The "Great Moderation" in the United Kingdom

We use a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with stochastic volatility for GDP deflator inflation, real GDP growth, a 3-month nominal rate, and the rate of growth of M4 to investigate the underlying causes of the Great Moderation in the United Kingdom. Our evidence points toward a dominant role played by good luck in fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the last two decades. Results from counterfactual simulations, in particular, show that (i) "bringing the Monetary Policy Committee back in time" would only have had a limited impact on the Great Inflation episode, at the cost of lower output growth; (ii) imposing the 1970s monetary rule over the entire sample period would have made almost no difference in terms of inflation and output growth outcomes; and (iii) the Great Inflation was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy shocks, and to a lesser extent—especially in 1973 and 1979—to supply shocks.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: From Sticky Inflation to Sticky Prices

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) model of inflation dynamics based on forward-looking expectations is of great theoretical significance in monetary policy analysis. Empirical studies, however, often find that backward-looking inflation inertia dominates the dynamics of the short-run aggregate supply curve. This inconsistency is examined by investigating multiple structural changes in the NKPC for the U.S. between 1960 and 2005, employing both inflation expectations survey data and a rational expectations approximation. We find that forward-looking behavior plays a smaller role during the high and volatile inflation regime to 1981 than in the subsequent period of moderate inflation, providing empirical support for sticky price models over the last two decades. A break in the intercept of the NKPC is also identified around 2001 and this may be associated with U.S. monetary policy in that period.     

Are inflation expectations rational?

Several recent papers report evidence of an apparent statistical bias in inflation expectations and interpret these findings as overturning the rational expectations hypothesis. In this paper, we investigate the validity of such an interpretation. We present a computational dynamic general equilibrium model capable of generating aggregate behavior similar to the data along several dimensions. By construction, model agents form “rational” expectations. We run a standard regression on equilibrium realizations of inflation and inflation expectations over sample periods corresponding to those tests performed on actual data and find evidence of an apparent bias in inflation expectations. Our experiments suggest that this incorrect inference is largely the product of a small sample problem, exacerbated by short-run learning dynamics in response to infrequent shifts in monetary policy regimes.     

On money and output: Is money redundant?

There is an emerging consensus that money can be largely ignored in making monetary policy decisions. Rudebusch and Svensson [1999, Policy Rules and Inflation Targeting. In Taylor, J.B. (Ed.), Monetary Policy Rules. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 203-246; 2002, Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from US Data. European Economic Review 46, 417-442] provide some empirical support for this view. We reconsider the role of money and find that money is not redundant. More specifically, there is a significant statistical relationship between lagged values of money and the output gap, even when lagged values of real interest rates and lagged values of the output gap are accounted for. We also find that inside and outside money provide significant information in predicting movements in the output gap.     

Interest rate pass-through,monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability

In this paper we analyze equilibrium determinacy in a sticky price model in which the pass-through from policy rates to retail interest rates is sluggish and potentially incomplete. In addition, we empirically characterize and compare the interest rate pass-through process in the euro area and the U.S. We find that if the pass-through is incomplete in the long run, the standard Taylor principle is insufficient to guarantee equilibrium determinacy. Our empirical analysis indicates that this result might be particularly relevant for bank-based financial systems as for instance that in the euro area.     

Regime switching and monetary policy measurement

This paper applies regime-switching methods to the problem of measuring monetary policy. Policy preferences and structural factors are specified parametrically as independent Markov processes. Interaction between the structural and preference parameters in the policy rule serves to identify the two processes. The estimates uncover policy episodes that are initiated by switches to “dove regimes,” shown to Granger-cause both NBER recessions and the Romer dates. These episodes imply real effects of monetary policy that are smaller than those found in previous studies.     

The EONIA spread before and during the crisis of 2007–2009: The role of liquidity and credit risk

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the factors affecting the spread between the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) and the main policy rate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Up until the period when Lehman Brothers collapsed in mid-September 2008, the spread was small and positive. After this point, the liquidity surplus that developed from the fixed rate full allotment tendering arrangement in refinancing operations drove the widening of EONIA spread (trading below the ECB policy rate), although other factors also played a significant role. This paper explains the drivers of spread across alternative non-crisis/crisis regimes. In addition, the paper examines how the EONIA spread reacts to shocks imposed on a range of liquidity and credit risk factors in alternative crisis/non-crisis regimes. The results have implications for factors that should be monitored closely across both regimes, and also the implications that this may have for steering an unsecured overnight rate in crisis times.     

The Phillips curve under state-dependent pricing

We derive a Phillips curve equation from the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with state-dependent pricing developed by Dotsey et al. [1999. State-dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 655-690]. This state-dependent Phillips curve encompasses the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) based on Calvo-type price setting as a special case. We analyze the effect of the state-dependent terms (that is, the variations in the distributions of price vintages) on inflation persistence, and we examine whether the hybrid NKPC (that is, the NKPC extended by a lagged inflation term) can adequately describe inflation dynamics generated in a calibrated state-dependent pricing economy.     

Phillips Curve Instability and Optimal Monetary Policy

Empirical evidence suggests the Phillips curve has flattened over the past few decades. To capture this feature of the data, I develop a framework where firms face a changing cost of price adjustment, which produces a Phillips curve with a slope coefficient that varies over time. To evaluate the implications for monetary policy, I construct the utility‐based welfare criterion where the relative weight on output gap deviations changes synchronously with the slope of the Phillips curve. The systematic component of the rule that implements optimal policy is constant under discretion and commitment.     

