Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans

In this paper, I study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents' uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique, mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two–part tariffs. Agents' uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types. In such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type, by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule. The theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by South Central Bell in two cities in Kentucky in 1986. The empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist, leading to different, nested, econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information. The empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes. All expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters.     

Ex post vs. ex ante pricing: Optional calling plans and tapered tariffs

We study optimal nonuniform pricing in a setting where a customer's demand at the start of a billing period contains a random variable whose realization becomes known by the end of the billing period. In this context, an optional calling plan is a tariff which the consumer must select based on his/her expectations about the random variable, whereas, under a tapered tariff, the consumer's choice of usage charge is made after he/she knows the realization of the random variable. We show that for low to moderate levels of uncertainty about the random variable entering the demand function, the optional calling plan approach to nonuniform pricing yields higher expected profit than does the tapered tariff approach, given risk-neutral consumers. We illustrate this finding with a case study and argue that it is consistent with the historical evolution of tariffs in the interexchange telecommunications market.     

Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm

Determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unobservable tastes is a difficult task. This paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products is large. Moreover, such tariffs take a simple form: (i) when taste parameters are independently distributed across products, the almost optimal tariff is a single cost-based two-part tariff which can extract virtually all consumer surplus; (ii) when tastes are correlated across products, perhaps because of income differences across consumers, the almost optimal tariff can be implemented as a menu of two-part tariffs each of which has prices proportional to marginal costs.     

Self-selecting tariffs under pure preferences among tariffs

The behavioral assumptions for welfare analysis of self-selecting tariffs are generalized to be consistent with those maintained in empirical models of tariff choice. When customers have pure preferences among tariffs, it is shown that the optimal self-selecting tariffs provide strictly greater welfare than mandatory marginal cost prices, contain marginal prices that do not equal marginal cost, and can Pareto dominate an existing tariff. As an illustration of the theoretical results, optimal self-selecting tariffs are calculated empirically for a local telephone company.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

Trade imbalance and the endogenous optimal tariff

Endogenous tariff literatures reveal empirically that trade imbalance is negatively related with import tariff, this article gives a theoretical evidence and explanation to support this finding with the methodology of multi-country numerical general equilibrium modelling and simulation. We explore how optimal tariff changes after trade imbalance is introduced, and find that optimal tariffs decrease substantially, either for surplus or deficit countries, when imbalance is considered. Specifically, when the imbalance is modelled in endogenous monetary and inside-money structures, the optimal tariffs decrease by 26% globally on average. Our results suggest that the deepening trade imbalance is beneficial to the global trade liberalization due to its driving tariffs down.     

Competitive nonlinear tariffs

This paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs, i.e., those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased, to the case of a symmetric oligopoly. Competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a Cournot framework. Various equilibria are obtained, which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors' strategies. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff. The phenomena of buyer self-selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in Cournot models both appear in the results.     

Countervailing Duties, Foreign Export Subsidies and Import Tariffs

Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports.     

Tariff-Index Theory*

Tariff indices such as trade-weighted means, variances, and coefficients of variation are commonly used despite their lack of a theoretical foundation. This paper provides a theoretical framework for the index-number problem for tariffs. This paper shows that the Anderson and Neary (1993) trade-restrictiveness index is a function of “marginal trade-weighted moments” of the tariff schedule, higher mean and generalized variance both implying a higher TRI. In the CES case, the TRI is increasing in the trade-weighted mean and in the variance of the tariff schedule. For this special case the mean and the variance are partially legitimized.     

Reconciling Observed Tariffs and the Median Voter Model

Median voter theory applied to trade policy predicts positive tariffs in capital‐abundant countries and negative tariffs in labor‐abundant countries. Negative tariffs are rare, and this paper reconciles the median voter theory with observed protectionism across countries. By considering large countries, I show the optimal tariff is a sum of the median voter component and a positive term of trade component. Positive terms of trade effects raise tariffs in all countries, and can overcome the negative median voter component in labor‐abundant countries. Testing the tariff prediction with cross‐section and panel data from the 1990s, I show the median voter component is negative in labor‐abundant countries and positive in capital‐abundant countries. As expected, terms of trade effects raise tariffs across all countries and are stronger among nonmembers of the WTO.     

VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

An empirical note about additive outliers and nonstationarity in Latin-American inflation series

This note shows the empirical dangers of the presence of large additive outliers when testing for unit roots using standard unit root statistics. Using recent proposed procedures applied to four Latin-American inflation series, I show that the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected.Jel classification: C2, C3, C5I want to thank Pierre Perron for useful comments on a preliminary version of this paper. Helpful comments from an anonymous referee, and Yiagadeesen Samy are appreciated. I thank the Editor Baldev Raj for useful comments about the final structure of this paper. Finally, I also thank André Lucas for helpful suggestions concerning the use of his nice computer program Robust Inference Plus Estimation (RIPE).First revision received: August 2001/Final revision received: December 2002     

On the Equivalence of Ad Valorem Tariffs and Specific Tariffs under Duopoly*

Using a quantity conjectural variation model, this paper examines whether an ad valorem tariff and a specific tariff are equivalent under duopoly. We show that if the average per‐unit import tax is the same for the two tariffs, domestic output will be smaller while foreign output will be larger under an ad valorem tariff. We further show that for any value of a specific tariff, there is a Pareto‐superior ad valorem tariff for all values of conjectural variation except in the case of perfect competition where the two tariffs are equivalent.     

Simulated economic impacts in applied trade modelling: A comparison of tariff aggregation approaches

This paper assesses the performance of two recently developed tariff aggregators in reducing tariff aggregation bias by analysing Swiss beef market liberalisation scenarios. Specific relevant sources of bias are addressed: substitution effects on import demand, Tariff Rate Quotas and overprotection in tariffs. The aggregators are linked to a global large-scale partial equilibrium model and benchmarked against a standard aggregator. The choice of the aggregation method shows considerable effects on simulated economic impacts, specifically if the dispersion in tariffs or tariff cuts is large. A large bias is revealed in simulated gains from trade liberalisation using the standard aggregator. The impacts on traded quantities are found to be overestimated, while price and welfare effects can be higher or lower by switching to alternative aggregation methods. By reducing aggregation bias and depicting negotiated tariff schedules more directly, the proposed aggregators enhance the contribution of trade modelling to evidence-based policy making.     

Industrial labour productivities and tariffs in South Africa

The analysis of the effect of tariffs for labour productivity faces the challenge of tariff policy endogeneity. Tariff policy is designed to promote economic development and the industrial sector tariff structure may reflect characteristics of the industries protected. We seek to identify the effect of tariffs by taking advantage of multilateral tariff liberalization using reductions in industrial sector tariffs in other world regions as instruments for sectoral tariff reductions in South Africa. The data cover 28 manufacturing sectors over the period 1988–2003. We find that tariff reductions have stimulated labour productivity when instrumented by multilateral tariffs. The ordinary least‐squares estimates show downward bias and this confirms the endogeneity of tariffs. Investigation of channels of effects shows some support for the importance of competitive pressure and technology spillover from trade liberalization.     

The structure of optimal tariff rates in a large country with market power

We theoretically analyze the optimal tariff problem that arises in a large country with market power. By using a model with more than two traded goods, we derive (1) the condition for optimal import tariff rates to be ranked, and (2) the condition under which the optimum import tariff becomes uniform. These conditions are established in a three-good model and in an N-good model. The results are evaluated on the basis of compensated excess demand elasticity, and hence do not require information on income effects. I would like to thank Tatsuo Hatta, Makoto Okamura, Katsuhiko Suzuki and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Tariff evasion and rules of origin violations under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Abstract Using product‐level data on trade between Canada and the U.S., this paper presents evidence of tariff evasion and violation of the rules of origin occurring under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). It shows that more imports go unreported at the destination country when tariffs are higher. Consistent with the tariff evasion hypothesis, this result implies that the trade creation effect of a free trade agreement may in fact be due to less underreporting. Further, this paper shows that the larger Canadian tariff preference margin for the U.S. is associated with more goods originating in third countries being transshipped through the U.S. territory for re‐export. The preference margin is also positively correlated with the value of excess imports from the U.S., which qualify for preferential treatment. Both results suggest the presence of persistent violations of CUSFTA’s rules of origin.