Dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction

In this study of firms’ entries into and exits from each other’s markets, we link research on multipoint competition to the emerging action‐oriented, dyadic approach to interfirm rivalry by specifying market interdependencies between pairs of firms that condition their potential for rivalry over time. Our dynamic analysis of competitive interactions between pairs of commuter airlines in California reveals the idiosyncratic and asymmetric market microstructures that characterize dyadic competitive relationships and helps explain why firms grapple vigorously with some of their competitors while being passive toward others. We show that there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between firms’ rates of entry into and exit from each other’s markets and the level of multimarket contact in competitor dyads. We also show how this basic curvilinear effect varies from dyad to dyad as a function of relative levels of multimarket contact with competitors in other dyads and the relative sizes of competitors in a focal dyad. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for performance: the firm‐size effects

Our study examines how, in a given industry, rivalry functions within strategic groups defined according to the size of their member firms and how this rivalry affects performance. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects including market power, efficiency, differentiation, and multimarket contact, strategic groups that comprise smaller firms will exhibit both increased rivalry and decreased performance compared with strategic groups that comprise larger firms. We test our hypotheses by estimating the effect of group‐level strategic interactions (i.e., conjectural variations) on firm performance. Ultimately, our analysis of empirical data on loans in the Spanish banking industry demonstrates that increased rivalry and decreased performance indeed characterizes firms belonging to a strategic group that comprises smaller firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry

This paper examines the effect of multimarket contact in afirst price sealed bid government procurement auction market. It investigates whether bidprices in the highway construction industry are related to conditions that favor the formation of a cartel.Repeated contacts among firms are found to have a significantly positive effect on the winning low bidwhich leads to higher profit. Further, rivalry among few firms tends to exacerbate the multimarket effect.The results in this study additionally support the recent theoretical predictions that collusion isbetter sustainable during economic downturns.     

Multipoint competition,strategic similarity and entry into geographic markets

The objective of this study is to integrate both multimarket contact and strategic similarity in the analysis of entry decisions. We also analyze the role of the reciprocity of contacts, market concentration, and coordination mechanisms at moderating the relationship. Our hypotheses are tested through the analysis of entry behavior into new geographical markets in the Spanish savings bank market. Interestingly, our results offer an opportunity of conciliating conflicting evidence in both the multimarket–mutual forbearance and the heterogeneity–rivalry literatures and offer further support to the U‐inverted influence of multimarket contact on entry. Given the coordination assumption implicit in the theory and the possible presence of unobservable variables, we also offer a method to cope with the common‐actor problem. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reciprocal threats in multimarket rivalry: staking out ‘spheres of influence’ in the U.S. airline industry

The paper investigates the outcomes of multimarket competition among U.S. scheduled airlines when the interests and positions of the airlines differ in the mutually contested markets. Asymmetry in territorial interests provides multimarket competitors with footholds in important markets of their rivals, which can be used to deter the behavior of the rivals in other markets. Evidence suggests that airlines use footholds in their rivals’ important markets (particularly in their hubs) to reduce the competitive intensity of those rivals in the airlines’ own important markets (their hubs), and sustain their dominant positions (or spheres of influence) in those markets. Copyright© 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources

Research summary: Research shows that multimarket contact (MMC ) reduces rivalry involving downstream activities. Yet, studies showing that MMC can increase the threat of imitation suggest a need to better understand how MMC affects upstream rivalry over knowledge‐based resources. In this study, we argue that MMC increases rivalry over knowledge‐based resources since the deterrent threat of retaliation that typically leads to mutual forbearance in downstream activities will not be sufficient to restrain firms from protecting their knowledge from imitation in upstream activities. In support of these arguments we find that MMC increases the likelihood that a firm initiates patent litigation against a rival. This study suggests the relationship between MMC and rivalry may depend on the competitive domain and the type of resources over which firms are competing . Managerial Summary: How does market overlap or MMC affect rivalry between two competitors? Prior studies have largely found that an increase in market overlap decreases rivalry in less knowledge‐intensive context because of the deterrent threat of retaliation. However, in this paper, we argue that an increase in market overlap may not reduce rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive context because of heterogeneity in capabilities to protect knowledge. We find that a firm is more likely to initiate patent litigation against a rival as market overlap increases. Our findings suggest that the incentive to protect value across multiple product markets may surpass the motivation to cooperate with rivals and that managers should have a more nuanced view of how market overlap with competitors affects rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive contexts . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The risk of contagion from multimarket contact

