风险喜好型零售商主导的双渠道定价策略研究

一个由生产商和零售商组成的供应链中决策的顺序为:零售商率先根据自己掌握的市场信息公布最大潜在订单数量,生产商根据最大订单数量来调整其批发价格和直销渠道价格,最后零售商才确定其最优订货数量。研究表明,在一个由风险喜好型的零售商和一个风险规避型的供应商组成的供应链中,零售商风险偏好系数超过某一特定值时,随着需求方差的增加,零售渠道最优定价会越来越高;而对于风险规避型供应商,则是随着需求方差和(或)供应商风险规避程度的增加,会选择较低的产品售价以期获得稳定的收入。     

Manufacturer Mergers and Product Variety in Vertically Related Markets

We study the incentives of final product manufacturers to introduce new products into the market and the impact of a manufacturer merger on them. We show that when manufacturers distribute their products through multi-product retailers, a manufacturer merger, although it leads to an increase in the wholesale prices, it can enhance product variety. The merger induced product variety enhancement though arises only when vertical relations are present: when manufacturers sell directly their products to consumers, a merger never results in more product variety. Still, both with or without vertical relations, a manufacturer merger hurts consumers and decreases welfare.     

Decomposing the effect of advertising: What happens in the retail channel?

The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

品牌权益影响下的双渠道供应链定价决策及协调研究

针对一个制造商开通直销渠道销售产品与零售商的价格竞争问题,文章基于制造商与零售商共享品牌权益的视角,研究在制造商双渠道供应链结构中,价格和品牌权益同时作用下的双渠道供应链定价决策,分别分析在集中决策下和分散决策下,品牌权益对两种渠道价格和利润的影响。研究发现：在集中决策下,两种渠道的价格、利润与品牌权益成正相关;在分散决策下,当品牌权益超过一定临界值时,其对制造商直销渠道的价格和制造商总利润的影响大于零售商。鉴于品牌权益对供应链定价决策的重要影响,文章建立制造商和零售商之间的品牌权益成本共担机制,并通过数值仿真分析发现,当实施品牌权益成本共担机制时,制造商和零售商的销售价格和利润均是最优的。因此,零售商应加强与制造商的互动,共同创造高品牌权益的同时,也应共同分享高品牌权益。     

不同市场力量下的再制造闭环供应链决策研究

本文建立了由一个制造商和两个竞争零售商组成的再制造闭环供应链博弈模型,研究了制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商和零售商Nash均衡博弈等三种市场力量结构,研究和对比了三种市场力量结构下的均衡回收率、批发价、零售价、渠道成员利润、渠道总利润。研究结果表明：零售商的回收率在市场无领导者时最高,在制造商领导的市场中最低。批发价格在制造商领导时最高,最小的是零售商领导情形。零售价在制造商领导时最高,最小是市场无领导者情形。消费者和整个行业均受益于无领导者的市场结构。然而,制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者。在具市场领导的市场结构下,消费者和整个行业偏好零售商领导的市场结构。     

Consumer and Retailer Promotions: Who is Better Off?

The long-term effects of promotions on sales are increasingly linked to the supposed shift of economic power within channels from manufacturers to retailers. However, formal knowledge about how they influence channel decisions under different promotional arrangements and the distribution of channel profits remains very sparse. In this paper, I develop two 2-period models to investigate the impact on channel decisions and profits of manufacturer-controlled and retailer-controlled promotions targeted at consumers. My findings indicate that retailers always invest in retailer promotions, while manufacturers may find it optimal to not invest in consumer promotions. Economic power shifts from manufacturers to retailers when consumer promotions significantly expand the baseline demand in the long-term. Otherwise, manufacturers remain more powerful. Trade promotions or other profit-transfer mechanisms may be indispensable in easing conflicts over who should undertake promotions, especially when these promotions substantially increase future sales.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

考虑行动次序的横向竞争供应链系统

本文建立了一个两级分散分销的供应链系统,以研究确定型需求和随机型需求两种情形下行动次序对供应链绩效产生的影响。在这样的供应链系统内,生产商以批发价格卖给零售商具有差异性的产品,零售商再根据情况选择最优零售价格。研究结果表明,两种情形都存在后发优势,且当参数满足一定条件时供应链系统整体绩效将得到改进,同时不仅供应链的竞争程度,而且渠道成员行动的次序性都将对参与者的决策行为产生重要影响。     

Why parallel trade may raise producers' profits

This paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade. In addition to an intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks, this occurs when competitive retailers must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose sale value drops at the end of the demand period. For these types of products, letting retailers trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer and higher manufacturer profit. The model provides a simple explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by manufacturers for some products such as automobiles, clothes, toys, consumer electronics, musical recordings, cosmetics and perfumes.     

Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel

Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.     

Information and channel profits

New marketing information technologies, associated with point-of-purchase scanner systems, have increased the potential information available to manufacturers and retailers. In this paper, we explore the pricing and profit implications of this technology within a channel setting. We find that improved information about demand always results in greater absolute profits, as well as a claim on greater division of channel profits for the informed channel member. The greater profitability is due to the informed channel member's ability to “fine tune” prices in response to changes in demand conditions. However, total channel profits are highest when only one channel member acquires information. We also show that fine-tuning of price has the effect of smoothing sales, as informed firms charge higher prices during high demand periods and charge lower prices during low demand periods. Lastly, we show that an equilibrium where both channel members acquire information does not lead to a prisoners' dilemma.     

Incorporating balance of power in channel decision structure: Theory and empirical application

The objective of a manufacturer is to maximize the profits of its brands. The retailer, on the other hand, is not interested in the profitability of any particular brand but concentrates on the overall category profit. In spite of these apparently diverging profit objectives, both manufacturers and retailers are increasingly realizing that profit margins for both may be increased when retailers and manufacturers recognize the strengths of each other and utilize them to maximize the overall category profit. We develop a game theoretic model to demonstrate that when the retailer allows a few large manufacturers to practice independent brand management but manages the rest of the brands, the category profit is indeed higher than the profits generated when it allows independent brand management by all manufacturers or acts as an uncompromising category manager. We also provide an empirical application of our model on scanner data.     

Coupon Trading and its Impacts on Consumer Purchase and Firm Profits

When a retailer distributes manufacturer coupons to consumers without perfectly identifying their product valuations, consumers may have incentives to trade coupons. We develop a model to capture the coupon trading phenomenon and compare three scenarios: (I) no coupon, (II) coupon without trading, and (III) coupon with trading. We find that coupon trading can increase the profits of either the retailer or the manufacturers, but not at the same time. The retailer benefits from coupon trading when the coupon market is competitive and consumer hassle cost is low, while the manufacturers benefit from coupon trading when the coupon market is uncompetitive and consumer hassle cost is high. In addition, coupon trading does not always increase total demand. Firms benefit from coupon trading by charging higher prices, which leads to a decreased total demand. As a result, consumers end up with a higher average cost under coupon trading. We also compare coupon trading with improved coupon targeting, and find that coupon trading may allow firms to gain higher profits than improved coupon targeting. Further, we extend the main model to a competitive setting where the products are substitutable, and find that the main results still hold. Finally, we employ numerical analysis to identify the optimal coupon face values in different scenarios, and the results suggest that coupon trading combined with incentive mechanisms may lead to Pareto improvement for the channel as a whole.     

Equilibrium in supply chain network with competition and service level between channels considering consumers' channel preferences

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain network consisting of multiple competing manufacturers, multiple competing retailers and multiple demand markets. Each manufacturer produces and distributes his products via direct e-commerce channel along with traditional physical channel. The manufacturers also provide services for the consumers in both channels, while the retailers only offer offline services to the consumers. On this basis, a dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model with pricing and service decisions are established based on variational inequality theory. Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by modified projection and contraction method. Combined with numerical examples, we analyze the impact of three critical factors on the equilibrium states and profits. Some interesting managerial insights are derived. We find that the profits of the manufacturers decrease (increase) in the raw material conversion ratio under single channel case (dual-channel case), while the increase of the raw material conversion ratio always benefits the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network; the service level in each channel is positively correlated with its transaction volume. There are significant inconsistencies among the best combinations of cross-channel price coefficients between two channels for the manufacturers, the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network. The same equilibrium decision (service level, price) or profit may exhibit the opposite changing trend with respect to cross-channel price coefficients under two cases of active e-commerce transaction and inactive e-commerce transaction. When the introduction of e-commerce channel can bring more profits for the whole dual-channel supply chain network, the manufacturers should provide reasonable allocation schemes of profit increment for the retailers to satisfy their participation constraints.     

Manufacturer rebate and channel coordination in O2O retailing

Many manufacturers are opening their own online channels due to the growth of e-commerce leading to intensive channel competition with their offline retailer partners. This research proposes an innovative coordination mechanism to lessen channel competition and help enhance the profits of all parties. First, two strategic mechanisms (i.e. a manufacturer rebate to offline consumers and the quantity discount) are proposed and studied. Our results show that although a manufacturer rebate offered to offline consumers helps mitigate the online-to-offline (hereafter O2O) competition conditionally, a quantity discount, unexpectedly, cannot be used to mitigate channel competition effectively. A new mechanism - the combination of the manufacturer rebate to offline consumers combined with a quantity discount to retailers – is developed to lessen channel competition. We find that compared to the first two mechanisms, the combination mechanism, surprisingly, provides a significant advantage in creating greater profits for the entire supply chain. Furthermore, compared to the benchmark O2O model, the combination mechanism also helps create a Pareto situation and thus is an optimal mechanism to be used to mitigate channel competition effectively.     

需求不确定对单周期产品的生产商—零售商供应链的影响

在单周期产品的生产商—零售商的供应链中,由于市场存在着激烈的竞争,市场需求的不确定性必然会对供应链双方的决策产生很大的影响。借助传统的报童模型,建立Stackberg博奕模型,考虑了一个供应商面对两个不同零售商时的情景,分别分析了当零售商决策依据是最大化期望利润和当两零售商的市场需求相关时,以及在零售商的决策依据是在给定利润水平时最大化其概率的情况下,市场需求不确定会对供应链双方产生怎样的影响。     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

An evolutionary game theoretic model for analyzing retailers’ behavior when introducing economy and premium private labels

The significant growth of Private Labels (PLs) has led to a growing competition between National Brand (NB) manufacturers, on the one hand, and retailers, on the other; while manufacturers strive to achieve enhanced customer loyalty through such measures as innovation and advertising, retailers focus their efforts on offering high-quality products. This paper considers for the first time a supply chain consisting of one NB manufacturer and a population of retailers under two scenarios. In the first, each retailer sells NB and chooses either to introduce an Economy Private Label (EPL) or not. In the second scenario, each retailer chooses either to introduce a Premium Private Label (PPL) or not. To solve the problem, an evolutionary game is introduced and the retailers’ behavior is analyzed. Using two numerical examples, parametric analysis and managerial insights are also provided. It is found that the entire population chooses the strategy of introducing a private label (EPL or PPL) and that this strategy yields greater profits for both the manufacturer and the retailers than other strategy profiles might do. In addition, it is shown that both the retailers and the manufacturer gain more profits by introducing a PPL rather than an EPL.     

Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer's profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturer's marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.