China's Exchange Rate Movements and Corporate Currency Invoicing Strategies

Since China introduced a new managed floating exchange rate regime in 2005, the persistent appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar has led Chinese firms to reassess their choice of invoice currency among the dollar and other international alternatives to price their exports. The present paper performs a systematic invoice currency analysis by surveying the published literature, summarizing criteria for decision-making, and evaluating the choices available to Chinese exporters implementing currency invoicing strategies to maximize expected profits. This study finds that the euro could play an increasing role as the invoice currency of Chinese firms, although the US dollar will still play a dominant role. Chinese exporters might shift gradually from the dollar to the euro in the face of the falling dollar, balancing between the two by necessity.     

解读西方“定量宽松”政策与中国的对应

继2009年3月12日瑞士央行入市干预瑞士法郎加速“货币贬值”后,3月18日关联储宣布购买3000亿美元长期国债和1．25万亿美元抵押贷款证券,就此西方进入了“定量宽松”货币政策时期。为应对西方“定量宽松”货币政策的出台和加快国际货币体制的改革,中国人民银行行长周小川提出的在国际货币基金组织（IMF）现有的特别提款权（SDR）基础上,构建“超主权国际储备货币”的建议在经济学界引起了广泛的热议。     

人民币升值与人民币国际化

美国以贸易平衡与就业问题为借口,逼迫人民币升值的真正目的是想通过削弱中国经济以减缓或消除人民币对美元构成的威胁,维护美元霸权。因此,人民币应加速国际化。只有人民币国际化才能有效保障经济国际化过程中中国经济的核心利益;只有人民币成为国际主要结算货币和储备货币,国际储备货币才能形成三足鼎立的稳定结构——这十分有利于国际货币体系治理结构的改善。     

Effect of exchange rate return on volatility spill-over across trading regions

This paper examines the effect of realized exchange rate returns on the volatility spill-over between the euro–US dollar and US dollar–yen currency pairs across the five trading regions: Asia, Asia–Europe overlap, Europe, Europe–America overlap and America. Modelling the interaction between returns and volatility in an autoregressive five-equation system, we find evidence that depreciation of the US dollar against the yen has a greater impact on the US dollar–yen volatility spill-over than appreciation in the subprime crisis period. Appreciation and depreciation of the US dollar against the euro does not appear to have an asymmetric effect on the euro–US dollar volatility spill-over. Our results support the notion that the yen may have been preferred to the euro as a ‘safe-haven’ currency relative to the US dollar during the subprime crisis period.     

美元“币权”战略与中国之应对

纵观资本主义全球化的发展历史,在商业资本和产业资本阶段,因资本同质性扩张而形成的以对资源地理纵深控制为目标的地缘关系成为了殖民化时代国际关系的核心。自20世纪70年代以来,金融资本愈益成为世界分工和分配的核心,遂使货币权力超越地缘实力,成为金融资本主义时代国家间关系的新枢纽。苏联解体后,美国"单极"霸权赋权于美元,使其无约束地增发并顺势主导了金融资本全球化,这决定了美元霸权成为币缘政治时代国际关系的实质,并衍生出强化美国的全球币缘战略体系,即以美元资本、能源(石油)、食物(粮食)三大霸权为核心的新霸权体系。作者认为,在此背景下方能理解"币权"的时代特征,即以地缘关系为保障、以决定产业链安全的资源定价权为基础、以当代国家政治主权派生的信用体系以及自主的财政货币政策为核心,美元可以在全球经济金融化竞争的资本扩张中获取利益并转嫁成本。对此,中国亟须恢复人民币的主权货币性质,以实体经济为本来推进国内产业纵向一体化战略、"资源重商主义"战略和"新重农主义"战略,并以陆权为基础构建自己币缘战略安全的陆域纵深。     

Worldwide Inflation and International Monetary Reform： Exchange Rates or Interest Rates？

The international dollar standard is malfunctioning. Near‐zero US short‐term interest rates launch massive hot money outflows into emerging markets (EM) in Asia and Latin America. Each EM central bank buys dollars to prevent its currency from appreciating but loses monetary control. Despite some appreciation, average inflation in EMs is now much higher than in the old industrial economies and world commodity prices are bid up sharply. This inflation on the dollar's periphery only registers in the US CPI with a long lag. However, the more immediate effect of the Fed's zero interest rate is to upset the process of bank intermediation within the American economy. Bank credit continues to decline while employment languishes. Therefore, constructive international monetary reform calls for the Fed to abandon its zero‐interest rate policy, which is best done in cooperation with the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England also abandoning their ultra low interest rates.     

