An experimental analysis of team production in networks

Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. This paper tests the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same decisions in a team work environment under four different organizational networks: the line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subject types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete network. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.     

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory

In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from the symmetric information benchmark, while in the bad state, private information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment with 954 participants to test these hypotheses. While the results largely corroborate the theoretical predictions, we also find that private information may be welfare-enhancing in the good state.     

The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?

We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, the UK and the US. In contrast to previous studies, we consider 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psychological or preference-related factors jointly and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to formally assess the attendant model uncertainty. We find that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% for the examined central banks. Our results suggest that most of the examined regressors, including factors that capture the effects of inflation and output, are not robust determinants of voting dissent. This result suggests that unobserved characteristics of central bankers and different communication strategies drive the dissent, rather than the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants sequentially guess which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed participants. In the second experiment, participants’ beliefs about the chosen state are elicited. In equilibrium, low informed players who observe an established pattern of identical guesses herd without regard to their private information whereas high informed players always guess according to their private information. Equilibrium behavior implies that information cascades emerge in the group of low informed participants, the belief based solely on cascade guesses is stationary, and information cascades are systematically broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. Experimental results show that the behavior of low informed participants is qualitatively in line with the equilibrium prediction. Information cascades often emerge in our experiments. The tendency of low informed participants to engage in cascade behavior increases with the number of identical guesses. Our main finding is that information cascades are not fragile. The behavior of high informed participants differs markedly from the equilibrium prediction. Only one-third of laboratory cascades are broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. The relative frequency of cascade breaks is 15% for the situations where five or more identical guesses are observed. Participants’ elicited beliefs are strongly consistent with their own behavior and show that, unlike in equilibrium, the more cascade guesses participants observe the more they believe in the state favored by those guesses.     

Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information

This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information does not always coincide with the theoretical prediction, the qualitative properties of the value of information are satisfied in the laboratory: (i) it is never negative, (ii) it decreases with the number of repetitions, (iii) it is bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game, and (iv) it is bounded above by the value of the one-shot game. In line with the theory, the empirical use of private information is almost complete when it should be, and decreases in longer interactions.     

An activist revival in central banking? Lessons from the history of economic thought and central bank practice

Abstract

We introduce the “minimalist–activist” spectrum as an analytical prism through which to view key aspects of central banking theory and practice. We focus on the activist end of this spectrum, concentrating on economic growth. We explore the theoretical roots of these ideas in the writings of Dennis Robertson. We illustrate central banking practice by detailing some approaches followed by central banks pursuing economic growth and development in the decades following the Second World War. History of monetary thought, monetary theory, and analysis of central bank practices blend together to illuminate key principles and practices of central banking.     

Determinants of compliance with fiscal rules: Misplaced efforts or hidden motivations?

This paper empirically examines which factors have influenced numerical compliance with fiscal rules in Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period 2000 to 2020. We use logistic regression models to associate three groups of specific factors with a greater or lesser probability of compliance with the rule: the macroeconomic and political environment of the countries and the design features of the enforced rules. We find that only changes in the macroeconomic and political context affect the probability of compliance with the enforced rules. In contrast, the institutional design of the fiscal rules does not seem to play an essential role in the compliance outcome. This result suggests that adjustments in this direction are not decisive for rule compliance.     

Finite-sample distribution of the augmented Dickey–Fuller test with lag optimization

This article presents a response surface analysis for the distribution of the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test with optimized lag order in the autoregression using frequently applied data-dependent methods. Simulation results demonstrate that finite-sample distribution of the test depends critically on the lag-order determination rule. The univariate test and its panel counterparts exhibit size distortion when the lag order in the autoregression is optimized but inappropriate distribution is employed in test implementation. Response surface coefficients reported for the finite-sample distribution of the test with lag optimization are therefore useful tools for practitioners in applied research. The simulation evidence and practical use of the response surface coefficients are substantiated with empirical illustrations.     