It is conventional wisdom that the strategic linkage of markets that is enabled by multimarket contact typically increases the profitability of cooperation among rivals. We find to the contrary that a strong force against strategic linkage results from imperfect monitoring of adherence to cooperation. With such imperfections, strategically linking markets can lower payoffs by permitting the impact of adverse shocks in one market to spread to others. Consequently, players of repeated games on more than one front may find it strictly advantageous to avoid linking strategies on a front with clear monitoring to outcomes on a front with error-prone monitoring. One implication is that antitrust, competitive strategy, and foreign policy analyses have presumed too broadly that multimarket contact fosters cooperation. The game-theoretic equilibria characterized here shed light on why players such as firms and nations sometimes strategically link fronts in their rivalry, and sometimes take care to articulate that some fronts of particularly volatile conflicting interests will not trigger broader adverse moves against the rival.     

Multimarket Contact and Intensity of Competition: Evidence from an Airline Merger

This paper examines the relationship between multimarket contact (MMC) and the intensity of competition. We take advantage of a recent merger, which altered the extent of MMC throughout the US airline industry, to understand the nature of MMC’s impact on the airlines’ frequency of service. Evidence that non-price effects of MMC are a part of the longer-term industry equilibrium is not robust. However, we observe that following the merger the market players started taking the degree of MMC into account in making their frequency decisions in line with the ‘mutual forbearance’ hypothesis; however, the effect showed signs of diminishing over time. Our results have implications for merger evaluation in industries where consolidation may lead to a higher extent of multimarket contact.     

Market Power and Multimarket Contact: Some Evidence from the Spanish Hotel Industry

This paper analyses the effect of multimarket contact on firms’ behaviour. According to Bernheim and Whinston [1990], firms that meet in several markets for an infinite number of periods may find it profitable to redistribute market power among markets where they are operating. We present evidence supporting this prediction by using data from the Spanish hotel industry. Moreover, we also find that the omission of variables measuring multimarket contact creates a downward bias on the effect of concentration on prices. This result questions previous conclusions about the role of competition in industries where multimarket behaviour is expected.     

On the relation between multimarket contact and service quality: Mutual forbearance or network coordination?

Research summary : We reconsider the relationship between multimarket contact and product quality in the airline industry by arguing that multimarket contact has both a negative mutual forbearance effect on quality and a positive network coordination effect on quality. Multimarket contact increases the frequency of contact between firms, and this anticipated future interaction promotes cooperation. In network industries, especially small firms may want to cooperate in order to increase the attractiveness of the composite product. By using size as a moderating variable, we indeed find a consistent positive effect of multimarket contact on product quality for small airlines. We show that this effect can be attributed to network coordination and that this effect generally dominates the negative mutual forbearance effect in a recent period. Managerial summary : Firms with sales in multiple geographical markets likely encounter each other with mutual respect (i.e., live and let live) because aggressive behavior in one market may lead to retaliatory responses in other markets. Such responses weaken competitive pressures on price and quality. Insofar these firms sell complementary products, they may however also coordinate and improve their joint product offering, resulting in better quality for the consumer. This paper shows that this positive effect of cooperation may dominate the negative competition‐reducing effect, depending on the size distribution of firms. The reason is that small or nondominant firms have a stronger incentive to produce compatible products than large or dominant firms with already a strong position in the (global) market. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relative impact of actual and potential rivalry on firm profitability in the pharmaceutical industry

This paper estimates the effects of actual and potential rivalry on profitability of firms in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the 20‐year period 1963–82. The results show that during the 1960s actual rivalry among the sampled firms did not materially affect firm profitability, but that during the 1970s competition among incumbents had an increasingly adverse effect on their profitability. The results also show that potential competition significantly reduced drug firms’ profitability during the entire 20‐year period. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The stalemate of cable digital switchover: A study of competition effects and deregulation

This paper addresses the phenomenon of delayed cable digitization in Taiwan and reports the results of a longitudinal analysis, determining that (1) inter-platform competition, primarily from internet protocol television (IPTV), generates a strong and positive impact on the digitization of cable service after it acquires numerous customers; (2) the installed cable base induces economies of scale that increase its digital penetration; (3) the overbuild of the equivalent-size rivalry can increase digital adoption, whereas unequal-sized competition might reversely decrease it; and (4) the monthly flat fee charged to customers does not influence digital adoption. In addition, this paper presents a discussion on the policy instruments derived from econometric results. Although repealing the horizontal integration cap in the cable TV industry could generate economies of scale, doing so may encourage monopolization over several franchises. The efficacy of intra-platform competition is reserved only for certain cases. Combining the results of these analyses reveals that inter-platform competition most effectively stimulates cable operators’ digital conversion. Hence, regulators should create a level playing field among various TV platforms, such as equal programming access and open standards, to ensure a high degree of cable digitization     

