Does anti-bribery enforcement deter foreign investment?

This article presents the first empirical evidence that bilateral fixed capital flows fall in response to anti-bribery enforcement actions. We hand-collect data on individual enforcement actions initiated by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and show that anti-bribery enforcement in a country is followed by a 40% reduction in foreign fixed capital investments made by US companies in that country.     

Does venture capital really foster innovation?

Using panel data of 17 European Union countries, we find robust empirical support for a positive impact of venture capital on innovation. After controlling for the potential endogenous relationship between venture capital and innovation, the results indicate that venture capital fosters innovation but mainly at a later stage.     

Does trade weaken product standards?

We investigate the effects of trade on national minimum quality standards for a product whose quality is unobservable to consumers prior to purchase. Two standard‐setting regimes are considered: (1) where the regulatory authority takes the trade share as given; and (2) where the regulatory authority takes full account of its ability to influence the trade share. We find that standards are not a protectionist instrument in this model, the usual gains from trade apply if standards are maintained at their autarky values, trade can cause private standards to be adjusted in a welfare reducing way, and the welfare of a country is higher if its regulatory authority adopts regime (2) rather than (1).     

Does trade liberalization increase global pollution?

In this paper we consider a simple duopoly market in which a home firm and a foreign firm use labor to produce an identical product and supply it to the home market. Firms emit pollution as a by-product of production. We show conditions under which international trade liberalization decreases (increases) the global pollution.     

Does trade stimulate product quality upgrading?

This paper investigates whether increased import competition leads firms to engage in incremental innovation reflected in product quality upgrading using Chilean manufacturing firm‐product data and measuring product quality with unit values (prices). We identify causal effects of import competition using an effective trade barrier measure – transport costs – as instruments for import penetration ratios across industries. Transport costs have a negative and significant effect on product quality. The evidence suggests that estimated unit value increases capture product quality upgrading, imports’ competition effects drive quality upgrading, and benefits depend on firms’ industrial specialization. Easier access to intermediate inputs also fosters quality upgrading.     

Does democracy foster financial development? An empirical analysis

This paper examines whether democracy promotes financial development. While cross-section results show a positive association between democracy and bank development, this relationship disappears in panel regressions. The data also reveals that democracy is not positively related to stock market development.     

Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.     

Does complexity explain the structure of trade?

This paper analyzes whether complexity, measured by the number of skilled tasks that are performed in production, explains countries’ commodity trade structure. We modify the Romalis ( 2004 ) model to incorporate advantage differences in complexity across commodities together with differences in the number of mistakes made by workers in the production process in developed and developing countries as a source of comparative advantage. Our model predicts that the share of developed countries in world trade increases with products’ complexity. Empirical tests confirm this prediction. Moreover, we find that complexity complements the explanation provided by skill‐intensity on countries’ commodity trade structure.     

Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990–2009. The results are interpreted in light of the predictions of the theory on fiscal federalism. We find that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue decentralization and not investment in redistribution. However, the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked grants to fund infrastructure investment.     

Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives

Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.     

Does China’s trade defy cultural barriers?

Using annual data for China and 88 trading partners that span the period 1995–2011, we estimate whether cross-societal cultural differences influence China’s external trade flows. Our results, obtained from the estimation of a series of multi-level mixed effect random intercepts and coefficients models, indicate that China’s aggregate exports and imports are largely unaffected by the cultural distance between China and its trading partners. Examination of disaggregate trade measures and consideration of the underlying dimensions of our composite cultural distance variable produces a largely similar result. Taken collectively, our results suggest that China’s trade is less affected by cultural distance than has been reported for other countries in similar studies.     

Does hidden information make trade liberalization more fragile?

Abstract This paper focuses on the impact of hidden information on strategic interaction in the context of trade agreements. In the presence of informational asymmetry it is possible that a tradeoff between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation emerges. It is shown that it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization associated with a strictly positive ex ante probability of deviation occurring. In that case, cooperation will break down in finite time, and the optimal degree of liberalization cannot be applied indefinitely.     

Does high labour mobility always promote trade liberalization?

Labour immobility (high adjustment cost) has been regarded as a major obstacle to trade liberalization and it has been argued that higher labour mobility promotes trade liberalization. However, this is not the case when we take into account conflicts of interest between politicians and voters that are inevitable in representative democracy. I construct a simple two‐period model including both elections and sectoral adjustment. Then I show that the non‐monotonic relationship between labour mobility and the equilibrium degree of trade liberalization exists due to the principal–agent relationship. In representative democracy, higher labour mobility prevents trade liberalization in some cases.     

Child abuse: Does public enforcement crowd out private vigilance?

We investigate whether increased public reporting of child abuse crowds out private reporting. We find, despite theoretical models suggesting significant crowding out, that public and private reports have risen nearly equiproportionately and that crowding out is small and not significant.     

The effect of free trade agreements revisited: Does residual trade cost bias matter?

This paper revisits a prominent gravity model‐based empirical literature on the effects of free trade agreements by accounting for a potential bias caused by unobservable trade costs that operate through general equilibrium constraints. It embeds state‐of‐the‐art panel estimation techniques in a recently proposed two‐step remedy that features a constrained ANOVA‐type estimation. Using a dataset on manufacturing trade flows in eight sectors in 40 countries and a rest‐of‐the‐world aggregate for the period 1990–2002, it finds evidence of significant residual trade cost bias. The direction and magnitude of bias vary across sectors, with the standard one‐step approach used in the literature overestimating or underestimating the partial effect of free trade agreements by up to 110 percent. Overall, coefficients on trade costs variables are jointly significantly different between the standard method and the two‐step method. The biases in partial effect estimates translate into biases in general equilibrium effects.     

Do trade missions increase trade?

Abstract In an effort to stimulate trade, Canada has conducted regular trade missions starting in 1994, often led by the Prime Minister. According to the Canadian government, these missions generated tens of billions of dollars in new business deals. This paper uses bilateral trade data to assess this claim. We find that Canada exports and imports above‐normal amounts to the countries to which it sent trade missions. However, the missions do not seem to have caused an increase in trade. In the preferred specification, incorporating country‐pair fixed effects, trade missions have small, negative, and mainly insignificant effects.     

Does it matter if growth is imported via terms of trade or trade volume increases?

This paper shows that to import growth via terms of trade or trade volume increases does matter when determining the degree of competition in the export sector that allows an economy to fully exploit its export market power.     

Does the quality of political institutions affect intra-industry trade within trade blocs? The ASEAN perspective

There has been a renewed resolve for deeper integration and cooperation within ASEAN. Intra-industry trade (IIT) is often viewed as a way of achieving economic as well as political integration. This article tests for the effect that political regime and governance may have on the intensity of IIT. We particularly examine if quality of political institutions which includes corruption and democracy indices as well as economic factors comprising corporate tax rate, regional FDI flow, flexibility of exchange rate regime, size of the market, economic distance affect the intensity of horizontal and vertical IIT. The study finds that control of corruption and good governance both increase the vertical IIT but not the horizontal IIT. The study further finds that intra-economy FDI flow, stable exchange rate regime, market size and proximity positively affect IIT within the trade bloc. However the negative effect of corporate tax rate suggests that if countries were to coordinate their tax policies, they could avoid harmful tax competition and promote IIT across their borders. The findings regarding the effect those economic and political factors have on the intensity of IIT certainly warrants the attention of policy makers and researchers alike.