Are happiness and productivity lower among young people with newly-divorced parents? An experimental and econometric approach

High rates of divorce in western society have prompted much research on the repercussions for well-being and the economy. Yet little is known about the important topic of whether parental divorce has deleterious consequences upon adult children. By combining experimental and econometric survey-based evidence, this study attempts to provide an answer. Under controlled conditions, it measures university students’ subjective well-being and productivity (in a standardized laboratory task). It finds no evidence that either of these is negatively associated with recent parental divorce. If anything, happiness and productivity appear to be slightly greater, particularly among males, if their parents have divorced. Using longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey—to control for so-called fixed effects—we then cross-check this result, and confirm the same finding, on various random samples of young British adults.     

So you want to run an experiment,now what? Some simple rules of thumb for optimal experimental design

Experimental economics represents a strong growth industry. In the past several decades the method has expanded beyond intellectual curiosity, now meriting consideration alongside the other more traditional empirical approaches used in economics. Accompanying this growth is an influx of new experimenters who are in need of straightforward direction to make their designs more powerful. This study provides several simple rules of thumb that researchers can apply to improve the efficiency of their experimental designs. We buttress these points by including empirical examples from the literature.     

Experimental asset markets with endogenous choice of costly asymmetric information

Asymmetric distribution of information, while omnipresent in real markets, is rarely considered in experimental financial markets. We present results from experiments where subjects endogenously choose between five information levels (four of them costly). We find that (i) uninformed traders earn the highest net returns, while average informed traders always perform worst even when information costs are not considered; (ii) over time traders learn to pick the most advantageous information levels (full information or no information); and (iii) market efficiency decreases with higher information costs. These results are mostly in line with the theoretical predictions of Grossman and Stiglitz (Am. Econ. Rev. 70:393–408, 1980) and provide additional insights that studies with only two information levels cannot deliver.     

An experimental study of the impact of competition for Other People’s Money: the portfolio manager market

In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has on the risk-taking behavior of laboratory portfolio managers compensated through an option-like scheme according to which the manager receives (most of) the compensation only for returns in excess of pre-specified strike price. We find that such a competitive environment and contractual arrangement lead, both in theory and in the lab, to inefficient risk taking behavior on the part of portfolio managers. We then study various policy interventions, obtained by manipulating various aspects of the competitive environment and the contractual arrangement, e.g., the Transparency of the contracts offered, the Risk Sharing component in the contract linking portfolio managers to investors, etc. While all these interventions would induce portfolio managers, at equilibrium, to efficiently invest funds in safe assets, we find that, in the lab, Transparency is most effective in incentivising managers to do so. Finally, we document a behavioral “Other People’s Money” effect in the lab, where portfolio managers tend to invest the funds of their investors in a more risky manner than their Own Money, even when it is not in either the investors’ or the managers’ interest to do so.     

What if women earned more than their spouses? An experimental investigation of work-division in couples

Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries. This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work-division is known as the “work-division puzzle”. Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized as competing explanations for this fact. We experimentally control for context and productivity to investigate preferences for work-division by true co-habiting couples, in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the “advantaged” player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which corresponds to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. Women and men contribute equally to the household public good in all conditions. This result allows us to rule out some of the standard explanations of the work-division puzzle.     

Are nascent entrepreneurs ‘Jacks-of-all-trades’? A test of Lazear's theory of entrepreneurship with German data

In a recent paper Edward Lazear proposed the ‘Jack-of-all-trades’ view of entrepreneurship. Based on a coherent model of the choice between self-employment and paid employment he shows that having a background in a large number of different roles increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. The intuition behind this proposition is that entrepreneurs must have sufficient knowledge in a variety of areas to put together the many ingredients needed for survival and success in a business, while for paid employees it suffices and pays to be a specialist in the field demanded by the job taken. This study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by empirically testing Lazear's hypothesis using a large recent representative sample of the German population. The empirical estimation takes the rare events nature of becoming a nascent entrepreneur and the regional stratification of the sample into account. The results illustrate the statistical significance and economic importance of the ‘jack-of-all-trades’ theory.     

Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs

For many years the Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) has been the primary auction design for spectrum sales worldwide. Recently, the core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has been used as an alternative to the SMRA in a number of countries promising strong incentives for truthful bidding and high efficiency as a result. We analyze the efficiency and auctioneer revenue of the CCA in comparison to SMRA and examine bidding behavior in both formats. The experiments are based on two value models, which resemble single- and multiband spectrum sales in the field. Such applications often allow for thousands of possible bundles. Bidders in the CCA submitted bids for only a fraction of all bundles with a positive valuation. Bundles were selected based on synergies and payoff after the primary bid rounds. As a consequence, we found efficiency of the CCA to be significantly lower than that of SMRA in the multi-band value model and auctioneer revenue of the CCA to be lower in both value models. In addition, we characterize several properties of the auction format, which result from the two-stage design and the payment and activity rules.     

An extension of the Tiebout hypothesis of voting with one’s feet: the Medicaid magnet hypothesis

This study empirically extends the Tiebout hypothesis of ‘voting with one’s feet’ in two ways. First, it provides updated estimates using net migration data for the period 2000–2008. Second, in addition to investigating variables reflecting public education outlays, property taxation and income taxation, it investigates whether migrants are attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits per recipient. The latter hypothesis is referred to as the ‘Medicaid magnet hypothesis’. The analysis includes three economic variables, three quality of life variables and three Tiebout-type factors in addition to Medicaid benefits. Results indicate that consumer voters were attracted to states with higher per pupil public school spending, lower property and income tax rates, and that certain consumer-voters may be attracted to states that offer higher levels of Medicaid benefits.     

A copula–GARCH model for macro asset allocation of a portfolio with commodities

Many authors have suggested that the mean-variance criterion, conceived by Markowitz (The Journal of Finance 7(1):77–91, 1952), is not optimal for asset allocation, because the investor expected utility function is better proxied by a function that uses higher moments and because returns are distributed in a non-Normal way, being asymmetric and/or leptokurtic, so the mean-variance criterion cannot correctly proxy the expected utility with non-Normal returns. In Riccetti (The use of copulas in asset allocation: when and how a copula model can be useful? LAP Lambert, Saarbrücken 2010), a copula–GARCH model is applied and it is found that copulas are not useful for choosing among stock indices, but can be useful in a macro asset allocation model, that is, for choosing stock and bond composition of portfolios. In this paper I apply that copula–GARCH model for the macro asset allocation of portfolios containing a commodity component. I find that the copula model appears to be useful and better than the mean-variance one for the macro asset allocation also in presence of a commodity index, even if it is not better than GARCH models on independent univariate series, probably because of the low correlation of the commodity index returns to the stock, the bond and the exchange rate returns.     

Are individuals with entrepreneurial characteristics more likely to engage in destruction? An experimental investigation among potential 21st century entrepreneurs in Tunisia

We test experimentally whether individuals high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are more likely to engage in destructive behavior than other individuals. In the joy-of-destruction game, participants can either preserve or costly burn the endowment of each other. In some treatments they can hide from other participants whether they are responsible for destruction. We found that participants high in some entrepreneurial characteristics are significantly more likely to adopt destructive behaviours.     

Do previous good deeds to a third party make people more tolerant of bad deeds against them? An experimental investigation

How do people react to a mix of good deeds to a third party and bad deeds against them? A modified ultimatum game shows that previous good deeds make responders substantially more tolerant to unfair proposals.     

An empirical test of the regional innovation paradox: can smart specialisation overcome the paradox in Central and Eastern Europe?

The regional innovation paradox is the greater need of lagging regions to invest in innovation and their relatively lower capacity to absorb funding compared to more advanced regions. Using data on regional public spending, industry composition and economic performance, we test empirically whether there is a differential impact of European funding on regional economic growth between Eastern and Western European regions. We conclude that the paradox is proven and consider the extent to which smart specialisation strategies may help to improve the quality of governance of regional innovation systems.