Dominant Currencies and the Future of the Euro

The paper's thesis is that the US dollar, despite the inevitable erosion of market share that it will suffer at the hands of the euro, will remain the most important international currency. The transaction domain of an international currency depends on its ability to lower transaction costs relative to alternative currencies. The EMU financial markets will not be as integrated, and thus as liquid, as the US financial markets for quite some time, thus favoring the use of the dollar as a medium of exchange. Inertia and reputational considerations further favor the dollar. The future value of the exchange rate dollar-euro will depend on economic fundamentals more than on portfolio shifts. Portfolio shifts argue for an appreciation of the euro; but fundamentals can swamp the effects of portfolio shifts. Should the EMU fundamentals reflect the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty and the Growth and Stability Pact, the chances for a euro appreciation will increase. Some caution, however, is in order because the ECB is a new and untested central bank where consensus for a conservative policy may be harder to achieve than can be gleaned from a literal reading of the Maastricht Treaty.     

Managing the renminbi: should China peg to a trade‐weighted basket?

Pegging the renminbi (RMB) to the US dollar since 1994 has characterised China's exchange rate policy under a fixed peg or appreciating crawling peg. The current policy, announced in June 2010, of ‘floating with reference to a basket’ made the RMB 25 per cent stronger against a trade‐weighted basket by early August 2015, while it was 10 per cent stronger against the US dollar. Thus, 14 percentage points arose from changes in the cross rates of the other currencies, notably from the fall of the euro since December 2014. Devaluation of the RMB by 3 per cent in August 2015 just covered the effective appreciation since December 2014. Effects of the cross rates of other currencies could be eliminated by managing the external value of the RMB with reference to a genuine trade‐weighted basket. This could be a suitable intermediary exchange rate regime for China, as the risks associated with free floating are still great. Diversifying further the currency composition of the foreign exchange reserves and other foreign assets of the Chinese government, from US dollars towards euro and yen assets, would be a natural parallel shift. The euro–US dollar–yen exchange rates in late summer 2015 may offer a good opportunity to carry out this move.     

Anomaly in China＇s Dollar-RMB

Newly-established data on onshore deliverable US dollar-RMB forwards and the Shanghai lnterbank Offered Rate from Oetober 2006 to April 2009 reveal significant violations of covered interest rate parity. This paper explains the cause of this anomaly. Deviations in the forward market are caused by an increase in US dollar-to-RMB conversion restrictions. Given that Chinese monetary authorities want to prevent market participants from taking advantage of the predictable appreciation of the RMB, China＇s State Administration of Foreign Exchange has to tighten up the control on US dollar-to-RMB conversions. Under the tightened conversion restrictions, similar deviations will resurface in the forward market whenever hot money inflow increases. One way to avoid covered interest rate parity violations in the forward market is to decrease hot money inflow into China by maintaining a stable and credible exchange rate policy.     

A tale of Asian exchange rate management: Romance of the three currencies

Asian currencies lack regional policy coordination and are therefore subject to volatilities such as the Asian currency crisis of 1997/99. As the Asian currencies have already been observed to be ‘flying-in-unison’, a stable exchange rate arrangement can be helpful as the next step of evolution for regional financial stability. We consider that creating a cluster effect from coordinated efforts/policies of policy-makers can lead to regional exchange rate stability. To demonstrate this cluster effect, a three-party-game is computed for an Asian bloc, viz-á-viz US dollar and the Euro, based on a Nash and a cooperative equilibrium. The cluster effect would generate external and internal pressures that work towards the formation of a regional currency, although the exact form of exchange rate regime would have to await political consensus. There are substantial welfare gains within Asia network economy through currency cooperation. The formation of an Asian currency bloc would also create counter-balance to the current dominance of the US dollar and the Euro. Like the epic story of Three Kingdoms who sought hegemony in Chinese history, the Asian currency bloc will contend with many possible outcomes of competition as well as cooperation.     

The Case for Stabilizing China＇s Exchange Rate： Setting the Stage for Fiscal Expansion

China＇s financial conundrum arises from two sources. First, its large saving （trade） surplus results in a currency mismatch because it is an immature creditor that cannot lend in its own currency. Instead, foreign currency claims （largely US dollars） build up within domestic financial institutions. Second, economists, both American and Chinese, mistakenly attribute the surpluses to an undervalued RMB. To placate the USA, the result was a gradual and predictable appreciation of the RMB against the dollar of 6 percent or more per year from July 2005 to July 2008. Together with the fall in US interest rates since mid-2007, this one- way bet in the foreign exchanges markets not only attracted hot money inflows but inhibited private capital outflows from financing China＇ s huge trade surplus. Therefore, the People＇s Bank of China had to intervene heavily to prevent the RMB from ratcheting upwards, and so became the country＇s sole international financial intermediary as official exchange reserves exploded Because of the currency mismatch, floating the RMB is neither feasible nor desirable, and a higher RMB would not reduce China＇ s trade surplus. Instead, monetary control and normal private-sector finance for the trade surplus require a return to a credibly fixed nominal RMB/USD rate similar to that which existed between 1995 and 2004. However, for any newly reset RMB/USD rate to be credible as a monetary anchor, foreign ＂China bashing＂ to get the RMB up must end. Then the stage would be set for fiscal expansion to both stimulate the economy and reduce its trade surplus.     

Fear of appreciation in East and Southeast Asia: The role of the Chinese renminbi

Our study brings into light evidence of the important role of the Chinese renminbi in shaping the exchange rate behavior of a select group of East Asian currencies. Results obtained suggest that there is an additional dimension to the ‘fear of appreciation’ or ‘fear of floating-in-reverse’ behavior, initially coined by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzengger (2007) with regard to the experiences of this group of East Asian currencies. In particular, we find that there is a greater degree of aversion to appreciation of these East Asian currencies—specifically, the Philippine peso and the Thailand baht—against the Chinese renminbi than against the US dollar. This heightened fear of appreciation against the Chinese currency confirms that trade competition matters in this part of the world and that this fear to appreciate plays a central role in the exchange rate management of major East Asian currencies. As envisaged, the increasing role of China as a major trading hub in the region as well as globally, implies that the Chinese renminbi would exert a growing significant influence on other currencies in the region.     

Relevant international experience of real exchange rate adjustment for China

Is the real appreciation of the Chinese yuan essential for correcting global imbalances? The present study offers a new perspective to the debate by drawing upon the rich international experience embodied in World Bank's World Development Indicators database. We find that the price levels of China and the United States are both low relative to the world's average. Therefore, the discrepancy between the price levels of China and the United States has been, in fact, close to zero since 2002. The difference in per capita income can fully account for the price difference between China and the United States. However, the Balassa–Samuelson effect is not a reliable guide for projecting the trend of real appreciation. According to the experience of those economies that have experienced real currency appreciation against the US dollar in 1985–2005, the mode of faster wage growth and inflation is as common as nominal appreciation, far more common for economies with a low initial price level. We do not find empirical evidence to substantiate the claim that low price levels tend to cause external surpluses. But real appreciation has a powerful effect in boosting job creation in the service sector. Therefore, the real appreciation of the Chinese yuan would contribute to restructuring the Chinese economy towards a domestic demand-based growth track.     

The implications of monetary expansion in China for the US dollar

We examine the influence of rapid growth in China's money supply on the US dollar within a framework of monetary models of exchange rates. We develop out-of-sample forecasts of the US dollar exchange rate using US and global data on price level, output, and interest rates, and money supply data for the US, China, and the rest of the world for the period 1996–2013. Monetary model forecasts significantly outperform a random walk forecast in terms of mean squared forecast error in the long run. A monetary error correction model with sticky prices performs best. Rolling sample analysis indicates changes over time in the influence of Chinese money supply in forecasting the US dollar. The expectation is that rapid money growth in China would increase the demand for dollars thus raising the value of the dollar, yet our forecasts are to the contrary for the mid 2000s. This is consistent with anticipation of renminbi appreciation under China’s managed exchange rate, which made holding renminbi more attractive. With the break from a dollar peg in 2005 and subsequent currency appreciation, the distortion was alleviated and the forecast direction for the dollar became as expected.     

East Asian equity markets,financial crises,and the Japanese currency

The paper studies the interactions between the US and four East Asian equity markets. The focus is on the change in the information structure/flow between these markets triggered by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It is shown that the information structure during the crisis period is different from that in the non-crisis periods. While the US market leads the four East Asian markets before, during, and after the crisis, it is Granger-caused by these markets during the financial crisis period but not in the post-crisis sample. Further, in accordance with concerns reported in the market, the Japanese currency is found to affect these equity markets during the crisis period. The Japanese yen effect, however, disappears in the post-crisis sample. The Japanese currency effect is quite robust as it is found from both local currency and US dollar return data and in the presence of Japanese stock returns. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (1) (2007) 138–152.     

