QUANTITY VERSUS PRICE IN A HOMOGENEOUS PRODUCT DUOPOLY*

In a simple homogeneous product setting, the paper looks at the debate on whether firms should choose quantity or price as their strategic variable. It examines a two-stage game between firms with symmetric costs in which the firms choose the strategic mode of operation in the first period and then, in the second period, price or output are chosen simultaneously according to the mode chosen in the first stage. In this game it is possible to have two Nash equilibria where either both play in quantities or both play in prices. One firm choosing price and the other quantity can never be a Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game. Both choosing quantity is always a Nash equilibrium. Both choosing prices may be a Nash equilibrium only in some situations: the structure of the cost functions decides this issue.     

Bargaining with Rent Seekers

Consider a rent‐seeking game, which has government bargain with firms over dividing the rents. In period 1, each firm can invest to increase the probability that the rent will appear. In period 2, the parties bargain. In equilibrium, though firms will invest more than the socially optimal level, rent‐seeking expenditures may be low. Firms that collude to restrict investment maximize joint profits by investing at a positive, non‐infinitesimal level, and restrict investment even if the cost of rent‐seeking effort is zero.     

Cost Signals under Uncertain R&D Outcomes

When it is difficult for firms to differentiate their products from those of their competitors, research and development (R&D) spending on process innovation to lower the cost of production is crucial for profitability. However, the information asymmetry in production costs that results from innovation reduces the efficiency of all firms in a market for a homogeneous good. We employ a signalling game to discuss the feasibility of utilising R&D spending and output levels as cost signals in an environment of quantity competition. The results show that a firm does not spend its money on R&D solely to signal the type of cost. Rather, R&D spending may be chosen as a cost signal over the output level only if expenditures on R&D can lead to a sufficiently high probability of reducing production costs.     

FIRM SIZE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY*

The South African motor vehicle industry has historically been considered a critical industry in the South African economy and the target of numerous government policies designed to protect it and/or increase its international competitiveness. This study examines the cost performance of firms in this industry according to their size, using data categorised by output level. The results are consistent with statistically significant economies of scale at the lowest output levels and a cost inefficiency averaging from about seven to nine per cent for all firms. The findings also suggest that all else equal, the smallest firms and the largest firms have lower unit costs than mid‐sized firms. While this work suggests that policies that would give incentives for the smallest firms to increase their scale of operations might help to reduce their unit costs, further investigation needs to be done with respect to why firms in the mid‐level size categories appear to be less efficient.     

Competition vs. collaboration in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies: a game theory approach

The study provides a game theoretic exploration of firms’ decisions on whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies. Different from models proposed by previous studies, which concentrates on process innovation and a two-strategy set (innovation or do nothing), the present game theory model emphasises product innovation and a three-strategy set (innovation, collaboration, or do nothing). The study makes three contributions. The proposed game theory model extends current understanding of the impacts of collaboration possibilities and collaboration cost in a dynamic game theory. Further, the model clarifies the impact of transaction costs on the outcome. Finally, the study finds that the relationship between collaboration costs is not univariate, but depends on the market type and various market characteristics, such as technology gap, technology level, the product substitution index, transaction costs, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness.     

Competitive experimentation with private information: The survivor's curse

We study a winner-take-all R&D race between two firms that are privately informed about the arrival rate of an invention. Over time, each firm only observes whether the opponent left the race or not. The equilibrium displays a strong herding effect, that we call a ‘survivor's curse.’ Unlike in the case of symmetric information, the two firms may quit the race (nearly) simultaneously even when their costs and benefits for research differ significantly.     

网络产业中的转换成本研究综述

网络产业的融合化发展打破了传统的产业边界,但转换成本却影响公司跨产业经营,阻碍了网络融合的进展.本文通过对国内外学者在网络产业转换成本方面的研究进行分类综述,重点介绍了基于双双寡头模型的多期博弈,旨在介绍相关理论方法及重要研究成果.通过分析转换成本与市场进入的关系,本文指出了转换成本通过对用户产生锁定效用而增强在位企业的垄断力量,阻碍大规模的市场进入;转换成本助长寡头间的默契合谋,产生劣币驱逐良币现象,进而产生肥猫效应,导致新进入企业产生低效率进入;最后分析了对忠实用户采取隐瞒信息情况下转换成本所产生的竞争效果.研究结论拓宽了相关研究思路,并对于网络产业进一步融合发展具有一定的借鉴意义.     

Influence of market-level and inter-firm differences in costs on product positioning and pricing

The objective of this article is to study the impact of differentiation and firm positioning on firm’s pricing decisions in a horizontally differentiated competitive market. We build a parsimonious game-theoretic model and analyse simultaneous entry of firms. The effect of differentiation is modelled as an additional cost incurred by both firms based on the degree of differentiation between the firms. The cost of positioning is modelled as a market level cost affecting both firms whereby firms incur a cost if they want to position themselves away from the centre of distribution of consumers. Our analysis provides some surprising results, explains some conflicting empirical observations documented in previous research and may also be useful for further empirical research in this area by providing sharper predictions about the impact of various types of costs on market outcomes. For example, we find that if the cost of positioning is sufficiently high, then a firm with lower cost of differentiation charges a higher price in equilibrium, even when no differences in exogenous costs exist. We also find that under some circumstances the cost disadvantaged firm can enjoy higher price-cost margins compared to the cost leader thereby suggesting that higher costs could be a blessing in disguise.     

Collusion and Price Rigidity

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria, wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each firm is strictly increasing in its cost level: such "fully sorting" schemes offer efficiency benefits, as they ensure that the lowest-cost firm makes the current sale, but they also imply an informational cost (distorted pricing and/or equilibrium-path price wars), since a higher-cost firm must be deterred from mimicking a lower-cost firm by charging a lower price. A rigid-pricing scheme, where a firm's collusive price is independent of its current cost position, sacrifices efficiency benefits but also diminishes the informational cost. For a wide range of settings, the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires (i) the absence of equilibrium-path price wars and (ii) a rigid price. If firms are sufficiently impatient, however, the rigid-pricing scheme cannot be enforced, and the collusive price of lower-cost firms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat. When the model is modified to include i.i.d. public demand shocks, the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a firm's lower-cost realization may occur only when current demand is high.     

The effect of technology choice on specialization and welfare in a two‐country model

This study presents a simple two‐country model in which firms in the manufacturing sector can choose a technology level (high or low). We show how trade costs and productivity levels affect technology choices by the firms in each country, where the fixed cost of adopting high technology differs between the two countries. This depends on the productivity level of the high technology. In particular, if the productivity of high technology is medium and trade costs are not too low, then a technology gap between countries arises. In this case, improving the productivity of the high technology country reduces the welfare level of consumers in the country in which low technology is adopted. To compensate for the welfare loss of the country from the technological improvement, trade costs should be reduced.     

Gains from Trade in a Differential Game Model of Asymmetric Oligopoly

This paper revisits a classical topic of trade gains in a differential game model of oligopoly in which Home and Foreign firms differ in the number and cost. After deriving the feedback Nash equilibrium, we provide examples to consider how the difference in the number of firms or costs affects gainfulness of trade. We prove that feedback strategies can result in implications for trade gains which are sharply different from the open-loop case.     

The Complete Welfare Effects of Cost Reductions in a Cournot Oligopoly

This paper provides the smallest upper bound or the critical level for a Cournot firm's market share below which its cost reduction reduces welfare. It shows that a firm's cost reduction increases social welfare with nonlinear demand and nonlinear costs if and only if its market share is above the critical level, which is equal to a weighted sum of the other firms' market shares. The paper also reports similar results for technological spill-overs within any given set of firms.     

Why the incidence of shirking varies across employers

Existing models of shirking are not consistent with the underlying behavior of employers and employees. In these models, either shirking does not occur in equilibrium or it may occur but the offending employee is immediately dismissed. These conclusions conflict with evidence that shirking is sometimes ignored by firms for many years. To resolve this conflict, the author models the interaction between employer and employees as a finite repeated game, and introduces the quasi-fixed costs of dismissing and replacing an employee. Shirking is distinguished from more serious malfeasant behavior by the criterion of imposing current period costs on the employer that are less than the cost of dismissing and replacing a shirking employee. When both the employer and the employees are rational and there are no informational asymmetries, shirking is not deterred by threat of dismissal. Introducing informational asymmetries leads to an equilibrium where shirking is deterred, to a great extent, by the dismissal threat. Comparative static analysis of the model yields testable implications on the incidence of shirking across firms, and contributes to our understanding of other labor market issues.     

Learning about compliance under asymmetric information

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms’ pollution levels and this information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future. If a firm is less successful than its peers in reducing emissions, it faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period. This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high-abatement cost firms to mimic low-abatement cost firms by choosing lower emission levels, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked. We explain firms’ compliance decisions and the inspection agency's monitoring strategy by means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing signaling game between firm types might lead to firms over-complying with the emission standard.     

The Strategic Effects of Batch Processing

We study a duopoly game in which firms commit to a batch technology before competing in sales quantities. Adopting a batch technology requires the quantity produced to equal an integer number of batches and allows sales to be less than production. When larger batch sizes lower unit production costs (as in the U.S. airline industry with its economies of density), subgame perfect equilibrium sales quantities are unique and more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium quantities of a one‐shot game with continuous total cost functions. When larger batch sizes yield higher unit costs, equilibrium production can exceed equilibrium sales.     

Synergy,learning and the changing industrial structure

In a set-up of two local firms and one foreign firm, we construct a model to capture the dynamics of local industrial structure induced by formation and breakdown of cross-border joint ventures (JVs). There is a synergic gain to the JV, and the partners learn from each other. Firms play a repeated game. We characterize the resulting industrial configurations under different scenarios as defined by the extent of cost saving. In particular, we show that when cost saving is moderate, an alliance formed between two firms in the first period, breaks up and a new alliance is formed in the second period, but again it breaks up; thereafter the market becomes an oligopoly of all three firms.     

Cost efficiency and scale economies in the Turkish insurance industry

This article examines the cost efficiency and scale economies of insurance firms in the Turkish insurance industry over a 15-year period, 1990–2004. Using the stochastic cost frontier model, cost efficiency scores and scale economies were estimated for each firm in the sample. The results show that mean cost inefficiencies range between 18.3 and 36.9% of total costs and they do not tend to decrease over time. On average, small firms are more cost efficient than large firms. Economies of scale appear present and significant for any class size. The results suggest that there is a substantial difference in scale economies between small and large insurance firms.     

Collusive outcomes in price competition

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for collusive outcomes in a single-shot game of simultaneous price choice in a homogeneous product market with symmetric firms and strictly convex costs. We also prove the counterintuitive result: if the second derivative of the cost function is nonincreasing in output, it is easier to sustain collusion when the number of firms increases.     

TALKING,SEARCHING, AND PRICING*

I study the implications of interpersonal communication for incentives for consumers to acquire information and firms’ pricing behavior. Firms market a homogeneous product and choose its price; consumers acquire price information at some cost to themselves. Also, each consumer accesses the information acquired by a sample of other consumers—interpersonal communication. An exogenous increase in the level of interpersonal communication decreases the information that consumers acquire, and, when search costs are low, firms price less aggressively. In an extension, consumers may choose to invest in interpersonal communication at some cost. A decrease in the costs of interpersonal communication decreases firms’ competition.     

OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES*

There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race, chooses the patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that efficiency cost of prizes is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms are similar, and social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur innovation and filter out inferior innovators.