Competition in the rail industry

The privatization of the railways in Britain is almost complete.The article describes the method of privatization, where a verticallyintegrated state-owned monopoly has been broken up into a monopolytrack company, three monopolistic owners of passenger rolling-stock,25 franchised passenger train operating companies, a freightoperating company, and large numbers of suppliers of services.The author explains the potential for competition within thiscomplex structure, in an industry which has been steadily losingits share of the transport market for some 70 years. Attentionis drawn to the absence of any clear criteria for continuedpublic subsidy and to the tensions which exist between the Regulatorand other players in the industry.     

Competition in the water industry

The paper discusses competition in the water industry in theUK, with the focus on product-market competition. Water hastraditionally been seen as an industry characterized by regionalor local natural monopoly, with franchising and contractingout, yardstick competition, and capital market competition beingfeasible, but not direct competition. Policy proposals for (I)inset appointments, (ii) common carriage, and (iii) cross-bordercompetition are assessed. The effect of potential competitionfrom inset appointments has been the introduction of quantitydiscounts for large users. In practice, the threat of competitionis likely to make tariffs more cost-reflective, and there willprobably be little effect on average tariff levels.     

Competition and regulation in the UK gas industry

The decade since privatization has seen gas change from an integratedmonopoly with no competition and without the structure necessaryto encourage it, to an industry moving rapidly towards fullcompetition. British Gas was privatized as an integrated monopoly;it had no regulation in the bulk market, and light regulationin the tariff market. Within 10 years it has lost more thanhalf its bulk market, has voluntarily 'demerged' into a transportationand supply arm, and is leading the way in liberalization ofthe residential market. Some of these changes have been assistedby the particular circumstances of the gas market, especiallythe contracts which the incumbent has inherited. The Regulatoris relying increasingly on prevention of undue discriminationfor control of the dominant supplier, and this principle hasbeen discussed and applied in a number of cases within the industry.Liberalization also raises important distributional issues,especially in the residential market.     

Regulatory change and competition in the South African electricity supply industry

The electricity industry is a concentrated, regulated and largely publicly owned sector which is dominated by Eskom, a vertically integrated public utility. Recently, new structures and regulation have been proposed to separate the different levels of operation, from generation through to distribution, and to open up the potential for competition. This study undertakes a preliminary analysis of competition and regulation issues in electricity for South Africa. First, the structure of the electricity supply industry (ESI) is analysed, with a brief review of the differing characteristics of operations at each level and the implications for ownership and control within the sector. The performance of Eskom is then assessed against both financial and non-financial criteria. Next, the electrification progress and the regulatory framework are evaluated before differing options for the restructuring of the ESI, both in the long and the short term, are appraised.     

The deregulation of Japan's electricity industry

Japan's electricity industry is now in the process of regulatory reform. This industry consists of three sectors: generation, transmission, and distribution. The reform phases out the entry barrier in the first sector, while keeping the latter two as they were with a rate-of-return (ROR) regulation. To simulate this regulatory reform, we employ a computable general equilibrium model, which distinguishes these three sectors and is equipped with the ROR regulation and substitution among various energy sources. Our numerical simulations show a potential for significant welfare improvements and substitution among energy inputs even if the reform scope is limited.     

Tobacco retail licences and state formation in early modern England and Wales

This article addresses one under‐studied aspect of Charles I's finances during his Personal Rule: the licensing of tobacco retailers. While it was ultimately a failed project, the tobacco retail licence project was fiscally successful before the transformative events of the 1640s triggered its demise. The project enabled tobacco retail licensees to establish commercial outlets for the marketing of tobacco throughout England and Wales, and cooperation with pre‐existing officeholders contributed to the apprehension of unlicensed retailers. Ultimately, the geographic breadth of tobacco licences translated into much‐needed royal revenue which, when added to other projects and patents, contributed to the king's financial survival. The evidence presented here suggests that we may want to rethink some of our assumptions for how the process of state formation worked and that earlier seventeenth‐century ‘prototypes’ of taxation were more fiscally successful than previously recognized.     

The production and consumption of bar iron in early modern England and Wales

Errata . The Economic History Review 59: 1, 64
The production and consumption of bar iron in early modern England and Wales. An estimate made of the bar iron production in England shows two periods when production grew rapidly, 1540-1620 and 1785-1810. Both of these were related to the adoption of new technology-the finery forge in the first case, and potting and stamping and then puddling in the second. Imports of iron from Spain declined sharply after 1540, but those from Sweden became significant from the mid-seventeenth century, and those from Russia after 1730. Consumption grew rapidly in the late sixteenth century, and again during the eighteenth. Hence, the industrial revolution was the culmination of a long period of growth.     

Restructuring the electricity distribution industry: An analysis of the proposed ownership and governance structures of regional electricity distributors

The electricity distribution industry is currently fragmented and in a financial crisis. The government proposes restructuring the industry into a number of regional electricity distributors (REDs) that will take over the electricity distribution function from municipalities and Eskom, who will be given shares in the REDs in exchange for their distribution assets. It is also proposed that REDs be controlled by boards consisting of customers, trade unions, national and provincial governments, municipalities and Eskom. This article critically examines these and other restructuring options relating to the ownership and governance of REDs. It is argued that these proposals would perpetuate the inequalities that exist between historically advantaged and disadvantaged local governments; that they would extend Eskom's monopoly of the electricity industry, and that they would obstruct good governance and private investment in the sector. To conclude, the article makes a number of recommendations that would mitigate these negative consequences.