The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Rise of the Dollar as an International Currency, 1914–1939

This paper provides new evidence on the rise of the dollar as an international currency, focusing on its role in the conduct of trade and the provision of trade credit. We show that the shift to the dollar occurred much earlier than conventionally supposed: during and immediately after World War I. Not just market forces but also policy support—the Fed in its role as market maker—was important for the dollar’s overtaking of sterling as the leading international currency. On balance, this experience challenges the popular notion of international currency status as being determined mainly by market size. It suggests that the popular image of strongly increasing returns and pervasive network externalities leaving room for only one monetary technology is misleading.     

Currency Networks, Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility and the Role of the US Dollar

We investigate monthly bilateral exchange rate volatility for a large sample of currency pairs over the period 1999?C2006. Pegs (particularly to the US dollar) and managed floats tend to have lower volatility than independent floats. A deeper investigation shows that the peg effect operates almost entirely through currency networks (i.e. where two currencies are pegged to the same anchor currency), and the lower volatility of US dollar pegs reflects the size of the US dollar network. Managed floats show clear evidence of tracking the US dollar, further increasing the effective size of the US dollar network. Inflation undermines the currency-stabilizing effect of peg networks. Currencies in smaller peg networks have higher unweighted but not trade-weighted exchange rate volatility, which is consistent with anchors being chosen to minimize trade-weighted volatility. The size of the effective US dollar network revealed here is a plausible explanation of the rarity of basket pegs. Volatility also reflects a range of structural factors such as country size, level of development, population density, inflation differentials and business cycle asymmetry.     

Optimal currency shares in international reserves: The impact of the euro and the prospects for the dollar

Foreign exchange reserve accumulation has risen dramatically in recent years. The introduction of the euro, greater liquidity in other major currencies, and the rising current account deficits and external debt of the United States have increased the pressure on central banks to diversify away from the US dollar. A major portfolio shift would significantly affect exchange rates and the status of the dollar as the dominant international currency. We develop a dynamic mean-variance optimization framework with portfolio rebalancing costs to estimate optimal portfolio weights among the main international currencies. Making various assumptions on expected currency returns and the variance–covariance structure, we assess how the euro has changed this allocation. We then perform simulations for the optimal currency allocations of four large emerging market countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), adding constraints that reflect a central bank's desire to hold a sizable portion of its portfolio in the currencies of its peg, its foreign debt and its international trade. Our main results are: (i) The optimizer can match the large share of the US dollar in reserves, when the dollar is the reference (risk-free) currency. (ii) The optimum portfolios show a much lower weight for the euro than is observed. This suggests that the euro may already enjoy an enhanced role as an international reserve currency (“punching above its weight”). (iii) Growth in issuance of euro-denominated securities, a rise in euro zone trade with key emerging markets, and increased use of the euro as a currency peg, would all work towards raising the optimal euro shares, with the last factor being quantitatively the most important. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (4) (2006) 508–547.     

Retrospect of the Chinese Exchange Rate Regime after Reform： Stylized Facts during the Period from 2005 to 2010

In the present paper, we estimate the de facto RMB exchange rate regime, the currency basket, the floating band and the foreign exchange market pressure before and after the reform of the Chinese exchange rate regime in 2005. We find the following stylized facts： the value of the RAIB became stable after the reform; the weight of the US dollar remained high in the basket, while other currencies remained statistically significant; and the floating band gradually increased to lO percent during 2005-2008, and then greatly narrowed from the late summer of 2008 under the assumption of a yearly resetting interval. We find that the foreign exchange market pressure increased from 2005 to 2008. A possible reason is that the weight of the US dollar in the basket was slightly lower than the share of the US dollar in total transactions on the Chinese foreign exchange market. Therefore, it is reasonable for China to adopt a dollar peg exchange rate regime.     

Purchasing power parity: Granger causality tests for the yen–dollar exchange rate

The paper analyses the causality between the Japanese prices and the yen–dollar exchange rate. It explains the long-term appreciation trend of the Japanese yen and why the Japanese yen proved strong even during the economic slump of the 1990s. The paper suggests that the appreciation of the Japanese yen forced the Japanese enterprises into price reductions and productivity increases, which put a floor under the high level of the yen and, thus, initiated rounds of appreciation. This corresponds to the conjecture of a vicious (virtuous) circle of appreciation and price adaptation. Further, there is evidence that the yen-appreciation has been accommodated by the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy. This corresponds to the conjecture that the recent Japanese deflation is imposed from outside via the exchange rate.