An exploration into Pigou's theory of cycles

This paper explores a theory of business cycles in which recessions and booms arise due to difficulties encountered by agents in properly forecasting the economy's future needs in terms of capital. The idea has a long history in the macroeconomic literature, as reflected by the work of Pigou (Industrial Fluctuation, MacMillan, London, 1926). The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we illustrate the type of general equilibrium structure that can give rise to such phenomena. Second, we examine the extent to which such a model can explain the observed pattern of U.S. recessions (frequency, depth) without relying on technological regress. We argue that such a model offer a framework for understanding elements of both the recent U.S. recession and of the Asia downturns of the late 1990s.     

Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective

The recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules. This paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple, micro-founded models in which the policy authority uses a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Unlike previous analyses, the model economy is not linearized about a steady state—instead, a global perspective is adopted. Globally, the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities. These include a second, low inflation ‘liquidity trap’ steady state, periodic equilibria, and sunspot equilibria. The main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning, even when the policy rule obeys the Taylor principle. The stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast-based. An important finding is that backward-looking Taylor-type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority.     

The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations

This paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections. We do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks. We do find evidence, however, in developing countries that lack central bank independence. Furthermore, we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election-related fiscal expansions. This suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the Phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles.     

The case for inflation stability

We evaluate the case for inflation stabilization in a New Keynesian (NNS) model that includes various frictions, capital accumulation and a variety of shocks. In such a model, price rigidity may provide the monetary authorities with an opportunity to improve upon the inefficient flexible price equilibrium via the suitable cyclical manipulation of real marginal costs. We find that such an opportunity is of limited value and that a strong case for perfect inflation stabilization remains. Policies that tolerate a small amount of inflation variability may outperform perfect inflation targeting when capital adjustment costs are low and the monetary distortion is substantial but only if prices are very flexible.     

The Great Inflation of the 1970s

The two leading explanations for the poor inflation performance during the 1970s are policy opportunism ( Barro and Gordon 1983 ) and "inadvertently" bad monetary policy ( Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000 , Orphanides 2003 ). The main models of the latter category are that of Orphanides (loose monetary policy was the outcome of mis-perceptions about potential output rather than of inflation tolerance) and of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (weak policy reaction to expected inflation led to indeterminacies). We show that both of these models can account for high and persistent inflation and also have satisfactory overall performance if an exceptionally large decrease in productivity took place at that time.     

The Cost of Nominal Rigidity in NNS Models

We present a model with Calvo wage and price setting, capital formation, and estimated rules for government spending and monetary policy. Our model captures many aspects of U.S. data, including the volatility that has been observed in various efficiency gaps. We estimate the cost of nominal rigidity—welfare under flexible wages and prices minus welfare with nominal rigidities—to be as much as 3% of consumption each period. Since there are interest rate rules that virtually eliminate this cost, our model suggests that—contrary to Lucas's (2003) assertion—there is considerable room for improvement in demand management policy.     

China as a reserve sink: The evidence from offset and sterilization coefficients

China has been stockpiling international reserves at an extremely rapid pace since the late 1990s and has surpassed Japan to become the largest reserve holder in the world. This paper undertakes an empirical investigation to assess the extent of de facto sterilization and capital mobility using monthly data between mid 2000 and late 2008. We find that China has been able to successfully sterilize a large portion of these reserve increases thus making it a reserve sink such as Germany was under the Bretton Wood system.     

The Central Banker as a Risk Manager: Estimating the Federal Reserve's Preferences under Greenspan

We derive a natural generalization of the Taylor rule that links changes in the interest rate to the balance of the risks implied by the dual objective of sustainable economic growth and price stability. This monetary policy rule reconciles economic models of expected utility maximization with the risk management approach to central banking. Within this framework, we formally test and reject the standard assumption of quadratic and symmetric preferences in inflation and output that underlies the derivation of the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that Fed policy decisions under Greenspan were better described in terms of the Fed weighing upside and downside risks to their objectives rather than simply responding to the conditional mean of inflation and of the output gap.     

The impact of monetary policy on asset prices

Estimating the response of asset prices to changes in monetary policy is complicated by the endogeneity of policy decisions and the fact that both interest rates and asset prices react to numerous other variables. This paper develops a new estimator that is based on the heteroskedasticity that exists in high-frequency data. We show that the response of asset prices to changes in monetary policy can be identified based on the increase in the variance of policy shocks that occurs on days of FOMC meetings and of the Chairman's semi-annual monetary policy testimony to Congress. The identification approach employed requires a much weaker set of assumptions than needed under the “event-study” approach that is typically used in this context. The results indicate that an increase in short-term interest rates results in a decline in stock prices and in an upward shift in the yield curve that becomes smaller at longer maturities. The findings also suggest that the event-study estimates contain biases that make the estimated effects on stock prices appear too small and those on Treasury yields too large.     

The Liquidity Effect in the Federal Funds Market: Evidence at the Monthly Frequency

In this paper, we argue that much of the research into the link between money and interest rates suffers from misspecification. The measure of money and the measure of interest rates are not always well matched. In examining the transmission of monetary policy, we show that using an appropriate measure of money, Federal Reserve balances, and the appropriate interest rate, the federal funds rate, a clear liquidity effect exists. Furthermore, we explain how a lack of a clear institutional understanding may have contributed to the finding of a "liquidity puzzle" in the past.     

A model in which monetary policy is about money

Optimal monetary policy is studied in a model with (i) heterogeneity in the degree to which different people are monitored (have publicly known histories); (ii) idiosyncratic shocks that give rise to heterogeneity in earning and spending realizations; and (iii) central-bank intervention in a “market” in claims or credit in which the participants are those who are heavily monitored. A special case of the model has everyone perfectly monitored. In that case, there is no role for money and no role for central-bank intervention. In the example displayed with imperfect monitoring, optimal intervention is not simple.