn about the new technology. Moreover, the initial overinvestment is accompanied by apparently inflated stock prices and apparently negative expected excess returns in the new industry, which are also fully rational. This suggests a new interpretation of what seems to be stock market driven real bubbles.     

Investment in financial literacy and saving decisions

We present an intertemporal consumption model of investment in financial literacy. Consumers benefit from such investment because financial literacy allows them to increase the returns on wealth. Since literacy depreciates over time and has a cost in terms of current consumption, the model delivers an optimal investment in literacy. Furthermore, literacy and wealth are determined jointly, and are positively correlated over the life-cycle. The model drives our empirical approach to the analysis of the effect of financial literacy on wealth and saving and indicates that the stock of financial literacy early in life is a valid instrument in the regression of wealth on financial literacy. Using microeconomic and aggregate data, we find strong support for the model’s predictions.     

Diversification and ownership concentration

If controlling shareholders can divert profits, equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation. A higher returns correlation reduces the benefits of diversification, giving rise to both a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model: equity ownership is more concentrated in countries where the stock returns correlation is higher; moreover the intensity of the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is amplified by poor investor protection.     

The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation

We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observe lender renegotiation actions and cover more than 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in these data, we find that bank-held loans are 26–36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2–5.7% in absolute terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have 9% lower post-modification default rates (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans. We also provide evidence supporting the affordability focus of recent policy actions, such as the Home Affordability Modification Program.     

RISK AND HEDGING BEHAVIOR: THE ROLE AND DETERMINANTS OF LATENT HETEROGENEITY

The notion of heterogeneous behavior is well grounded in economic theory. Recently it has been shown in a hedging context that the influence of risk attitudes and risk perceptions varies for different segments using a generalized mixture regression model. Here, using recently developed individual risk attitude measurement techniques and experimental and accounting data from investors with differing decision environments, we examine the determinants of heterogeneity in hedging behavior in a concomitant mixture regression framework. Allowing for latent heterogeneity, we find that risk attitudes and risk perceptions do not influence behavior uniformly and that the heterogeneity is influenced by manager's focus on shareholder value and the firm's capital structure.     

Credit spreads: An empirical analysis on the informational content of stocks,bonds, and CDS

This paper explores the dynamic relationship between stock market implied credit spreads, CDS spreads, and bond spreads. A general VECM representation is proposed for changes in the three credit spread measures which accounts for zero, one, or two independent cointegration equations, depending on the evidence provided by any particular company. Empirical analysis on price discovery, based on a proprietary sample of North American and European firms, and tailored to the specific VECM at hand, indicates that stocks lead CDS and bonds more frequently than the other way round. It likewise confirms the leading role of CDS with respect to bonds.     

Taylor rules, McCallum rules and the term structure of interest rates

Recent empirical research shows that a reasonable characterization of federal-funds-rate targeting behavior is that the change in the target rate depends on the maturity structure of interest rates and exhibits little dependence on lagged target rates. See, for example, Cochrane and Piazzesi [2002. The Fed and interest rates—a high-frequency identification. American Economic Review 92, 90-95.]. The result echoes the policy rule used by McCallum [1994a. Monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates. NBER Working Paper No. 4938.] to rationalize the empirical failure of the ‘expectations hypothesis’ applied to the term structure of interest rates. That is, rather than forward rates acting as unbiased predictors of future short rates, the historical evidence suggests that the correlation between forward rates and future short rates is surprisingly low. McCallum showed that a desire by the monetary authority to adjust short rates in response to exogenous shocks to the term premiums imbedded in long rates (i.e. “yield-curve smoothing”), along with a desire for smoothing interest rates across time, can generate term structures that account for the puzzling regression results of Fama and Bliss [1987. The information in long-maturity forward rates. The American Economic Review 77, 680-392.]. McCallum also clearly pointed out that this reduced-form approach to the policy rule, although naturally forward looking, needed to be studied further in the context of other response functions such as the now standard Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214.] Rule. We explore both the robustness of McCallum's result to endogenous models of the term premium and also its connections to the Taylor Rule. We model the term premium endogenously using two different models in the class of affine term-structure models studied in Duffie and Kan [1996. A yield-factor model of interest rates. Mathematical Finance 57, 405-443.]: a stochastic volatility model and a stochastic price-of-risk model. We then solve for equilibrium term structures in environments in which interest rate targeting follows a rule such as the one suggested by McCallum (i.e., the “McCallum Rule”). We demonstrate that McCallum's original result generalizes in a natural way to this broader class of models. To understand the connection to the Taylor Rule, we then consider two structural macroeconomic models which have reduced forms that correspond to the two affine models and provide a macroeconomic interpretation of abstract state variables (as in Ang and Piazzessi [2003. A no-arbitrage vector autoregression of term structure dynamics with macroeconomic and latent variables. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 745-787.]). Moreover, such structural models allow us to interpret the parameters of the term-structure model in terms of the parameters governing preferences, technologies, and policy rules. We show how a monetary policy rule will manifest itself in the equilibrium asset-pricing kernel and, hence, the equilibrium term structure. We then show how this policy can be implemented with an interest-rate targeting rule. This provides us with a set of restrictions under which the Taylor and McCallum Rules are equivalent in the sense if implementing the same monetary policy. We conclude with some numerical examples that explore the quantitative link between these two models of monetary policy.     