Multimarket Contact in Banking

According to linked oligopoly theory, the anticipated effect of multimarket contact is reduced competition. Specifically, the theory predicts that contact lowers competition by reducing the benefit of aggressive action in any single market by providing rivals with the opportunity to retaliate in multiple common markets. The results of this paper are consistent with the theory. In banking, contact is positively related to profitability. Although the economic impact of this relationship is unimportant for most institutions, the relationship is meaningful for the small group of banks most heavily exposed to contact. This finding suggests that the importance of contact may rise as consolidation of the banking industry continues.     

Multimarket contact and sales growth: evidence from insurance

Research on pricing, profits, and firm survival has shown that multimarket contact causes mutual forbearance against competition, but has not considered the consequences of imperfect observability of competitive moves. Here, predictions are developed to explain how mutual forbearance occurs—but sometimes fails—in markets with imperfect observability. Mutual forbearance means that firms do not seek to take market share from each other through price cuts or nonprice competition, and thus that sales grow at uniform rates. Firms defect from mutual forbearance, and hence have higher sales growth, if the potential rewards are high and the likelihood of being discovered is low. This theory is tested on a panel of firms operating in the Norwegian general insurance industry. The evidence suggests that sales growth is most rapid in firms that do not meet many multimarket competitors in a given market and firms that are economically troubled. Growing or highly concentrated markets have higher heterogeneity of growth rates. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage*

Many industries consist of large firms that compete in multiple geographic markets. Such overlap, defined as multimarket contact (MMC), may facilitate tacit collusion and soften competition. We examine the effects of MMC on health insurance prices and quality using comprehensive data on the Medicare Advantage (MA) market from 2008 through 2015. Our identification strategy exploits two plausibly exogenous changes to MMC: (1) out-of-market mergers; and (2) policy-driven changes in the benchmark rates of other markets. Our results consistently support the mutual forbearance hypothesis, where we find that prices are significantly higher and high-quality plans less pervasive as MMC increases.     

Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements With Interdependent Demands

Strategic substitutes and complements have become standard tools of analysis in industrial organization. Bulow et al. (1985) original model which introduced these concepts focused on multimarket oligopoly. Building upon that model, this paper shows that there becomes not one but two strategic interaction terms if the demands between markets is interdependent and the firms compete in prices. This new model is applied to the telecommunications industry, where the local exchange carriers face competition from competitive access providers. The theoretical model shows the critical variables in the local exchange carriers' strategic pricing decision.     

Sources of Competitive Rivalry in Japan

The fact of the Japanese competitive success on a world scale is well established and we have been offered many reasons for that success. But we know much less about their competitiveness on their domestic markets. And we know even less of the underlying sources of their competitive behavior. Nigel Campbell has studied many facets of Japanese life—the history and culture, the geography and economic structure, the present-day patterns of thinking—and draws for us the structure of the rivalry that we see expressed in global competition. His article is a useful background for any manager seeking a competitive advantage.     

Competition for imperfect consumers

This lecture provides a selective discussion of some issues in the economics of competition for imperfect consumers. Limited consumer awareness – about what deals are on offer, or about the consequences of purchasing decisions – is a central feature of many markets. Consumer imperfection can give rise to market power, but can also co-exist with strong rivalry between firms, and then is more for ‘consumer policy’ than competition policy. Two recent court cases illustrate some of the issues involved. The lecture then reviews a line of theoretical work on competition for imperfect consumers. The analysis highlights some policy tradeoffs, and a key theme is how patterns of consumer awareness matter for patterns of competition among firms.     

Intraorganizational influences on business-to-business pricing strategies: A political economy perspective

Historically, researchers have addressed pricing issues from many different perspectives, including the firm's business model (cost structure, experience curve), stakeholders (customers and channel partners), competition (market structure and intensity), and macroeconomic issues (interest rates, economic growth). An important dimension of organizational price setting that has been neglected is the impact that the firm's internal political system, reflected in interdepartmental coordination and rivalry, has upon price setting. A study of managers who are influential in shaping the firm's pricing strategy was conducted to identify intraorganizational issues and their relative impact on the firm's pricing strategy. The results of the study provide important implications for the development and execution of a firm's pricing strategy.     

Oligopoly intermediation,relative rivalry and market conduct

We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices.