零售商买方势力理论研究述评

随着零售业集中化趋势不断增强和大型零售商不断涌现,零售商买方势力日益突出.买方势力问题已经受到了理论界和产业界的高度关注.文章梳理了买方势力理论研究的主要成果,从买方势力的内涵、形成因素、经济效应和政府规制等几个方面系统地阐述了买方势力理论的研究进展,并对未来的研究方向进行了展望.     

我国零售商买方势力的反垄断规制研究

随着我国零售市场的日益集中,零售商在上游市场的买方势力愈来愈明显。供应商对零售商的相对经济依赖性促成了零售商买方谈判势力的形成,现实中一些零售商由于把握好零供关系中的三重角色而具有了买方谈判势力。在我国,对零售商行使买方势力行为的反垄断规制应以“相对经济优势地位”为逻辑起点,遵循论辩规则对零售商进行反垄断调查。     

浅析大型零售商买方势力的同业影响

规模的扩大促成了零售商在上游市场形成买方势力,大型零售商行使买方势力的行为对下游零售市场的同业竞争者产生三方面的影响:市场圈定效应、水床效应、反水床效应,针对零售商买方势力的政府竞争政策应考虑到零售商买方势力的正面影响和负面影响。     

论零售商经营规模与买方势力的经济关系

卖方市场逐步演变为买方市场,意味着需求成为制约经济增长的关键因素.在此背景下,零售商的买方势力开始凸显并受到社会关注,本文认为,零售商买方势力和经营规模都是零售企业发展目标的具体体现,零售商经营规模扩张能促进买方势力的形成,但是反之未然.我国进入零售产业整合时期,零售商经营规模的扩张是今后的趋势,与此同时,零售商的买方势力呈现增强态势.     

零售商抗衡势力假说研究评述

文章以纵向市场结构为背景对零售商买方势力进行了较为清晰的界定,并依据买方势力的福利影响区分买方垄断势力和买方抗衡势力。然后从理论模型、经验研究和实验设计等方面,系统综述了零售商抗衡势力的测度方法及其对市场价格、市场绩效和社会福利影响的相关研究进展,以此对我国零售业实施相关的规制政策提供一定的理论指导和经验借鉴。     

零售商买方势力对供应商的影响分析

现代零供关系中,供应商对零售商具有更高程度的经济依赖性,促成了零售商买方势力。短期内零售商行使买方势力会阻碍供应商获取利润、扭曲供应商间的竞争,但以动态的视角分析,零售商买方势力的存在有利于上游市场保持竞争性、激励供应商进行创新,相关部门应综合考虑零售商买方势力对供应商的影响从四个方面进行规制。     

零售商买方势力的消费者福利效应分析

伴随零售商经营规模的扩张,大规模零售商在上游市场拥有的买方势力越来越强,买方势力的存在改变了供应商和零售商的经营决策,由此波及下游市场产品价格、产品种类及产品质量的高低水平,消费者福利水平因此受到影响。     

我国零售业买方势力竞争效应分析

当前,我国零售市场的买方势力日益增强,而且由加入WTO时的大型超级市场一家独大逐渐发展为超级市场与百货行业零售商的双寡头主导、不断挤压边缘零售商的竞争格局。针对零售业市场结构的这一新变化,本文通过建立数量竞争的斯坦克尔伯格寡头动态竞争模型,研究寡头垄断零售商产量竞争的效率及其福利效应。     

双边议价框架内主导零售商买方势力及政府规制取向

在双边议价框架内,外部选择价值决定纵向关系中交易双方各自的议价势力。规模以及作为产品进入市场的"守门人"角色是主导零售商自身所具备的影响外部选择价值的因素,是主导零售商买方势力的主要来源。在对称性寡头竞争的零售市场,主导零售商的买方势力产生有益的"抵消效应",而在非对称性寡头竞争的零售市场,主导零售商的买方势力可能产生有害的"水床效应"。"水床效应"既可能会加剧零售市场垄断化趋势,又可能损害消费者福利。因此,政府规制应高度关注主导零售商的市场兼并行为,高度关注主导零售商剥削中小供应商的行为,高度关注主导零售商过度低价促销行为。     

Buyer Attitudes and the Continuity of Manufacturer/Retailer Relationships

Abstract

This research focuses on the delisting (or unbuying) of products and what in the attitude of the buyer might lead to a delisting of all the supplier's products, thereby ending the relationship. A del-isted product is defined here as one which was still being sold by other retailers. The decision to delist therefore involves a purposive action by the retail buyer. Using confirmatory analysis of a model of delisting behaviour, both cognitive and affective components of buyers' attitudes were found to correlate with the ending of the relationship by the retail buyer. Of the antecedent factors, frequency of contact was found to be the most salient. The practical and theoretical implications are discussed.     

Buyer Power,Transport Cost and Welfare

Manufacturers produce substitute products and sell to consumers in a linear city through competing retail stores. A low cost store obtains large market share by selling at low prices. Assume that a big retailer may exert buyer power by demanding wholesale discounts from manufacturers. The model identifies exclusionary effects of buyer power against competing retailers. It is also found that certain level of buyer power of a discount retailer may maximize social welfare, while that of a regular price retailer may maximize total consumer surplus. Nevertheless, excessive buyer power hurts both consumers and society.     

Buyer Power and its Impact on Competition in the Food Retail Distribution Sector of the European Union

In recent years, there has been significant consolidation and concentration in food retail distribution in the European Union, as our paper documents. We examine the implications of this from the social welfare viewpoint. Our focus is on buyer power, since a commonly held view is that, arising from increased concentration, it may be a buffer to significant manufacturer power. We investigate the issue both theoretically and through data and case study work. We suggest the market will develop into a concentrated pattern across Europe, but that the eventual impact on consumers will depend significantly on the nature and form of competition between large retail chains and how well buying groups ensure that even the smaller retailers can compete on an effective basis.     

The Dark Side of Buyer Power: Supplier Exploitation and the Role of Ethical Climates

Media increasingly accuse firms of exploiting suppliers, and these allegations often result in lurid headlines that threaten the reputations and therefore business successes of these firms. Neither has the phenomenon of supplier exploitation been investigated from a rigorous, ethical standpoint, nor have answers been provided regarding why some firms pursue exploitative approaches. By systemically contrasting economic liberalism and just prices as two divergent perspectives on supplier exploitation, we introduce a distinction of common business practice and unethical supplier exploitation. Since supplier exploitation is based on power, we elucidate several levels of power as antecedents and investigate the role of ethical climate as a moderator. This study extends Victor and Cullen’s (1988) ethical climate matrix according to a supply chain dimension and is summarized in an integrated, conceptual model of five propositions for future theory testing. Results provide a frame of reference for executives and scholars, who can now delineate unethical exploitation and understand important antecedents of the phenomenon better.     

Retailer Pricing and Competitive Effects

Until recently, retailers have taken an either/or approach to competition: either reacting fiercely to competitive price changes or ignoring them altogether. Today, however, firms make a concerted effort to determine and quantify competitive effects. In this paper, we focus on how pricing and competitive effects interact as a general phenomenon, particularly as it applies to retailing. We attempt to construct a general framework that enhances our understanding of the emerging research issues in the area of pricing and competitive effects, and we examine their implications for practice. The areas that show high promise/opportunity are in the online setting for all types of goods—fashion, perishable and packaged staples, and durables—particularly with respect to pricing for profitability and understanding the impact of competition. Other opportunities include understanding the pricing and competitive effects in the perishable goods category sold in specialty, discount, and convenience stores.