Fuzzy logic,trading uncertainty and technical trading

From the market microstructure perspective, technical analysis can be profitable when informed traders make systematic mistakes or when uninformed traders have predictable impacts on price. However, chartists face a considerable degree of trading uncertainty because technical indicators such as moving averages are essentially imperfect filters with a nonzero phase shift. Consequently, technical trading may result in erroneous trading recommendations and substantial losses. This paper presents an uncertainty reduction approach based on fuzzy logic that addresses two problems related to the uncertainty embedded in technical trading strategies: market timing and order size. The results of our high-frequency exercises show that ‘fuzzy technical indicators’ dominate standard moving average technical indicators and filter rules for the Euro-US dollar (EUR-USD) exchange rates, especially on high-volatility days.     

Insider trading in credit derivatives

Insider trading in the credit derivatives market has become a significant concern for regulators and participants. This paper attempts to quantify the problem. Using news reflected in the stock market as a benchmark for public information, we find significant incremental information revelation in the credit default swap market under circumstances consistent with the use of non-public information by informed banks. The information revelation occurs only for negative credit news and for entities that subsequently experience adverse shocks, and increases with the number of a firm's relationship banks. We find no evidence, however, that the degree of asymmetric information adversely affects prices or liquidity in either the equity or credit markets.     

Specialists as risk managers: The competition between intermediated and non-intermediated markets

We develop a model that analyzes competition between a non-intermediated market (such as an electronic communications network) and an intermediated market (such as via the market specialist’s structure within the NYSE) when both markets are allowed to trade the same securities. Specialists are viewed as providers of a “volatility dampening” service, a mechanism for reducing round-trip trading costs, as well as an “order execution risk management” service. The economic value of these three specialist services is determined by five key factors (the difference in spreads between the two financial market types, investors’ holding periods, the specialist’s quoted spread in relation to the asset’s price, the relative probability of executing an order in the intermediated market, and the short-term risk-free rate).     

Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad

Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm's own performance. Recently, it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests; that is, they can enjoy “pay for luck” as well as “pay for performance.” We first show that this argument is incomplete. The positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk. If executives’ pay is tied to market movements, they can only expect to receive the market-determined return for risk-bearing. This argument, however, assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck. If executives can truly influence the setting of their pay, they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest, namely, when the benchmark has fallen. Using industry benchmarks, we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down (in which case, pay for luck would reduce compensation) than when it is up. These empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks, and they suggest that the average executive loses 25–45% less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck.     

Robust optimization of conditional value at risk and portfolio selection

This paper deals with a portfolio selection model in which the methodologies of robust optimization are used for the minimization of the conditional value at risk of a portfolio of shares.     

Smoothing with liquid and illiquid assets

A quantitative examination of the demand for liquid assets arising from consumption smoothing motives reveals that such demand is very low. Consumers faced with income streams calibrated to match income and unemployment data and returns and transactions costs calibrated to match US Treasury Bill data almost exclusively buy and hold illiquid long term assets even though the return premium on long term assets is quite small. This is because, with standard preferences, savings are highly persistent even when risky income is not. In the calibrated model, the first order autocorrelation of savings is an order of magnitude larger than that of income.